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Abstract 
This thesis explores the view that many of the difficulties and apparent eccentricities 
of Beethoven's Late Quartets (particularly Op. 130, 132, 133 and 135) may be 
understood in terms of irony, in the sense that it appears in the philosophical and 
aesthetic writings of the early German Romantics. A chain of influence is 
demonstrated between Beethoven and Friedrich Schlegel's philosophy of Romantic 
irony, through significant inter -personal relationships as well as through Beethoven's 
exposure to Schlegel's written works. This connection provides a firm hermeneutic 
basis for considering the composer's work in terms of irony. 
The A minor Quartet Op. 132 is given as an example of Beethoven's Romantic 
irony, and considered in terms of the constitutive elements of Schlegel's Romantic 
irony - Paradox, Parabasis and Self -consciousness. However, this thesis also 
demonstrates that the irony within the Late Quartets goes beyond the confines of 
Romantic irony. The paradoxical structures of the Cavatina and Grosse Fuge are 
considered as examples of "general" or "existential" irony -a form closely related to 
Schlegelian irony. Moreover, the replacement finale of the Op. 130 quartet is shown 
to constitute a striking instance of satire: a bitter ironic comment upon the musical 
conservatism of Beethoven's critics. 
This thesis therefore explores the philosophical background and the nature of irony 
itself, relating all of its forms to one underlying structure and to one fundamental 
process. This process - "objectification" - is derived from the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, and forms the theoretical basis for the structural approach of the analyses of 
irony within the thesis. The thesis also considers the relationship between irony and 
related phenomena such as wit and humour. It suggests that the differences between 
these concepts correspond to those between Beethoven's Romantic irony and the wit 
and humour of his predecessors. 
Finally, the relationship between irony and ambiguity is also considered. Ambiguity 
is frequently elided with irony within theoretical writing on irony; indeed the terms 
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"irony" and "ambiguity" are often used synonymously. Since ambiguity is a 
significant element of the harmonic and formal practices within the Quartets this 
elision is important: if ambiguity and irony are elided then each instance of 
ambiguity may be considered ironic - a reductio ad absurdum. This work 
distinguishes ambiguity and irony as separate phenomena, approaching this division 
through the semiotic concepts of "immanence" and "manifestation ". I argue that 
ambiguity occurs as a particular effect of the immanent level of discourse, whilst 
irony occurs entirely within the manifest level. In addition to this difference in 
function, different structures are demonstrated for these phenomena. This distinction 
is applied to the third movement of the Op. 130 Quartet, which is considered as a 
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Beethoven's quartets, particularly the late works are often considered to be 
"difficult" or problematic. Their aesthetic is often extreme, ranging from the most 
intimate cantilena of the Cavatina of Op. 130 to the harsh, aggressive dissonances of 
the Grosse Fuge, by way of vulgar peasant dances, awkward marches, solemn hymns 
and child -like naivety. All this is accomplished by means of sudden juxtaposition, 
dissociation and even by extreme fragmentation of the musical structure. 
This work addresses the reason for this aesthetic, the question of why Beethoven 
should write these works in this way. I assume primarily that this is the result of a 
deliberate artistic choice, rather than viewing these works as those of a creative artist 
whose powers were waning, even as his health deteriorated. Throughout this work I 
suggest that many of the difficulties and apparent eccentricities of these quartets may 
be understood in terms of irony. In particular, the grotesquery of juxtaposition and 
multi -layeredness of the discourse may be understood in relation to the philosophical 
viewpoint and aesthetic practice of the early German Romantics. 
This viewpoint rests upon certain basic assumptions. Firstly, that the context in 
which Beethoven lived - philosophical, political and artistic - is directly relevant to 
his work. In the period following the French Revolution there was perhaps a closer 
relationship between art and philosophy than had ever been before. Artists such as 
Goethe - the archetype of the period - were both philosophers and authors, both 
poets and politicians. This was, however, particularly the case with Friedrich 
Schlegel: his philosophy was an attempt to produce a synthesis of art and philosophy 
- a "transcendental poetry ". Crucially, irony was of central importance to his 
philosophy. Schlegel's irony - which has come to be known as Romantic irony - is 
an aesthetic response to a philosophical perception of paradox. It is an artistic device 
that parallels and attempts to transcend the fundamental contradictions of human 
existence - the dialectic of finite and infinite, subject and object, life and death. 
This thesis draws upon the work of theorists such as Rey Longyear and Robert 
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Hatten, who have previously suggested a link between Beethoven and Schlegel's 
philosophy. I share their view that the context of Schlegel's philosophy, particularly 
the proximity of his writing to the composition of Beethoven's quartets is important 
to understanding certain aspects of these works. Irony, particularly Romantic irony - 
was a current force in the literary and philosophical life of Beethoven's world; 
understanding the composer and his works within this context places him in the same 
milieu as ironists such as Goethe, Tieck, Schlegel and Hoffmann. 
I think there is a need, however, to expand upon the understanding of both 
Beethoven's irony and his relationship to Schlegel: there is simply more to say about 
his relationship with the philosophical context in which he worked. Examination of 
this relationship will demonstrate that a chain of influence may be drawn between the 
composer and the theories of the leading German Romantics, particularly Schlegel, 
through exposure to their written works and through significant inter -personal 
relationships. This stronger connection between Beethoven and Schlegel may be 
considered to provide a firmer historical -contextual basis for considering these 
quartets in terms of irony. 
In addition, although Hatten and Longyear identify certain of Beethoven's works, or 
traits within his works as ironic, their analyses tend to focus largely on specific 
elements of Romantic irony - the "destruction of illusion" and the shifting of 
discursive levels. Their respective approaches, as well as that of other theorists such 
as Scott Burnham, raise the question of the extent of Beethoven's irony: is it limited 
to rhetorical moments, as the focus on such ironic moments tends to imply, or is it a 
more fundamental principal of the music? 
Closer examination of Schlegel's writing reveals that Romantic irony as he 
conceived it is not simply a rhetorical trope, limited to single moments of a work. 
Rather it is a sustained property of the artwork, its basic authorial viewpoint. This 
thesis will seek to examine the interesting relationship between Beethoven's work 
and Schlegel's philosophy of irony. It will try to establish the view that these works 
contain not just elements of romantic irony, but rather the extended meaning and 
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function of irony seen within Schlegel's writing. It will argue that, although the 
irony of the late works is related to other phenomena such as wit and humour, 
particularly of the type seen in Haydn, it is nevertheless strikingly different: 
Beethoven's irony is a sustained authorial viewpoint, a fundamentally Romantic 
ironic consciousness which produces a continual, paradoxical motion of creation and 
destruction, assertion and negation. Indeed, not only is this the case, but the scope of 
the irony within these quartets also goes beyond the confines of Romantic irony, 
encompassing a closely related form of irony known as "general" or "existential" 
irony as well as striking instances of satire. 
The inherent assumption behind this question, however, is that music can actually be 
ironic, i.e. that irony as a discursive tool is a phenomenon that is not limited solely to 
literature or the theatre, but that can also function within non -representational art 
forms such as music. Sustaining this assumption requires that the philosophical 
background and theoretical basis of irony be thoroughly examined, particularly 
within the context of music. It also requires that the nature of the phenomenon itself 
be explored. 
This examination therefore covers the work of the principal theorists and writers on 
irony: in addition to Schlegel's philosophy of irony, the work of Soren Kierkegaard - 
the other major writer on irony from the nineteenth century - and that of more 
modern theorists, including Wayne Booth and Douglas Muecke, is considered. Of 
particular concern, though, are those theorists - primarily musicologists - who relate 
music to irony. Of these, the work of Esti Sheinberg most clearly identifies the 
manner in which irony may be seen to be operative within musical structures. Her 
approach is essentially structural, relating all of irony's forms to one underlying 
structure, which may initially be given simply as two or more incongruous elements 
present simultaneously within one discourse. This produces a discourse comprising 
incongruous, co- existent semantic levels, resulting in multiple significations, or 
meanings. She argues that where music evinces this structure of incongruities it can 
be considered to be ironic in purport. 
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This structural approach forms the basis of the understanding of irony in this work. 
My approach differs from Sheinberg's however, in that I emphasise that irony is not 
simply a structure, but rather a process, unfolding in time. I therefore relate the 
structure of irony to a fundamental process common to all forms of irony - the 
process of objectification, which derives from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. 
Objectification relates to the notion of "reality ", that is, to the subjective viewpoint 
comprising the unique experience of existence of the individual. In a case of irony 
there is a preferencing of one subjective viewpoint - one "reality" - over another 
incongruous one. In such instances the "reality" of the rejected viewpoint becomes 
the focus of the irony, its subjectivity becoming an "artifice ". This negation 
objectifies the second viewpoint, transforming it from a "reality" into an object -a 
victim of irony. 
Within Bakhtin's work discursive irony occurs as an incongruous opposition of 
elements that represent such subjective realities, with the incongruity producing the 
same process of objectification and irony. I suggest that all occurrences and forms 
of irony - whether discursive or "philosophical" - may therefore be understood in 
terms of this objectification process. Despite differences in the function or purpose 
of some types of irony, or the addition of different levels of incongruity, nevertheless 
these separate types arise as species of the same fundamental genus, sharing the same 
fundamental structure, and process of objectification. 
Any consideration of music in terms of phenomena such as ambiguity and irony is, 
by definition, based upon another fundamental assumption - that musical discourse 
has meaning. Although this may not be self -evident in a post -deconstructionist 
context, I have chosen instead to adopt the assumption of Beethoven's 
contemporaries: these works do possess some form of meaning.' Moreover, whilst 
See, for example, Johann Georg Sulzer's statement, within a section headed "Musical Expression ", 
that "Expression is the soul of music. Without it, music is but an entertaining diversion. But with it, 
music becomes the most expressive speech overpowering the heart." Sulzer, Johann Georg (1771 -74) 
General Theory of the Fine Arts in Baker, Nancy Kovaleff and Christensen, Thomas (1995) Aesthetics 
and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment p. 51. Similarly Heinrich Koch 
considers "feelings" as the content of music Koch, Heinrich Christoph (1787) Introductory Essay on 
Composition, Vol. 2 in Baker and Christensen (1995) p. 148. In both instances there is an inherent 
assumption that music produces a significant content, even if this "meaning" cannot be translated into 
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this "meaning" may or may not be purely musical in nature it may nevertheless be 
analysed and discussed in terms of other communication systems, i.e. in language. 
The approach to the analysis of irony and ambiguity in these works is therefore 
essentially semiotic, dealing primarily with the types of "cultural unit" seen in much 
current semiotic research and topic theory. It incorporates both congeneric and 
extrageneric significations (or other correlatives such as introversive and 
extroversive, absolute and referential) to locate the type of "meanings" necessary in 
order to express irony within the structure of the music itself. In focussing on both 
the fine detail of the "surface" of the score, as well as "deeper ", structural levels the 
analyses perhaps reflect "structuralist" concerns. This approach, however, is 
appropriate to the subject: the presence of musical irony is often indicated by, and 
located in small details, in fissures and rents in the surface which nevertheless have 
profound implications for the meaning of the entire discourse. 
However, basing the analysis of musical irony upon the process of objectification, 
rather than upon structure alone better reflects the nature of music itself. Music 
undoubtedly possesses a demonstrable, analysable formal structure, but its diachronic 
nature - the unfolding of its material across or within time - is also a dynamic 
process. Focussing on objectification highlights this processual nature, and tends to 
balance the tendency of structural analysis to reduce music to a static object. 
Moreover, recognising that irony itself is fundamentally processual allows that this 
process may function in a purely musical manner. In other words, musical irony 
functions in the same manner as literary irony or philosophical /existential irony - as 
a common process, rather than only a correlation or mapping of two structures. 
The exploration of the function and nature of irony raises an important question 
concerning the relationship between irony and ambiguity. Ambiguity is frequently 
mentioned in writing about irony, indeed the terms "irony" and "ambiguity" are often 
confused or even used synonymously. The result of this is that the two phenomena 
are often elided; in some cases they are even considered to be the same thing. 
definite concepts. 
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This viewpoint has a direct bearing upon music in general. If music is understood as 
a communication process then it will, by definition contain an inherent level of 
ambiguity. This latent ambiguity is seen most clearly in the tonal system, which 
relies upon the lexical ambiguity of chords for much of its process. The question that 
arises is that if irony and ambiguity are considered to be the same thing, as some 
writers maintain and as others adhere to in practice, and if music contains an inherent 
ambiguity, then must this inherent ambiguity be considered ironic? In short, is all 
musical ambiguity ironic in effect? 
This question is particularly important in relation to Beethoven's quartets. There are, 
as will be seen, striking instances of irony within these works, as well as significant 
moments where ambiguity, both formal and tonal, plays a vital role in the music's 
process. If ambiguity and irony are considered to be the same thing, then the 
question of what differentiates these moments and their striking effects arises. This 
thesis therefore seeks to examine the relationship between these two phenomena, and 
to establish a workable distinction between them. This is approached primarily from 
a structural basis: ambiguity will be considered to possess a different structure from 
irony, and to function on a different level of the semiotic process. This difference 
precludes the process of objectification that defines irony, with the result that a 
successful differentiation can be made between the two phenomena. This 
differentiation allows the distinctive aesthetic effects of each of these important 
modes of expression to be maintained, and in particular allows the singular manner 
in which Beethoven uses each to be more fully explored. 
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Critical Context 
Any consideration of Beethoven's quartets, particularly the late works, must take into 
account an important fact: as Carl Dahlhaus highlights, "inwardly and outwardly, 
[Beethoven] was a contemporary of both Goethe and Jean Paul ".' In other words, the 
aesthetics and philosophies of the Enlightenment and of the Romantics may both be 
applicable to the analysis of these works. Beethoven was neither wholly Classical, nor 
wholly a Romantic, but rather both. 
This situation is in itself paradoxical and seems almost tailor -made for irony. Irony was 
a phenomenon common to both periods, in both music and literature. To the 
Enlightenment belong the comic irony of Lawrence Sterne, the ironic humour of Haydn 
and the dramatic irony of Mozart's operas, as well as the irony of the human condition 
common to so many of Goethe's heroes. The Romantics drew upon these examples 
(Friedrich Schlegel, for example, cites Shakespeare, Cervantes and Goethe as his 
paragons of Romantic irony2) in developing their own theories and philosophies of 
irony, broadening their conception to include paradox, consciousness and authorial 
presence. Within Beethoven's quartets may be seen evidence of both Haydnesque ironic 
humour and the paradoxical, self -conscious irony of the Romantics. Thus to consider 
these works in terms of irony is not to label Beethoven as a Romantic, but rather to place 
these works, and indeed the composer himself, within the context of a greater tradition 
of irony that transcends both Romantic and Classical aesthetics. 
This duality is reflected in the manner in which commentators have approached 
Beethoven's output, even from within the composer's lifetime. E.T.A Hoffmann's 
famous commentary on the Fifth Symphony, for example, claims Beethoven as a 
1 Dahlhaus, Carl (1991) Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music trans Mary Whittall p. 66 
2 See, for example Schlegel, Friedrich (1991) Athenaeum fragments 238 p. 51, 247 p. 52, and 253 p. 53. 
Unless indicated otherwise all quotations from Schlegel's fragments are found in Firchow, Peter (trans.) 
(1991) Friedrich Schlegel: Philosophical Fragments. 
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proponent of Romanticism,3 his attribution of "self- consciousness" to Beethoven 
attempting to align the composer with the Romantic aesthetics. Nevertheless, as 
Dahlhaus argues, Hoffman's description of Beethoven's "Romantic" symphonism is 
actually heavily influenced by the Enlightenment concept of the sublime and by the 
aesthetic and form of the classical Ode. 
This dichotomy continues to function in recent Beethoven criticism. Dahlhaus himself, 
for example, considers that Beethoven's "proximity to Rousseau is as obvious as his 
inner distance from Wackenroder or Tieck, Novalis, or Friedrich Schlegel ".4 
Beethoven, he considers, was more aligned in his "inner" person to Enlightenment 
aesthetics and philosophy than to the emerging philosophy of German Romanticism. On 
a similar basis, both Glenn Stanley and Michael Spitzer assert that there is actually little 
or no irony in Beethoven. Stanley argues that the aesthetics and philosophies of Goethe, 
Schiller and Kant shaped Beethoven's artistic self -image and compositional aesthetic.5 
As such, he considers that musical irony was a "subcurrent" of Beethoven's music, even 
as verbal irony was a subcurrent of his language.6 However, in his review of Scott 
Burnham's Beethoven Hero (a work which will be considered below) Stanley seems 
reluctant to accept the possibility of irony in Beethoven at all. He agues that, even if it 
does occur, it should be considered as a negative element - presumably of both 
Beethoven's intellect and of his music - whose subjectivity is to be cast aside in favour 
of some objective certainty.7 In addition he questions the manner in which Burnham 
3 Hoffmann, E.T.A. (1813) "Beethoven's Instrumental Music" in Strunk, Oliver (1981) Source Readings 
in Music History p. 777 
4 Dahlhaus (1991) p.71 
5 Stanley, Glenn (2000) "Beethoven at work: musical activist and thinker" in Stanley, Glenn (ed.) (2000) 
The Cambridge Companion to Beethoven 
6 Ibid. p. 30 
7 "Can the idea of heroism, as we imagine it for Beethoven and his time be successfully reconciled with 
the categories of irony developed by Schlegel, Hatten and Burnham? Does Schlegel's romanticism 
promote the heroic idea, or does it stand in a negative or indifferent relation to it? ... I should stress that 
Burnham's ideas about Beethoven's self -consciousness which I discussed earlier are very much on the 
mark; I do not think, however, that this self -consciousness is best explained by drawing on the category of 
irony. But even if we admit irony as an aspect of Beethoven's intellect, I think it best - at least in the 
heroic music - to view it as a negative one, a thing to be left behind, to be overcome, just as the beginning 
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associates the self -consciousness that he identifies in the Heroic style with irony, 
claiming that he is not "sensitive to the ironic quality of the coda to the Egmont 
overture ".8 
Although I agree with Stanley's criticism of Burnham's analysis of the Egmont overture, 
the basis upon which he rejects the association between Beethoven and irony is 
somewhat questionable. He considers that attempts to connect Beethoven's musical 
humour - a concept closely related to irony - to the philosophical writing of the 
Romantics "have established affinities to Lawrence Sterne or Friedrich Schlegel but not 
direct debts; they cannot demonstrate that he knew their work ". However, as will be 
seen, the connection between Beethoven and Schlegel, and therefore the basis for 
understanding Beethoven's humour and irony within the context of Schlegel's writing is 
much stronger than Stanley supposes. Therefore, although the poets and philosophers 
that Stanley cites undoubtedly shaped Beethoven's early aesthetics, I will suggest that in 
later life the philosophy of Romanticism came to exert it's influence. 
Spitzer is more emphatic than Stanley in his denial of the possibility of Beethovenian 
irony: 
Rey M. Longyear has attempted to show that Beethoven was a Romantic Ironist. This is 
wrong. All the capricious contrasts, abrupt mood changes, incongruities and interruptions 
which Longyear catalogues as evidence of Willkur, paradox and irony are rhetorical, not 
structural . . . For [a] piece to be authentically ironic, the composer must attack the 
foundations of the structure, not the surface ... As such, Longyear's examples of irony in 
Beethoven are actually cases of Haydnesque playfulness. So Beethoven is not an ironist; 
rather his discourse occupies a paradoxical, even unthinkable, middleground between 
comedy and irony . . . it is the whole tenor of the present study that Beethoven 
problematises musical logic by raising absurdity to the second power.9 
However, Spitzer himself subsequently attributes irony to several of Beethoven's works 
of the true recapitulation in the first movement of the Eroica renders the anticipatory (mocking ?) horn call 
null and void." Stanley, Glenn (1997) Review of Scott Burnham's "Beethoven Hero ", Journal of the 
American Musicological Society vol. 50, p. 479 
8 Ibid. p. 475 
9 Spitzer, Michael (1993) Ambiguity and paradox in Beethoven's late style p. 18/19 
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within his analyses. For example, in discussing Beethoven's off -tonic reprises he states 
that "the essential difference between the early -Classical and Romantic procedure is that 
the former resolves the false reprise while the latter does not. Structurally the false 
reprise is comic and the off -tonic reprise is ironic ".10 In addition, he considers that 
"there are a number of ironies" within the harmonic procedures of Beethoven's late 
style,' 1 for example, "the irony of a tonic being pervaded by supertonics of such short 
duration - a grace -note and a demi- semiquaver - is entirely typical of the late style ".12 
In addition, many of the aspects of Beethoven's late style that Spitzer identifies are 
frequently associated with irony. For example, one of the key elements of his argument 
is that the composer consistently "problematises" formal conventions, and that this 
problematising forms a "critique" of the Classical tradition.13 However, as will be 
considered below, and indeed as Spitzer himself observes, the manipulation and critique 
of musical conventions and styles invariably produces irony, indeed, in some cases, 
specifically Romantic irony: "Romantic irony criticises the terms of its own discourse 
where the Classical Comedy had kept a respectful distance ".14 Therefore, as will be 
seen, despite Spitzer's assertion that there is no irony in Beethoven, the paradoxes and 
some of the comic elements that he identifies are actually intrinsically related to irony. 
One of the most significant studies of the quartets - Joseph Kerman's magisterial survey 
- tends to avoid this area, relating the difficulties of these works to an analytical 
conception based upon predominantly technical concerns, i.e. to purely musical issues, 
10 Ibid. p. 55 
11 Ibid. p. 141 
12 Ibid. p. 271 
13 "To the extent that sonata form is representative of the Classical Style as a whole, Beethoven's critique 
of the style, i.e. Beethoven's late style, bears most of the two cornerstones of the form: the modulation to 
the contrasting key and the return to the tonic. For the sonata form is "Classical" in proportion to the 
cogency of the dominant (or third -related key) preparation and the re- transition. The piece is "Romantic" 
in so far as the harmonic treatment is colouristic rather than functional. Beethoven's late style is 
paradoxical because his procedure is neither one nor the other, nor both at the same time, nor somewhere 
in the middle." Ibid. p. 50 
14 Ibid. p. 25, emphasis added 
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rather than to any philosophical or aesthetic theory. Kerman's conception of the late 
style is important and influential. He approaches it through the opposition of "public" 
vs. "private" impulses - "the duality of introspection and solicitation, the inward - 
outward, public -private aspect of the art".15 He argues that the "public" aspect - the 
urge to communicate more clearly - leads to the increasing presence of lyricism, of 
dance -parodies and particularly of folk -like material. Against this `popularising' 
element is ranged the inward, "private" aspect: the technical concerns of motivic work, 
part- writing and form. 
However, Kerman focuses this "private" element upon contrast: he considers that 
throughout the late works Beethoven deals extensively with extremes of contrast, 
maximising contrast in some - Op. 132 and 130 - whilst effectively minimising it in 
others - Op. 131. From the viewpoint of contrast, he argues, many of Beethoven's 
preoccupations in these works may be derived. The predominance of fugue, for 
example, arose from his dissatisfaction with the conventional contrasts found in sonata 
forms: fugue provided both an alternative means of thematic working and "a fresh 
means to attain vehemence - but vehemence without the drama inherent in the classic 
[sonata] style "16. Similarly, the emphasis upon the finale and, on occasion, the middle 
movements of a work, rather than on the first movement, may be seen to arise from the 
dissatisfaction with conventional notions of contrast and cyclical form. 
Above all, the play of contrast may be seen in the dichotomy that Kerman terms 
"dissociation" vs. "integration ", typified by the Op. 130 and 131 quartets respectively. 
His comments on the Op. 130 quartet, in particular are important, and are closest to the 
viewpoint expressed in the current work. This quartet is characterised as "a mercurial, 
brilliant, paradoxical work ",17 in which contrast is pushed to its extreme, both within 
and especially between movements: "In many ways the Quartet in B flat is problematic, 
15 Kerman, Joseph (1967) The Beethoven Quartets p. 195 
16 Ibid. p. 273 
17 Ibid. p. 304 
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but the heart of the problem lies in the quite radical attitude it embodies toward the 
balance, confrontation, or sequence of the movements ".18 
Kerman considers that the extreme contrasts of Op. 130 result in whimsy, enigma and 
fascination, and a detached and aloof, rather than involved, effect. Significantly, he 
suggests that through this process the whole idea of the continuity of a cyclical work 
becomes the subject of ironic enquiry. This quartet, he argues, challenges the 
assumption of continuity - a logical progression - between movements; rather, it 
"celebrates dissociation, forced by the play - or rather the war - of contrast ".19 
Presumably it is the conflict between the expectation and lack of such coherent, unified 
progression that he considers ironic. However, it is difficult to see in what precise way 
this is ironic: could Beethoven, as Kerman himself argues, not simply have been aiming 
at a new type of cyclical work, developing beyond conventional expectations? 
Indeed, although Kerman briefly mentions irony several times in relation to specific 
instances within the late quartets, his meaning is not always particularly clear. It appears 
that by `irony' he refers to a general process of reversal - the presence of both terms of 
an opposition within a work. For example, he considers the continual ascending 
semitone steps of the subject of the Grosse Fuge "make their ironic reference to the 
downward step B flat -A of the early movements ".20 However, the difference between 
such an "ironic" procedure and thematic transformation, or even simple inversion is not 
clear; many of Kerman's references to irony raise questions of this sort. 
Similarly, whilst he makes important references to paradox, particularly, as will be seen, 
in relation to Op. 130, the sense in which he uses the term is not always clear. For 
example, the reappearance of the adagio introduction of the opening movement of Op. 
130 opening after the first theme is considered paradoxical in that it fulfils the role of 
18 Ibid. p. 319 
19 Ibid. p. 320 
20 Ibid. p. 324 
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both introduction and theme. Similarly he considers he manner in which the cadence of 
the adagio reappears as figuration in the development as paradoxical.21 However, he 
subsequently describes this derivation as ambiguous:22 this elision of paradox and 
ambiguity is common and will be addressed in the final chapter of this work. 
In all of these cases Kerman treats the double- function of the musical elements - 
introduction and theme, cadence and figuration - as paradoxical, a viewpoint based in 
latent assumptions regarding their "correct" functions. Whilst, from this viewpoint there 
is a certain paradoxical effect, this type of paradox is different from the manner in which 
I use it. Kerman's critical comments on the quartets are important, and will be drawn 
upon in the analyses below; nevertheless, the manner in which he understands irony, 
paradox and ambiguity will not generally be applied. As will be seen, paradox is 
considered to be fundamentally a property of the structure of certain movements - the 
very structures of these works contain irreconcilable incongruities and oppositions. 
Furthermore, these paradoxical structures will be understood in terms of irony: as a 
result irony is not confined to isolated incidences, but rather informs the foundations of 
the movements in question. 
Daniel Chua's analytical tour de force, The Galitzin Quartets of Beethoven, provides 
perhaps the most extensive analyses of the Op. 127, 132 and 130/133 quartets. Like 
Kerman, Chua identifies elements of irony and paradox within these works. Such 
moments are frequently of the type identified by Kerman, characterised by reversals and 
double- images and functions,23 and as such differ from the type of irony discussed here. 
Nevertheless, whilst many of Chua's insights will be useful to the current work, two 
elements of his approach will be of particular importance. 
21 Ibid. p. 306 
22 Ibid. p. 307 
23 "The paradoxes in the work [Op. 130, 151 movement] are engendered by a fission in the construction, in 
which the elements double up, duplicate themselves, insist on happening twice. Confusion arises from the 
blur of double images, and the clarity of events in the Classical language breaks down in the face of this 
`duplicity'." Chua, Daniel K.L. (1995) The "Galitzin " Quartets of Beethoven: opp. 127, 132, 130 p. 204 
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In addition to instances of paradox, Chua adds what he describes as "aporia" - "a path 
that is impassable ".24 Moments of aporia are those where the music reaches a crisis, a 
state of equivocation - `undecidability' in Chua's terms - where multiple possible 
meanings occur, confounding, to a certain extent, critical understanding. For example, 
he considers that the final coda of Beethoven's Quartet Op. 95 is "filled with the jollities 
of opera buffo, complete with clichés so incongruous to everything else in the quartet 
that the situation is one of aporia rather than humour; there is a creative refusal to 
respond to the struggle that has threatened to destroy the structure of the work ".25 
Chua's analyses tend to focus on such moments of aporia, moments when the music 
fissures and breaks down, thereby revealing the "workings" of the discourse. In such 
cases, he argues, "seemingly insignificant rhythmic irregularities, tiny gaps in the music, 
and other surface gestures become the focus of an entire structure ",26 and thus the focus 
of analysis. 
However, as will be seen below, such moments may be considered in terms of both 
irony and ambiguity. In the final chapter of this work some equivocal moments of 
aporia produce musical structures that correlate with ambiguity: the presence of multiple 
possible meanings or interpretations will be seen to define this phenomenon. In some 
instances, however, moments of aporia actually produce irony: indeed both Rey 
Longyear and Robert Hatten have considered the coda of Op. 95 in terms of irony as an 
instance of the "breaking of illusion ". I relate such moments to the concept of 
"parabasis ", seen in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, the demonstration of the artifice of 
the artwork, and the presence of the ironic composer.27 As will be considered, parabasis 
is an important element of Romantic irony. 
24 Ibid. p. 9 
25 Ibid. p. 108 
26 Ibid. p. 10 
27 See, for example, Schlegel, Friedrich (1963) Kritisches Ausgabe, Vol. 18, no. 2 Ernst Behler ed. p. 668. 
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Therefore, the analyses of irony in these late works will often, like Chua's, involve the 
analysis of such seemingly passing fissures and incongruities. It is in such moments, 
though fleeting, that the paradox, parabasis and consciousness which define Romantic 
irony may be seen. 
Unlike Kerman, Chua does relate the moments of paradox and aporia that he identifies 
to an underlying aesthetic - Theodor Adorno's conception of Beethoven's late style. 
Although Adorno's projected work on Beethoven hardly progressed beyond fragmentary 
sketches, his work is influential, and several elements of his theory are actually closely 
related to the irony examined below. Adorno considered Beethoven's middle -period 
style, particularly the symphonic style, to be the Classicist art par excellence, the 
embodiment of "the unity of subjectivity and objectivity ... the totality arising from the 
motion of all particulars ".28 Beethoven's symphonism "generates a totality within 
itself',29 a totality that is universal in that it transcends the particular, and yet is arrived 
at from the bottom up, as it were, through the particular. 
Essentially Adorno considers the late style a deconstructive critique of this earlier style. 
He implies that Beethoven became aware that life does not correspond to this Classical 
ideal - there is no reconciliation of opposites, no transcendental totality. The result of 
this is that he came to perceive the inherent artifice in Classicist art, of which his own 
oeuvre was the highest point, and therefore "refused to reconcile in the image what is 
unreconciled in reality ".30 In this sense Beethoven's late style is really a form of 
realism - his "demand for truth rejects the illusion "31 of Classicism. Above all, 
however, Beethoven's critique of Classicism is understood as a social critique: the 
composer expressed his disillusionment through his critique of the Enlightenment ideals 
This fragment will be considered in the next chapter. 
28 Adorno, Theodor W. (1998) Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott p. 151 
29 Ibid. p. 146 
301bid, p. 152 
31 Ibid. 
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of his own earlier music. 
The rejection and critique of Classicism manifests itself within his late works as the 
absence of subjectivity. "Subjectivity" for Adorno relates to the manner in which an 
artist uses conventions and figures: the evidence of subjectivity is the removal of 
inessential conventions, `recasting' necessary ones in order to express the content that 
the artist requires. Subjectivity is therefore a form of artistic presence, the `signature' of 
the artist - the characteristics, autonomy and spontaneity that mark his use of the 
musical language. Thus: 
In this the middle Beethoven absorbed the traditional trappings into his subjective dynamic 
by forming latent middle voices, by rhythm, tension or whatever other means, transforming 
them in keeping with his intention. Or - as in the first movement of the Fifth Symphony - 
he even developed them from the thematic substance itself, wresting them from the 
convention through the uniqueness of that substance.32 
Whereas Beethoven's earlier style resulted from artistic subjectivity, the late style, 
Adorno argues, arises from the withdrawal of this subjectivity. The removal of 
subjectivity leaves only `objective' elements, devoid of the subjectivity that previously 
transformed them into living language. In place of the Classical unity of the middle 
period works, the late words therefore constitute fragmented forms, with rents, fissures 
and unmediated juxtapositions of ossified, objective conventions as the surface of the 
discourse.33 
In late Beethoven therefore, Adorno argues, conventions are made to speak both for and 
about themselves - they exist as both specific instances of convention, and as signs of 
32 Ibid. p. 124 
33 "The force of subjectivity in late works is the irascible gesture with which it leaves them. It bursts 
them asunder, not in order to express itself but, expressionlessly, to cast off the illusion of art. Of the 
works it leaves only fragments behind, communicating itself, as if in ciphers, only through the spaces it 
has violently vacated ... the masterly hand sets free the matter it previously formed. The fissures and rifts 
within it, bearing witness to the ego's finite impotence before Being, are its last work ... hence the 
conventions are no longer imbued and mastered by subjectivity, but left standing. As subjectivity breaks 
away from the work, they are split off. As splinters, derelict and abandoned, they finally themselves 
become expression ... the conventions become expression in the naked depiction of themselves." Ibid. 
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that convention i.e. as "types ". The use of convention in the late works is therefore a 
critique of conventionality. For example, Beethoven's use of tonality in the late quartets 
is, according to Adorno, "functionless ", in that, where it does occur, it occurs not as a 
structural principle, but as a signification - "the chord as allegory replaces the key as 
process "34. Paradoxically, it is in this critique that the subjectivity of the late style 
asserts itself - it is present through its absence, it "speaks" through its silence. 
Chua follows Adorno's notion of the late style as a critique, adding to Adorno's theory 
musico- analytical tools from both Schenker and Schoenberg. Essentially, he considers 
these late works in terms of deconstruction: the Grosse Fuge, for example is considered 
to be a deconstruction of both sonata form and fugal technique. He argues that this work 
sets itself against both genres, to the point where it dismantles their coherence: 
"contrapuntal laws ... invert into a disorder of polyphony that dismembers the very 
logic that fugue symbolises ".35 To such "critiques that play with unity and 
destruction "36, Beethoven adds parody, the manipulation of "historical relics ".37 All of 
these techniques are used essentially to produce defamiliarisation (which, again, invokes 
Russian Formalism), casting conventions and genres in an objectified light in order to 
produce a critical comment. 
As will be seen, many of these elements of Adorno's theory, and by extension Chua's, 
are related to irony. (Indeed Robert Witkin asserts that Adorno considered irony to be 
the source of the expressive power of late Beethoven.38) For example, in considering 
the late quartets in terms of unmediated juxtapositions of motifs and "polyphonic 
p. 125 
34 Ibid. p. 129 
35 Chua (1995) p. 230 
36 Ibid. p. 10 
37 Ibid. 
38 Witkin, Robert W. (1998) Adorno on Music p. 109/110: "By establishing its non -identity in and 
through its distancing of itself in relation to such [conventions and `empty'] forms (and in its presence as 
an absence from such forms) the subject takes up the stance of irony ... this is essentially what Adorno 
held to be the source of the expressive power in late Beethoven." 
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complexes" Adorno clearly hints at paradox, an important element of irony. Similarly, 
the term "subjectivity" often appears in discussions of irony, notably Kierkegaard's The 
Concept of Irony. Finally, the separation of the subjective and the objective that Adorno 
considers as a critique of Classicism, for example, produces the effect of aesthetic 
"distance" between the artist and his work, an occurrence that is frequently associated 
with irony. The use of conventions that both Adorno and Chua describe - the use of the 
signifier as a `signified' - produces music that "is no longer innocent, but knowing ":39 it 
has a slightly parodic cast, a `shadow of objectification' in Mikhail Bakhtin's terms.40 
Such objectified, stylised language is, as will be considered, inherently ironic. 
However, although Adorno's conception of the late style as a critique - which Chua 
develops - does imply an intrinsic irony, nevertheless, this irony differs from the type 
proposed here. The irony that will be demonstrated in Beethoven is not simply a 
`knowing' use of anachronisms, conventions or clichés. Although this is undoubtedly 
present, it functions essentially as a `base -line' from which Beethoven develops the 
paradoxical structures and parabasis that are, according to Schlegel, the quintessence of 
Romantic irony.41 Despite referring to paradox and subjectivity, Adorno does not link 
these elements to irony; indeed, his use of the terms is actually frequently different from 
that which occurs in discussions of irony.42 Similarly, Chua chooses to relate the 
extreme contrasts and disruptions of the Galitzin quartets to the Kantian dialectic of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful.43 As a result, although this work shares common elements 
with both Chua and Adorno's theories, the type of irony demonstrated in the late 
quartets will be considered not as a critique of Classicism per se, but rather, as Romantic 
irony - an aesthetic response to a fundamental existential paradox. 
39 Ibid. p. 110 
40 Bakhtin, Mikhail (1929) Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics, trans. R.W. Rotsel, 1973 p. 154 
41 See, for example, Schlegel (1991) Critical (Lyceum) fragment no 48, p. 6. This fragment will be fully 
considered in the next chapter. 
42 Adomo's use of "subjectivity" - the artistic presence through individualistic use of language - for, 
example, is radically different from Kierkegaard's: Kierkegaard used the term to refer to the totality of 
existence of his ironist Socrates. 
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In recent years several significant studies have, to a greater or lesser extent, considered 
Beethoven's works, particularly the late works, in terms of irony. Longyear's article 
Beethoven and Romantic Irony was perhaps the first attempt to relate the music of 
Beethoven to this important Romantic concept. One of the most significant insights 
offered by this work regards the relationship between Beethoven and Friedrich Schlegel 
- one of the most prominent and important philosophers of early German Romanticism. 
Longyear considers that there was no direct influence between the two, observing that 
Beethoven knew of Schlegel only as a translator of Shakespeare. Therefore, 
Beethoven's Romantic irony arises, for Longyear, not as a result of direct influence, but 
rather as an affinity between his work and that of Schlegel and his contemporary Ludwig 
Tieck. He encountered it not as theory, but rather as a concept that was, so to speak, "in 
the air" during his lifetime: 
Romantic irony did not arise from any influence by Friedrich Schlegel on Tieck, nor from 
their impact on Beethoven ... The dying Classical and emerging Romantic styles, and the 
pedestrian attitudes of musicians and audiences were as ripe for parody, satire, and pranks 
as were the sentimental theatre and the philistine actors and playgoers of the time. 
Beethoven, attuned temperamentally to the idea of romantic irony, expressed it in tones 
much as Schlegel and Tieck represented it in words 44 
However, as will be demonstrated, the relationship between Beethoven and Schlegel 
may have been more substantial than Longyear assumes. Although he observes that the 
names of Fichte and Tieck never occur in Beethoven's conversation books, Schlegel's 
does. More significantly, as will be seen, it is possible to establish the connection 
between Beethoven and Schlegel from before the composer's deafness forced the use of 
writing for conversation: a direct chain of interpersonal relationships, some of an 
intimate nature, may be drawn between the two. 
43 Chua (1995) p. 105/6 
44 Longyear, Rey M. (1970) "Beethoven and Romantic Irony" The Musical Quarterly vol. 56 p. 664 
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If a chain of influence may be drawn between Beethoven and Schlegel then it becomes 
possible to view the irony in Beethoven's work specifically within the context of 
Romantic irony. Beethoven's consciousness of irony, not simply as a device, but also as 
a fundamental condition of both life and the creative process of the artist, manifests 
itself, as will be seen, in a specifically Romantic manner within several of his late 
quartets. 
Consciousness of both irony for its own sake and of the artistic self does form one 
element of Longyear's definition of Romantic irony. This definition is essentially a 
summation derived from Friedrich Schlegel's philosophical Fragments: 
Irony is paradox, instinctive throughout, and impossible either to feign or to explain to one 
who cannot understand it. It should be all jest and all earnestness (alles Scherz and alles 
Ernst), and a good sign it is when one who cannot understand irony takes the joke seriously 
and the serious elements as a joke. "Really transcendental buffoonery" is, internally, a 
mood that perceives everything and rises over all limitations, even those of its own art, 
virtue, and originality; externally, it is "the expression of the mimic manner of an ordinarily 
good Italian buffo. 
Irony is the "clear consciousness of eternal agility, of infinitely full chaos," a capricious 
appearance of self -annihilation, a playing with the contradictions of form and practice, the 
introduction of the fortuitous and the unusual, a flirtation with unlimited caprice - all as a 
means to annihilate the self, for self -limitation, the Alpha and Omega for the artist, is a 
result of self -creation and self -annihilation. Many writers have considered the destruction 
of illusion a central element in the theory of romantic irony.45 
Although this is a masterly condensation of Schlegel's thought, nevertheless it presents 
several problems. The first of these is that there is no real elucidation of the definition: 
in itself it is too concise to deal with the complexities of Schlegel's thought. As will be 
seen, whereas Longyear presents Schlegel's various definitions of irony in the form of a 
montage, each sub -definition may actually be seen to be related to two fundamental 
elements: the ironic paradox of existence, particularly of the artist's existence, and self - 
consciousness. 
Although Longyear does mention ironic paradox, he seems to relate it more to the 
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relationship of the artist to his creation - the paradoxical situation where he is 
simultaneously within the work and external to it, involved in its creation and 
objectively ambivalent to it.46 In contrast, I attempt to demonstrate that, although this 
conception of paradox does persist in Schlegel's understanding, it is subsumed within 
the more fundamental, "existential" paradox of the position of the "finite" artist within 
an "infinite" universe. As will be seen, I consider this paradox, together with the 
consciousness of this paradox, to be the centre- point, the locus of Romantic irony. 
The second problem arising from Longyear's definition is that the constitutive elements 
of Romantic irony that he identifies do not really correspond to the instances of this 
irony that he analyses in Beethoven's work. The emphasis of his analyses is upon ironic 
effects - upon elements of "parody, satire and pranks ".47 For example, he considers 
elements such as an `insulting' cello solo, a distorted recapitulation, a "humorously 
sudden modulation ", a purposeless fugato and a juxtaposition of contrasting material 
within a phrase as evidence of Romantic irony within the second movement of 
Beethoven's Quartet Op. 59 number 2. Moreover, he considers this movement "the 
pronouncedly sustained example of romantic irony in Beethoven's music ".48 
Each example of ironic devices contributes to the overall effect of the `destruction of 
illusion' - displaying the devices of the artwork in order to emphasise its inherent 
artifice. Longyear specifically identifies this destruction of illusion as the chief 
characteristic of Romantic irony: 
The juxtaposition of the prosaic and the poetic is an essential ingredient in the destruction 
of illusion that characterises romantic irony.49 
45 Ibid. p. 648/649 
46 "The artists, as an individual, animates his work and is constantly perceivable in it, yet must detach 
himself from it and regard it objectively, almost as if it were an illusion." Ibid. p. 649/50 
47 Ibid. p. 664 
48 Ibid. p. 658 
49 Ibid. p. 655 
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As a result, it is the "destruction of illusion" that actually forms the focus of Longyear's 
analyses. However, whilst, as will be seen, the destruction of illusion is certainly an 
element of Romantic irony I suggest that it occurs as a result of the fundamental 
philosophical irony. Thus, such ironic devices alone are not sufficient to establish the 
presence of specifically Romantic irony: they are effect, rather than cause. Romantic 
irony is specifically aesthetic, or philosophical in nature, centring upon the ironic artist's 
aesthetic response to the fundamental ironic paradox of existence. 
Indeed, the ironic effects that Longyear identifies in Beethoven may be seen to be akin, 
not so much to the Romantic irony developed in the theoretical writings of Schlegel, but 
rather to the specifically dramatic effects seen within the work of Ludwig Tieck. This 
arises due to the fact that, although Longyear's theoretical definition is drawn from 
Schlegel, his literary examples of irony are from Tieck's work. As will be seen, 
although there are similarities between Schlegel and Tieck's respective conceptions of 
irony, there are also significant differences; so much so that, as Longyear himself 
observes, Schlegel did not consider Tieck's work "ironic" in the sense in which he 
constituted the term. In addition, whilst the influential connection between Beethoven 
and Schlegel provides a hermeneutic framework for considering Beethoven's irony in 
terms of Schlegel's theories, it is not possible to establish such a connection to Tieck. 
Thus although the elements that Longyear demonstrates in Beethoven are indeed ironic, 
they are not, as will be seen, specifically Romantically ironic in the Schlegelian sense: 
indeed such devices may be seen in many works predating the conception of Romantic 
irony. As a result, although the connection that Longyear suggests between Beethoven 
and Schlegel will be important for this current work, the actual cases of Romantic irony 
that he identifies will be seen to differ significantly from those considered below. 
John Daverio, in his article on the chamber music for strings in The Cambridge 
Companion to Beethoven, also links Beethoven's quartets to the theoretical work of 
Schlegel. He uses one of Schlegel's (unpublished) fragments as a framework for his 
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understanding of the development of the quartets: 
The various types of novel [Romanarten] are determined by manner, tone and tendency 
[Manier, Ton, Tendenz]. But for the classical genres, style, content and form [Styl, Stoff 
Form] are the determining factors.5o 
Daverio argues that Beethoven was concerned with the transformation and rethinking of 
the norms of the quartet genre, to the point where the genre almost dissolves. 
Essentially he considers that this transformation may be seen across the traditional three - 
period division of Beethoven's work, and that these divisions correspond to the three 
elements of the Romantic art form that Schlegel identifies: 
In the string chamber music of his earlier period Beethoven strove to establish an individual 
manner, in his middle phase he effected a transformation of the tone of the string quartet and 
quintet and in his late quartets he challenged the aesthetic unity at the heart of classicism by 
resorting increasingly to tendency.51 
Daverio relates the late quartets, particularly the Galitzin quartets, to Schlegel's concept 
of the fragment. It is through the fragmentation of form, the replacement of the "self - 
sufficient, rounded forms of Classicism with the intentionally fragmented structures of 
modernity ",52 that Beethoven's late quartets exhibit the `tendency' of the Romantic 
artform. 
Significantly, Daverio also identifies the presence of irony as an element of this 
`tendency' in the late quartets, particularly in the scherzo -like movements of Op. 132 
and 131 and the finale of Op. 127. In this finale, the extensive "false reprise" is not 
simply a good- humoured, Haydnesque device: rather, he considers that it interrupts the 
continuity of the music to the point where it becomes "cast in an ironic light ".53 
Daverio considers the ironies that he identifies simply as "rhetorical devices" (i.e. they 
"say one thing and mean another "), and that Beethoven used these essentially to expose 
50 Daverio, John (2000) "Manner, Tone and Tendency in Beethoven's Chamber Music for Strings" in 
Glenn Stanley (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Beethoven p. 151 
51 Ibid. p. 152 
52 Ibid. p. 152 
53 Ibid. p. 161 
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the artifice of his own art. In this sense, within the context of the transformation of 
genres, they therefore form a type of authorial comment upon these genres themselves: 
irony is used as a device, 
The manner in which Daverio approaches irony in Beethoven arises largely because, 
although he uses the work of Schlegel both as a framework for understanding 
Beethoven's quartets, and a link to Romantic tendencies, there is little examination of 
Schlegel's actual theories. (The fragment that Daverio uses occurs in an unpublished 
notebook.) The result of this is seen in particular in relation to the late style. As will be 
seen, throughout Schlegel's work irony is considered not simply as a device, but rather 
as an aesthetic, philosophical principle, one of the most important elements of his 
Romanticism. Therefore, the ironic devices that Daverio identifies are not really 
Romantic, i.e. Schlegelian irony, rather they are more closely related to the "comic" 
satirical irony of the type seen in Haydn and Lawrence Sterne. As I attempt to 
demonstrate, Romantic irony is located in Beethoven, not so much in such rhetorical 
devices, but rather as an underlying, pervading principle and process of several of his 
late quartets. 
Robert Hatten's seminal work Musical Meaning in Beethoven also approaches irony in 
terms of structural principle. His consideration of irony in Beethoven, however, occurs 
within the greater context of the semiotic concerns of his work. In other words, he is 
more concerned with the manner in which musical semiotics can account for cases of 
musical irony and metaphor, than with the manner in which irony informs Beethoven's 
work. His position is really a development of Longyear's, whose definition of Romantic 
irony forms the basis of Hatten's own understanding. However, as has been considered, 
Longyear's analyses focus upon ironic devices, rather than the paradox and parabasis so 
prevalent in Schlegel's writing. Hatten's reliance upon Longyear's work means that, by 
extension, his understanding of Romantic irony shares the same problems. 
Although the philosophical basis of the irony that Hatten identifies is ostensibly derived 
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from Schlegel, the theoretical basis of his conception of the manner in which irony may 
be seen in music centres upon the concept of "troping ". Troping is defined as occurring 
"when two different correlations are brought together to produce a third meaning ",54 
thus essentially a trope arises as a synthesis of one new meaning from two older, 
contradictory meanings belonging to the same language or signifying system. However, 
despite this theoretical work, in practice the instances of irony that he identifies in 
Beethoven focus upon the notion of a "shifting of discourse level ". This concept draws 
on the work of Carolyn Abbate, who argues that such shifts within music indicate a 
narrative presence - the "speaker" of the dialogue, as it were - and is closely related to 
Bakhtin's "heteroglossia ".55 
Hatten argues that shifting discursive levels indicates not simply a narrator, but rather 
the self -consciousness of the artist, drawing attention to his ability to be "outside" of his 
own artwork. As will be seen, such self -consciousness is an essential element of 
Romantic irony. He considers that in music "extreme contrasts in style or topic 
(especially where they suggest a reversal), cueing of recitative as a topic, direct 
quotation or intertextual importation, disruptions of the temporal norm, or even 
negation "56 may indicate such a shift in the level of the discourse. 
He demonstrates the first of these in the closing section of the finale of the Op. 95 
Quartet. This analysis is essentially the same as Longyear's, except that Hatten refers to 
the section as an "addendum ", rather than a coda. This implies that this section is 
effectively added on: the extreme juxtaposition of this section with the preceding 
movement cues a shift in discourse level, with the result that it is perceived as an ironic 
postscript, whose buffo -like character undermines the seriousness of the preceding 
movement. Charles Brauner, who demonstrates the device in both the ironic poetry of 
54 Hatten, Robert (1994) Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation and Interpretation 
P. 166 
55 See Abbate, Carolyn (1991) Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century 
and Morson, Gary Saul and Emerson, Caryl (1990) Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics p. 139 -145 
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Heinrich Heine and Schumann's settings of the works, has also considered "surprise" 
endings of this sort in relation to music.57 
Hatten considers that intertextuality is related to irony in that it functions reflexively 
within the discourse. Instances of intertextuality (including references or quotations of 
other styles, or quotations from the given work within itself) highlight the process of the 
discourse from within the discourse - i.e. they draw attention to the essential artifice of 
the unfolding artwork. He considers that Beethoven's stylisation of both Renaissance 
and Baroque styles in the third movement of the Op. 132 Quartet is such an instance of 
intertextuality, producing a discursive shift that may be taken as an indication of a 
tropological interpretation. 
However, I would suggest that intertextuality, or allusions to other composers or styles 
do not necessarily imply a shift in discourse level, and as such are not automatically to 
be considered ironic. Certainly allusions or quotations may draw extra meaning into a 
work - consider the references to An die Ferne Geliebte in Schumann's Fantasy. They 
may even be attributed to the presence of a narrative voice, able to draw comparisons to 
works or contexts external to the discourse. However, this type of narrator is more akin 
to that discussed in Edward Cone's The Composer's Voice, than to the ironic artist of 
Schlegelian Romantic irony. Such a narrator is not necessarily ironic simply because of 
his superior position; rather the decisive issue will be the nature of the intertextuality. If, 
as in the case of Schumann, the intertextuality is internally congruent, then no irony will 
occur, and the external reference is accepted as a simple quotation, homage etc. If, on 
the contrary, there are incongruities within the intertextuality, then it will tend towards 
parody and will therefore, by definition, be ironic in nature. 
As will be seen, I do consider the Op. 132 Quartet to be ironically motivated, but not 
56 Hatten (1994) p. 202 
57 Brauner, Charles S. (1981) "Irony in the Heine Lieder of Schubert and Schumann ", The Musical 
Quarterly, vol. 67 p. 269 and 275 
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simply because of the intertextuality. Rather I will argue that Beethoven produces a 
paradoxical situation, a chain of allusions, stylisations and parodies, each of which 
undermines the others. This produces an infinite negation of the type considered by 
both Schlegel and Soren Kierkegaard - an infinite negation that is ironic in purport.58 
Whilst I agree with Hatten that sudden juxtapositions and intertextuality can produce 
discursive shifts, I would suggest that the cueing of recitative as a topic to indicate a 
shift in discourse level is problematic, particularly in relation to Beethoven. Hatten cites 
this topic - in particular the salient first inversion chord that stylistically heralds the 
topic - in relation to perceived discursive shifts in the Op. 130 Quartet and the 
Hammerklavier sonata. He considers that the use of recitative within such instrumental 
music produces the effect of a narrative voice - an intruding presence that is understood 
to be fundamentally ironic in purport. Indeed, throughout his discussion the topic is 
treated as though it were somehow `reserved' specifically for instances of musical 
narrating. 
However, I would suggest that although, through extreme juxtaposition, the cueing of 
recitative may be used to shift discursive level, recitative alone does not necessarily lead 
to such a shift. The fact that recitative occurs as a topic means that, like any other topic 
or style, it is susceptible to the artistic manipulation of the composer. Indeed, Beethoven 
had previously used it in precisely this manner in instrumental works: the recitatives in 
the piano sonatas Op. 31 number 2 and Op. 110, for example, form integral parts of the 
structures of the movements. In these cases, the use of recitative produces a "narrative" 
topic, but this topic occurs as part of the discourse. Therefore no shift in level is 
produced by the use of the topic, and thus no "external" narrator. 
In the cases cited by Hatten the shift in level, if indeed it does occur, should really be 
considered to arise because of the type of juxtaposition already identified, rather than 
58 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 51, p. 24, also Critical (Lyceum) fragment 37, p. 4 and 
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simply from the use of recitative. Hatten's own analysis of the third movement of the 
Quartet Op. 130 actually supports this view: "The abrupt, operatic interruption [by the 
recitative topic] in m. 17 suggests a persona ".59 The shift of level is achieved not 
simply by the insertion of the recitative topic, but by the juxtaposition of these elements 
with the preceding music. In fact, as I will argue in the analysis of this movement in the 
fourth chapter of this work, the structure and function of both the "operatic" moments 
and the introduction to the movement may be explained in terms other than an ironic 
discourse shift. 
Even if one accepts the use of recitative as constituting a musical narrative "voice ", this 
fact alone is still not sufficient to produce irony. Indeed, although the artistic device of a 
narrator may possess an inherent potential for irony, the mere presence alone of such 
narrative voices as are identified by Hatten, Abbate and Burnham is not ironic. As will 
be seen, the intrusion of a self -conscious authorial presence is an important element in 
Schlegel's philosophy of irony, a device he refers to as "parabasis ". However, in 
Schlegel's writing parabasis is considered ironic only in conjunction with self - 
consciousness and paradox. Thus the instances of narrating in Hatten's examples cannot 
be considered to be ironic in Schlegel's sense. 
Like Hatten, Burnham's discussion of irony in Beethoven draws upon the 
philosophical /theoretical basis provided by Longyear, focusing on the important concept 
of self -consciousness. However, his identification of irony in Beethoven is unusual in 
that, unlike Longyear and Hatten, he focuses on works from the composer's middle 
period, his so- called "Heroic" style. Indeed, it is doubly unusual in that he does not 
focus on ironic moments within works, but rather attributes it as a property of the heroic 
style. His attribution of irony to works from this period is based upon his perception of 
a narrative "voice" within these works, a voice which he considers "self- conscious ", 
subjective and ironic. 
Kierkegaard (1841) p. 216/217 
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Burnham traces the concept of self -consciousness throughout the "Goethezeit" (which is 
the age, not only of Goethe, but also of Kant, Hegel and Schiller), considering its 
presence in both the typical Goethian hero and the philosophical systems of Kant and 
Hegel. Burnham argues that the typical hero of the "Goethezeit" sees himself from 
"outside" - "he both enacts and sees himself enacting, and thus bears the weighted wrap 
of self -consciousness, the human condition which was to become fundamental to 
German Idealism's concept of reality and its history".60 Such a hero is not only 
conscious of his actions but is also able to contemplate his own actions objectively, as 
though they were those of another. In other words he both acts and observes, enacts and 
narrates. 
Within the philosophical systems of Kant and, in particular, of Hegel the concept of self - 
consciousness is greatly expanded: 
The progress from Kant to Hegel consists of nothing less than the transformation of human 
cognition from a radically limited interface with reality to the origin and destiny of all 
reality. (In other words, that which was confined to putting a distinctly human construction 
on a forever unknowable reality now constructs - in the strong sense - that reality).61 
Within Hegel's philosophy, self -consciousness of the type attributed to the "Goethezeit" 
hero evolves into a position of absolute subjectivity. If the world is to be defined 
through the subjectivity of the self then, in a sense, the self becomes the world. Thus, 
when the self -consciousness becomes the defining factor in constituting "reality ", 
"reality" actually becomes subjectivity. 
An important element of this subjectivity is the inclusion of the self within this 
subjectivity. Since the self defines subjective reality, the process of self -contemplation 
is the beginning of the process of the contemplation of this subjective reality. The self is 
59 Hatten (1994) p. 176 
60 Burnham, Scot (1995) Beethoven Hero p. 116/7 
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therefore simultaneously an organic part of a greater whole, and also the totality of that 
whole. Burnham considers that Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is an embodiment of 
this process, representing "thought contemplating itself'. This results in what he 
describes as a `closed' system - "the self generates and culminates its own destiny ".62 
Burnham associates Beethoven's compositional approach in the heroic style to the 
concepts of subjectivity and self -consciousness of the "Goethezeit ". He argues, in 
effect, that Beethoven's Heroic style is a counterpart to the philosophical systems of 
Hegel, in that it too represents a `closed' system, "self- generating, self -sustaining, and 
self -consuming ".63 This view centres on Beethoven's much -vaunted thematic process: 
the manner in which Beethoven constructs entire movements from thematic material is 
taken as a process of the individual becoming the totality, i.e. of subjectivity. This 
viewpoint, however, is dependent upon an anthropomorphising of the thematic process: 
in other words it is dependent upon an association of the theme with a person. The 
theme is simultaneously an individual, and yet is subsumed in an organic whole that it 
actually generates. 
Burnham relates the thematic process in the heroic style to the self -consciousness and 
subjectivity described above. He identifies the theme with a "Goethezeit" Hero; middle - 
period works thus represent a narrative that is both enacted (through the thematic 
process and the outworking of the musical discourse) and narrated. This dual process - 
simultaneous enacting and narrating - is therefore understood as Hegelian self - 
consciousness and subjectivity. 
This viewpoint hinges upon the presence within these works of a narrating "voice ". 
Burnham considers that at certain points in some of the Heroic style works - for example 
in the coda of the Egmont Overture, and in the famous horn calls in the Eroica 
61 Ibid. p. 113/4 
62 Ibid. p. 117 
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Symphony - a narrating voice intrudes upon the discourse. The result of this is that 
these works, together with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, are treated as 
Bildungsroman, i.e. as first- person narratives. He argues that such works can only be 
composed from the viewpoint of their ending - the narrative voice can only "tell" the 
story from "outside" the action. It is the presence of this "external" narrating voice that 
transforms such works into self -conscious works that both enact and speak of the 
process of enacting. 
However, Burnham argues that the presence of this narrative voice also creates irony. 
He considers that all such narratives are fundamentally ironic because of the superior 
knowledge of the narrator - his knowledge betrays his position `outside' of the actual 
process of the narrative.64 (He refers to the manner in which Dickens sometimes makes 
ironic comments on the still -to -come fate of characters that he is introducing). The 
Heroic -style works are therefore inherently pervaded by irony. 
Although Burnham's discussion of narrative presence - a "telling voice" - in these works 
is generally convincing, his attribution of irony to this narrating voice raises several 
problems. The first of these centres upon the notion of the narrative "voice" as being 
somehow an external narrating presence. He considers that the manner in which 
Beethoven uses sonata form in these middle -period works is both "internalised" and 
"externalised ". That is, that although the music is actually in sonata form, there is also, 
at certain crux points, a simultaneous narration, a narrative voice that speaks about 
sonata form from outside the discourse.65 Burnham refers to this narrating "voice" as 
63 Ibid. p. 118 
64 "The more pervasive irony of this period rests in the simultaneous assumption that the world is all that 
the self is ... and yet that one can stand apart from this master narrative, in fact, must stand apart from it 
in order to narrate it, or even to be aware of it. This is why the trope of narration plays so well in studies 
of nineteenth -century culture: the very act of self -awareness, of self -consciousness, is a type of narration. 
And all such narration is fundamentally ironic." Ibid. p. 146/147 
65 "The extrovert voice of this music speaks from outside the formal process, across that process, or of 
that process. This is perhaps most perceptible at the coda ... but can be heard throughout a movement as 
that pressurised utterance that tells of beginnings, middles and endings. This voice is both a distanced, 
narrating entity, speaking from a place beyond the moment -by- moment temporal enactment of the music, 
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either "Beethoven's hero" or as "Beethoven Hero ", i.e. as either a heroic figure, the 
heroic self, or as the "voice" of Beethoven himself. 
The assertion of the external nature of this narrative voice is, however, problematic. The 
narrative "voice" within these works is not an external presence, but rather is an artistic 
device created by Beethoven: however compelling this "voice" may be, it nevertheless 
remains an internal device of the artwork. (Indeed, as will be seen, Beethoven does, on 
occasion, actually undermine such devices to ironic effect.) Moreover, the presence 
within a work of such narrative devices alone does not constitute irony. It is certainly 
the case that in a Bitdungsroman irony may occur, if the narrator treats his characters 
ironically; this, however, is simply a type of dramatic irony. Therefore, Burnham's 
assumption that narrative "voices" of the type seen in Beethoven are inherently ironic is 
somewhat problematic. If all works that evince narrative voice - all Bildungsroman, and 
indeed much of world literature - are to be considered ironic, then, at the least, irony 
becomes a very commonplace occurrence, and thus rather meaningless as a concept. 
Indeed this problem actually arises in Burnham's final chapter. Here he argues that 
"presence" - the narrating voice - of the type identified is the essence of the heroic style, 
rather than simply the thematic process. He considers that, in enshrining these heroic 
works as the paradigm of tonal music we have elevated that "presence" - it is not the 
thematic process, the striving towards the end point, or the heroic `overcoming', but 
rather the Beethovenian "voice" that is the epitome of music. He argues that we return 
many times to favourite works, not simply to hear the process, but rather to experience 
the `presence' of the composer, to hear the `voice'. The problem with this view is that 
such `presence' is earlier identified as ironic. If this presence is ironic, and if such a 
presence defines both the experience of music and our criteria for "good" music, then 
music is by definition, at baseline, ironic. 
and the very sound of that music's ongoing process." Ibid. p. 144 
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The difficulties encountered in Burnham's assertion of an ironic narrative voice in 
Beethoven arise from the fact that there is little definition of irony within his work. 
Rather, he simply refers to the irony that Longyear and Hatten demonstrate, presumably 
adopting their definitions. The manner in which these authors approach Beethovenian 
irony, however, is, as demonstrated, not without problems. Neither author, though, 
deals with the type of "systemic" irony, considered by Burnham. Rather, they 
essentially focus on ironic devices, particularly the destruction of artistic illusion. 
In addition, the attribution of irony to such works, particularly in light of the parallel 
drawn to Hegel's work is not really justified on the hermeneutic ground that Burnham 
lays. As Kierkegaard observes, Hegel dismisses irony, specifically Schlegelian irony, as 
an exaggeration of the negation stage of his dialectic. Thus to attribute irony to 
Beethoven because of his proximity to Hegel and Kant is perhaps flawed. 
However, as will be seen, self -consciousness and subjectivity are considered to be ironic 
- in a certain specific sense - within the work of both Kierkegaard and Schlegel. 
Kierkegaard considered that Socrates' irony arose from his self -consciousness and 
subjectivity. However, it is not these qualities alone that produced the irony, but rather 
their incongruity and juxtaposition with Socrates' historical context. Likewise, although 
self -consciousness and subjectivity occur in Schlegel's theoretical writing this self - 
consciousness is consciousness not only of one's own enactment, but also of the 
fundamental irony and paradox of that position. Thus there is a double self - 
consciousness (an awareness of one's awareness as ironic), a double subjectivity. 
Kierkegaard refers to this concept as "subjectivity raised to a higher power ", identifying 
this "subjectivity's subjectivity" as the essence of Schlegel's irony. 
Therefore, although Burnham tries to link the "irony" that he identifies in Beethoven 
with Romantic irony, self -consciousness and narrative presence alone cannot be 
considered to be Romantic irony, either of the type discussed by Hatten and Longyear, 
or of that seen in the work of Kierkegaard, Hegel or Schlegel. 
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In addition to those works that explicitly consider the relationship between Beethoven 
and irony, several recent studies consider the composer's work in relation to concepts 
that form important elements of Romantic irony. Like Burnham, James Hanley Donelan 
asserts that Beethoven's music, specifically the Op. 130/133 Quartet, exhibits self - 
consciousness, a concept that he traces through the philosophical system of Hegel and 
the work of Hölderlin and Wordsworth: 
Opus 130/133 is, in musical terms, the assertion of a self which looks back upon its 
constitutive elements, and in a clear, audible, and real sense, achieves self -consciousness 
through this reflection.66 
He considers that in this quartet, particularly the first movement, Beethoven creates his 
own tonal structure, based in a key- scheme of ascending thirds rather than the 
tonic /dominant opposition of conventional sonata movements. In addition, he argues 
that the manner in which Beethoven foregrounds counterpoint as an intrinsic element of 
the entire structure of the Quartet is also unique, producing a preferencing of theme over 
formal convention. The Grosse Fuge therefore arises as the consummation of both 
elements of this unique approach. 
He considers that, whilst Beethoven's compositional approach in this quartet is unique, 
nevertheless, in order for it to be intelligible, it functions within "the discourse of 
traditional classical harmony, counterpoint, and sonata -allegro forms ".67 He argues that 
Beethoven highlights this duality through the incorporation of "constant, audible 
references to the past ", i.e. the conventions of the quartet and of sonata form. These 
include a parodic second subject - reminiscent of Haydn - in the first movement, trite 
circle of fifth progressions that reference conventional modulatory procedures and dance 
66 Donelan, James Hanley (1993) Self Consciousness and Music in Early Romanticism: Holderlin, Hegel, 
Wordsworth and Beethoven p. 222 
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movements based on banal melodies and progressions. 
The result of this is that a dialectical tension is established between the unique tonal and 
structural language of this quartet and the conventional gestures of the genre, and it is 
this tension that Donelan considers to be the locus of the self -consciousness that he 
attributes to the work. Essentially the opposition of the unique elements with the 
conventional mirrors the Hegelian opposition of the individual and the universal, or 
subjective and objective that is at the centre of Romantic self -consciousness: 
This is self -consciousness expressed in musical terms: an identity in the musical discourse 
which becomes aware of itself through its opposition and contrast to the other of traditional 
musical form. This identity nevertheless depends upon the other for its articulation; in this 
case, the other is traditional form 68 
Like Burnham, Donelan considers that Beethoven's thematic process embodies this self - 
consciousness, with the theme functioning as "the assertion of the composer's identity, 
the self as the musical theme ".69 Although certain elements of Donelan's discussion, 
particularly the manner in which he demonstrates Beethoven's parodic use of 
Haydnesque conventions, relate directly to irony, unlike Burnham, he does not generally 
associate self -consciousness with irony. Rather he treats it simply as a philosophical 
concept in its own right, demonstrating a plausible philosophical/hermeneutic 
background for considering Beethoven's work in these terms.70 
Donelan's work is stronger for this. Beethoven uses the devices outlined above to create 
the artifice of a narrative, self -conscious voice. However, this self -consciousness alone 
is not ironic, as Burnham suggests, at least not in the Schlegelian sense. In Schlegel 
there is, as Kierkegaard wrote, a "subjectivity's subjectivity ", i.e. not simply self- 
67 Ibid. p. 221/222 
68 Ibid. p. 222 
69 Ibid. 
70 This may be summed up thus: "self- consciousness is a fundamental structural principle of late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth -century thought which disseminated not from a single source, point, or 
discipline, but from a matrix of common concerns among poets, philosophers and composers ". Ibid. p. 3 
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consciousness but an awareness of self -consciousness, including the existential position 
of the author, both as a person and as an artist in relation to his own work as ironic, an 
objectification of that very self -consciousness. Schlegel thus treats self -consciousness 
with irony. As will be seen, Beethoven follows this process by undermining the type of 
self -conscious "voice" that Donelan convincingly demonstrates. This undermining of 
self -conscious produces Schlegelian Romantic irony, the continual chain of negation 
articulated by Kierkegaard. 
In addition to self -consciousness, the concept of paradox is central to the understanding 
of Romantic irony outlined below. Both Spitzer and Sylvia Imeson have recently 
considered the presence of paradox within Beethoven's late style, in particular the late 
quartets. Spitzer's work - Ambiguity and Paradox in Beethoven's Late Style - focuses 
on the theory that "Beethoven raises paradox to the second degree, so that it becomes 
not just a function of structure, but of the aesthetic in which the structure is 
comprehended ".71 Although, as will be seen, this observation is confirmed in the 
analyses in the current work, Spitzer's work raises several problematic areas. 
The first of these is that neither paradox nor ambiguity is defined anywhere throughout 
the work. Spitzer hints that this lack of definition is necessary because of the subject 
matter: 
I have nowhere attempted to define paradox. Umberto Eco says somewhere that the 
relationship between the structure of one metaphor and that of another is itself 
metaphorical: the same could be said mutatis mutandis, of paradox as well. We are 
dealing, then, with forms rather than form; with a set of family relationships instead of 
universal structure or algorithm.72 
The reader is left to infer the manner in which Spitzer applies both "paradox" and 
"ambiguity" to Beethoven. However, it is difficult to establish in what sense the 
instances of paradox that are identified are actually paradoxical. Indeed many of these 
71 Spitzer (1993) p. 28 
72 Ibid. p. vi 
41 
"paradoxes" only occur if the works are considered in light of assumptions arising from 
either conventional analytical distinctions of sonata form or from Schenkerian 
principles.73 Similarly, many of the instances of ambiguity identified arise from 
assumptions regarding tonality drawn from Schenkerian analysis. Frequently, re- 
harmonisations of a theme within a work are considered to produce ambiguity because 
of the resulting "bi- tonality" within the harmonic structure of the theme.74 However, in 
this case, as in that of the formal paradoxes identified, the "ambiguity" arises solely in 
light of latent analytical assumptions - there is no harmonic ambiguity actually present 
in either harmonisation. 
The result of these assumptions may be seen most clearly within his analysis of the 
opening movement of the Op. 132 Quartet. He concludes that this movement actually 
consists of only eleven bars, which function as an "interruption, wedged between an 
introduction and a false reprise ".75 This novel conclusion arises from the (inaccurate) 
observation that it is only in the development that the theme of the movement is heard 
fully, and is predicated on the assumption that: 
Insofar as an exposition fulfils ideas adumbrated by the introduction, it is only here, in the 
middle of the development section, that the introduction ends and the exposition begins.76 
The lack of a definition of paradox and ambiguity is particularly significant to this 
current study. As was seen above, Spitzer considers that, although paradox does occur 
in the music of Beethoven, irony does not. However, in neglecting to define paradox, he 
omits consideration of the relationship between the two phenomena, and thus it is 
73 "The piece [the Op. 127 Quartet] simultaneously invites and resists analysis as a first- movement sonata 
form. In real terms the tension of the movement is dependent on the G minor section [which Kerman 
considers the second subject] being both a self -sufficient second group and a mere transition. The 
cogency of the paradox is due to each side being backed by convention (or at least by precedent)." Ibid. 
p. 114 
74 "Statements of the subject at original pitch clash with the background key. In other words, original - 
pitch ritornellos cut across the modulation to the dominant. The analysis must reckon, ultimately, with a 
"counterpoint" between Schenkerian tonicisation and Schoenbergian monotonality." Ibid. p. 299 
75 Ibid. p. 151 
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difficult to see in what way the paradoxes that he identifies are to be considered non - 
ironic. Similarly, this produces problems regarding the relationship between paradox 
and ambiguity. In many cases he uses the terms synonymously; in other instances the 
formal properties of one are attributed to the other. For example, he considers that 
"Schumann's ambiguity differs from that of Haydn and Beethoven in that it is 
unresolved, exposed, incorporated into no system. It lacks the objectivity of convention. 
The paradox of Beethoven's late style is similarly unresolved, but it is stated in 
conventional terms, and is therefore more authentically disturbing. It is more 
realistic "77. Similarly, "ambiguity in Schumann is a state, or an "atmosphere ", whereas 
in Beethoven it is the result of a dialectical process, an active contradiction ".78 In both 
instances the formal properties are reversed: as will be seen, paradox always involves an 
active contradiction, whilst ambiguity is an unresolved state. 
The relationship between ambiguity and paradox is of particular importance to this 
current study. As will be considered below, the elision of the two phenomena is by no 
means uncommon, and indeed often leads to an association of ambiguous effect with 
ironic intent. The result of this elision of the two phenomena is that every case of 
ambiguity could be considered ironic. Since Beethoven uses both ambiguity and irony 
in the late quartets it is therefore of particular importance to the current work to 
differentiate between them. 
Imeson's definition of paradox in "The Time Gives it Proof" - Paradox in the Late 
Music of Beethoven derives from an initial examination of the fields of myth, alchemy, 
psychology and literature. The element common to all of her examples - the paradoxes 
of death and rebirth, of sacrifice leading to reward, of male and female, good and evil, 
and the "contradictions of love" - is the simultaneous presence, or co- existence of 
contradictory or contrasting elements. Imeson argues that in all of these fields paradox 
76 Ibid. p. 141 
77 Ibid. p. 47 
78 Ibid. p. 105 
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is used to express "transcendental" ideas - ideas that are unable to be expressed 
unequivocally. 
In particular, she highlights the literary paradox of self -referentiality, which she 
considers "arguably most fascinating of all paradoxes found in literature ".79 In such 
paradoxes artists "insert themselves into their own works in order to comment upon the 
nature of art itself, and the relationship between imitation and actuality ".80 Self - 
referentiality is therefore a form of reflexivity - the process whereby the essential artifice 
of an artwork is expressed within the artwork itself. Within this process the relationship 
between paradox and irony is seen particularly clearly; in self -reflexive texts Imeson 
considers that 
The ambiguities ... are frequently reflexive ones, paradoxes which call attention to the 
nature of the text and to any underlying assumptions about what is normative for that 
type of text.81 
The example she gives of such a reflexive text, Lawrence Sterne's Tristram Shandy, is 
consistently identified as ironic.82 The manner in which Sterne "calls attention" to the 
"underlying assumptions" of the text through manipulation, distortion and exaggeration 
of literary norms results in the satirising of these norms. The reflexive process thus 
possesses a type of `corrective element', characteristic of satirical irony. Imeson 
considers that this reflexivity is important to the aesthetic of Beethoven's late style, 
linking his use of reflexive paradox to his relationship with Haydn: 
In Beethoven's op. 10 no. 3 can be seen clearly his interest in the compositional techniques 
of self -reference, and to a certain, extent, the roots of these procedures in the reflexive 
approach to musical structure taken by Haydn. A special type of reflexivity, the paradox, 
79 Imeson, Sylvia (1996) "The time gives it proofe ": Paradox in the Late Music of Beethoven p. 28 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. p. 38 
82 See, for example, Bonds, Mark Evan (1991) "Haydn, Laurence Sterne, and the Origins of Musical 
Irony ", Journal of the American Musicological Society, vol. 44 no. 1: 57 - 91, as well as Viktor 
Shklovsky's famous Formalist reading (Shklovsky, Viktor Borisovich (1921) "Steme's Tristram Shandy: 
Stylistic Commentary" in L.T. Lemon and M.J. Reis (eds.) Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays 
(1965)). 
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came increasingly to occupy Beethoven; that which had been a witty means of introducing 
drama, surprise or humour into his musical fabric for Haydn became a more powerful and 
expressive instrument in Beethoven's hands ... Beethoven used musical paradox as a 
structural tool.83 
In addition, she does, briefly, relate the types of paradox and disruption that she 
identifies in the Op. 130 Quartet in particular to the concept of humour in Jean Paul 
Richter's Vorschule fiir Ästhetik. Disruptive humour, according to Jean Paul 
"annihilates both great and small because before infinity everything is equal and 
nothing "84, and it is through this annihilation that humour allows the creation of new 
forms. Imeson suggests that this may be the principle behind Beethoven's Op. 130: the 
disruption of form in this work is Richter's "sublime in reverse ", forcing the creation of 
new genres through annihilating the old. 
There are two important considerations with regard to Imeson's work. Firstly, with the 
exception of the literary examples, the examples of paradox that she draws from in order 
to arrive at her definition of Beethovenian paradox are perhaps not the most pertinent to 
Beethoven. Similarly, she relates the self -referentiality of Beethoven and Haydn to the 
Russian Formalist's process of ostranenie - "making strange ". In both cases the 
theoretical work of Beethoven's contemporary Schlegel is perhaps more pertinent. As 
will be seen, the paradoxes Imeson analyses from the fields of literature, alchemy, myth 
etc., as well as her consideration of the annihilating humour of Jean Paul are all related 
to the type of existential paradox that lies at the philosophical heart of Schlegel's 
theoretical writing on irony. In addition, Schlegel specifically relates reflexive 
paradoxes to Romantic irony, referring to them as a device of "parabasis "85. Paradox 
and parabasis are essential elements of Romantic irony; therefore, the paradoxes and 
elements of paradox that Imeson identifies - reflexive devices, internal contradiction, 
contrast and multiple meaning - may be more directly related to Beethoven through the 
83 Imeson (1996) p. 51 
84 Richter, Jean Paul (1804) Vorschule für Ästhetik, trans. Hale, Margaret R. (1973) Horn of Oberon: 
Jean Paul Richter's School for Aesthetics p. 88 
85 See, for example, Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 238 p. 50/51 and Schlegel (1963) p. 668. 
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philosophy of Romantic irony, than through other fields or the work of the Russian 
Formalists. The relationship between Beethoven and Schlegel provides a hermeneutic 
basis for considering such paradoxes within the composer's work, as indicators of 
Romantic Irony. 
Secondly, throughout Imeson's work the same elision of ambiguity and paradox seen in 
Spitzer's work occurs. In the above quotation, for example, she describes the distortions 
in Sterne as both ambiguities and paradoxes. Indeed, she uses the two terms 
interchangeably throughout her discussion, culminating in her definition of "paradox" in 
relation to music as 
covering phenomena in which some sort of reflexive device, internal contradiction, 
contrast, ambiguity or multiple meaning is employed in order to add a particular 
richness of detail or complexity of overall structure and symbolism. Unlike ambiguity, 
implicit in the idea of paradox is the notion of the potential resolution; the self - 
contradiction is only apparent, which permits a structure capable of expressing meaning 
that would be difficult or impossible to express in any other way. 86 
The association of ambiguity with paradox throughout Imeson's work is seen most 
clearly in this definition, and arises, in part, from the fact that she draws upon William 
Empson's seminal work Seven Types of Ambiguity in order to develop her understanding 
of paradox. She identifies musical paradoxes that correspond to Empson's types, and 
that resolve in the same manner, largely by substituting `paradox' in place of Empson's 
`ambiguity'. The theoretical problem that this produces is seen in the last portion of the 
passage above, where she states that paradox is potentially resolvable, whilst ambiguity 
is incapable of resolution.87 The problem with this assertion is that, as will be seen, it is 
actually paradox that is inherently unresolvable, whilst the possibility of resolution in 
These fragments will be considered more fully in the next chapter. 
86 Imeson (1996) p. 53 
87 Implicit in a paradox is the possibility of its resolution; both halves of an idea, seemingly at 
irreconcilable odds with each other, are held together in a tensional synthesis in order to say something 
that cannot be expressed in any other way. At some point, there is a moment of epiphany, when the 
meaning of an expression such as "X and not -X" is clearly communicated, and is found to be richer than 
the acceptance of only one or the other. At some higher level, we hope to find that all of these small 
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the case of ambiguity is, in some ways, the actual definition of the phenomenon. 
Examination of one of Imeson's own examples of paradox - the famous Liar's Paradox 
- suffices to demonstrate the point. This paradox arose in the sixth -century B.C. 
through the declaration of the Cretan prophet Epimenides that "All Cretans are liars ". In 
this simple paradox may be seen the inherent unresolvability of all paradoxes - there is 
an opposition of two "truths" neither of which can be asserted without the negation of 
the other. This lack of assertion means that both are equally "true" and equally "false" - 
there is no possibility of resolution. As will be seen, whilst not all paradoxes involve the 
opposition of "truths ", every paradox produces an unresolvable situation. 
As will be considered in the final chapter of this work, the elision of paradox and 
ambiguity that occurs in both Spitzer and Imeson's work is common: it may also be 
seen, for example, in the work of Kerman,88 Chua,89 and Dahlhaus,90 and, as will be 
seen in the final chapter of this work, of Muecke, Booth and Sheinberg. It is particularly 
important to differentiate paradox from ambiguity because of the correlation between 
irony and paradox that will be demonstrated in the third and fourth chapters. If paradox 
and ambiguity are considered to be correlatives, then any ambiguity could, in theory, be 
treated as ironic. The profound implications of this viewpoint for signifying systems, 
including music, will be seen below. Moreover, Beethoven's work, particularly the late 
quartets, demonstrates significant instances of both ambiguity and irony. Irony was, in 
fact, never central to Beethoven's compositional aesthetic - clearly a significant 
majority of his works display no trace of it. Therefore, those cases when it does occur 
are of special importance. Differentiating irony from ambiguity thus allows a fuller 
critical appreciation of the role of both within these important works. 
epiphanies, or fragments of meaning arising from local paradoxes will exhibit a converging pattern of 
structural and expressive significance." Ibid. p. 126/7 
88 Kerman (1967) p. 307 
89 Chua (1995) p. 229 
90 Dahlhaus (1991) p. 232 
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Romantic Irony 
The concept of "Romantic" irony originated primarily within the philosophical 
writing of the brothers Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, two of the most 
important figures in early German Romanticism. August Wilhelm was far better 
known to the general public, largely because of his popular translations of 
Shakespeare, as well as for his criticism and public lectures. His philosophy, 
however, is in some ways derivative of Friedrich's, his work popularising many of 
his brother's conceptions. Indeed, Friedrich Schlegel's philosophical thought was 
the more radical and influential, forming the basis for almost the entire philosophy of 
Romantic irony, and indeed of much of the emerging Romantic movement. 
Friedrich Schlegel's conception of Romantic irony is rather awkward: it does not 
readily fit into any standard division of `types' of irony such as "verbal ", 
"situational ", "dramatic" or "general" irony. Rather, Romantic irony is best 
understood as a combination, or hybrid of such types: it is fundamentally an 
aesthetic (hence "verbal ") response to the perception of the essential "situational" 
irony of human existence. Muecke's definition - "the irony of the fully- conscious 
artist whose art is the ironical presentation of the ironic position of the fully 
conscious artist "1 - is perhaps the best place to begin the examination the concept. It 
demonstrates the three essential elements of Romantic irony - consciousness, 
paradox and parabasis in Schlegel's terminology. This chapter will examine the 
philosophical basis of these elements first; the two following will demonstrate the 
manner in which Schlegel's conception of irony is reflected within Beethoven's 
quartets, focussing on Op. 132 and Op. 130/133 respectively. 
Consciousness 
According to Schlegel, the foundation of all ironic art is consciousness, specifically 
the artistic self-consciousness. This is most clearly expressed in several fragments 
1 Muecke, Douglas C. (1970) Irony p. 20 
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from the collections of fragments published as the Lyceum (1797) and as Ideas 
(1800)2. Lyceum fragment 42 is perhaps the most famous: 
Philosophy is the real homeland of irony ... there is a rhetorical species of irony which, 
sparingly used, has an excellent effect, especially in polemics; but compared to the 
sublime urbanity of the Socratic muse, it is like the pomp of the most splendid oration 
set over against the noble style of an ancient tragedy ... [Romantic] poetry does not 
restrict itself to isolated ironic passages, as rhetoric does. There are ancient and modern 
poems that are pervaded by the divine breath of irony throughout and informed by a 
truly transcendental buffoonery. Internally: the mood that surveys everything and rises 
infinitely above all limitations, even above its own art, virtue or genius; externally, in its 
execution: the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian buffo.3 
Fragment 37 is more emphatic: 
In order to write well about something, one shouldn't be interested in it any longer. To 
express an idea with due circumspection, one must have relegated it wholly to one's 
past; one must no longer be preoccupied with it. As long as the artist is in the process of 
discovery and inspiration, he is in a state which, as far as communication is concerned, 
is in the very least intolerable.4 
Consciousness is also integral to Ideas number 69 - "Irony is the clear consciousness 
of eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming chaos ".5 (This fragment will be considered 
more closely in the context of the concept of paradox.) 
The consciousness of the artist may be understood in two key ways. Firstly, artistic 
consciousness tempers inspiration by artistic control. The conscious artist establishes 
a distanced, or "surveying" viewpoint over his work, i.e. he "relegates it wholly to 
his past ", rather than creating by "blurting out "6 from within the work, whilst in the 
process of inspiration. This objective viewpoint of the processes of artistic creation 
results in "complete superiority, detachment, manipulation of the subject matter ",7 
2 The fact that Schlegel chose to write in a fragmentary form is itself related to his conception of 
irony, particularly the relationship between paradox and existence. This relationship is, however, 
beyond the scope of this current thesis: for a full explanation see Behler, Ernst (1993) German 
Romantic Literary Theory and Gasché, Rodolphe (1991) "Ideality in Fragmentation" in Schlegel, 
Friedrich (1991) Philosophical Fragments trans. Peter Firchow. 
3 Schlegel (1991) Lyceum fragment 42 p. 5/6 
4 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 37 p. 4 
5 Ibid. Ideas no. 69 p. 100 
6 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) Fragment 37 p. 4 
7 Wellek, René (1955). A History of Modern Criticism: 1750 -1950. The Romantic Age p. 15 
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with the result that the artwork becomes an object to the artist; he is conscious of the 
artifice of his own art. 
Crucially, Schlegel's conception of artistic "consciousness" does not merely entail 
objective manipulation or control of the artwork or the awareness of its inherent 
artifice. Rather, it also encompasses an awareness both of the paradoxical and ironic 
nature of reality, and of the irony of the artist's own position within such a 
paradoxical reality. The irony of the artist's position is that all art, even ironic art 
that is aware of its own artifice, is essentially artifice. The irony of his existence 
(which will be considered more fully both below and in the fifth chapter) is what 
Muecke terms an "observable" irony: that of a victim, a finite being within an 
infinite, paradoxical universe. 
Therefore, according to Schlegel, the conscious artist is able to view his art as an 
object, and to objectify the whole of existence by removing himself from that reality 
and observing it as though it were wholly in his past. Such a "clear consciousness of 
eternal agility ", is an objectification of even the artist's own existence, allowing him 
to "survey everything and rise infinitely above all limitations, even his own art, 
virtue, or genius ". Consciousness is, in essence, an ironising view. 
Schlegel believed that a conscious artist transcends the paradox and contradiction of 
reality. In effect, he implies that to be conscious, to adopt an objective, ironic 
viewpoint is to be Godlike, since God's viewpoint is that of an ultimate ironist. To 
be ironic is, as in Lyceum fragment 42, to breath the "divine breath ", and to be 
conscious is to adopt, or more accurately mirror, God's consciousness. Adopting this 
"divine" ironic viewpoint allows the artist to free himself momentarily from the 
bounds of both his own art and his existence: it allows him to objectify art and 
existence before the "cosmic" irony of reality does. 
Before considering the connection between artistic consciousness and Schlegel's 
philosophy of paradox, it is important to note briefly that Schlegel and the other early 
German Romantics considered Shakespeare, Cervantes and Goethe to be archetypal 
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conscious artists, whose works possess a high degree of irony. Significantly, E.T.A. 
Hoffman took pains to point out Beethoven's intrinsic consciousness, comparing him 
to Shakespeare, as well as to Haydn and Mozart (both of whose works have also 
been considered ironic).8 Much of his discussion reflects Schlegel's conception of 
consciousness: 
The truth is that, as regards self -possession, Beethoven stands quite on a par with Haydn 
and Mozart and that, separating his ego from the inner realm of harmony, he rules over 
it as an absolute monarch. In Shakespeare, our knights of the aesthetic measuring rod 
have often bewailed the utter lack of inner unity and inner continuity, although for those 
who look more deeply there springs forth, issuing from a single bud, a beautiful tree, 
with leaves, flowers and fruit; thus, with Beethoven, it is only after a searching 
investigation of his instrumental music that the high self - possession inseparable from 
true genius and nourished by the study of the art stands revealed.9 
Paradox 
Paradox is of central importance to Schlegel's conception of irony. It forms the 
basis, not only of his philosophy of irony, and indeed of that of all the Romantics, 
lying at the heart of all his writing on irony, including, as considered briefly above, 
the concept of artistic consciousness. René Wellek acknowledges this when he 
defines the basis of Schlegel's irony as "his recognition of the fact that the world in 
its essence is paradoxical and that an ambivalent attitude alone can grasp its 
contradictory totality ".10 
The essence of Schlegel's philosophy of paradox may be seen in several fragments. 
The most important is Lyceum fragment 48: 
Irony is the form of paradox. Paradox is everything simultaneously good and great.11 
8 See Bonds (1991) and Diener, Betty Sue (1992) Irony in Mozart's Operas (Austria) 
9 E.T.A. Hoffmann (1813) "Beethoven's Instrumental Music ", in Leo Treitler (Ed.), (1998) Strunk's 
Source Readings in Music History p. 1195 (emphasis added) 
10 Wellek (1955) p. 14 
11 Schlegel (1991) Critical (Lyceum) fragment no. 48, p. 6. Note that the manner in which Schlegel 
defines paradox in this fragment - as simultaneously "good and great" - is somewhat unclear. 
"Good" has both Platonic and Kantian associations: for Plato "goodness" was a fundamental principle 
of reality - things were only real to the extent that they participated in the Form of the Good. Equally 
Schlegel's "good" may refer to either of the categories of moral or natural goodness, or more 
specifically to Kant's "categorical imperative" which essentially unites both. The key, perhaps, is the 
implied antithetical relationship of "good" to "great ". "Great" seems to have Burkeian overtones: it is 
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In addition 
Paradox is the conditio sine qua non of irony, its soul, its source and its principle.12 
Finally, the last clause of fragment 69 from Ideas (quoted above) is important. In 
describing irony in relation to "an infinitely teeming chaos ",13 Schlegel demonstrates 
his conception of the world as essentially paradoxical, composed of infinitely 
contradictory realities the effect of which, according to this fragment is chaotic. 
Within these fragments irony is clearly defined in terms of paradox: paradox is the 
essential element of irony, and every paradox, it seems, will produce an ironic form. 
The key to this, however, is the consciousness of the paradox and irony. Irony is the 
"clear consciousness" of the "eternal agility" of the irony itself; it is the 
consciousness of the "infinitely teeming chaos" that is the result of a paradoxical, 
contradictory universe. Against the backdrop of such a paradoxical, chaotic reality 
man is understood as a finite being, struggling to comprehend the infinite. Schlegel 
and the Romantics understood Man's position within the universe in terms of the 
situational dramatic irony of the stage: that is, man is considered to be the victim of a 
cosmic irony.14 As Muecke points out, although they were not the first to 
comprehend this paradox of reality, perceiving it as ironic did originate with the 
Romantics. 
Within Schlegel's conception of an infinitely paradoxical, chaotic universe, not only 
is man himself considered as a finite being, but every human "reality" is also 
understood as finite, as a "closed" order or, in other terms, as an artifice. As 
one of the characteristics that he continually ascribes to the Sublime. As such, "great" may mean 
something that is dark and terrible i.e. that induces the fear that is characteristic of the Sublime. 
Within this context "good" may be taken to mean the opposite, without specifying Schlegel's precise 
meaning. Regardless of this problem, the important point from this fragment for the current work is 
the relationship between irony and paradox. 
12 Schlegel (1957) Literary Notebooks 1797 -1801 ed. Hans Eichner p. 114 
13 Schlegel (1991) Ideas no. 69, p. 100 (emphasis added) 
14 This conception is reflected in Hegel's perception of life as art: "I live as an artist when all my 
action and my expression in general, in connection with any content whatsoever, remains for me a 
mere show and assumes a shape which is wholly in my power ". Hegel, G.W.F. (1835). Aesthetics: 
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Frederick Garber explains, Schlegel thought that, in order to exist in such a 
paradoxical vacuum, humans construct closed realities, which he termed "systems ", 
within which we attempt to function; we "manipulate experience by making models 
of order which are fully subject to our wishes ".15 The irony of this process is that 
systems are nothing other than "privileged fictions, untenable images of order that 
have no effective relationship to the world where they are supposed to be applied ".16 
Schlegel's answer to this paradox is itself paradoxical: "It's equally fatal for the mind 
to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the 
two ".17 This impossible combination of system and non -system is achieved through 
art: the artist overcomes the irony of existence through irony. In essence, ironic 
artistic creations are analogues of the paradoxical and ironic structure of the universe. 
Such utterances are themselves ironic, since, according to Garber, they "make 
independent cosmoses that seek both to minor reality and to stay aloof from it ".18 In 
adopting an ironic position on the irony of life, the artist creates structures that can be 
seen as ironies of life, i.e. ironies of irony. Irony is therefore, as in Schlegel's 
Lyceum 48, the form of both the paradoxical universe and of paradoxical, ironic 
artworks.19 
Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T.M. Knox (1975) p. 65 
15 Garber, Frederick (1988) Sterne: Arabesques and Fictionality p. 35. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment no. 53, p. 24 
18 Garber (1988) p. 35. 
19 Garber's explanation of this process is exceptional, so I quote it in full: 
"The ironists found their answer [to the irony of existence] by seeking out and working with the 
potential fecundity of chaos, and that approach took the form of an impersonation of the forces which 
threaten the constructs set up by the mind. In this way the ironist could do precisely what Schlegel 
had proposed, that is, have a system and not have one, both at once. What the ironist offers is a skilful 
mimicry of that anarchy which is always out there, ready to swallow up all the fixities of human 
experience. In so doing he shows how the mind can turn the threat of disintegration onto the matter of 
high art. Order and disorder, control and chaos, exist simultaneously, all guided by the mind which is 
so free and so masterly that it can show off its strength and creativity by making an image of the most 
profound threat to its freedom. The ironist offers himself as a victim (irony always needs a victim) 
but he is, in fact, a victor, however tentative and temporary his triumphs are. His work is 
characterised by a combination of autonomy and lucidity which leads him to a profitable complicity 
with chaos. His authority is demonstrated by the authorial sovereignty of which Sterne found telling 
instances in Cervantes, and which is exemplified further in the creativity of Tieck, Byron and 
Hoffmann, among others. Romantic irony is the product of a self -consciousness aware of both the 
proximity of chaos and the strength of artifice." Ibid. p. 38 
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Schlegel's philosophy of paradox thus reflects the dichotomy of the finite and the 
infinite, the ultimate meaninglessness of fixed human constructs in an infinitely 
chaotic universe. Moreover, he demonstrates the value to both life and art of 
recognising the inherent artifice of such systems. The ultimate irony of this 
philosophy however is that even the "system without a system ", the ironising of the 
paradox of existence in art by the conscious artist, results ultimately in another 
artificial system. Schlegelian irony may therefore be understood as a never -ending 
progression from the position of ironist to that of ironised. 
This continual alternation between ironist and ironised, finite and infinite reflects the 
relationship between Romantic irony and transcendental philosophy, specifically 
post -Kantian idealism. Romantic irony, as seen, relates art to existence, aesthetics to 
metaphysics and ethics - it is essentially a philosophical viewpoint.20 Indeed, this 
relationship is perhaps the central concern of all of Schlegel's philosophy. He sought 
to overcome the difficulties that he perceived in Kantian and post -Kantian 
philosophy through a union of philosophy and art that he termed "transcendental 
poetry". 
There is a kind of poetry whose essence lies in the relation between ideal and real, and 
which therefore, by analogy to philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental 
poetry. It begins as satire in the absolute difference of ideal and real, hovers in between 
as elegy, and ends as idyll in the absolute identity of the two.21 
Such transcendental poetry should, like transcendental philosophy, contain "the 
producer along with the product "22 and a description of transcendental thinking 
within the system of transcendental thoughts: "in all its descriptions, this poetry 
should describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of 
poetry".23 
Schlegel's description of transcendental poetry is clearly related to Fichte's 
20 Indeed, as will be seen in the fourth chapter of this work, the "existential" basis of Schlegel's 
Romantic irony is derives not only from post -Kantian idealism, but also from the Socratic irony of 
Plato's writing. 
21 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 238 p. 50/51 
22 Ibid. 
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"subjective" development of Kant. Although Schlegel largely rejected Fichte's 
system, the "existential" basis of his irony may nevertheless be connected to the 
concept of reflexivity, or reflective thought, from Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.24 
Fichte argued against the separation of the self from actuality that originated from 
Kant's reliance upon the concept of the "thing -in- itself' by rejecting this concept 
altogether, proposing instead the notion of the "self- positing I ".25 He considered 
that the self and the external world are actually one and the same thing: 
consciousness is self -positing, but it also posits actuality. This complicated process 
may be described in terms of two `drives': the first towards the infinite, and the 
second towards the finite. The first `practical' drive is "unbounded self assertion "26, 
through which the self -positing "I" is obliged to reach out towards the infinite, 
seeking to subject everything to its own autonomous laws. This movement towards 
the infinite is opposed at every turn however, by the `theoretical' drive, which Fichte 
termed "reflective thought" - self -contemplation that effectively transforms the 
infinite, self -positing self into a finite, bounded entity. 
There is therefore a constant tension, indeed contradiction between these two drives, 
a constant process of self -positing and self -limiting, of self -assertion and self - 
destruction; in other words, a continual paradox. From this continual movement 
23 Ibid. 
24 Schlegel's famous comparison of Fichte's philosophy to both the French Revolution and Goethe's 
Meister (Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 216, p. 46) should suffice to demonstrate his 
relationship to Fichte's system. 
25 Indeed, Kant's concept of the "thing -in- itself' relates directly to Schlegel's writing on irony in two 
important ways. Firstly, Kant's system irrevocably separates the self from the world - the "thing -in- 
itself'. Our knowledge contains an inherent inability to know anything about the "thing -in- itself'. 
This results from the conditions of our knowledge, which, according to Kant, are defined and 
delimited by the limits of our empirical experience. The "thing -in- itself' is unknowable as a 
phenomenal reality: since we can never experience it we can therefore know nothing about it; we are 
forever distanced from the world as it is in itself. However, the existence of the "thing-in-itself' must 
be `thought', as a necessary pre- condition for our representation and reason. 
This is closely related to the second issue, the "illusion of the unconditioned ". According to 
Kant our knowledge is, by definition, conditional and synthetic. However, the process of our reason 
leads us, inescapably, to seek beyond the conditions of our knowledge for the unconditioned that 
makes all conditions valid. There is therefore, within the process of our reasoning a continual 
movement from the conditional towards the unconditional, a continual antithesis between finite and 
infinite. Crucially, this dichotomy cannot be avoided, despite our awareness of it: it is intrinsic in the 
manner in which reason functions. Both of these issues therefore produce a distinction between the 
"finiteness" of human knowledge and reason compared to an infinite that is forever beyond our 
perception or understanding - an inherently ironic situation. 
26 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1802) Science of Knowledge ( Wissenschaftslehre) p. 192 
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between finite and infinite results `imagination': "the source of all presentations and 
hence the locus of the physical world ".27 Actuality is therefore posited as a synthesis 
from the continual motion between thesis and antithesis embodied in the process of 
reflective thought. It arises from the perception of the subjective consciousness: in a 
sense, therefore, all knowledge is actually self -knowledge. 
Schlegel's transcendental poetry introduces Fichtean reflective thinking - the 
`immediate union of being and looking'28 - into Romantic art, producing within it a 
dialectic of the finite and infinite which parallels that embodied in Fichte's system. 
It is a continuous process of self -creation and self -annihilation, a constant antithesis, 
a constant paradox. Moreover, it is continually self -reflexive, containing both poet 
and poem. Crucially, however, as may be seen in the fragments above, Schlegel 
describes this transcendental poetry in terms of irony, and his description of irony as 
a "continuously fluctuating between self -creation and self -destruction "29 makes this 
relationship between his irony and Fichtean philosophy explicit. Thus, the 
transcendental basis of Schlegel's philosophy - the paradoxical, self -reflexive 
dialectic between finite and infinite, real and ideal - is conceived as fundamentally 
ironic. His philosophy of irony thus relates not only to art, but also to ethics and 
especially to metaphysics: Schlegel's irony forms a fundamental philosophical 
viewpoint. 
It is important to stress the infinite process of this irony. (Indeed, in the following 
chapters I will argue that this infinite process not only distinguishes Schlegel's irony 
from concepts such as wit and humour, but also that the process of Beethoven's Op. 
132 quartet may be understood as a correlate of this infinite reflective process.) The 
infinite, never -ending nature of the paradoxical, reflective process of Romantic irony 
is seen clearly in many of Schlegel's figurations - "infinitely teeming chaos ", an 
"endless series of mirrors" and the "continuous" alternation of creation and 
destruction.30 However, his longest discourse on irony actually demonstrates this 
27 Ibid. p. xviii 
28 Behler, Ernst (1993) German Romantic Literary Theory p. 138 
29 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 51 p. 24, also Critical (Lyceum) fragment 37 p. 4 
30 Ernst Behler highlights this infinite process. He considers that for Schlegel "poetic reflection" was 
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infinite process. In "On Incomprehensibility" he describes the paradoxes of the 
"irony of irony ", which occurs 
If one speaks of irony ironically without in the process being aware of having fallen into 
a far more noticeable irony; if one can't disentangle oneself from irony anymore ... if 
irony turns into a mannerism and becomes, as it were, ironical about the author ... if 
irony runs wild and can't be controlled any longer. 
What gods will rescue us from all these ironies? The only solution is to find an irony 
that might be able to swallow up all these big and little ironies and leave no trace of 
them at all. I must confess that at precisely this moment I feel that mine has a real urge 
to do just that. But even this would be only a short-term solution. I feat that if I 
understand correctly what destiny seems to be hinting at, then soon there will arise a 
new generation of ironies: for truly the stars augur the fantastic ... Irony is something 
one simply cannot play games with. It can have incredibly long -lasting after effects.31 
The infinite nature of Schlegel's conception of irony - the constant cycle from irony 
towards ironised - is described by Hegel as "infinite absolute negativity ", a never - 
ending process of destruction that undermines not only of the basis of human 
existence, but also of art: 
The ironical, as the individuality of genius, lies in the self -destruction of the noble, great 
and excellent; and so the objective art- formations too will have to display only the 
principle of absolute subjectivity, by showing forth what has worth and dignity for 
mankind as null in its self -destruction. This then implies that not only is there to be no 
seriousness about law, morals and truth, but that there is nothing in what is lofty and 
best, since, in its appearance in individuals, characters, and actions, it contradicts and 
destroys itself and so is ironical about itself .. . 
But if irony is taken as the key -note of the representation, then the most inartistic of all 
principles is taken to be the principle of the work of art. For the result is to produce, in 
part, commonplace figures, in part, figures worthless and without bearing, since the 
substance of their being proves to be a nullity.32 
Hegel's rejection of Schlegel's philosophy is based primarily upon only his own 
"inseparable from the creative process, animating the entire poetic work, and blending the author's 
artistic creation with his critical, theoretical discourse ". Crucially, however, "such a reflection is of 
course infinite and can be exponentiated to ever higher powers ". (Behler, Ernst (1990) Irony and the 
Discourse of Modernity p. 60) 
31 Schlegel, Friedrich (1800) "On Incomprehensibility" in Wheeler, Kathleen M (1984) German 
Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: the Romantic Ironists and Goethe p. 37 It is interesting to note that 
in this essay Schlegel states that irony "is to be found everywhere in [the Athenaeum]" (ibid. p. 36), 
and yet this discourse on irony actually takes place within the Athenaeum. Although it occurs in 
essay form, this passage may therefore be taken as an incidence of the irony of irony - the 
commentary on irony actually participates in or produces a dialectical spiral of irony, involving the 
conscious ironising of an artist who speaks ironically about irony. 
32 Hegel (1835) p. 67/8. Hegel's exposition of Schlegel's philosophy of irony that precedes the 
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belief in the intrinsic worth of "the lofty, the beautiful" etc.33 Rather than actually 
refuting Schlegel's conception of these as finite, artificial human constructs, he 
simply insists upon the opposite - the "moral and true" and "inherently substantial 
content ".34 Hegel was unable to reconcile himself to Schlegel's view, so he simply 
denies it any worth, insisting that it leads to the negation of art (whilst ignoring the 
fact that Schlegel's models of artistic irony were Shakespeare, Cervantes and 
Goethe). 
It is important to consider however, that whilst Hegel rejected Schlegel's conception 
of irony and paradox as a process of infinite negation, Romantic irony may also be 
understood in an entirely opposite manner. Significantly, Lowry Nelson considers 
that Schlegel's "Unendlich vollen Chaos" represents a process that "characteristically 
stresses the positive, generative notion of chaos as productive and fruitful, with 
cosmogenic pre- Socratic and Platonic overtones ",35 the process which Sheinberg 
refers to as "infinite creation ", an "eternal process of affirmation ".36 In other words, 
according to Nelson, the paradox of Romantic irony occurs not as a Hegelian process 
of infinite negation, but rather as a positive, creative force. 
This perception of paradox as a generative force will be considered in the fourth 
chapter of this work. Within that chapter Schlegel's conception of paradox will be 
placed within a larger philosophical context and will be seen to relate to a form of 
irony known as "general" or "existential" irony: indeed, his Romantic irony may be 
considered a development of these other forms. Significantly, this relationship will 
also be seen to be reflected within the corpus of Beethoven's quartets: general, 
existential irony may be seen within two important movements - the Cavatina from 
Op. 130, and the Grosse Fuge Op. 133. 
quoted passage is particularly brilliant. 
33 In other words, his argument reflects the dichotomy of aesthetics vs. ethics. 
34 Hegel (1835) p. 67/8 
35 Nelson, Lowry Jr. (1988) "Romantic Irony and Cervantes ", in Romantic Irony, ed. Frederick 
Garber p 18 
36 Sheinberg, Esti (2000) Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque in the Music of Shostakovich: A 
Theory of Musical Incongruities p. 62 
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Parabasis 
According to Schlegel "Irony is a permanent parabasis "37. This conception 
demonstrates the manner in which Schlegel considered that the ironic paradox of 
reality and the consciousness of the artist affect the artwork. Parabasis is a type of 
dramatic device, referring specifically to an interlude in the midst of a comedy by a 
chorus that claims to speak in the author's name. The effect of this was a momentary 
shift of focus from the "reality" of the play towards the reality of the play as an 
artwork, i.e. as an artifice. According to Nelson, "Schlegel's universalising of the 
term as permanent or continuous defines that aspect of his general conception of 
irony which calls for the author's explicit control and willed intervention ".38 
As considered above, the conscious artist establishes an objective, ironic viewpoint 
over the paradox of both life and art: the essence of Schlegelian parabasis is the 
perception of the permanent presence of such an ironic artist within the artwork. 
That is, the artist's ironic manipulation of the artwork, which demonstrates both his 
own consciousness and his control over the work, is understood as corresponding to 
the actual presence of the artist within the work. This "presence" is an extension of 
the momentary representation of the author by the device of parabasis. The effect of 
this parabasis is that, through ironic manipulation of the artwork, the conscious artist 
mirrors both the irony of existence, including the irony of his own artistic position, 
and the artifice of art. 
Thus, in an ironic work, the artist's control over the work - the process of creation - 
becomes part of the subject of the work itself. This process foregrounds both the 
subject of the work and the entire works existence as artifice, which, according to 
Schlegel's conception, parallels the artifice of every system within a paradoxical 
reality. As Muecke explains, "the only possibility open for a real artist is to stand 
apart from his work and at the same time incorporate this awareness of his ironic 
position into the work itself and so create something which will, if a novel, not 
37 Schlegel (1963) p. 668 
38 Nelson (1988) p. 17 -18 
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simply be a story but rather the telling of a story complete with the author and the 
narrating, the reader and the reading, the style and the choosing of the style, the 
fiction and its distance from fact, so that we shall regard it as being ambivalently 
both art and life ".39 
Two concepts which writers on irony have consistently identified with Romantic 
irony - "aesthetic distance" and the "destruction of the aesthetic illusion" - may be 
understood as deriving from ironic parabasis. "Aesthetic distance" describes the 
effect caused by parabasis - the objectification of the process of composition within 
the work itself. The resulting perception of the artifice of the work prevents the 
content of that work being apprehended on its own terms. In a "Classical" narrative 
structure we engage purely with the content of that narrative, in some sense, as 
reality: in Schlegel's terms, we willingly confine ourselves within the defined 
boundaries of the narrative "system ". In an ironic narrative we become aware, not 
only of the content of the narrative, but also of the process of the narration. The 
perception of narration violates the boundaries of the narrative system, preventing 
the acceptance of the narrated as a reality. The narrative becomes, instead, an 
artifice, and as such is regarded as an object, rather than as a reality. 
"Aesthetic distance" is frequently the point of departure for consideration of irony in 
musical discourse. For example, in separate articles Brauner40, Heinz Di1141 and 
Longyear42 each sought to identify individual elements that indicate the presence of 
irony in musical discourse. Essentially, however, all these writers focus on 
"aesthetic distance" within the work as the locus of irony. Mark Evan Bonds' refers 
more specifically to the creation of two closely related types of "distance ": distance 
between the composer and his work and between the listener and that same work.43 
The first of these is effectively the result of parabasis: the disruptive /manipulative 
presence of the composer establishes "distance" between composer and composition 
39 Muecke (1970) p. 20 
40 Brauner (1981) 
41 Dill, Heinz J. (1989) "Romantic Irony in the works of Robert Schumann ", The Musical Quarterly. 
vol. 73. 
42 Longyear (1970) 
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within the work. The second may, on the one hand, be considered to be a result of 
this parabasis: the perception of the composer's presence draws attention to the 
artifice of the work, violating the `suspension of disbelief'. However, the opposite is 
also true: the composer's "presence ", his distance, is a result of the perception of the 
listener. Thus, the "aesthetic distance" between the reader and the work and between 
the composer and the work are really two sides of the same coin. 
The technique of the "destruction of aesthetic illusion ", frequently associated with 
Romantic irony, is consistently identified as one of the most important ways in which 
aesthetic distance is achieved: it is often considered to be the locus of such irony. In 
fact, such violation of illusion is an effect of parabasis: according to Schlegel the 
"self- infliction" of parabasis "is not ineptitude, but deliberate impetuousness, 
overflowing vitality ... the most intense agility of life must act, even destroy; if it 
does not find an external object, it reacts against a beloved one, against itself, against 
its own creation ".44 Tieck's techniques of displaying the conventions of the stage, 
which destroy the aesthetic illusion, making the audience conscious of seeing a play 
are an example of this. In the following example, from his Der Gestiefelte Kater 
[Puss in Boots] the characters Leutner, Schlosser, Fischer and Müller are critics 
within an on -stage audience, witnessing the play. The author and the machinist have 
just had an on -stage conversation concerning the stage machinery after the curtain 
has risen for the beginning of the third act. This caused confusion among the critics 
in the audience and so Jackpudding, the court jester, attempts to repair the situation: 
JACKPUDDING. Excuse me if I make so bold as to deliver a few words which 
actually don't belong to the play. 
FISCHER. Oh, but you ought to remain perfectly silent. You've already 
displeased us in this play, and still more now - 
SCHLOSSER. A Jackpudding presumes to talk with us? 
JACKPUDDING. Why not? For if I'm ridiculed that doesn't bother me. Indeed, it 
would be precisely my warmest wish that you laugh at me. So don't be 
embarrassed. 
LEUTNER. That's rather droll. 
JACKPUDDING. Of course, what little becomes the King is all the better suited 
for me. For this very reason he refused to come out at all and left this 
important announcement to me. 
MÜLLER. But we don't want to hear anything. 
43 Bonds (1991) 
44 Quoted in Behler (1990) p. 84 
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JACKPUDDING. My dear German countrymen - 
SCHLOSSER. I believe the play is set in Asia. 
JACKPUDDING. Now, however, I'm talking to you as mere actor to the 
spectators. 
SCHLOSSER. People, I'm done for; I'm insane. 
JACKPUDDING. Please realise, though, that the previous scene [the conversation 
of the Author and Machinist], which you just saw, doesn't belong to the 
play at all.. 
FISCHER. Not to the play? But then, how did it get into it? 
JACKPUDDING. The curtain was lifted too early. It was a private conversation 
which wouldn't have occurred on stage at all if space weren't so 
disgustingly tight in the wings. If you laboured under the illusion, that 
would indeed be even worse. Do be so good, then, as to eradicate this 
deception in yourselves; for from now on, - understand me, only after I've 
gone off, - the act will actually begin. Between ourselves, everything 
which has preceded plays no role in the affair. - But you shall be 
compensated; there will, in contrast, soon come a number of things which 
very much pertain to the matter. I've spoken to the author himself, and he 
has given me his word.45 
Throughout the example, indeed throughout the entire work, Tieck constantly 
manipulates the aesthetic illusion of the "reality" of the onstage work. The presence 
of the author, machinist and prompter draw attention to the "machinery" of the 
onstage play in the same way that a serious mistake in a recital diverts the attention 
from the music onto the performance - the aesthetic illusion of the performance is 
destroyed. 
Tieck though further distorts this process. When Jackpudding addresses the audience 
of the play "as mere actor to the spectators ", he clings to the characteristics of the 
fool, opposing this to the serious character of the king, in order to justify this address. 
In effect he is at once both character and actor, which produces a similar blurring of 
the distinction between play and "reality ". 
Tieck uses this juxtaposition of play and reality to produce a satire on certain critical 
philosophies of art. The onstage critics are portrayed as demanding "taste ", 
heightened emotionalism and the beautiful, by which they generally mean gross 
stereotypes and conventional dramatic devices. Thus the fact that throughout the 
work they are unable to judge either between the events of the play and the numerous 
intrusions of "reality ", or between characters and "actors ", may be taken as satirical. 
45 Tieck, Ludwig (1797) Der Gestiefelte Kater, trans. Gerald Gillespie (1974) pp. 98 -101 
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In particular it may be seen as a satire of the view encapsulated in one of Hegel's 
complaints against Romantic irony: 
For this reason, after all, on the part of irony there are steady complaints about the 
public's deficiency in profound sensibility, artistic insight, and genius, because it 
does not understand this loftiness of irony; i.e. the public does not enjoy this 
mediocrity and what is partly wishy -washy, partly characterless. And it is a good 
thing that these worthless yearning natures do not please; it is a comfort that this 
insincerity and hypocrisy are not to people's liking, and that on the contrary people 
want full and genuine interests as well as characters which remain true to their 
intrinsic worth.46 
Der Gestiefelte Kater may be understood as possessing levels, or layers of irony. 
The satire on criticism constitutes one level, whilst the effect of displaying the 
"machinery" of the play, and its juxtaposition with "reality" - the destruction of 
aesthetic illusion - may be taken as another. The effect of parabasis, however, is 
found in a third level of irony - the objectification of the second level. The blurring 
and juxtaposition of the onstage "system" - the play - and "reality" occurs within a 
play, i.e. as a system. The onstage destruction of aesthetic illusion objectifies the 
artifice of the actual play: through observing the ironic destruction of illusion, the 
audience is made aware of the aesthetic illusion they are currently participating in. 
The result of this is that the act of watching a play is objectified. 
This process, however, also objectifies the creation of the work, since the awareness 
of an artifice automatically implies the presence of an artist. Moreover, in this case 
the artist will also be perceived to be not only conscious of the irony of the aesthetic 
illusion, but also ironic towards it. The destruction of aesthetic illusion and the 
presence of the artist within the artwork are subjects of the actual work, the ironic 
treatment of which has the effect of objectifying these same processes in the actual 
work. This objectification is understood as the ironic "presence" of the artist, the 
essence of Schlegelian parabasis. 
* 
46 Hegel (1835) p. 68 Note that although Hegel earlier implies that Tieck knew nothing of irony, it 
appears that he knew enough to satirise the view expressed above over thirty years before Hegel 
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Two significant points must be considered regarding parabasis and the philosophical 
foundation of Romantic irony. The first of these is that, whilst Schlegel refers to 
devices of parabasis as a demonstration of the "artist's presence" within an artwork, 
it is important to realise that these devices establish the presence, not of the artist 
himself, but of a narrator. Such a narrator may, to a greater or lesser extent, provide 
a substitute for an authorial "voice "; nevertheless, such a presence will always be, in 
essence, an artifice. 
Lowry Nelson demonstrates this point: "The sovereign power of the writer, the self - 
reflexiveness of both writer and work, the wit, urbanity and irony with which a work 
may be suffused, all suggest a strong but complex presence of manipulatable tone 
that may be attributed to the author -in- charge or to the controlling narrator or 
speaker ".47 In other words, the devices of parabasis and other manipulations of the 
work create the presence of the "author ", which must therefore be understood as an 
artifice. Thus, the "presence of the artist" cannot be perceived as the "authentic" 
voice of the actual composer, but must actually be considered as a narrator. 
The identification of the artist's "presence" or "voice" within a work as a narrative 
artifice is particularly significant with respect to musical discourse, especially within 
the context of Beethoven's late quartets. In musical discourse the "narrator" is often 
latent: the simple existence of a narrative system actually indicates the presence of a 
narrator; because of this, such utterances are often considered the "direct" utterance 
of the composer. However, Bonds demonstrates the manner in which Haydn began 
to manipulate narrative devices to produce an ironic effect, which he considers to 
parallel that of Sterne.48 As I will demonstrate below, in his quartet Op. 132, 
Beethoven goes even further than this, manipulating even the "artist's presence" - in 
effect he ironises the artifice of his own "narrator ". 
penned it. In other words, as A.W. Schlegel stated, Tieck had foreseen the reader's "tacit objections" 
and responded to them with irony. 
47 Nelson (1988). p. 23 
48 Bonds (1991) 
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The second point regarding the philosophical basis of Romantic irony is more 
fundamental: techniques and devices of parabasis alone, particularly the destruction 
of aesthetic illusion, cannot be considered to constitute or indicate the presence of 
Romantic irony. Wellek makes this particularly significant point with regard to 
Schlegel's conception of irony. He states that Schlegel did not necessarily consider 
the "interference of the author in his work, in the deliberate breaking of the 
illusion "49 to be ironic in itself and that he never identifies the devices of parabasis 
used by Tieck, Brentano, Hoffmann and Heine, as constituting irony alone. Indeed, 
Wellek points out that Schlegel never considered works by these artists to be 
realisations of his philosophy; "Goethe, Shakespeare and Cervantes were his ironists, 
not his fellow romanticists ".50 
Raymond Immerwahr makes a similar point; "Romantic irony" now has a different 
meaning than it did for Friedrich Schlegel. According to him, "the term is most 
commonly applied nowadays to the drastic violation of illusion by reference within a 
literary work to its author and the process of its creation, to the transgression of the 
boundary which separates our level of reality as readers of a book or as audience in a 
theatre from the reality of the characters in that book or play ".51 Immerwahr states 
that when Schlegel does praise such techniques of parabasis he refers to them, not in 
terms of irony, but rather of "arabesque ". (Examples include Sterne, Diderot's 
Jacques le Fataliste, and Jean Paul.) Schlegel's definition of arabesque is "a form 
characterised by involutions, complex and seemingly aimless digressions, and 
wanderings back and forth between temporal and spatial settings as well as between 
levels of narrative reality. This last, the device generally called Romantic irony, is 
thus to be seen as one element of what Schlegel terms the arabesque ".52 
Contrary to Immerwahr's view however, Schlegel's arabesque may best be 
understood, within the context of his whole work, as a specific manifestation of 
49 Wellek (1955). p. 15 
50 Ibid. p. 15 
51 Immerwahr, Raymond (1988) The Practice of Irony in Early German Romanticism p. 82 
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Romantic irony, rather than vice versa. Frederick Garber, like Immerwahr, connects 
the devices of parabasis in Sterne to Schlegel's "arabesque ". However, he 
demonstrates that in essence arabesque is an analogue of chaos: "a skilled semblance 
of chaos "53. As has been seen above, Schlegel considered the paradox inherent in an 
"infinitely teeming chaos" as intrinsically ironic.54 Therefore, if the artistic structure 
of an arabesque mirrors this chaos, it demonstrates the artist's ironic consciousness 
of paradoxical reality: arabesque is an inherently ironic form. 
Nevertheless, Immerwahr's point is important - parabasis alone is not Romantic 
irony. As has been seen, devices of parabasis are related, whether through arabesque 
or not, to irony, but only because they demonstrate the consciousness of the artist, a 
consciousness that has its basis in Schlegelian paradox. As Muecke notes, Schlegel's 
identification of the paradox of reality as ironic was an original, and fundamentally 
Romantic view. As such, it is this concept that is the essence or foundation of 
Romantic irony, in both philosophy and practice. Parabasis may be taken as a 
general indicator of irony, but it is the combination of parabasis with paradox that is 
central to Romantic irony.55 
This distinction may be seen within the example from Tieck's Der Gestiefelte Kater. 
The devices of parabasis within this work may be seen in much older works such as 
Aristophanes' comedies or certain soliloquies in Shakespeare. However, the manner 
in which such devices are used by Tieck to create paradox is new: the continual 
parabasis produces "worlds within worlds" i.e. levels of "realities" or systems. Each 
of these successive realities becomes objectified in a continual process from ironic to 
ironised, "reality" to "artifice ", and it is the paradox created by this infinite process 
that makes the irony of this work specifically Romantic. 
52 Ibid. p. 84 
53 Garber (1988) p. 36 
54 Schlegel (1991) Ideas 69 (see quotation above) 
55 As indicated in the opening chapter of this thesis, it is at this point that the conception of Romantic 
irony given here differs from those of Longyear and, to a lesser extent, Hatten. Longyear's analysis of 
Beethoven's `Romantic' irony essentially focuses on moments of parabasis - on disruptions and 
disjunctions within the music - and refers to paradox only briefly. As such, these ironies tend to be 
limited to specific moments in the discourse - quite the reverse of Schlegel's `permanent parabasis ". 
This type of irony is therefore really "rhetorical ", rather than "Romantic" in Schlegel's sense. 
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This understanding of paradox, and its relationship to parabasis as the foundation of 
Romantic irony, clarifies the relationship between Romantic irony and the final, 
specific element of parabasis remaining to be considered: A.W. Schlegel's 
identification of the juxtaposition of "comic" and "serious" modes as an ironic 
technique. This element of parabasis played such an important role in A.W. 
Schlegel's understanding of irony that it has led Raymond Immerwahr to consider 
the juxtaposition of comic and tragic to be the locus of Romantic irony. The 
philosophical basis of this technique will be considered here in some detail because it 
will prove to be important to the following analysis of Beethoven's Op. 132 Quartet. 
According to A.W. Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, the 
juxtaposition of comic and tragic in Shakespeare is a result of the artist's "superior ", 
i.e. ironic viewpoint. He considered that Shakespeare was above all a conscious 
artist, possessing "the indifference of a superior mind, which has run through the 
whole sphere of human existence and survived feeling ".56 From this superior, 
ironising position Shakespeare allows what August Wilhelm refers to as "an 
occasional glance at the less brilliant side of the medal ":57 a demonstration of the 
contradictory, irremediably flawed reality of life, of "the almost inevitable influence 
of selfish motives in human nature "58, in other words of paradox. 
Significantly, this "occasional glance" may be regarded as a device of parabasis, a 
demonstration within the work of the artist's freedom, the artifice of his art, and, 
above all, the paradox of reality. 
He [Shakespeare] makes, as it were, a sort of secret understanding with the select circle 
of the more intelligent of his readers or spectators; he shows them that he has previously 
56 Schlegel, August Wilhelm (1808) Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature trans. John Black 
(1883) p. 369 Significantly, as will be seen in the next chapter, Beethoven had access to this work 




seen and admitted the validity of their tacit objections; that he himself is not tied down 
to the represented subject, but soars freely above it; and that, if he chose, he could 
unrelentingly annihilate the beautiful and irresistibly attractive scenes which his magic 
pen has produced.59 
Here Schlegel specifically considers the juxtaposition of serious and comic elements 
to be the result of the objective consciousness of the artist, of his ironic view. This 
juxtaposition is an annihilation of the aesthetic illusion of the beautiful: comic scenes 
undermine or destroy the illusion created in serious or tragic scenes. He considers 
that this effect is heightened when the comic scene is a parody of the preceding 
serious scene, or when a character's favourable self -presentation is immediately 
juxtaposed with another's less flattering opinion. According to Schlegel, such 
juxtaposition of comic and serious can only be understood in terms of irony: "the 
mixture of such dissimilar, and apparently contradictory, ingredients, in the same 
works, can only be justifiable on principles reconcilable with the views of art, which 
I have already described [i.e. the ironic in art] ",60 
However, it is important to consider that ironic juxtaposition of opposed modes is not 
limited purely to the opposition of comic vs. serious. Nelson's definition of 
Friedrich Schlegel's irony demonstrates an expansion of the concept to include other 
oppositions: 
In general one can say that irony for Schlegel, in his early and widely influential poetics, 
is a concept that entails a hard -won harmony among vastly diverse elements, a 
glorifying in infinity and plenitude, an artistic mastery over contemporaneously opposed 
modes of the serious and the playful, of the exalted and the mundane, a fusion of the 
artful and the natural, and a recognition of the presence of a sovereign personality in the 
work.61 
As Wellek suggests, for August Wilhelm irony may have been centred on the comic, 
because comedy most effectively destroys the aesthetic illusion of the serious.62 For 
Friedrich Schlegel, however, the juxtaposition of comic and serious was one of many 
oppositions and contradictions that comprise the paradox of reality. The significance 
59 Ibid. p. 370 
60 Ibid. p. 371 
61 Nelson (1988) p. 22 
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for the current work is therefore that juxtapositions of other oppositional genres etc. 
may be used as devices of parabasis. 
The expansion of this concept from the opposition of comic and serious is paralleled 
in the development of irony in musical discourse. Bonds demonstrates how humour, 
and its juxtaposition with the sentimental in a process of unexpected disruptions and 
returns, was used by Haydn to create ironic distance: comic devices are used to 
undermine the aesthetic illusion of the serious or sentimental, thereby creating a 
sense of ironic distance. Humour thus "betrays the presence of the composer ".63 
Longyear expands the technique of ironic juxtaposition when he demonstrates that 
Beethoven's juxtapositions of "prosaic" and "poetic" that interrupt a mood, and, 
significantly, particularly in "sharply contrasting movements ", achieve the same 
destruction of illusion.64 Finally, Dill demonstrates a similar technique in Heine's 
famous "sting in the tail ", comparing this to Schumann's creation of an illusion that 
is subsequently destroyed by "a change of tone, a personal comment, or a violently 
contradictory sentiment ".65 In such cases the juxtapositions are not limited merely to 
comic vs. serious, but rather include other opposed topics or elements. 
* 
62 "Comedy is the more perfect the more vivid is the illusion of our purposeless play and unlimited 
caprice." Schlegel, A.W. (1808) p. 273, quoted in Wellek (1955) p. 53 
63 Bonds (1991) p. 78 
64 Longyear (1970) p. 655 
65 Dill (1989) p. 173 
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Romantic Irony: Structure and Objectification 
Immerwahr's definition of Schlegel's irony as "all the ways ... by which a creative 
writer calls attention to the paradox and flux inherent in the universe and in human 
communication, including works of art, and to the impossibility of any "definitive" 
creative work "66 highlights the three elements discussed above - consciousness, 
paradox and parabasis. Before demonstrating the manner in which these elements 
(which comprise the philosophical basis of Romantic irony) may be seen within 
Beethoven's Op. 132 Quartet it is important to first consider the manner in which the 
analysis of irony will be approached. In particular, the relationship between irony 
and musical discourse must be examined. The approach used below centres upon 
two conceptions: firstly, that irony, in all its forms, may be understood in terms of 
one fundamental structure of opposed, incongruous elements; secondly, this structure 
invariably produces the effect of objectification. Consequently it is this objectifying 
process that will be considered to define irony throughout this thesis. 
The Structure of Irony 
In relation to the structure and function of irony used in this work, three key elements 
are drawn from Esti Sheinberg's extensive work on musical irony. The first of these 
relates to the manner in which irony may be identified within artistic discourse. In 
common with many writers she considers structural incongruities to be the primary 
indicator of irony,67 and she suggests several criteria for the identification of musical 
irony in terms of such incongruity. According to her, the following characteristics 
may be used to convey irony in music: 
1. Stylistic incongruities within one governing style 
2. Stylistic discontinuities within one governing style 
3. Incongruities with available information about the composer's set of convictions, 
beliefs, values, or about his personal characteristics 
4. Incongruities based on meta -stylistic norms, e.g. rendering a feeling of `too high', 
`too fast', `too many repetitions' etc., not when measured relative to a certain style or 
66 Immerwahr (1988) p. 84 
67 See, for example, Bonds (1991) p. 64/65, Cook, Nicholas (1993) Beethoven: Symphony Number 9 
p. 103, Dill (1989) p. 174/175, Hatten (1994) p. 174/175, Muecke (1969) The Compass of Irony p. 19- 
23, all of whom identify irony in relation to incongruity. 
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topic, but per se 
5. Shifts between levels of musical discourse 
6. Juxtapositions of more than one stylistic or topical context, none of which could be 
regarded as `governing'.68 
With the exception of the third criterion the above will be used in this work to 
identify irony within Beethoven's quartets. The implicit assumption of this third 
criterion is that the viewpoint expressed in an artwork must always be congruent with 
the artist's own, since any incongruity would result in irony. As a result this criterion 
is somewhat unconvincing because it makes no allowance for the fact that the 
relationship between artist and work is often unquantifiable: an artist may express an 
opinion or viewpoint that is contrary to his own views, or that may even be morally 
repellent to him, for aesthetic ends other than irony. Whilst it is certainly the case 
that an artist could take such a position in order to satirise the viewpoint expressed, 
the satire will only be successful if an incongruity of any of the other types listed 
occurs within the structure of the work. Without structural incongruity no irony will 
occur; the expressed viewpoint could be understood as an "authentic" authorial 
viewpoint. 
Incongruity between a work and its extra -textual context, however, can indicate 
irony. For example, incongruity may arise between a given work and either the 
prevailing stylistic milieu or other of the composer's works. As will be seen in the 
fifth chapter of this work, Beethoven's use of musical conventionality in the 
replacement finale of the Op. 130 Quartet may be understood, when compared to the 
other quartets, to be ironic. In such instances, however, the incongruity occurs 
primarily within and between the works, with secondary reference to the 
biographical details of the artist's life. The resultant irony is therefore based upon 
incongruity perceptible within the discourse. 
Sheinberg's general approach to irony is perhaps the most fundamental element used 
within this work. In essence, her conception of irony is based upon a structural 
approach; the structure of irony she proposes, given below, is understood firstly as a 
cultural unit, i.e. as a semiotic unit, and secondly as a discursive structure. In other 
68 Sheinberg (2000) p. 64 
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words, irony is understood as an independent structure, similar to an `idea' in the 
Hegelian sense, that has an existence of its own, separate from any discursive 
manifestation. This structure may subsequently be manifested within any signifying 









The final element drawn from Sheinberg's work concerns the manner in which this 
basic structure is related to discourse, including music. This relationship is based on 
the concept of correlation, which she develops from Hatten's approach. She argues 
that the structure of irony actually functions as a cultural unit, and that this structure 
may be correlated to discursive structures that share the same structural properties. 
Thus where the structure of irony occurs as a discursive form then, rather than simple 
analogy, the structure may be understood as irony. This approach is of particular 
importance in relation to musical discourse. If a musical structure displays this same 
structural property then it is possible to establish a correlation between this structure 
and that of irony, regardless of the semantic contents of the specific discourse. 
The fact that the key correlation is in the structure and not in the content allows an easy 
application to non -verbal modes, such as music. Consequently, a musical structure that 
encompasses co- existing incongruities can be regarded as a correlative of the cultural 
unit of ambiguity [i.e. irony].69 
Essentially this structural approach to irony is used throughout the course of this 
work, with two modifications. The first relates to the actual structure of irony. 
69 Ibid. p. 16. Note that, despite the use of the term "ambiguity", Sheinberg actually refers, from the 
context of the passage, to the structure of irony. Indeed, she considers irony and ambiguity as 
correlatives or synonyms. The problems inherent in this viewpoint will be considered in the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
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Whereas Sheinberg separates the `hidden meaning' from the `incongruous elements' 
within her diagram, I will remove this distinction. The incongruous elements in the 
structure do not point to a hidden meaning; rather, they form at least part of that 
meaning. The incongruity inherent in an ironic structure is not a separate element of 
the structure, but is rather a quality of the relationship between the two elements of 
the structure. Therefore, the diagram may be simplified thus: 
A 
B 
In this diagram, the two elements of the structure (`A' and `B') are incongruous, and 
yet co -exist within a greater meta -structure; this fundamental incongruity creates the 
irony. In simpler ironies, for example in satire, one of the elements will be preferred 
over the other, the rejected meaning becoming the victim of the irony. However, 
more complex forms of irony such as Romantic irony and "general" or "existential" 
irony may also be understood in terms of this structure. As will be seen in the fifth 
chapter, although such forms involve additional discursive levels, all forms of irony 
can be reduced to the same fundamental incongruous structure. 
Objectification 
Secondly, I suggest that, although irony may be considered as a structure of 
simultaneous difference and incongruity, an additional element is needed. This 
additional element is the process of objectification, and it is in this process that the 
locus of irony is to be found. What makes a discourse ironic is not simply the 
presence of an incongruity, but the objectification of one element of the incongruous 
structure by the other that results. 
The process of objectification forms the basis for the analysis of irony throughout 
this thesis. This concept derives from the work of Bakhtin, functioning as part of the 
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"dialogical relationship" that he proposes as the subject of the "meta- linguistic" 
analyses in his Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. His conception of the manner in 
which artistic discourse functions is often complex, even elusive, but is of particular 
importance to this work. Central to his theory is the "word ". This `word' is not the 
unit of language that normally occurs as the subject of linguistic analysis. Rather, 
the Bakhtinian `word' always implies the embodied utterance of a person or 
character: the `word' and the speaker are inseparable.70 This association of an 
utterance with a speaker is attributable to the process of narrativity described above: 
since all forms of discourse are processes of communication, the presence of such a 
communication implies the presence of an author. The result is that the utterance 
embodies, to a greater or lesser extent, the point of view of the implied author. (It is 
important to note, however, that the "author" of an utterance is an artifice implied by 
the inherent narrativity of all discourse.) 
Bakhtin identifies three types of "word ", according to the manner in which each 
relates to the implied author. The first is described as the "direct, linear, fully 
significant word "71, which functions as a "direct authorial word "72 - the expression 
of the author's "ultimate semantic authority ".73 This type, known as the "single - 
voiced word ", "denominates, informs, expresses or represents, and is intended for 
direct, object- oriented comprehension ".74 It is the utterance of one author, with one 
object or purpose, and it is in this mode that most speech and communication occur. 
The second type is the "objectivized word ", the utterance of a represented character 
within a discourse. According to Bakhtin, such words do have the same type of 
direct, object- oriented meaning as words of the first type. However, this second type 
of word "does not lie in the same plane with the author's speech, residing instead at a 
70 "In order to become dialogical, logical and concrete semantic relationships must be embodied, i.e. 
they must enter into a different sphere of existence: they must become a word, i.e. an utterance, and 
have an author, i.e. the creator of the given utterance, whose position is expressed. In this sense every 
utterance has its author, who is heard in the utterance as its creator. We can know absolutely nothing 
about the actual author as he exists outside the utterance." Bakhtin (1929) p. 152 
71 Ibid. p. 156 
72 Ibid. p. 159 
73 Ibid. p. 156 
74 Ibid. p. 154 
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perspective distance from it. It is not only understood from the point of view of its 
object, it itself becomes an object as a characteristic, typical or picturesque word ".75 
This second type of word therefore introduces the process of objectification, whereby 
one viewpoint, one "word" becomes the object of the discourse of another. In the 
represented speech of a character there are essentially two `speech centres' - those of 
the character and the implied author. The character's word, however, is entirely 
subordinate to that of the author, occurring as an element of the author's discourse. 
Thus although there are two "voices" present, the word of the represented character 
occurs solely as the object of the author's discourse. 
Whereas in "single- voiced" words the objectified utterance of the represented 
character is subservient to that of the author of the discourse, in a "dialogical 
relationship" the objectified word is not subsumed within the author's. Rather, the 
presence of two different authorial voices simultaneously within one discourse 
results in a dialogue, within that discourse, between the respective "words ". Bakhtin 
terms the resulting phenomena, containing such dialogical relationships, "double - 
voiced words ". 
This third type of word varies according to the character of the dialogical relationship 
between the "voices ". In all cases, however, the author makes use of another 
person's utterance for his own purposes. He does this by "inserting a new semantic 
orientation into a word which already has - and retains - its own orientation. In that 
case such a word, by virtue of its task, must be perceived as belonging to another 
person. Then the two semantic orientations, two voices, are present in a single 
word ".76 The most significant point for the current discussion is that all forms of 
double- voiced word involve the objectification of one voice by another: 
We know that objectivisation is to a certain degree inherent in all words of the third [double - 
voiced] type.77 
75 Ibid. p. 154 
76 Ibid. p. 156/157 
77 Ibid. p. 164 
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Indeed, the process of objectification is essential to the double- voiced word: 
according to Bakhtin, if the "word" of the other person does not occur as an 
objectified word then the two "voices" in the dialogue will tend to merge - the 
double- voiced word will revert to a single- voiced type. The result of this will be that 
the dialogical relationship will not be perceived. 
Bakhtin's analysis of stylisation demonstrates the dialogical relationships present in 
"double- voiced" words: 
The styliser uses another person's word as another person's thereby casting a slight 
shadow of objectification on that word. The word does not, however, become his 
object. The body of devices of another person's speech is important to the styliser 
precisely as the expression of a particular point of view. He works with the other 
person's point of view. Therefore a certain shadow of objectification falls on that point 
of view itself, and as a result it becomes conditional (uslovnoe - i.e. no longer absolute 
or independent -trans.)... the conditional word is always a double- voiced word.78 
In stylisation, the author shares the same purpose as that of the original speaker. As 
such, the dialogical relationship between the two "voices" is essentially one of 
agreement. The stylising author uses the other person's "word" for the express 
purpose of representing the presence, the viewpoint, of another person. It is the 
relationship between his own viewpoint and that of the "other person's word" that is 
important to the styliser.79 
Where stylisation produces a dialogical relationship of agreement, other cases of 
double- voiced words - Bakhtin specifically identifies irony and parody80 - create 
hostile relationships within the word. In such cases the author forces the voice of 
another to say things that are contrary to that original speaker's viewpoint. This 
produces an incongruity within the structure of the `word', resulting in the ridicule or 
78 Ibid. p. 157 
79 Stylisation differs from imitation in that in imitation there is no sense of the "otherness" of the 
original speaker's "voice ", no process of objectivisation: rather, there is essentially one merged voice. 
In contrast, in stylisation, even though the two voices agree, they remain two different voices. 
Similarly, the difference between stylisation and the second type of "word" - the objectivised word - is 
that, although in the second type of word there are two "voices" present (the author's and the 
character's) there is no dialogical relationship between them - one functions entirely as a represented 
object within the other. 
ß0 "The ironical use, and in general any ambiguous use of another person's word, is analogous to the 
parodistic word, since in such cases the other person's word is being used to communicate aspirations 
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ironising of the original viewpoint. 
The approach to irony used in this work derives from Bakhtin's understanding. All 
forms of irony, whether discursive or non -discursive, will be understood essentially 
as dialogical relationships. In other words, in every irony there is a process of 
objectification, whereby one viewpoint becomes the object of another. The quality 
of this objectification may vary according to the "aim" of the utterance, whether 
stylisation, satire or parody. Nevertheless it is this process that, as will be seen, 
defines irony. 
Although Bakhtin deals exclusively with discursive forms of irony, the same 
approach may be applied to "non- verbal" forms such as situational or dramatic irony. 
For example, the irony of the pickpocket having his pocket picked, cited by Muecke 
as a situational irony,81 may be explained in terms of the objectification of systems. 
The pickpocket's world is a system; it represents reality from his viewpoint. 
However, the fact that he is having his pocket picked, even as he carries out his theft 
demonstrates to the observer the artifice of his system. In such cases the system is 
viewed as "reality" from one viewpoint and simultaneously as an artifice from that of 
the surrounding incongruous context. Since the system is revealed as an artifice it 
becomes objectified - the victim of irony. 
The basic philosophy of Romantic irony may likewise be understood as 
objectification. As considered above, existence was considered to be fundamentally 
ironic because of the paradox created by the incongruous co- existence of "systems" - 
man made, fictional realities that are perceived, by those that created them, as, in 
some sense, an actual reality. The incongruity created by the paradoxical co- 
existence of opposed artificial "realities" however, may be understood as 
objectification: the artifice of all the systems becomes objectified by their 
incongruous juxtaposition. 
which are hostile to it." Ibid. p. 161 
81 Muecke (1970) p. 8 
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This understanding of irony may be demonstrated through the analysis of the 
"dramatic" irony in the example from Tieck's Der Gestiefelte Kater. In this 
example, the satire on criticism is achieved through the onstage parabasis. The 
critics' world, in which the onstage `reality' is perceived as part of the play, and the 
actors are confused with characters, is a fictional reality. The juxtaposition of this 
system with the onstage "reality" objectifies the critics system, demonstrating the 
artifice of that system. The effect of this is not only that the critics' reality but also 
the philosophies that they express throughout the work is seen to be an artifice. As a 
result they become objectified, the victims of satirical irony. 
Tieck's play was, however, considered to be Romantic irony because of the element 
of paradox. As considered, the onstage destruction of illusion objectifies the artifice 
of the actual play. The artifice of the onstage play objectifies that same system - the 
aesthetic illusion - in all plays, including, crucially, the actual play (i.e. Tieck's own 
work) through the process of self -reflexivity. This produces paradox because the 
context of the actual play had previously rendered the onstage play an artifice: the 
objectifier thus becomes the objectified. This creates a never -ending progression 
from "reality" to "system ", in which each reality is eventually seen to be an artifice. 
This contradictory cycle effectively mirrors the paradox of existence that is the basis 
of Schlegel's philosophy. Romantic irony is fundamentally a discursive form 
whereby the artifice of discursive systems is objectified by paradox and 
contradiction, thereby mimicking the fundamental ironic paradox of existence. The 
important point, however, is that this aesthetic response may be understood in terms 
of the same process of objectification outlined above. 
Finally, it is important to consider that, whilst discursive forms of irony such as 
dramatic and Romantic irony will be approached in terms of the structure outlined 
above, this structure will be understood with regard to objectification i.e. as the 
embodiment of a dialogical relationship. The incongruity inherent in the structure of 
irony produces a process of objectification either within one of the elements or, as in 
Romantic irony, in both. This objectification gives the ironic utterance the quality of 
a dialogue: there will be a relationship between the objectified element(s) of the 
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structure and the remaining term. In all cases of irony this relationship will be, in 
Bakhtin's terms, hostile. 
As a result, as will be considered more fully in the following two chapters, the 
process of objectification seen within all irony may be understood, in essence, as a 
process of preferencing. Within dialogical relationships the objectified element is 
always subservient to the non -objectified term, i.e. the `viewpoint' of the non - 
objectified element is always preferred over that of the objectified `word'. As will be 
seen, such preferencing negates the objectified element: it becomes the victim of 
irony. 
* 
Music and Objectification: Convention and Self- reflexivity 
It is important to briefly consider the manner in which the process of objectification 
can occur within music. This is necessary because of an issue that is raised most 
clearly with Muecke's consideration of musical irony. According to Muecke, one of 
the difficulties an ironic composer faces is that "to be ironic is to be ironical about 
something ".82 However, since he considers that music is essentially a non- 
representational art, he concludes that musical discourse is therefore not well suited 
to irony. Muecke seems to suggest, following Eduard Hanslick, that music can 
signify only music, not "what people say, think, feel, and believe ... the area within 
which irony operates ".83 Lacking a referent, music therefore lacks anything that can 
become the object of irony. 
However, if music is more referential than Muecke supposes then the potential for 
irony increases. Since music may signify extrageneric connotations, it is possible 
82 Muecke (1970) p. 4 emphasis added 
83 Paid. p. 7 
79 
that thoughts, beliefs etc. can become musical content.84 For such occurrences to be 
ironic, though, requires that such extrageneric "meanings" occur not simply as the 
subject, or the content of the discourse, but rather as objects, i.e. as in some sense 
objectified `victims'. The discourse must, as Muecke insists, be ironic about them. 
The manner in which this objectification occurs is therefore of importance in 
producing or understanding musical irony. 
Muecke's comments actually indicate two important ways in which music can 
produce objectification: through the use of conventions and through the process of 
self -reflexivity. In both these cases musical structures can occur as objects within 
the discourse. He considers that a common musical "language" makes ironic 
distance possible, since it can provide an object for an ironist - "one piece of music 
can `comment' ironically upon another or upon some other musical style or 
convention and this by means of parodic exaggeration or distortion or by 
incongruous juxtaposition or `quoting "'.85 For example, he considers that the 
Marseillaise in Tchaikovsky's "1812" Overture represents "France, in or after the 
revolution ", and that the composer's subsequent treatment of the theme is ironic. 
Muecke's "language" of music, which allows the possibility of irony through parody, 
may be understood essentially as the conventions of musical discourse. As Umberto 
Eco demonstrates, all communication processes, including language, are based upon 
socially- established convention.86 Any common musical language will therefore, by 
definition, be established in terms of such social convention. Significantly, such 
musical conventions may be treated as objects within a piece: in other words, they 
become susceptible to ironic manipulation. 
This understanding of the relationship between musical convention, objectification 
and irony can be seen to be at the root of Dill and Bonds' respective work on musical 
84 Recent semiotic studies like Hatten's have suggested that by cultural convention music can be 
correlated with such extrageneric connotations or meaning. More generally, topic theories such as 
Leonard Ratner's suggest entire systems of such correlations. 
85 Muecke (1970) p. 6 
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irony. According to both writers, the aesthetic illusion created by a composer is 
thoroughly conventional, indeed often banal: Dill refers to this initial conventionality 
in terms of Heine's manipulation of clichés;87 Bonds discusses Haydn's use of 
heightened (i.e. exaggerated) conventionality in order to achieve ironic "distance" in 
the "Surprise" Symphony.88 In both cases the "aesthetic illusion" of these semantic 
conventions is subsequently exposed, objectifying the conventionality of the 
previous discourse. 
Two types of convention will be of particular importance to the analyses that follow 
- "generic" conventions and "work- specific" conventions. As Bonds argues, 
conventions of genre - for example formal structures such as sonata form - act in a 
similar manner to narrative conventions, providing a framework both for 
composition and for "reading" the discourse.89 Manipulation of these very general 
conventions can therefore direct attention from the content of a work to the technique 
of composition, objectifying the compositional conventions of the genre. 
The infamous finale of Haydn's "Joke" quartet Op. 33 no. 2 may been seen to be an 
example of such manipulation. A seemingly conclusive perfect cadence occurs in 
bar 148 - a clear convention of closure, which the fermata that follows seems to 
confirm. The adagio that follows therefore comes as a surprise, undermining the 
closure implied by the preceding cadence. This effect is repeated at the end of the 
adagio - its closure is undermined when Haydn re- introduces the beginning of the 
main theme. The repetition of the theme is distended it by progressively longer rests, 
which destabilise the effect of the meter. Finally, when the beginning of the theme is 
used to finish the movement there is a paradox of beginning and ending, closure and 
non -closure. 
86 "Every attempt at attempt to establish what the referent of a sign is forces us to define the referent 
in terms of an abstract entity which moreover is only a cultural convention." Eco, Umberto (1976) A 
Theory of Semiotics p. 66. 
87 Dill (1989) p183 
88 Bonds (1991) p. 71 
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The second type of convention is the "work- specific" convention. According to 
Bonds, establishing and subsequently violating a pattern is an important element in 
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the ironising, i.e. objectification of generic conventions.90 Such "patterns" are 
essentially established through repetition, as unique conventions reiterated within the 
individual work. Like generic conventions, these work -specific conventions function 
as narrative structures, producing a framework for the "decoding" of the discourse. 
Similarly, the manipulation of these conventions can also produce aesthetic distance, 
resulting in objectification and irony. 
The first theme of the finale of Beethoven's Quartet Op. 18 No. 6, generates such 
work -specific conventions, dictating much of the movement's subsequent course and 
character. The joyful, euphoric effect of this theme results from a combination of 
elements: the triple time and tempo tend to indicate a basic "dance" topic, augmented 
by the untroubled B flat major key. In addition, the syncopated, sforzando accents of 
the first two bars add elements of cross -rhythm, increasing the rhythmic energy, 
whilst the staccato articulation and persistent semiquaver motion of the first violin 
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In the course of the movement these work -specific conventions are subjected to 
ironic manipulation and objectification. The first occurrence begins at bar 60, where 
the theme occurs in what appears to be a simple modulation device - an ascending 
sequence - combining with the crescendo to produce harmonic /dynamic momentum. 
Bars 67 and 68 represent the fourth phase of this sequence, which in itself perhaps 
suggests a certain exaggeration of the sequential function: there is almost an 
implication of the sequence going too far. Nevertheless, this objectification is 
increased by the sf dominant seventh on the second beat of bar 68, which abruptly 
90 Ibid. p. 71 ff 
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interrupts the fourth phase of the sequence on what should have been its final note. 
The sustained dominant seventh harmony and the hemiola effect produced by the 
repetition of the four -note melodic figure in bars 68 to 71 suspend both the harmonic 
and melodic momentum of the preceding bars. This produces a sudden stasis, a 
disruption of momentum which is fundamentally opposed to the most basic 
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Nevertheless, the fact that this sudden stasis actually develops from the perpetual 
motion of the theme may be understood as an objectification of this work -specific 
conventions, an ironic reversal of function. This objectification is compounded by 
the objectification of the modulation device itself. The stasis on F dominant seventh 
halts the upward sequential progress of the previous bars, forcing the music towards 
the tonic key. This produces the paradoxical situation of a modulation process that 
doesn't actually modulate, an ironic reversal that objectifies the conventions of the 
device. (Indeed, this opposition is actually seen within the relationships of the parts 
in this passage. Throughout the course of the "sequence" the cello remains on an F, 
producing an opposition between this static, immovable bass pedal and the upward 
sequential motion of the three upper parts.) 
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Finally, the manner in which the stasis of these bars forces the theme back to the 
tonic produces an objectification of one of the generic conventions of the rondo. In a 
conventional rondo form, the main theme invariably appears in at least one 
contrasting key. Throughout this entire movement, however, the theme is prevented 
from appearing in any key other than the tonic. This produces an abnormal emphasis 
on the tonic - an objectification and reversal of convention. 
Bars 137 -150 intensify the ironic objectification of the modulation device seen in this 
example through exaggeration of both the semantic structure of the theme and the 
modulation process. Although the harmonic and dynamic momentum generated by 
the earlier modulation device is not particularly incongruous with the conventions of 
the movement, that of bars 137 to 150 is. The ascending sequence continues for too 
long, going too far by extending to a full octave. The harmony of these bars moves 
too far away, increasing in pace between bars 147 and 149, whilst the dynamics 
become too intense, extending to sforzando in a fortissimo dynamic level. This 
produces a complete breakdown of the sequence, culminating in the sudden rupture 
of the texture in bar 150. The fermata entirely halts the music, producing a stasis 
even more pronounced than in the first example. 
The irony of these bars is essentially the same as that of the earlier modulation - an 
objectification, through exaggeration, of the conventions both of the theme itself and 
of the modulation device. Here though, the irony is more pronounced. The 
conventions of the theme destroy their own "aesthetic illusion" - they objectify 
themselves.91 
91 It is important to state that the irony identified in these examples is not Romantic irony. These 
passages are used simply to illustrate the manipulation of generic and work -specific conventions; they 
do not produce the continual "infinite" process of Romantic irony that will be seen in the late quartets. 
Rather, the simple undermining of convention in these instances produces reversals that are finite in 
effect. Thus where there is irony in these examples, it tends to be satirical or corrective in effect: 
"jokes" aimed at mocking the unwary listener as much as "exposing illusion ". In the following 
chapter I argue that, as a result, this "irony" is much closer to Muecke's conception of "Proto- 
romantic irony ", and that such instances should actually be considered in terns of concepts such as 
wit and humour. 
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Significantly, the objectification of such "work- specific" conventions creates the 
possibility for self -irony: the process known as self -reflexivity. In such a case the 
composer creates a work whose own established conventions are subsequently 
treated ironically within the same discourse, resulting in a process of self -irony or 
self -reflexivity. This self -reflexivity occurs in the ironic treatment of the 
conventions in the above examples, causing the conventions of the discourse to 
become an object for their own discourse. Dill's consideration of Schumann's self - 
reflexivity, however, demonstrates that there is an additional objectification process 
involved. He defines self -reflexivity as "the reflection about poetry in the poetic 
work itself ',92 considering Schumann's use of quotation, specifically self -quotation, 
as such a device. According to Dill, this self -quotation may be understood as a 
process whereby music may comment upon itself the composer's own music 
becomes an object within his discourse. However, in doing so the process of 
composition itself is objectified the objectification of a previous discourse destroys 
the "aesthetic illusion ", both of that discourse and, by implication, of the 
92 Dill (1989) p. 172 
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compositional conventions of the new discourse. This establishes an ironic distance 
not only in relation to the self -quotation, but also in relation to the conventions of the 
current work. The process of self -reflexivity, in other words, is an objectification, 
not only of the individual work, but also of the process of composition itself, albeit 
almost by implication. 
It may also be seen that other types of irony will produce an element of self - 
reflexivity. Parodies, for example, objectify the conventions of either a work, an 
individual artist or a style. This objectification may be understood, however, as an 
objectification not only of the conventions themselves, but of the process of their 
creation - a parody of Haydn objectifies his compositional procedure. In 
objectifying the compositional process of the parodied composer, the ironic 
composer, by implication, also objectifies his own process of composition, even if 
unintentionally. Through parody he reveals the artifice of his own art, demonstrating 
the possibility that it too may be subject to parody. In Schlegelian terms the parodist 
demonstrates "both sides of the medal ", i.e. the artificiality both of the parodied 
system and of the system he has himself constructed. In effect the self -reflexivity 
inherent in parody produces, simultaneously, system and non -system. 
Self- reflexivity is therefore directly related to Romantic irony. The objectification of 
the process of the composition within the work itself results in a paradox: the work is 
seen to be simultaneously art and artifice, system and non -system. This self - 
reflexive paradox is effectively a process of self -irony - an objectification of the 
artifice of all art, including the artist's own work. As such, self -reflexivity functions 
as a device of parabasis, drawing attention to the ironic consciousness of the artist, 
and reflecting this consciousness within the work itself. Self -reflexivity therefore 
relates to all of the essential elements of Romantic irony. 
As will be seen in the analysis of Beethoven's Op. 132 Quartet the continual 
presence of parabasis and ironic paradox produce a self -reflexive function, a 
continual objectification resulting from incongruities both within and between the 
movements of the work. These movements not only reflect the consciousness of the 
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paradox of art and artifice within their structure, they also self -objectify. This mix of 
paradox, parabasis and self -reflexivity produces a structure that correlates with the 
infinite process of creation and destruction, assertion and negation. It produces an 
irony that informs not simply moments of the work, but pervades its entire structure, 
resulting not only in the fragmentation of the musical "surface" and the destruction 
of illusion, but also in fundamental paradoxes within the "deep" structures of the 
work. This work produces, in other words, a powerful Romantic irony. 
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Irony, Wit and Humour 
Before considering Beethoven's Op. 132 quartet in terms of Romantic irony it is 
important to demonstrate the hermeneutic basis - the historical context - for this 
analysis. Firstly, the chain of influence between the composer and the Schlegel 
brothers, and hence between Beethoven and the concept of Romantic irony provides 
the basis for considering Beethoven's work in terms of this fundamental Romantic 
conception. Secondly, the relationship between Schlegel's Romantic irony and the 
phenomena of humour and wit will be considered. This has a direct bearing upon the 
Beethoven quartets: the irony of these works is a development of the wit and humour 
of Mozart and Haydn. 
The connection between Beethoven and the Schlegels may be considered from two 
overlapping perspectives: the first is "literary" - through reading their work, or the 
work of those connected with them; the second is through personal contact with their 
close associates. The first important literary connection between Beethoven and the 
Schlegels was through Shakespeare. That Beethoven read Shakespeare is well 
documented; this alone connects the composer to certain devices of "dramatic" 
irony,l particularly the parabasis considered in the previous chapter. However, in a 
letter to Therese Malfatti in May 1810, Beethoven indicates that he had read 
Shakespeare in A.W. Schlegel and Tieck's translation.2 
This direct literary connection is strengthened by the possibility that Beethoven also 
read A.W. Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Art, which he may have become 
acquainted through his close friend Karl Joseph Bernard, editor of the Wiener 
Zeitung. Bernard appears extensively throughout the conversation books, but in one 
entry (dating from late September 1824) he states that he possesses a copy of 
l Note that although such devices in Shakespeare have their origins in Greek tragedies there is no 
evidence that Beethoven knew these works. The connection to so- called "dramatic" or "Sophoclean" 
irony, whilst pertinent, is therefore perhaps more accurately made through Shakespeare than through 
the Classics. 
2 Anderson, Emily (1961) The Letters of Beethoven, Vol. 1 p. 273 
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Schlegel's Lectures.3 This implies that, at the very least, Beethoven had access to 
this work only a few months before beginning the A minor quartet. Crucially, in the 
23rd Lecture, Schlegel outlines his understanding of the ironic basis of art, 
specifically referring to Romantic irony in Shakespeare.4 
The work of Goethe, one of Beethoven's favourite authors, provides a similar link 
between the composer and devices of literary irony. As Romain Roland considers 
"from his earliest days [Beethoven] had steeped his mind in Goethe's works. He 
worshipped him, he read Goethe every day ".5 Significantly Friedrich Schlegel 
considered Goethe's work, particularly Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, (a work that 
Beethoven specifically refers to in the letter to Malfatti of 1810). as ironic. The 
connection to Schlegel and Romantic irony through Goethe is, however, personal as 
well as literary. Goethe's letter to August Schlegel in June 1798 demonstrates not 
only that he knew the Schlegels personally, but also that he was familiar with their 
work: 
Many thanks for the `Athenaeum' you sent; I should have liked and enjoyed its 
contents even if the authors had not spoken of me and my work with such decided 
approval ... We shall have a good deal of pleasant conversation over this in detail 
when we meet again or when I can find a peaceful hour to write more fully.6 
Similarly, two letters to Schiller in 1800 indicate that he also received proofs of the 
Athenaeum from Friedrich Schlegel.7 Finally, a letter to his brother August von 
Goethe in 1808 demonstrates that he maintained an interest in the brothers: 
3 "Ich habe ihm ... Schlegels Vorlesungen über die Dramaturgie ..." Köhler, Karl - 
Heinz and Herre, Grita (1972). Ludwig van Beethovens Konversationshafte. Volume 6, 
p. 303 
4 It is also significant that many of the concepts of this lecture series are actually related to Friedrich 
Schlegel's work. Moreover, although August Willhelm was the more popular speaker, Friedrich 
Schlegel was also known for his lecture series. Significantly, Leon Botstein states that many of 
Beethoven's friends, including Prince Lobkovitz and Georg Kinsky, actually attended a 15 lecture 
series on art and drama that Friedrich Schlegel gave in Vienna in 1808. (Botstein, Leon (1994) "The 
Patrons and Publics of the Quartets: Music, Culture, and Society in Beethoven's Vienna" in Winter, 
Robert and Martin, Robert (eds.) (1994) The Beethoven Quartet Companion, p. 102) 
5 Roland, Romain (1931) Goethe and Beethoven, trans. Pfister and Kemp (1968). p.4 
6 Herzfeld, M. von and Sym, C. Melvil (1957) Letters from Goethe number 301 
7 Indeed, the second letter, in Dec. 1800, demonstrates, not only that he had received Friedrich as a 
guest, but that he was also reading works by August Wilhelm: "The enclosed charming little book 
[A.W. Schlegel's satire on Kotzebue] will no doubt already be current among you; if not, do keep it 
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We have already finished a good many things and started others and have also read 
Cicero's letters in Wieland's translation ... and Friedrich Schlegel on the `Language 
and Wisdom of the Indians'.$ 
The significance of this relationship is that Beethoven spent time with Goethe in 
Teplitz in 1812, after the correspondence quoted above.9 This fact raises more 
questions than it answers: whilst Goethe was familiar with the Schlegel's work there 
is no record of his conversation with Beethoven, thus there is no evidence that they 
discussed it. In addition, Goethe and Beethoven appear to have had neither direct 
contact nor correspondence after their time together.10 Nevertheless, the connection 
to the Schlegels through Goethe must at least be considered plausible. 
The final literary connection between Beethoven and the philosophy of Romantic 
irony is provided by E.T.A. Hoffmann. Beethoven's sole letter to Hoffmann refers to 
his reviews, in particular his essay on Beethoven's chamber music.11 However, as 
A. C. Kalischer notes in his commentary on this letter, Beethoven also read 
Hoffman's literary works, often praising them in the conversation books.12 This 
alone may indicate another link to Romantic irony: Hoffman's work demonstrates a 
high level of ironic technique. More significant, however, is the fact that Beethoven 
had read Hoffmann's essay, which specifically refers to Beethoven as a "conscious" 
artist. This produces a direct connection between Beethoven and one of the 
fundamental concepts of Romantic irony, a connection arising, moreover, within the 
context of a discussion of the composer's own music. 
The "personal" connections between Beethoven and the Schlegels complement these 
"literary" ones. The most important of these is established through the Brentano 
for a few days, it undeniably contains some brilliant passages ... I have continued my solitary 
existence; I have been out walking once only, on the finest day. Friedrich Schlegel, Harbauer and 
Niethammer have been to see me ". Ibid. number 334 
8 Ibid. number 383 
9 According to Roland's account, after their initial meeting, "they went out walking together. On the 
day after, the 215` [of July], Goethe went to see Beethoven, in the evening. He called again on 
Thursday, the 23`d, and Beethoven played to him at the piano." Roland (1931) p. 45 
10 Ibid. p. 87 -93 
11 Anderson, Emily (1961) The Letters of Beethoven p. 884 
12 Kalischer, A.C. and Schedlock, J. S. (1909) The Letters of Ludwig van Beethoven vol. II p. 170 
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family, particularly the poet Clemens Brentano. Brentano knew Friedrich Schlegel 
personally, particularly during his residence in Vienna in 1813; Barry Cooper 
specifically identifies him as a member of Friedrich Schlegel's circle.13 Crucially, as 
Immerwahr considers, Brentano's work was directly influenced by Schlegel, 
particularly with regard to irony and narrative devices.14 The contact between 
Beethoven and Brentano is therefore a significant one: it substantially increases the 
possibility of Beethoven's exposure to the philosophy of the Schlegels in the period 
prior to the composition of the works in question. 
That Beethoven knew Brentano is certain, though when they first met is not clear. 
Theodore Albrecht indicates that Beethoven may have met the poet in Teplitz in 
1811,15 whilst Köhler and Herre go further, stating conclusively that Beethoven met 
both Goethe and Brentano at that time.16 However, they were certainly acquainted 
during Brentanos' year in Vienna from July 1813:17 the first of two surviving letters 
from Brentano to Beethoven (from summer 1813) indicates that the two had met; the 
second, from January 1814 contains the text of four Lieder.18 Indeed, a certain 
familiarity, beyond more than simply a formal acquaintance, is perhaps implied in 
the only reference to Brentano in Beethoven's conversation books where Bernard 
mentions him in first name only. l9 
13 Cooper, Barry (2000) Beethoven p. 108 
14 "Godwi shows the influence both of Friedrich Schlegel's critical theory and of his practical 
example in Lucinde." Immerwahr (1988) p. 95 
15 Albrecht, Theodore (1996) Letters to Beethoven p. 20 
16 Köhler and Herre (1972) Vol. 1, p. 422 n. 87 
17 "Beethoven may have met poet Clemens Brentano ... in Teplitz during the summer of 
1811, although there is no contemporary evidence for such a meeting ... Clemens Brentano 
spent the period from July 1813 to July 1814 in Vienna ... Beethoven seems to have spent 
much of July in Vienna ... and most of August and early September in Baden (with occasional 
trips to the city), moving back to Vienna between September 15 and 20 ". (Albrecht, Theodore 
(1996) p. 20). In addition, the fact that Brentano mentions that Beethoven was in Teplitz in a 
letter to Friedrich Karl von Savigny in October 1811 perhaps indicates that the two had met at 
that time (Oehring, Sabine (ed.) (1996) Clemens Brentano: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, vol. 
32, number 598, p.358). 
18 Oehring, Sabine (ed.) (2000) Clemens Brentano: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, vol. 33 numbers 648 
and 649, p. 107 -112. 
19 This occurs between March and May 1819. Köhler and Herre (1972) vol. 1 p. 53 
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Moreover, the link between them is strengthened through Beethoven's relationships 
with Bettina von Arnim, Brentano's sister, and Antonie Brentano, his sister in law. 
Antonie first made Beethoven's acquaintance in 1809, and a close friendship 
developed over the next two years. They spent considerable periods of time 
together,20 and even after Antonie left Vienna permanently in 1812 they continued a 
close and intimate correspondence. Indeed, this relationship was so strong that, as 
Maynard Solomon considers, Antonie is the most likely possibility for Beethoven's 
famous "Immortal Beloved ".21 
Although Solomon considers the relationship between Beethoven and Bettina 
Brentano only a "flirtation ",22 Roland's account suggests a more intense 
relationship. Bettina was "fascinated from the first moment, and remained so to the 
end - "Ich habe diesen Mann unendlich lieb gewonnen" ( "I have become infinitely 
fond of this man ")...she devoted herself to his cause ".23 Beethoven, in return, 
sought her company assiduously: he "would not let Bettina go, accompanied her to 
the Brentanos' house, took her for walks...During his last days in Vienna he never 
left her ... and when he had to go he begged her to write to him at least once a 
month, because he had no other friend ".24 
Moreover, Roland notes that their conversations during their time in Vienna "were 
on serious matters ".25 Whatever the nature of the relationship it is possible to 
speculate that these conversations mentioned Romanticism: significantly, Bettina 
knew not only Tieck, whose works became almost synonymous with Romantic 
irony, she also knew intimately both Brentano and Goethe (indeed it was through 
20 Beethoven, for example spent the summer of 1812 with the Brentanos in Karlsbad and 
Franzensbad. 
21 Solomon, Maynard (1978) Beethoven p. 241 -250. In addition, Cooper concurs with Solomon, 
adding that, at the very least Antonie Brentano was "intensely fond of Beethoven" (Cooper (2000) p. 
211) 
22 Solomon (1978) p. 222 
23 Roland (1931) p. 13 
24 Ibid. pp 12 -14. Although, as Cooper suggests, Bettina's account of their relationship, from which 
much of Roland's evidence is drawn is unreliable, it is certain that she had, at least, "a genuine 
fondness and admiration for him and his music" (Cooper (2000) p. 194). 
25 Roland (1931) p. 12 
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Bettina that Goethe and Beethoven met).26 All three of these were connected to 
Schlegel. 
Beethoven's relationship to Bettina, together with those with the other members of 
the Brentano family, thus provide significant links to central figures of the emerging 
German Romanticism, and to Schlegel in particular. The influence of both Schlegel 
and Goethe upon this family was considerable; thus it is possible to assume that 
Beethoven came into contact with this influence through his close, even intimate 
relationships with them. 
Finally, two additional "personal" connections can be made between Beethoven and 
Schlegel. The first of these is through Bernard, who mentions both Schlegels several 
times throughout the conversation books.27 These entries demonstrate that 
Beethoven at least knew enough of Friedrich Schlegel to be able to discuss his 
conversion to Catholicism, and imply a certain level of familiarity with his 
movements, as well, perhaps, as his ideas. The second connection is through the 
composer Johann Friedrich Reichardt: from 1796 Reichardt's country estate in 
Giebichenstein was "a `hostel of Romanticism' for such artists and intellectuals as 
Goethe . . . [Achin] von Arnim, Brentano, E.T.A. Hoffmann, Tieck, the brothers 
Grimm, Fichte, Jean Paul, Schleiermacher, Novalis, Schlegel and J.H. Voss ".28 
Significantly, according to Cooper, Reichardt became acquainted with Beethoven in 
1808,29 although it seems that the relationship was problematic: in April 1809 
Beethoven wrote "I have very good reasons in general to distrust the character of 
H[err] R[eichart] ".30 Beethoven's relationships, though, were often tempestuous, and 
26 Helps, Arthur and Howard, Elizabeth Jane (1957) Bettina: A Portrait. 
27 Friedrich Schlegel, for example, is mentioned in Köhler and Herre (1972) vol. I pp. 169, 200, 352 
and vol. II p. 348, whilst August Wilhelm is mentioned in vol. VI p. 363. 
28 Helm, Eugene and Hartung, Günter (2001) "Reichardt, Johann Friedrich: Life" in Stanley Sadie ed. 
(2001) The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians vol. 21 p. 138 
29 "Another visitor ... was the composer Johann Friedrich Reichardt, who arrived from Kassel on 24 
November and remained for a few months...Beethoven invited Reichardt to dinner at the home of 
Countess Erdödy...five days later Reichardt was invited back, this time to hear the first of 
Beethoven's new piano trios. Then on 31 December he heard both trios, again at the same venue." 
Cooper (2000) p. 178 
30 Anderson (1961) vol. 1, p. 225. In addition, in December of the same year Beethoven refers to 
Reichardt's Vertraute Briefe as a "silly scrawl ". Ibid. p. 250 
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it entirely possible that he later revised his opinion of Reichardt. Regardless of this, 
Beethoven's acquaintance with Reichardt produces a plausible connection not only to 
the Schlegel's, but also to many leading figures of early German Romanticism. 
These last "personal" contacts complement the connections between Beethoven, the 
Schlegels and the concept of Romantic irony outlined above. Whilst no single 
element provides a definitive link, their cumulative effect demonstrates a plausible 
relationship between the composer and the Early German Romantics. As Daverio 
states, "a romantic worldview was very much in the air in Beethoven's household ".31 
In particular, between 1808 and 1814, Beethoven came into close contact with 
people either directly involved with, or closely connected to the leading literary and 
philosophical figures of German Romanticism, including, most importantly, the 
Schlegels. If these relationships are combined with the discussion of Schlegel in the 
conversation books and Beethoven's possible re- acquaintance with the concept of 
Romantic irony just prior to the composition of the Op. 132 quartet through A.W. 
Schlegel's Lectures, then a basis for considering the late quartets in terms of 
Romantic irony may be suggested. 
* 
Whilst the preceding discussion has suggested the direct influence of Schlegel's 
philosophy upon Beethoven's late works it is important to recognise that certain 
aspects of irony would also have been familiar to Beethoven from the work of his 
predecessors. In particular the dramatic irony of Mozart's operas and the elements of 
satire and parody in Haydn's music form important precedents for the irony that will 
be analysed in the next chapter. 
However, the works of these composers also contain important instances of related 
phenomena, particularly wit and humour. These, together with irony, have been 
variously applied to descriptions both of music in general as well as to specific 
31 Daverio (2000) p. 152 
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composers.32 Since all three concepts deal primarily with incongruity and contrast, 
however, the distinction between them is not always plain: there are clear 
relationships between them, and indeed even apparent overlap in places. This 
situation is further compounded by the radical re- evaluation of irony undertaken by 
the Romantics, particularly Schlegel. This new conception, indeed new meaning of 
irony changed the understanding of the phenomenon, significantly affecting the 
aesthetics, philosophy and art of the following years. The discussion around this new 
conception of irony, however, was rarely definite in its use of terminology, often 
bordering on other concepts. There are, however, important differences between 
irony, wit and humour, key areas of each that are distinct from the others. Even in 
the writing of the Romantics, where these three phenomena were drawn closest 
together, they remained, to some extent, distinct. Therefore, to simply consider them 
as comparable or synonymous is to create an equivalence that the Romantics did not 
intend. 
The following section will consider the complex interaction and relationship between 
irony, wit and humour, particularly within the context of early German Romanticism. 
Crucially, the differences in the conceptual bases of these concepts will be seen to 
correspond with their manifestation within actual discourses. Specifically, although 
the irony of Beethoven's late quartets is certainly related to the humour, wit and 
earlier forms of irony in the works of composers such as Haydn and Mozart (and 
indeed within his own earlier works), it is, nevertheless, distinct. Considering the 
relationships between these concepts will demonstrate the unique nature of the irony 
that will be seen in the late quartets. 
The distinction between Romantic irony, wit and humour will be approached from to 
two key viewpoints. The first relates to the conception of "proto- Romantic irony" 
outlined by Muecke: earlier instances of irony - those that most closely overlap with 
32 The list of commentators /works that consider the relationships between these phenomenon and 
both individual composers is extensive. A rough sampling might include Richter, Jean Paul (1804) 
Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, Rosen, Charles (1971) The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, 
Wheelock, Gretchen A. (1992) Haydn's Ingenious Jesting with Art: Contexts of Musical Wit and 
Humour, Bonds (1991) and Chua, Daniel (1999) Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning 
chapters 25 and 26. All of these works will be referred to in the following discussion. 
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humour - consist only of certain elements of Schlegel's Romantic irony; they do not 
accord with the most important aspects - Fichtean reflection and paradox. This first 
difference really generates the second. That is, that where Romantic irony is a 
continuous, infinite reflective process, the irony in these earlier instances is, in 
Wayne Booth's terms, "finite ", "stable" and "reconstructable ". 
These differences distinguish the Romantic irony of Beethoven's late works from the 
instances of wit, humour and "rhetorical" irony in earlier musical works. Although 
some of Haydn's work, for example, may best be located in the "overlapping" of 
humour and Romantic irony it cannot be considered to correspond to Romantic 
irony, at least in the full, rich sense that Schlegel's conception involves. Indeed, as 
will be seen, there are few instances of musical irony that do correspond to this full 
conception of Romantic irony. Crucially, however, I will assert that such a 
correspondence does occur in certain of Beethoven's late quartets. 
Wit and Humour 
Wit and humour are categories that occur frequently together, both in comparison 
and in contrast. Whereas humour is almost always considered as a fundamental 
property of both artworks and artists themselves, wit has a more limited, specific 
meaning.33 Firstly, wit is a combinatory power that makes associations and 
demonstrates an essential affinity between elements that are contrasting and even 
contradictory; Locke defines wit as "the assemblage of ideas, and putting those 
together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or 
congruity ".34 
33 Note that the German term "Witz" may be directly translated to the contemporaneous usage of the 
English "Wit ". The close, almost parallel relationship of German theories of literature and comedy to 
those of the English in the eighteenth century means that there is an almost identical understanding of 
the basis and elements of wit. It is this conception of wit that the German Romantics inherited and 
indeed built upon. In any case, "wit" has a different meaning from the manner in which it is now 
used. In particular, whereas "wit" is now frequently used to imply that something or someone is 
comical or funny, the earlier usages examined here encompassed a far greater range of meaning. 
34 Locke, John (1690) Essay Concerning Human Understanding p. 86. Locke's definition 
distinguishes wit from judgement, which "lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one 
from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another" (ibid.). 
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Above all, this combinatory power - the perception of similarities and relationships 
between apparently dissimilar elements - is a faculty of the intellect, a display of 
intellectual virtuosity.35 Sulzer, for example, describes wit as "a particular gift of the 
mind which consists principally in the facility for quickly seeing and vividly feeling 
the various connections and relationships of one subject compared with another ".36 
However, this association with intellectual facility led to an inherent association with 
artifice: instances of wit require intellectual "shaping" in order to function. As such, 
they possess an obvious "made" quality, similar to that of an artistic creation.37 
The frequent descriptions of "flashes of wit "38 - "hasty, dazzling, glancing 
fancies "39 - highlight the limited scope of wit. Its restricted locus of specific, 
immediate instances, together with the rapidity with which it operates frequently 
gives rise to descriptions of wit as "dazzling ".40 Moreover, the striking, novel 
combination of disparate elements and sudden discovery of relationship between 
them produces frequent associations with the element of surprise and laughter.41 
35 Dugald Stewart, for example, considers that "We consider wit as a sort of feat or trick of 
intellectual dexterity, analogous, in some respects, to the extraordinary performances of jugglers and 
rope- dancers ". Stewart, Dugald (1792) Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind p. 273 
36 Sulzer (1771 -1774) Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste, 2 vols. Translated Wheelock (1992) 
p. 28 
37 This "artistic" quality is seen in Corbyn Morris' definition of wit as "a Stroke of Art, where the 
original Subject, being insufficient in itself, is garnished and deck'd with auxiliary Objects" (Morris, 
Corbyn (1744) An Essay Towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour Raillery, Satire and 
Ridicule p. 23), and persists in William Hazlitt's later statement that "Wit is the product of art and 
fancy" (Hazlitt, William (1818) Lectures on the English Comic Writers p. 15). 
38 Stewart (1792) p. 274 
39 Wheelock (1992) p. 21. Also, see again Sulzer's reference to "quickly seeing and vividly feeling" 
and Morris' brief "stroke of art" quoted above. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Dugald Stewart, for example, wrote "there is unquestionably a smile appropriated to the flashes of 
wit; -a smile of surprise and wonder; - not altogether unlike the effect produced on the mind and the 
countenance, by a feat of legerdemain." (Stewart (1792) p. 274) The relationship of "surprise" to wit, 
however, is somewhat contentious. It is present almost constantly in definitions of wit throughout the 
Eighteenth century: see, for example, Richard Blackmore (1716) Essay upon Wit, p. 191/193, Morris 
(1744) p. 2, and Stewart (1792) p. 272. (Similarly, Adam Smith's discussion of the effect of surprise 
displays much in common with discussion of wit: "When one accustomed object appears after 
another, which it does not usually follow, it first excites, by its unexpectedness, the sentiment called 
surprise, and afterwards, by the singularity of the succession, or order of its appearance, the sentiment 
properly called wonder" (Smith, Adam (1795) Essays on Philosophical Subjects, p. 40)). Indeed, this 
relationship persisted even into the Nineteenth century; as will be seen, the effect of surprise is found 
in Friedrich Schlegel's conception of wit, occurring not only in some of his fragments, but more 
particularly in those of his brother. However, Jean Paul argues, persuasively, that although surprise 
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Although the combinatory power of wit covers a wide scope of instances,42 there is a 
significant association with rhetorical figures such as metaphor and simile. For 
example, Gretchen Wheelock considers that the aim of "true wit" "was to engage the 
imagination without violating good sense. Delight in discovering an uncommonly 
apt allusion or metaphor, the originality of which was as remarkable as its truth, was 
consonant with that aim ".43 Indeed, as will be seen, Jean Paul's conception of wit 
focuses almost exclusively upon metaphor, simile and allegory; in his work metaphor 
is almost the exemplar of wit. 
This association highlights wit's combinative power as its most fundamental 
element. In such instances the initial contradiction or incongruity is resolved in a 
moment of enlightenment in which the essential connection is perceived. As such 
wit produces only an apparent antithesis: the contradictions of wit only appear to be 
antitheses until they resolve.44 As will be considered, this underlines the important 
difference between the combinative power of wit - the ability to produce 
metaphorical associations - and the infinite paradox of irony. 
* 
Humour is best understood as an all- pervading aspect of the nature of both the artist 
and his works.45 Sulzer describes it as 
a frame of mind in which a vague agreeable or disagreeable feeling is so pervasive that 
all perceptions and utterances are affected by it. It is a passionate state in which the 
passion is not violent and has no definite object, but simply spreads pleasure or 
does occur in relation to wit it cannot be a fundamental property of it: "Does wit reread lose its value 
along with its surprise ?" Richter, Jean Paul (1804) Vorlesungen über Aesthetik in Wheeler, Kathleen 
M (1984) German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: the Romantic Ironists and Goethe p. 187 
42 As Wheelock notes, "the specifically literary meanings attached to wit range from ingenious and 
novel enhancement of language to the incongruous juxtaposition of "things by nature most 
unneighborly "." Wheelock (1992) p. 22 
43 Ibid. p. 23 
44 Indeed, Schlegel considers that "The form of wit is the appearance of absolute antithesis ". 
Schlegel (1957) no. 540 p. 67 
45 Like "wit" and "witz ", the German "Laune" was used roughly equivalently to the English 
"humour ". 
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displeasure over the entire spirit ... Often the artist has no other muse than his humour 
to support him.46 
Humour is thus related to temperament, forming the ground state of an individual's 
nature, the paradigm through which all experience was filtered and from which every 
utterance was ultimately derived.47 This emphasis upon the nature of the individual 
meant that, from its beginning, humour was a "natural" quality, a fundamental 
property of the artist's nature. However, the artist's humour also formed the basic 
temperament of his works, `infusing' the spirit of the artwork with that of its creator. 
As Wheelock notes, the unique humour of the artist "betrayed itself in the natural, in 
the personal style congruent with the artist's unique temperament ".48 
Ordinarily, humour was to be tempered by reason, by the "sensible" behaviour of 
society. Increasingly, however, the humorist was seen as one who, because of the 
abundance of his humour, wilfully departed socially accepted conventions - both 
artistic and behavioural - in favour of striking, even eccentric behaviour, novel 
associations and flights of fancy, frequently grotesque in nature. Such indulgence of 
the passions and artistic fancy led almost invariably to an association with laughter 
and the comic. At first, this association was with "low ", "vulgar" laughter, but over 
time it came to include the artistic representation of the "foibles" and eccentricities of 
individuals, presenting them in a good- natured rather than satiric light.49 In other 
words it was considered humorous to portray the unique "humour" i.e. temperament 
of individuals.50 Thus, for example, Sterne's contemporaries consistently identified 
46 Sulzer (1771 -1774) translated Wheelock (1992) p. 29 
47 Indeed the fundamental temperament from which each person's character was determined was 
actually considered to relate to one of four basic "humours ". 
48 Wheelock (1992) p. 28 
49 It is at this point that the distinction between humour and wit was seen most clearly; wit, in 
contrast to humour, was always considered more refined, largely because of the intellectual demands 
that it required both of the author and the recipients. 
50 See, for example, Hazlitt's comment that "Humour ... is an imitation of the natural or acquired 
absurdities of mankind, or of the ludicrous in accident, situation and character" (Hazlitt (1818) p. 15). 
In addition, Stuart Tave demonstrates that "By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was a 
commonplace that the best comic works present amiable originals, often models of good nature, 
whose little peculiarities are not satirically instructive, but objects of delight and love ". (Tave, Stuart 
M. (1960) The Amiable Humourist: A Study in the Comic Theory and Criticism of the Eighteenth and 
Early Nineteenth Centuries, p. viii.) 
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his portrayal of Uncle Toby's "foibles" or Tristram's many eccentricities in Tristram 
Shandy as humorous.51 
The emphasis upon striking associations, originality and the "natural" quality of 
humour, became increasingly associated with the conception of the natural genius.52 
Increasingly, it became because of his inherent genius that the humorist was able to 
break with artistic and social conventions to make his extraordinary, striking new 
forms. Through this association the conception of humour included forms of high 
comedy, like those of Shakespeare, that border on tragedy. 
Finally, the consistent association between humour and wit should be noted; wit is 
understood as resulting from the intellectual, artistic faculty of the humorist, i.e. as a 
further manifestation of his nature. Indeed the combination of humour and wit was 
considered desirable. In Morris' definition, for example, humour is considered the 
ground -state of a work, forming its basic character and subject, whilst wit is an 
"ornamental" device that decorates or colours the subject of a work with dazzling 
flashes of striking and novel combinations: 
The most agreeable representations or compositions of all others appear not where they 
separately exist, but where they are united together in the same fabric; where humour is 
the ground -work and chief substance, and wit happily spread, quickens the whole with 
embellishments.53 
51 For an indication of such comparisons see Bonds (1991) p. 57 -63. It is important to note, however, 
that although Sterne's work does fit into the category of the good -natured presentation of individuals 
there is also a strong element of satirical corrective in his work: it is not simply the actions of Toby or 
Tristram that are presented; rather, these characters represent `types' - their oddities are those of 
humanity. In Sterne's work there is therefore a mix of humour, comedy, satire and irony, and it is this 
that led to the variety of aesthetic theories that drew upon Sterne as a model. Crucially however, 
different authors focussed on different elements of Sterne's work in developing their theories: where 
Schlegel found irony in Sterne's attitude to his characters, in the continual process of negation 
(Schlegel's alternation of self -creation and self -destruction) and in the self -reflexivity of the work, 
Jean Paul emphasised the comic techniques and overarching "authorial" viewpoint as humorous. To 
equate irony and humour because both may be found in Sterne is to disregard the important 
distinctions between these conceptions. 
52 Indeed, for some writers the terms `genius' and `humorist' were effectively interchangeable. See 
Wheelock (1992) p. 27 
53 Morris (1744) p. 25. It is important to note, however, that the "natural" quality of humour - its 
basis as an intrinsic element of the individual's human nature - contrasts with wit's "artificial" nature, 
with its relationship to the artist's intellect and fancy. Thus where humour is "generous benevolent 
sentiments of heart" (ibid. p. 24) wit's intellectual basis is cold or inanimate: "in the Allusions of Wit, 
Severity, Bitterness and Satire are frequently exhibited" (ibid.). 
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Romantic Wit and Humour 
The Romantic conception of both wit and humour essentially follows the established 
critical definitions examined above. For example, although Jean Paul expands the 
definitions of both he does not redefine the phenomena in the manner that Schlegel 
did for irony. His description of humour is the most oft quoted of his definitions: 
Humour as the inverted sublime annihilates not the individual but the finite through its 
contrast with the real. It recognises no individual foolishness, no fools, but only folly 
and a mad world.54 
His inversion of the concept of the sublime as "an applied infinity "55 (where the 
properties of infinity are attributed to finite objects) applies finitude to the infinite, 
thereby producing the "infinite contrast" between finitude and infinity themselves 
that he considers defines the comic.56 Humour compares or contrasts the infinite to 
the finite; it "measures out the small world ... against the infinite world and sees 
them together ", producing, "a kind of laughter . . . which contains pain and 
greatness ".57 In particular, individuals become microcosms of totality, their unique 
foibles become projected onto an infinite plain - it is not individuals that are foolish, 
but rather all people. Humour is therefore inherently metaphorical: it is to be found 
in the comparison of small and great, finite and infinite that levels both, and laughter 
at the small or the part also entails mocking of the great or the whole.58 Thus the 
54 Wheeler (1984) p. 174, emphasis added. This definition clarifies Jean Paul's earlier description of 
humour as the "romantic- comic ", an "infinity of contrast, that is a negative infinity" (ibid.). Note that 
Jean Paul's formulation "negative infinity" comes very close to Hegel and Kierkegaard's nomination 
of irony as "infinite absolute negativity ". Again, this has led to the two phenomena being confused. 
However, where Hegel envisioned irony as the infinite negation of every positive assertion, Jean Paul's 
"infmite" refers to a continual contrast between finite objects, and it is this contrast that is described as 
humour. 
55 Ibid. p. 174 
56 "How will the comic become romantic, since it consists merely in contrasting the finite with the 
finite and cannot allow any infinity ?" Ibid. p. 174 
57 Ibid. p. 177. Note that it is this "measuring out of the small against the great" that is the inverse of 
the sublime. 
58 "Humorous totality takes many forms . . . It will be expressed in any generalisation from 
something which is strictly true only in a particular case; for example, in Sterne, "Learned men, 
brother Toby, don't write dialogues upon long noses for nothing "" (ibid. p. 176.) 
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examples that he gives are essentially contrasts of the particular and general, which 
represent finite and infinite respectively.59 
In Jean Paul's writing the concept of humour comes closest to Schlegel's irony. For 
example, the allegorical associations and equations of the finite and infinite in his 
humour indicate a fundamental, over -arching world -view similar to that encountered 
in Romantic irony. The humorist "simply laughs at everything, without excluding . . 
. himself ';60 to him everything is ridiculous, everything is levelled and equal. This 
affinity is also seen in the "overlap" of concepts such as self -reflexivity, the breaking 
of illusion and the confusion of discursive "levels ", which Jean Paul considers as 
elements of humour: 
For every humorist the self plays the first role; when he can, he even introduces his 
personal circumstances upon the comic stage, although he does so only to annihilate it 
poetically.61 
Humour often delights even in contradictions and impossibilities, for example in Tieck's 
Zerbino, in which the dramatis personae finally believe themselves to be merely fictive 
non -entities, thus drawing the audience themselves onto the stage and the stage under 
the press jack.62 
These concepts, however, also function as precedents of Romantic irony. Indeed, it 
is largely as a result of this "overlap" that Jean Paul's humour is sometimes 
considered synonymous with Schlegel's irony. This misapprehension, however, 
arises largely from the common misunderstanding of Schlegel's irony - associating 
and limiting it to devices of illusion- breaking. In Schlegel's conception such devices 
produce continual parabasis - the authorial presence within the work - and 
contribute to the paradox, the continual alternation of self -creation and destruction 
59 He considers that Cervantes, for example, draws "humorous" parallels between "realism and 
idealism, between body and soul, in the face of the infinite equation; and his twin stars of folly hover 
over the entire human race" (Ibid. p. 175). In addition to Cervantes, Jean Paul cites Shakespeare and 
Sterne as examples of this conception of humour: the "mad mask" of Hamlet, for example is a 
disguise behind which Shakespeare ridicules the world (ibid, p. 175), while in Sterne "Uncle Toby's 
campaigns do not make Toby himself or Louis XIV alone ridiculous; they are an allegory of all 
human hobbyhorses" (ibid. p. 175). (Swift, Voltaire, Rabelais and Tieck are also considered as 
humorists, without examples being given.) 
60 Ibid. p. 176 
61 Ibid. p. 179 
62 Ibid. p. 178 
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that is so vital to his Fichtean model. Jean Paul, in contrast, focuses on the comic 
effect of these devices; they are necessary techniques for "Romantic- comic" humour. 
Thus, although both irony and humour have been related to such devices the 
emphasis is different, and this difference reflects those between the fundamental 
bases of these conceptions, differences that preclude synonymy. Schlegel's irony is 
based in Fichtean reflection, a continual, infinite process of assertion and negation, of 
infinite reflection in a minor. Jean Paul's humour is not an infinite process; rather, it 
is, at all times, simply the contrast between the finite, particular and individual and 
the infinite and general. Jean Paul irreversibly connects his humour to the "romantic 
comic ";63 the comic both delimits and defines humour.64 This relationship clearly 
differentiates it from Schlegel's irony: irony is not inherently bound to the comic; 
rather it encompasses but also transcends it. 
Indeed, it is on precisely this point that Ernst Behler differentiates Jean Paul's 
humour from Schlegel's irony. He observes the "overlapping" of aspects of the two 
conceptions considered above but concludes, however, that "in the last analysis, Jean 
Paul conceives of humoristic contrasting in such broad terms that his concept of 
"world humour" eludes critical distinctions and appears as the manifestation of the 
comic mood as such, or more precisely as Jean Paul's own manner of comic 
contrasts ".65 
63 This basis in the comic means that humour invariably produces "a kind of laughter" (ibid. p. 177), 
and humorists are known as "comic poets" (ibid). Thus "the humorist is both his own court jester or 
quartet of masked Italian comedians and at the same time their prince and director" (ibid.). 
64 Jean Paul writes, "Since without sensuousness the comic cannot exist, the material element as the 
exponent of applied finitude in humour, can never become too colourful. The representation should 
overflow with images and with witty and imaginative contrasts, both in grouping and in colouring" 
(ibid. p. 183). The conclusion of the section on humour is therefore essentially a list of comic devices 
that enhance the humour of a work by adding such colour and sensuousness. These include "always 
to choose active verbs of motion ... always to give definite quantities in allusions to money, numbers 
and all magnitudes, where one expects the indefinite" (ibid. p. 184). Moreover, "the comic writer 
should also take advantage of proper names and technical terms (ibid.), and "presentation of 
movement, particularly quick motion, or of rest beside movement, helps heighten the comic effect of 
humorous sensuousness. Presentation of a mass has a similar effect" (ibid. p. 185). This section 
therefore clearly displays the essential link that Jean Paul perceived between humour and the comic. 
Moreover, it gives some indication of the difference between humour and irony: these comic devices 
are not ironic, nor would they contribute to the continual alternation of creation and destruction 
involved in romantic irony. 
65 Behler, Ernst (1988) "The Theory of Irony in German Romanticism" in Frederick Garber (ed.) 
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Moreover, Jean Paul himself explicitly differentiates humour from irony. Although 
some of his comments on irony relate only to "rhetorical" forms, many of his 
observations actually reflect Schlegel's conception.66 For example, he considers 
Goethe's irony as (to paraphrase Schlegel) "not simply circumscribed in moments, 
but rather pervading entire works ".67 More importantly, he refers to an ironic 
manner - objective and serious, even "cold" and "calm ", and lacking subjective 
reaction - similar to the constant negativity of Socratic irony.68 Indeed, he 
specifically refers to the ironic perception of Plato's Socrates, which he explicitly 
differentiates from humour: 
Plato's irony ... could be called world- irony, on an analogy with world humour; it 
hovers singing and sporting not only above errors but above all knowledge (just as 
humour is more concerned with follies) like a flame - free, consuming and rejoicing, 
volatile and yet pressing towards heaven alone.69 
Overall, Jean Paul's irony is a detached manner, unengaged and objective, 
manifesting itself in the "cold" language of rhetorical irony and the urbanity of 
Socrates (the objective viewpoint that rises over everything, engaging with nothing 
earnestly that forms the basis of Schlegel's conception). Crucially, throughout his 
Romantic Irony p. 68. Indeed, Behler also outlines a contemporaneous opposition of irony to humour 
on the basis of their effect: "irony was faulted with being too intellectual, sophistically Erasmic, 
deceiving, haughty, dandyish and coldly Western, whereas humour was seen as genuine, open, honest 
and heartfelt" (ibid. p. 45) 
66 Indeed, the first examples that Jean Paul gives are simple verbal irony, demonstrating how they 
achieve their end - which is essentially "saying one thing and meaning another" - through linguistic 
means. See, for example, Hale (1973) p. 107/108. The equation of humour with irony considered 
above results in part from the misapprehension that his comments on irony relate only to such 
"rhetorical" forms. 
67 "That much the more elective affinity does irony have with Goethe's epic prose. May the author 
of Faust, with his extraordinary powers for a characteristic humour and for an ironically cold story of 
folly, imitate Shakespeare, winged man on the dramatic Pegasus" ibid. p. 109/110. In addition, see 
pages 111/112 where examples of entire works, even entire author's outputs are given as "ironic ". 
68 Ibid. p. 107 
69 Ibid. p. 113. It is important to note that Jean Paul terms Socratic irony "world irony ", as an 
analogy to "world humour ". Analogy, however, is not the same as identity, thus Socratic irony - 
which forms a basis for Schlegel's Romantic irony - is not the same as humour. Indeed, Jean Paul 
gives one explicit difference: where Socratic irony views everything from an objective, ironic light, 
hovering freely above them all (cf. Schlegel's "the freeist of all licences "), humour views only the 
faults of mankind from above, comparing the finite to the infinite in order to laugh at the world 
through the folly of the individual. 
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discussion he continually distinguishes such irony from humour, and ironists are 
differentiated from humorists.70 
Although Schlegel rarely mentions humour, his brief references reflect this 
distinction. Athenaeum fragment 305 is perhaps the most significant: 
Humour deals with being and non -being, and its true essence is reflection. Hence its 
closeness to the elegy and to everything transcendental; and hence its arrogance and its 
bent for the mysticism of wit. Just as genius is necessary to naiveté, so too an earnest, 
pure beauty is a requisite of humour. Most of all humour likes to hover about the gently 
and clearly flowing rhapsodies of philosophy or poetry, and abhors cumbersome masses 
and disconnected parts.71 
Although the emphasis on "being and non -being" and "reflection ", and the 
relationship to "everything transcendental" in this fragment correlate to Jean Paul's 
conception of humour, Schlegel's assertion that humour "abhors cumbersome masses 
and disconnected parts" is almost directly opposed to the manner in which Jean 
Paul's humour may be seen in artworks. A similar opposition occurs in the manner 
in which Schlegel explicitly relates humour to beauty, rather than to the sublime. 
Finally, Schlegel actually mentions irony at the beginning of this fragment: 
Intention taken to the point of irony and accompanied by the arbitrary illusion of its self - 
destruction is quite as naïve as instinct taken to the point of irony ... 72 
Although the relationships between irony, humour and wit are not subsequently 
examined, it is significant that Schlegel explicitly differentiates between the three. 
As will be seen below, whilst irony is related to these other concepts, it retains its 
singular place in Schlegel's thought. 
70 Jean Paul's discussion is littered with small comparisons and differentiations between irony, 
humour and other categories. For example, "Humour does not elevate individual imbecility but 
lowers the great ... Humour raises the small like irony, but then sets the great beside the small" 
(Wheeler (1984) p. 174), or "What irony is to persiflage, humour is to whimsy. Humour has the 
higher, whimsy the lower point of comparison" (Hale (1973) p. 117). Moreover, he seems to equate 
"epic poets" with "ironists" and "comic poets" with "humorists ". Thus, "so many great and small 
comic epic poets - Cervantes, Swift, Ariosto, Voltaire, Steele, La Fontaine, Fielding - were unable to 
write comedies or wrote bad ones; and conversely, writers of great comedies can be cited as poor 
ironists" (ibid. p. 113). Such differentiations, again, occur throughout his discussion - see Hale 
(1973) pp. 113 -115. 
71 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 305 p. 60/61 
72 Ibid. 
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As with humour, the conventional definitions of wit inform the Romantic 
conceptions. Jean Paul's systematic discussion, for example, encompasses the 
conventional characteristics seen above: humour forms the inherent character of the 
work, with wit limited to particular instances or moments within works.73 Wit, he 
argues, is most effective when brief because it is not simply the juxtaposition of 
elements that achieves its effect, but rather the "rapidity of the language ".74 In other 
words wit requires the quasi- artistic `shaping' considered earlier to function 
effectively, condensing its oppositions into tighter juxtaposition. 
Above all Jean Paul maintains the conventional definition of wit as a combinatory 
power.75 In its "broadest sense" wit is the "comparison of two ideas, whether their 
objects be perceptions, ideas or a mixture of the two ",76 whilst the aesthetic form of 
wit (which he considers quintessential) "discovers . . . similarities between 
incommensurable magnitudes, between physical and spiritual worlds (e.g., sun and 
truth), in other words, the equation of self and other, of two perceptions ".77 
Crucially, his examples display the relationship between wit's combinatory power 
and that of metaphor and simile seen above: his examples of both "figurative" (i.e. 
poetic) and "non- figurative" aesthetic wit are metaphorical conjoinings such as "rage 
is a storm wind ".78 Indeed, Jean Paul's entire discussion of wit centres around such 
73 See, for example, Wheeler (1984) p. 189 -191 
74 Ibid. p. 188 
75 With some modification: he takes issue with the notion of wit as an ability to find "remote 
similarities" (Ibid. p. 185), since "remote" implies vague or weak. Jean Paul argues that all 
similarities are actually equalities, and therefore a binary state, rather than an incremental one. 
Moreover, he adds that wit, in the form of acumen, also involves fording dissimilarities, thus 
"similarities" is suspect. Wit is therefore more to do with establishing new relationships between 
elements. 
76 Ibid. p. 186. He adds that this comparison produces a third idea that is solely the product of the 
creative mind. 
77 Ibid. p. 187 emphasis original 
78 Ibid. p. 195. Other examples of such metaphorical, combinatory wit include "I sharpen ear and 
quill ", "His Majesty has made both verses and war upon the world" (ibid.), and a paraphrase of 
Samuel Butler's comparison between a "reddening dawn" and "a red cooked lobster" (ibid. p. 187). 
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metaphors, including extended forms such as allegory: the intellectual faculty of 
aesthetic wit is even clearly described as the mental ability to create metaphor.79 
Finally, it is important to note that Jean Paul explicitly differentiates wit from irony 
The [comic] contrasts of wit endanger the appearance of gravity [the necessary 
condition of irony], because they express the serious too weakly and the ridiculous too 
strongly ... cold gravity heightens the bitterness of irony spontaneously, without any 
desire, hatred or assistance on the part of the writer; Swift's irony is the most bitter only 
because it is the most serious.80 
Schlegel's conception of wit demonstrates the same basis in conventional definitions. 
His aversion for philosophical "systems" and preference for ambiguity and 
uncertainty, however, means that his conception of wit is spread throughout his 
fragments. Moreover, as Muecke states, his terminology is frequently "shifting and 
unsettled ";81 at times concepts like `Witz', 'Arabeske' and 'Ironie' appear to 
overlap. However, "sometimes 'Witz' and 'Arabeske' have other significances and 
are distinguished from, even contrasted with `Ironie "'.82 His use of the term "wit" is 
particularly wide ranging: it is compared or attributed, for example, to the 
grotesque,83 to mysticism,84 to "urbanity "85 and to algebra.86 His descriptions of 
wit are equally diverse: wit is "absolute social feeling "87 and "fragmentary 
genius ";88 its `types' include "sorry wit ",89 "passive wit ",90 "solid wit ",91 "scientific 
Indeed, in some instances Jean Paul seems to use the terms "wit" and "metaphor" interchangeably: see 
Wheeler (1984) p 194 -196. 
79 Ibid. p. 194 
80 Hale (1973) p. 109/110. This differentiation is subsequently expanded in the rest of the passage. It 
is also important to note that Jean Paul knew Schlegel personally during the time of writing his 
Aesthetics (after publication of the Athenaeum), and indeed quotes him in places. Crucially, however, 
he does not consider wit or humour in terms of Schlegel's irony. I would suggest that this may be 
taken as evidence that Jean Paul at least considered that there is are distinctions between the 
phenomena. 
81 Muecke (1969) p. 182 
82 Ibid. 
83 Schlegel (1991) Ideas fragment 59 p. 99 
84 Ibid. Ideas fragments 26 and 59 p. 96 and 99 
85 Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 438 p. 91 
86 Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 445 p. 92 
87 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 9 p. 2 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 17 p. 2 
90 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 39 p. 5 
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wit "92 and "architectonic wit ".93 As a result, his precise meaning is frequently 
unclear, as are the relationships that he understood between irony, wit and humour. 
It is therefore important to understand both the similarities as well as the obvious 
distinctions that he makes. 
Schlegel maintains the conventional definition of wit is combinatory in effect - in 
some cases he refers specifically to "combinative wit ";94 indeed, in designating wit 
as "chemical" in nature he highlights its combinative power and ability to associate 
disparate elements.95 Significantly, the combinative power of the novel - its mixture 
of styles and elements, its juxtapositions and production of new relationships 
between disparate elements - is likened to that of wit.96 
Schlegel's "wit" is clearly an intellectual faculty, and is inherently "artificial ", 
requiring aesthetic `shaping' in order to be most effective.97 This is reflected in the 
91 Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 111 p. 14 
92 Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 121 p. 33 
93 Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 383 p. 78. Several of the Athenaeum fragments that mention wit and 
humour actually originate with August Wilhelm Schlegel. Each of these relates it specifically both to 
the comic and to humour: wit, for example, is paired with "frivolity" in fragment 58; fragment 237 
considers that humour is "the wit of sentiment ", whilst in fragment 106 the "good intention of being 
witty ... is the virtue of a clown." In these last two fragments August Wilhelm also seems to argue 
that wit is an innate faculty, and functions best when there is a lack of intention (except the intention 
of "lifting the conventional barriers and liberating the spirit" (Athenaeum fragment 106)). Indeed he 
suggests that humour (and, by association, wit) ceases to be "genuine" the moment one perceives 
intention in it (Athenaeum fragment 237). Again, much of August Wilhelm's conception of wit and 
humour reflects that seen in the discussion above. The crucial point is that there is presumably some 
relationship or correlation between his thought and his brother's, simply by virtue of the fact that all 
of the fragments appeared in the same collection. 
94 Ibid. Ideas fragment 123 p. 105 
95 Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 366 p. 75: "Understanding is mechanical, wit is chemical, genius is 
organic spirit ". 
96 Athenaeum 426, for example, states that "the novel, criticism, wit, sociability, the most recent 
rhetoric, and all previous history have a chemical makeup ". Ibid. Athenaeum fragment 426 p. 87 
97 Lyceum fragment 104, for example, relates wit to intellect, stating that it is reason that makes wit 
witty. Ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 104 p 12/13. See also Lyceum 16, 71, 96, Athenaeum 32, 
383 and Ideas 26. Moreover, Schlegel's assertion in Athenaeum fragment 394, that "real wit ... is 
still only conceivable in written form, like laws ", largely due to its "classical form" displays a clear 
indication of aesthetic working, the `made' quality discussed above (ibid. Athenaeum fragment 394 p. 
80). The cognitive faculty that Schlegel associates with wit, however, is "fantastic" in nature: "Witz is 
pure thought -play; the understanding, on the contrary, works through thoughts purposefully and 
intentionally" (cited in Daverio, John (1993) "Dahlhaus's Beethoven and the Esoteric Aesthetics of 
the Early Nineteenth Century" in Lockwood, Lewis and Webster, James (eds.) Beethoven Forum, vol. 
2 p. 194). In privileging fancy over reason Schlegel follows, indeed parallels Locke's much earlier 
definition of Wit, which associates it with fancy and opposes it to reason. In addition, see Lyceum 67, 
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brevity or "limited" quality of wit, required to achieve its fullest effect: Ideas 26, for 
example, compares it to the "lightening bolt of the imagination ".98 Finally, the 
"conventional" relationship between wit, humour and the comic considered above is 
maintained. In Athenaeum fragment 305 (quoted above), for example, humour is the 
"groundstate ", wit occurs as a manifestation of this humour, the decorative element 
that enlivens it. Athenaeum fragment 156 reflects wit's comic basis, considering the 
"comic wit" in Aristophanes, whilst fragment 120 states that "wit makes [us] laugh ". 
Despite this "conventional" basis both Schlegel and Jean Paul indicate an expansion 
of the conception of wit. Jean Paul's "profundity ", for example, approaches a type of 
"god- like" viewpoint: it is a "higher divine wit "99 that is not limited to particular 
instances, a "capacity of the whole man ... the whole tendency towards the invisible 
and the highest" that "strives for the equality and unity of all that wit has joined 
together in perception ".100 
A similar expansion may be seen in the unpublished fragments that comprise 
Schlegel's Literary Notebooks.lol In his statement that "Everything is wit and 
90 and Ideas 109 
98 Schlegel (1991) Ideas fragment 26 p. 96. Here Schlegel doesn't deny the limited scope of wit, but 
rather decries those who for this reason devalue it. Similarly, Athenaeum fragment 120 adds "they 
have so little regard for wit because its expressions aren't long and wide enough" (ibid. Athenaeum 
fragment 120 p. 33). This again, demonstrates the limited extent of wit in Schlegel's conception. In 
addition, see Athenaeum 217, which considers that "isolated wit" can "disturb the harmony of the 
whole" (ibid. Athenaeum fragment 217 p. 46), and Lyceum fragment 109, which discusses wit in 
terms of "the sharpest focus on a single point" (ibid. Critical (Lyceum) fragment 109 p. 13). 
99 Wheeler (1984) p. 187 
100 Ibid. Jean Paul distinguishes profundity from both wit and acumen, which might be described as 
wit in reverse. Acumen distinguishes between established similarities, discovering new and 
unsuspected contrasts and "a relationship of dissimilarity, i.e., of partial inequality, hidden in greater 
equality" (ibid.). It is interesting to note that Jean Paul's differentiation of wit from acumen 
corresponds almost exactly to Locke's distinction between wit and `judgement" quoted above. Locke 
considers that wit consists of the creation of congruities between different ideas, again a combinatory 
function. "Judgement ", in contrast, was the "separation of ideas wherein can be found the least 
difference ". This serves to underline the essentially traditional view of wit that Jean Paul outlines in 
his aesthetics. 
101 A word of caution needs to be added concerning the use of the Literary Notebooks. The 
fragments quoted below derive from Schlegel's private notebooks: they were unpublished and, within 
his lifetime, were shown to only a few close friends (Schlegel (1957) p. 8). As such, although they 
provide background information on the genesis of Schlegel's thought, they cannot really be 
considered as influential as his published works. Indeed, many of these fragments are the precursors 
of those that appear, in altered and expanded form, in the Athenaeum (which was published 
concurrently). Thus there is a case for considering the fragments of the Athenaeum as the final 
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everywhere is wit "102 can be seen the expansion of the Enlightenment aesthetic of 
wit into an over -arching concept. The fundamental combinative power of wit seems 
to underlie much of human perception and activity; thus for example "all forms of 
poetry are witty ", and "All poetic wit is transcendental. Political wit is universal. 
Political wit may be written only poetically. - Combinatory wit is truly 
prophetic ".103 Indeed in Athenaeum fragment 220 Schlegel considers wit "the 
principle and the organ of universal philosophy ", referring specifically to the 
philosophical systems of Bacon, Liebniz and Kant, which are described as "the spirit 
of universality, the science of all the eternally uniting and dividing sciences, a logical 
chemistry ".104 This correspondence occurs in a very particular sense - between the 
"form" of wit and philosophy only. "Universal philosophy" shares the properties as 
wit -a combinatory, unifying power, an "aesthetic" element or intellectual `shaping' 
and the elements of surprise. (In terms of "content ", however, Schlegel 
versions of many of the concepts in the Notebooks (and thus perhaps equivalent, in that regard, to the 
Beethoven sketchbooks): for these reasons I have tended for the most part to rely on the published 
fragments. 
Perhaps more importantly, as Eichner states 
"As is to be expected of notes written down on the spur of the moment, their quality is 
uneven. A part of Schlegel's theoretical consideration is pedantic in the very worst 
tradition of the Greek writers on Rhetoric, others are based on wild generalisations . . . 
some entries are incomprehensible. Above all, the first impression created by these 
notebooks is not only one of a striking wealth and variety of ideas, but also one of utter 
chaos" (ibid. p. 6/7). 
The overwhelming impression of these writings is of experimentation, of half -formed concepts and 
thoughts. Indeed, some of the ideas and equivalences that Schlegel draws are clearly experimental: 
one sees him pursuing different strains of an argument, often producing comments that appear to 
contradict both other fragments within the Notebooks and within the Athenaeum. This, together with 
Schlegel's "predilection for such forms as the Fragment and the symposium, which enable an author 
to present a subject from different points of view and invite him to yield to momentary whims, his 
love of paradox and his highly individual or, as August Wilhelm would have it, `mythological' 
terminology all combine to make his writings exceptionally difficult to interpret" (ibid. p. 4). Thus 
although Schlegel does draw comparisons between wit and irony it is not clear in what way these 
correspondences function. (Indeed, it is not even clear if, in drawing these comparisons, he means 
Romantic irony or the contrasting types of finite, "rhetorical" forms.) It is telling that in the published 
fragments the comprehensiveness of wit suggested in the notebooks, as well as the correspondences 
drawn between wit, irony and other concepts have largely been omitted. For these reasons great 
caution must be exercised in drawing too -specific conclusions from these fragments. 
102 Schlegel (1957) no. 782 p. 91 
103 Ibid. no. 2172, p. 215 and no. 568, p. 70 
104 Note that this reference to chemistry and to "uniting and dividing" is already related to the 
combinative power of wit described above. 
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acknowledges that philosophical systems are much more than mere poetic wit.)105 
Inflating the combinatory power of wit to correspond to the all- encompassing 
philosophical system of Kantian philosophy allows Schlegel to argue that, if the 
relationship holds, then the value of wit is limitless or infinite.106 
Daverio argues, moreover, that Schlegel developed the concept of wit to the point 
where it forms "the principal agent of cohesiveness in a broad range of cultural 
products extending from Greek mythology and the Bible to Shakespeare's dramas, 
Kantian philosophy, and the early nineteenth -century Roman "107 and "the network 
of connective threads that bind together works belonging to the "epigrammatic 
genre" ".108 This important development expands wit's scope from the momentary 
and "ornamental" to a guiding principle of philosophical communication. Indeed, his 
conception of wit becomes so wide that it encroaches upon the universal: Schlegel 
compares it to parody, grotesque, art and science, hieroglyphics, sarcasm, urbanity 
and caricature; he even asks whether wit is not "entirely identical" with genius.109 
On occasion Schlegel draws the concepts of wit and irony together, producing 
apparent comparisons and equivalences. Indeed, irony appears as a type of wit: for 
example, "Irony is philosophical wit ";110 "Romantic wit is the highest. - the satirical 
105 Schlegel writes that "The most important scientific discoveries are bon mots [i.e. wit] of this sort 
- are so because of the surprising contingency of their origin, the unifying force of their thought, and 
the baroqueness of their casual expression. But they are, of course, in respect to content, much more 
than the unsatisfied and evanescent expectation of purely poetical wit. The best ones are echappées 
de vue into the infinite" (ibid. Athenaeum fragment 220 p. 47). Note that Schlegel's use of the 
figuration "bon mots" to refer to instances of wit (i.e. to witty remarks) parallels Stewart's use in his 
earlier discussion (Stewart (1792) p. 270). 
106 Note, however, that this type of "infinity" refers specifically to quantity: i.e. wit is of exceedingly 
great worth if such philosophical systems can be considered in terms of its characteristics. This is 
therefore different from the quality of the infinite that Schlegel bestows upon irony. It is also worth 
noting that the comparison that Schlegel makes here is itself almost metaphorical: in combining wit 
and philosophy Schlegel creates an idea that itself possesses all the combinative and surprising power 
of wit. 
107 Daverio (1993) p. 192 
108 Ibid. p. 194 
109 Ibid. no. 1030, p. 111, no. 1959, p. 193/194 and no. 1029, p. 111. Note that in the association 
with genius in this last fragment Schlegel's conception of wit really touches upon Jean Paul's 
conception of "profundity ". 
110 Ibid. no. 2172, p. 215 also in no. 1959, p. 193 
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is next, and most similar to it. Socratic irony also belongs to it ";111 "Irony and 
Parody are the absolute types of wit; the first is ideal, the second real ".112 This 
relationship of wit as an overarching concept, with irony as a species of it, though, 
actually reflects the earlier association of wit with satire noted above.113 This 
persists in Hazlitt's comment that "Wit ... is the imagination or fancy inverted, and 
so applied to given objects, as to make the little look less, the mean more light and 
worthless ".114 
Nevertheless, the comparisons between wit and irony that Schlegel draws in these 
fragments seem aimed at pointing out the "overlapping" of certain elements, in 
particular the fundamental dialectical basis of opposition and contrariety that 
underlies both concepts, rather than suggesting a precise equivalence.115 Although 
at times Schlegel seems to conceive of irony as a species of wit, this does not mean 
that wit is inherently ironic: whilst some instances of irony (particularly "rhetorical" 
forms) do have an element of wit in their dialectical structure, not every instance of 
wit will be ironic. This distinction is reflected in the important observation that in all 
cases although elements of these conceptions overlap, Schlegel nevertheless 
maintains a distinction between the two phenomena. This may initially be seen, on a 
superficial level, in the different terminology used: the fact that Schlegel maintained 
the use of different terms to describe the phenomena may, perhaps simplistically, be 
taken as an indication of a perceived difference.116 
111 Ibid. no. 53, p. 24. Note, however, that in fragment 407 Schlegel argues that "The arabesque wit 
is the highest" (ibid. p.56), appearing to contrast this with irony and parody. This indicates, again, the 
experimental nature of the fragments and the apparent contradictions that sometimes occur. 
112 Ibid. no. 1030, p. 111 
113 Indeed Edward Niles Hooker considers that "by the 1690's there had been a clear tendency to 
associate wit with mirth, and often with satire. By 1726 James Arbuckle could write ( "A Collection 
of Letters ", 1729, II, 72): " ... Satire and Ridicule, which are the main Provocatives to Laughter, still 
keep their ground among us, and are reckoned the chief Embellishments of Discourse by all who aim 
at the Character of Wits "" (Hooker, Edward Niles (1946) Introduction to the Series on Wit, Augustan 
Reprints Society publication number 4, p. 4) 
114 Hazlitt (1818) p. 15 
115 It is also worth noting that Schlegel draws a similar equivalence between humour and wit: 
"Humour = poetic, sentimental, transcendental wit" (Schlegel (1957) no. 777 p. 91). This, once again, 
indicates that the equivalences that Schlegel draws are not absolute or unqualified, but rather point out 
common elements in all three conceptions - irony, wit and humour. 
116 Indeed, it is notable that even in the comparisons that Schlegel draws between wit and irony, this 
is not to the specifically Romantic irony that he discusses elsewhere in these fragments. This 
difference reflects the distinction that Steven Alford draws, considered below. Moreover, the fact that 
113 
More importantly, there are significant differences in the underlying processes of wit 
and Romantic irony. Wit is fundamentally combinatory, a creation of relationship 
between disparate ideas or objects; even the developments and expansion of wit's 
meaning and significance that Schlegel and Jean Paul undertook retained this 
fundamental combinatory power.117 Like metaphor, wit is an essentially "additive" 
process, comparing disparate, even incongruous elements and, by virtue of the 
combinations and relationships that it discovers, augmenting both elements, creating 
a new, richer meaning for both. The combinations of wit are not, by their nature, 
inherently ironic, just as metaphors (and their extended forms) are not intrinsically 
ironic: they are simply witty. 
In particular the relationship of wit to figures such as metaphor, simile and allegory, 
distinguishes it from Romantic irony. Romantic Irony is not fundamentally 
combinatory; rather, the emphasis placed upon paradox means that it is inherently 
divisive - it separates by antithesis and paradox.118 Irony is thus not an additive 
process, but rather a continual contrast.119 This difference led Hegel, and later 
Kierkegaard, to describe it as a constant negation, as "infinite, absolute 
negativity ".120 Irony does not add "meaning" to the elements of the paradox: rather 
the constant alternation of creation and destruction produces a "stasis" of meaning, 
these phenomena remained, to a certain extent, distinct is indicated not least by the fact that there are a 
great number of fragments that deal with irony separately from wit. 
117 It is important to bear in mind that Schlegel's theory of irony was much more influential than his 
writing on wit, both in relation to his contemporaries and especially in the decades following (See 
Behler (1993) p. 210). The notion of Romantic irony was worked out in discussion with the Jena 
circle and in response to the writings of Solger and Jean Paul, and generated much critical comment. 
Crucially, it was this ongoing discussion that ensured the wider dissemination of the theory of 
Romantic irony, and its influence upon later critical thought and artistic practice. 
118 As Barthes states "The antithesis [paradoxism] separates for eternity". Barthes (1974) S /Zp. 27 
119 In addition, see Wayne Booth's comparison of irony and metaphor, which differentiates between 
them on the basis that metaphor is essentially a positive accretion of meaning, whilst irony is a 
continual negation (Booth (1974) p. 22 -25 and 176 -178). However, it is worth noting the possibility 
that witty combinations such as metaphors may subsequently be used ironically. The metaphor "John 
is a tiger ", for example, becomes ironic when used in an incongruous context i.e. if John is actually a 
noticeably shy individual. Nevertheless, in such cases there is an extra incongruous element added 
"between" the metaphor and the context, and it is here that the irony resides. Crucially though, even 
in this case the irony that results is "satirical" in nature: it is not Romantic irony. 
120 Kierkegaard, Soren (1841) The Concept of Irony, With Continual Reference to Socrates p. 
216/217 
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which Kierkegaard describes as being held on the "prong" of irony.121 Thus 
although wit may underlie systematic philosophy or bring coherence to the 
epigrammatic genre, irony produces the opposite effect: in "On Incomprehensibility" 
Schlegel actually argues that irony produces incomprehension.122 Romantic irony 
does not create new combinations or meanings, rather it renders "meaning" 
meaningless; by signifying only itself irony's only "meaning" is itself.123 As Mihály 
Szegedy -Maszák (quoting Paul de Man) writes "Romantic irony is anti -didactic, it is 
"an endless process that leads to no synthesis ". It is not temporary or transition, but 
"repetitive, the recurrence of a self -escalating act of consciousness" ".124 
This statement highlights the final and most important distinction. Romantic irony is 
an infinite process, a constant alternation between self -creation and self -destruction, 
a continual paradox. In contrast, wit in all its forms is, as seen, a fundamentally 
finite process. It is by definition limited in extent, its momentary flashes of 
combinatory brilliance opposed to the infinite reflective function of Schlegel's 
irony.125 Schlegel does draw comparisons between the dialectical bases of irony and 
"combinatory wit ": both involve the relationships of dialectical opposites. However, 
even at this point of apparent overlap or synonymy he maintains a crucial distinction. 
Steven Alford explains this essential difference by separating Romantic irony into 
two elements. The first is the continual, "dialectical" movement between assertion 
and negation, the infinite spiral of creation and destruction or "comprehensibility and 
121 Ibid. P. 269 
122 "A great part of the incomprehensibility of the Athenaeum is unquestionably due to the irony that 
to a greater or lesser extent is to be found everywhere in it" (Wheeler (1984) p. 36). In contrast, in 
Lyceum 96 Schlegel considers that the "meaning" of wit should be "clear" as soon as it has been hit 
upon. The clarity of meaning in wit is therefore directly opposed to the incomprehensibility of irony. 
123 See Kierkegaard (1841) p. 264 
124 Szegedy -Maszák, Mihály (1988) "Romantic Irony in Nineteenth -Century Hungarian Literature" 
in Frederick Garber (ed.) Romantic Irony p. 205 
125 Even "profundity" differs in that it is an all- encompassing viewpoint that is nevertheless 
"external "; it sets the self "outside" the world, contemplating it and its manifold "witty" connections 
from above. It is, in addition, simply as a personal quality, rather than an aesthetic phenomenon. 
(Jean Paul, at least, seems to understand it in this way, a view supported by the fact that he gives no 
examples of it.) As such its process differs from both the continual reflection of self -creation and 
destruction involved in irony, as well as from irony's inherent association with aesthetic endeavour. 
An ironic self -consciousness is an essential aspect of the Romantic artist's makeup, but this is 
explicitly connected with his work: as Muecke considers, Romantic irony is the infinite irony of "the 
ironical presentation of the ironic position of the fully conscious artist ". Muecke (1970) p. 20 
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incomprehensibility" considered above.126 The second arises from this: the 
"exhaustion brought about by the play of the ironic dialectic in the text "127 forces an 
awareness of the condition of finitude that creates the dialectic (the "finite" position 
of having to think in terms of dialectical opposites). This produces a type of 
transcendence of "finitude ", an epiphantic process in which the finite and infinite or 
the whole and the part are unified in the reader's perception. (This unity is, however, 
doomed to failure: because of our condition of finitude, such romantic irony - "the 
stylistic binding of the infinite and the finite "128 - is "an unstable and destabilizing 
mode of irony that is forever falling back into dialectical irony ".)129 
Alford terms this second element as irony's "performative" function - the point of 
such irony is not to signify a meaning, but rather to "force toward an effect" beyond 
meaning, the transcendental effect of the ironic understanding.130 Crucially, wit 
lacks this performative function: wit is, by definition, circumscribed in the 
"finitude ", its combinations a result of the finitude of our limited cognitions that 
distinguish actuality into oppositions. Being inherently bound to the finite, wit is 
thus unable to perform the transcendental uniting of finite and infinite that occurs in 
Romantic irony.131 In other words, lacking the performative element wit cannot 
make the important existential claims that Romantic irony can (claims that will be 
considered more fully in chapter 5). 
* 
126 Alford, Steven E (1984) Irony and the Logic of the Romantic Imagination p. 94 
127 Ibid. p. 95 
128 Ibid. p. 31 
129 Ibid. It should be noted that this would, of course, itself create an infinite movement from 
dialectic to ironic transcendence and back. 
130 Ibid. p. 73 
131 Indeed, Schlegel relates irony to poetry which, he considers, transcends the dialectical movement 
of opposites that is an inherent, inseparable aspect of "systems" of thought based upon finite cognition 
and perception: it unites the finite with the infinite in the perception of the artist and the reader. The 
continual motion of assertion and negation, creation and destruction forces (or perhaps allows) the 
abandonment of finite thinking by destroying its basis - this destruction produces the momentary 
transcendence that is the final aim of Romantic irony. 
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Musical Wit and Humour 
The distinctions between wit, humour and Romantic irony that have been seen in the 
preceding discussion are important in relation to the late Beethoven quartets that will 
be analysed in the next two chapters. The differences between these phenomena, 
which persisted even in the context of Romantic thought, may, crucially, be seen 
reflected in the music of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. As will be seen, there are 
musical instances of wit and humour that correspond well both with earlier 
conceptions of wit and humour, and to later versions like Jean Paul's. In other 
words, these instances may be fully accounted for by the conventional definitions of 
wit and humour. 
However, the type of irony that will be demonstrated in Beethoven's late quartets 
differs significantly from the instances of musical wit and humour that may be seen 
in Mozart, Haydn and in earlier Beethoven; it is for this reason that the relationships 
and distinctions between the three phenomena were outlined above. Although it is 
related to the wit and humour of Beethoven's predecessors, the irony of these 
quartets is unique, and of a different order to these earlier instances. I consider that 
this difference may be understood as corresponding to those in contemporaneous 
thought between the concepts of wit and humour, and Schlegel's Romantic irony. 
The definitions of wit and humour considered above are inadequate to account for 
these late works: the juxtapositions and incongruities analysed within these late 
works are not fundamentally witty, combinatory or "metaphorical" in effect, nor are 
they cohesive or systematic. Rather, I suggest that they produce the constant 
alteration of creation and destruction, the continual paradox of Schlegelian irony that 
accounts for the incomprehension to their contemporaneous audience. The A minor 
quartet in particular produces a constant dialectical movement of comprehension and 
incomprehension, finite and infinite that, through the force of the music, pushes the 
listener beyond the perception of meaning into the performative effect of Romantic 
irony. 
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In order to demonstrate this difference, however, it is important to consider the 
manner in which wit and humour function in music. In a sense it is easier to 
demonstrate instances of musical wit than it is to demonstrate musical humour: 
Charles Rosen, for example, describes musical wit as "the incongruous seen as 
exactly right, the out -of -place suddenly turning out to be just where it ought to be" 
and as "a surprising change of nonsense into sense ".132 His examples of wit focus 
on the integration of an initially problematic incongruity into the subsequent course 
of the movement, as an essential element of its structure. He centres on double - 
meanings, arguing that the use of reinterpretation, the clear articulation and 
differentiation of melody and accompaniment, and the sharp distinction between 
tonal areas within the "Classical" style allowed the double- meanings necessary for 
wit and humour to function.133 The emphasis on reinterpretation, for example, 
meant that what was initially incongruous could subsequently be seen to be central - 
i.e. the surprising relationship between incongruities that defines wit. 
The enharmonic manipulation seen in Haydn's D major Trio H. 7, for example, 
produces a witty pun of the type that Rosen considers as the highest form of musical 
wit.134 The E flat which occurs as the dominant of A flat in bar 86 is subsequently 
heard as D# - the third of B major; the momentary combination of two tonal areas 
produces a double meaning that functions as a "joke" because of the sharp distinction 
between tonalities that was essential to the Classical style.135 
132 Rosen (1971) p. 96 and 98 
133 Rosen also makes an important connection between humour, wit and the operatic origins of 
Viennese Classicism. He argues that comedy and wit were an inherent element of the style because of 
the heritage of opera buffa from which it draws (ibid. p. 96). Chua's recent assessment of wit and 
irony in the "Classical" style follows on from Rosen's comments. He considers that the inherent 
"chemical" nature of the style, seen for example in the combination of seemingly incongruous topics, 
may be considered ironic because, according to him, such witty combinations are inherently ironic 
(Chua (1999) p. 201 -204). In addition he considers the sonata forms of Haydn, Mozart and 
Beethoven as inherently ironic for similar reasons: sonata form, he argues, is inherently contradictory, 
producing a "self- consciousness" that "simultaneously insists on and resists all definitions of its form" 
(ibid. p. 210), whilst the type of manipulation of the form Haydn's produces an "ironic scrutiny" (ibid. 
p. 213). As will be seen, however, although Viennese Classicism may be based upon wit and humour 
there are significant differences between wit and irony, particularly Romantic irony. 
134 Ibid. p. 96 
135 The conventional formulas of the classical modulation offered similar scope for wit. Rosen 
argues that "all we need ... is one moment when we are not sure what the meaning of a note is" 
(Rosen (1972) p. 98), giving an example from Haydn's quartet Op. 33. Other examples of "witty" 
relationships include the contrast of melodic and accompanimental parts in Haydn's famous Clock 
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Indeed, instances of such musical wit are frequently attributed to Haydn, particularly 
to several well -known examples from his quartets.136 The finale of the "Joke" 
quartet (considered in the previous chapter) is perhaps the most obvious: the use of 
the opening theme as the final gesture of the movement produces a combinatory 
effect, an unlikely mixture of opening and closing, theme and closural figure.137 
Similarly, the use of an explicitly "closural" gesture -a repeated perfect cadence - as 
the opening of the finale of Op. 76 number 5 produces a witty double function: the 
gesture is at once closural and thematic. The subsequent use of this figure as 
Symphony: the subsequent re- distribution of these is considered witty (ibid. p. 97). Similarly, the 
contrasts of register in Beethoven's Diabelli variations and Haydn's Op. 33 no. 3 quartet are 
considered "grotesquely funny" (ibid. p. 95). 
136 See, for example, Wheelock's extensive analysis of Haydn's wit and humour (Wheelock (1992)). 
137 I am here ignoring the uncertainty that arises at this point regarding where the movement ends. 
The "satirical" effect that this moment produces will be considered later in this chapter. 
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sequential and modulatory material produces a further combinatory elision of 
functions. Both these instances thus present the type of witty relationships identified 
above: a strikingly novel combination or use of language that is subsequently 








Ex. 3.2 Haydn Op. 76 no. 5 Finale 
Finale. Presto 
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Like Rosen, Dahlhaus draws a connection between wit and Classicism. He, though, 
relates the combinatory power of wit to the type of similarities and indirect 
relationships between and within themes in certain of Beethoven's early and middle - 
period works. For example, he considers the manner in which the principle motive 
of the finale of quartet Op. 18 no. 5 occurs extensively throughout the movement, 
producing unexpected relationships with the second subject, as a case of wit's 
combinatory power. In addition, he identifies witty, Haydnesque reversals of 
function in Beethoven's work. The opening four bars of the first movement of Op. 
18 no 5, for example, produce a witty relationship: they are both introductory and 
thematic, the first two bars functioning as introduction to the 3rd and 4th, which are 
themselves clearly based upon these preceding bars. This conflation of introductions 
and themes resolves itself at the end of the work, producing a clarification of the wit 





Ex. 3.3 Beethoven Op. 18 no. 5 1st Movement 
Allegro 
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Daverio, however, argues that wit is actually most pertinent to Beethoven's late 
works. In particular, he considers that the "abstract subthematicism" characteristic of 
the late style produces witzig connections within works such as the late sonatas and 
quartets. The 4 -note motivic element that informs Op. 130, 131, 132 and the Grosse 
Fuge, for example, provides a connective thread between these disparate works. He 
argues that such "long- range" connections relate to Schlegel's understanding of wit's 
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function as a "network" of loose connections between fragments.138 However, 
despite Daverio's assertion, I will argue that wit is most appropriate to Beethoven's 
earlier period(s); conventional forms of wit are most clearly seen in his earlier 
output, where the influence of Haydn is most clearly felt.139 The late works draw 
upon these earlier models, and yet differ significantly: certain works, like the Op. 
132 quartet are informed throughout with irony. 
Where specific instances of incongruous connections or double- meanings may 
produce musical wit, musical humour is a more general quality. Reichardt's 
description of Mozart, Haydn and Beethoven as "the three true humorists ",140 for 
example, recognises the particular qualities of their individual "humours" or genius - 
138 The problem with this viewpoint, however, is that, whilst the thematic link between the late 
quartets undoubtedly exists, these works are constituted as individual works, with different opus 
numbers etc. These works must therefore, despite their common thematic basis be considered as 
autonomous and complete in themselves, rather than as in some sense forming a "whole" (despite 
Deryck Cooke's assertion to the contrary ). As such these works are not placed in an antithetical 
relationship and as a result there is no "clever" or "surprising" combination of these works arising 
from their shared thematic basis. There is, in other words, no wit. Moreover, whereas there may be a 
witzig connection between the individual fragments within the three collections that Schlegel 
published, this differs markedly from the type of witty connection that Daverio asserts in the late 
quartets. Schlegel's fragments actually exist in juxtaposition, within the same collection, thus wit 
combines disparate elements "within ", as it were, the same work. This therefore accords to the 
traditional view of wit as combinatory and lightening quick, and differs significantly from the 
connections between the autonomous late quartets. 
139 It will be noted that the instances of musical wit and, as will be seen, humour that have been 
given have been drawn entirely from Haydn's works. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, it is 
noticeable that associations of wit and humour are most frequently made with Haydn's music: these 
works most clearly display the qualities considered. Secondly, Haydn's influence upon Beethoven is 
important (perhaps more so than Mozart's): the wit and humour of Haydn can been seen in earlier 
Beethoven and form important precedents for the Romantic irony of the later works. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that important instances of humour and wit may also be seen in Mozart. Chua's 
analysis of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony, for example, highlights a combination of apparently 
contradictory topics in the main theme of the first movement (Chua (1999) p. 203 -208). Although he 
considers this combination ironic, I would argue that both this combination and its subsequent 
treatment throughout the movement accord perfectly with the conventional definitions of wit seen 
above: the continual combining and recombining of these thematic elements produces a relationship 
between apparently antithetical elements that is frequently surprising and dazzling in effect and which, 
moreover, displays the intellectual and fanciful caprice of the composer. 
140 Reichardt, Johann (1810) Vertraute Briefe geschrieben auf einer Reise nach Wien ... 1808/9, 14`11 
letter (16`h December 1808). Translated Wheelock (1992) p. 50/51 
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their originality, breaking of conventional models, and innovative use of 
conventional language - rather than simply the comic elements of their music.141 
Nevertheless, humour is most often associated with Haydn's music, in particular the 
metrical play of his dance movements.142 By disrupting the rhythm and periodicity 
of the music Haydn undermines the essential dance -like quality of such movements. 
Such instances problematise these forms by producing "dances" that simply cannot 
be danced to. The humour involved in this process undermines not simply musical 
"good- behaviour ", but also the social conventions that are correlated with dance 
forms; it is an expression of Haydn's "natural" jesting with serious topics. 
The scherzo from quartet Op. 33 number 5 is characteristic: the hemiola figures in 
the opening theme, augmented by the static harmony and continual pulse of the 
accompaniment, establish the metrical uncertainty and conflict that underpins much 
of the movement. This is compounded by further metric and harmonic 
displacements: the rest in bar 8 diverts the expected cadence, thereby disrupting the 
periodicity of the phrase by extending it to ten bars. Similarly, the fermata in bar 16 
disrupts the re- established pulse by halting the music in an unlikely place (the middle 
of a phrase), whilst the apparent repeat of the opening that follows is aborted in the 
final hemiola. Finally, the conflicting accents from bar 21 broaden the metrical 
problems, before introducing hemiola figures in the remote key of B flat. 
141 Reichardt's description occurs within the context of his comments upon a concert at Count 
Razumovsky's in which quartets by the three composers were heard. He compares the manner in 
which each composer develops the genre: 
Haydn created it from the pure, bright source of his delightful, original nature. Naïveté 
and gay humour are thus always his unique features. Mozart's more powerful nature 
and richer fantasy enabled him to express in many works the heights and depths of his 
inner being ... he also valued artful modulations more highly and thus built his palace 
on Haydn's lovely, fantastic summer house. Beethoven himself was at home in this 
palace early on; thus it remained for him only to express his own nature in a unique way, 
in building defiant towers on which no one could plate anything further without 
breaking his neck. (Ibid.) 
Reichardt's comments demonstrate his understanding of the "humour" of these composers. Here 
humour is equated with the "heights and depths" of each individual nature: each was unique, although 
Mozart and Beethoven built upon Haydn's humour. 
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Haydn's humour also manifests itself in bizarre creations like the Scherzo from the 
quartet Op. 33 no. 3. The strange "scherzo" is homophonic throughout, the low 
register and restricted compass, combined with the restrained dynamics and sotto 
voce indication, producing a subdued atmosphere that contradicts its `jesting' title. 
The quaver motion and high register of the trio, which excludes viola and cello 
entirely, produces a much thinner texture, its lighter, quasi -contrapuntal nature in 





Ex. 3.5 Haydn Op. 33 no. 3 2nd movement 
Scherzando. Allegretto 
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The characteristics of both sections are exaggerated to produce the maximum 
contrast, and this overstated opposition foregrounds the irregularity of the individual 
elements. Thus the "normal" contrasts of such movements here actually become 
"abnormal ". Haydn's humorous flouting of convention is here doubled: he breaks 
125 
the normal boundaries of convention, whilst appearing to adhere strictly to the 
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Significantly, Jean Paul identifies Haydn's alternating of opposites and destruction of 
tonal schemes as similar to humour. 
Something similar to the audacity of annihilating humour, an expression of scorn for the 
world, can be perceived in a good deal of music, like that of Haydn, which destroys 
entire tonal sequences by introducing an extraneous key and storms alternately between 
pianissimo and fortissimo, presto and andante.143 
Such a "storming alternation" occurs in the opening movement of Haydn's quartet 
Op. 76 no. 5. Following the fugato treatment of the main theme there is an abrupt 
change to entirely new material in bar 41: the rapid scale and arpeggio motion, 
tremolandos and alternating figuration contradict the steady motion and gentle 
counterpoint of the main theme. This sudden change foregrounds the change of key: 
143 Wheeler (1984) p. 178 
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although B flat is expected, the juxtaposition of material is not. It ends unexpectedly, 
however, with the main theme returning (in B flat) after the repeated chords in bar 46 
halt the music's motion altogether. It is the abruptness of these juxtapositions that 
surprises, producing an apparent incongruity that fractures the continuity of the 
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This intrusion, however, is subsequently worked into the remainder of the 
movement. The rapid scale motion in bars 49 to 57 acts as a countersubject to a 
fragment of the main theme, producing a variation of the contrapuntal working of the 
development.144 Similarly, the scales and tremolando accompaniment from bar 107 
in the coda are clearly related to the earlier interruption. These instances transform 
the meaning of the initial interruption: its surprising incongruity is subsequently 
combined with the preceding material, integrated into the form of the work in order 
to form a new combination. Thus, in retrospect, the dramatic change at bar 41 is 
necessary to the movement; it defines and extends its form, creating new "meanings" 
by adding drama and contrast to an otherwise single -theme form. This movement 
thus produces the combination of wit and humour considered above: the 
"annihilation" of the humour is incorporated into the movement via the combinatory 
power of wit.145 
Although Jean Paul's association of Haydn's music with his expanded conception of 
humour is significant, it is important to note that he only identifies a correspondence 
between such instances and the "audacity" of humour: it is the striking quality of 
their unexpected effect that relates to humour. Indeed, although such instances are 
similar to humour, Jean Paul does not draw a complete parallel. His comments do 
imply a correspondence with the comic effects and destruction of illusion that he 
earlier identifies in the "humour" of Sterne and Tieck.146 Nevertheless, although 
Haydn's music produces the contrast and annihilation that he identifies with such 
humour it is limited to the contrast of opposites, rather than the crucial contrast of the 
144 Compare with bars 29 to 34 and 37 to 39 with bars 49 to 51. 
145 Precisely the same process occurs in Haydn's quartet Op. 54 no. 2. Chua analyses this work in 
relation to Jean Paul's statement regarding annihilation, considering the interruption of the tonic by 
the flattened submediant in the exposition as an annihilation of the tonic by an intrusion of an 
extraneous key. However, he also argues that this intrusion may be understood in light of events later 
in the movement, namely the "massive block of A flat major, placed where it should be - at the close 
and as a structural cadence" (Chua (1999) p. 215). Thus, again, there is a combination of an apparent 
humorous incongruity that is subsequently resolved through the combinatory power of wit. Although 
Chua considers this process as ironic, I would argue that it is simply an archetypal instance of the 
combination of wit and humour: although Haydn's manipulation of the form is a demonstration of his 
own artistic awareness, more importantly it is, as with all humour, a comic effect designed to tease his 
audience (particularly the unaware or naïve). This process is markedly different from the 
transcendental paradoxes of Romantic irony. 
146 In this regard, Jean Paul's comments mirror the frequent associations that contemporaries made 
between Haydn and Sterne. See Bonds (1991) p. 59 -63 
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particular and general, finite and infinite that defines his "romantic comic ". Such 
instances, in other words, lack the "existential" element that is central to Jean Paul's 
humour.147 
Indeed, in this context it is interesting to note Sulzer's comments that "to express 
violent or other vehement affections, the harmonic progressions should be 
interrupted by modulations to distant keys ".148 This implies that the type of 
interruption and alternations that Jean Paul identifies as humorous in Haydn could 
also be understood differently, in terms of the more conventional "Sturm and 
Drang", for example. In other words, not every alternation or interruption of 
tonalities will prompt a "humorous ", or even "ironic" interpretation.149 
Sulzer's comments, however, also highlight the important consideration that such 
instances, including cases of wit and humour were, to a certain extent, a normative, 
indeed expected element of the style that Beethoven inherited from Mozart and 
Haydn.150 Indeed, Griesinger's comments, for example, demonstrate that Haydn's 
humour - "the very spirit of Austrian cheerfulness "151 - was an accepted aspect of 
his style, whilst Dies inextricably connects this to his artistic character: 
In his compositions this caprice [humour] is most striking, and his allegros and rondeaux 
are especially often planned to tease the audience by wanton shifts from the seemingly 
serious to the highest level of comedy, and to be tuned to an almost wild hilarity.152 
147 Moreover, it is significant that Jean Paul identifies Haydn's music as similar to the effect of 
humour, rather than irony. As seen, Jean Paul differentiates humour from both "rhetorical" and 
Romantic forms or irony. Indeed, the basis of the "humour" that he sees in Haydn is not related to 
Romantic irony, which, as seen above, centres on paradox, on "everything simultaneously good and 
great ", and on "sublime urbanity ". Rather humour centres simply on annihilation and on "scorn for 
the world ", and therefore, as will be seen below, produces results closer to the "finite" effect of 
"proto- romantic ". Thus to label Haydn's work as Romantic irony, simply because Jean Paul describes 
it in terms of humour is misleading in that it ignores the crucial elements of Schlegel's Romantic irony 
that do not occur within it. 
148 Sulzer (1771 -74) trans. Baker (1995) p. 52 
149 This point has also been made more recently by Hatten, who suggests a number of possible non- 
ironic interpretations for such disruptive instances. See Hatten, Robert S. (2004) Interpreting Musical 
Gestures, Topics and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert p. 268 -270. 
150 The type of metrical play seen in the minuet from Haydn's Op. 33 no. 5, for example, became a 
"stock -in- trade" of the "Classical" style. 
151 Griesinger, Georg August (1810) Biographische Notizen über Joseph Haydn, translated Vernon 
Gotwals (1968) Haydn: Two Contemporary Portraits p. 57 
152 Ibid. See also Wheelock's statement that "a recurring theme in [critic's] perceptions of Haydn's 
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Woven into Haydn's character is a genial, witty, teasing strain, but with it always the 
innocence of a child. His musical output attests to this.153 
In his character there was much cheerfulness, jest and musical wit both popular and 
refined, but original to the highest degree. It has often been called humour, from which is 
rightly derived Haydn's bent for musical teasing.154 
These descriptions demonstrate that wit, humour and even extreme contrasts were 
not problematic but rather were stylistically acceptable, inherently associated with 
Haydn's unique artistic humour. Indeed, these quotations highlight the fact that 
humorous elements were, to a certain extent, actually conventional - humour was 
intrinsic in the conception of the quartet that Beethoven inherited from his 
predecessors. Moreover, they demonstrate the point made earlier: that 
contemporaneous definitions of wit and humour are perfectly adequate to account for 
such instances. For example, the instances of humour seen in Haydn's work accord 
perfectly with Michaelis' description of musical humour: 
Music is humorous if the composition betrays more the disposition [Laune] of the 
composer than the strict application of an artistic system. The musical ideas are 
extremely peculiar and unusual; they do not follow one another in the manner one might 
expect, say, on the basis of certain conventions or according to the natural progressions of 
harmony or modulation. Instead, these ideas surprise us through turns of phrase and 
transitions that are entirely unexpected, or by wholly new and unusually juxtaposed 
figures ... The humorous composer distinguishes himself by means of unusual ideas that 
cause one to smile; he sets himself above and beyond the ordinary ". 155 
Significantly, since instances of wit and humour were, to an extent, an expected part 
of the "Classical" style, such devices were actually somewhat anachronistic by the 
time of the late quartets. The importance of this is that such devices were not really 
viable in Beethoven's late works: in order to be effective, irony would need to 
manifest itself differently.156 As a result, as will be seen, the irony in the late 
musical humour is his matchless balance of the grand and the playful" (Wheelock (1992) p. 27). 
153 Dies, Albert Christopher (1810) Biographische Nachichten von Joseph Haydn, trans Vernon 
Gotwals Haydn: Two Contemporary Portraits, p. 145 
154 Ibid. p. 203 
155 Michaelis, Christian Friedrich Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 9, no. 47 (12`" August 
1807). Quoted in Bonds (1991) p. 77/78 
156 Indeed, Rosen considers that wit of the type he identifies was not actually possible in the 
Romantic period. The loosening of key relationships "nullifies the effect of wit altogether" (Rosen 
(1972) p. 98); Romantic modulations, for example, became so chromatic that "the two keys blend into 
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quartets differs significantly from the wit and humour of Viennese Classicism. 
Indeed Beethoven's late works are so different from the music of his predecessors 
that, where definitions of wit and humour can adequately encapsulate Haydn's 
humour, the processes of these works simply cannot be accounted for by either the 
conventional or indeed Romantic conceptions of wit and humour.157 Rather, the 
continual paradoxes and infinite motion of assertion and negation that will be seen 
within these works relate to those of Schlegel's Romantic irony. 
Yet the Romantic irony of these works does relate to the music of Beethoven's 
predecessors. Just as the concept of Romantic irony is, as was considered, related to 
but distinct from the concepts of humour and wit, so too Beethoven's Romantic irony 
is related to the humorous, witty "Classical" style. Indeed, in some cases the irony of 
these works draws on these earlier devices, transforming them from anachronism by 
raising them to the second power, a process that parallels Schlegel's "irony of 
irony ".158 This produces a historical progression or development: the humour and 
wit of Mozart and Haydn (and indeed earlier Beethoven) form important precursors 
to Beethoven's Romantic irony, in the same way that Sterne's humour influenced the 
works of Tieck, Brentano and Schlegel. 
"Proto- Romantic" irony 
This progression may be understood in relation to the distinction that Muecke draws 
between romantic and "Proto- romantic" irony. He observes that devices such as 
`authorial' interruptions - which remind the observer that the artwork is "only a 
painting, a play, or a novel and not the reality it purports to be "159 - occur frequently 
in works preceding the conception of Romantic irony.160 He designates such cases 
each other, and are often much slower and gradual" (ibid.). Thus whilst there are instances of wit 
similar to those of Haydn throughout Beethoven's earlier works the expansion of tonality made this 
type of "Classical" wit less viable for his late style. 
157 This is perhaps reflected in the perennial fascination of commentators with the late style and the 
common perception that, to an extent, the late works (particularly the late quartets) stand apart in some 
way. 
158 Wheeler (1984) p. 37 
159 Muecke (1969) p. 164 
160 He gives examples from Aristophanes, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Diderot and, of course, 
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as proto- romantic irony, in order to indicate both the critical historical development 
of the concept and the difference between these and the later concept. 
Lilian Furst's comments indicate an important element of this distinction. She 
considers that 
the impetus for such Proto- romantic irony might be described as negative since its 
purpose is a reduction of the work of art from autonomous standing to its proper place 
in the scheme of the universe as "only a painting, a play, or a novel ". By contrast, in 
true Romantic irony the breaking of illusion is positive in intent for it aims to 
demonstrate the artist's elevation over his work, his transcendence even of his own 
creation.161 
Significantly, this distinction can also be made with regard to the examples 
considered above: certain aspects of the wit and humour of Haydn and Mozart may 
be considered forerunners of the Romantic irony seen in later Beethoven. Devices 
like false recapitulations and unexpected tonal diversions, for example, produce a 
"breaking" of aesthetic convention and illusion. The authorial manipulation in 
Haydn's "Joke" quartet, for example, breaks the aesthetic illusion by contrasting the 
"expected" function of the ending with the "open" way it actually finishes. This 
produces incongruities between the conventions of the artwork, the inherent 
assumptions of the listener and actuality. 
Although it might be argued that such instances do produce irony, there are two 
important points to consider. The first of these is historical: the "irony" in these 
works is understood as such only because of the later conception of irony developed 
by Schlegel. The German Romantics, particularly Schlegel and the Jena circle, were 
not simply following practice with theory; rather, they were consciously prescribing 
aesthetic theory for future works to follow.162 Thus, for example, Behler underlines 
the "tension" between Classicism and modernism (Romanticism), in Schlegel's 
Sterne (ibid. p. 165 - 177) 
161 Furst, Lilian (1998) "Romantic Irony and Narrative Stance" in Frederick Garber (ed.) Romantic 
Irony p. 301 
162 This prescriptive element arises, at least in part, from the "nationalistic" aspect of the Romantics' 
agenda: they wished to establish specifically German literature - focussing particularly on the novel - 
which would always be Romantic in character. They looked both to Classical antiquity and to the 
authors identified above in order to validate the claims of this new, national literature. 
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writing: Schlegel argued not for "the restitution of a classical mythology, but the 
creation of a contemporary, up -to -date "new mythology ", not the rejuvenation of the 
Homeric epic, but the creation of the modern novel as an expression of subjective 
transcendental poetry ".163 In trying to establish Romanticism they looked to 
Cervantes, Goethe and Shakespeare both to validate their ideas and as models for 
future works, but these authors were not considered as `full' representations of 
Romantic irony.164 
Similarly, we recognise in "Classical" humour and wit expressions related to 
irony.165 Crucially, however, although these form important precursors of later 
instances of Romantic irony, such antecedents do not correspond to the full sense of 
the term. Rather, I would argue that the "ironic" effect of these instances is closer to 
Proto- romantic irony. For example, there is often a strong element of satirical 
corrective in Haydn's "jokes ": such instances seem aimed at exposing and mocking 
the expectations and assumptions of the unwary or "conventional" listeners, in 
particular the belief in the aesthetic illusion of music. However, the "aim" of this 
process correlates with Furst's observation: it is "negative" in effect, a destruction of 
illusion whose only purpose is to remind the listener of this illusion and to jest. 
This highlights the second, and most important point: the areas where wit and 
humour overlap with Romantic irony relate only to certain aspects of the later 
concept. The presence and intervention of a self -conscious artist, together with the 
play and "breaking" of levels of aesthetic illusion are only one element of Schlegel's 
conception of Romantic irony. Instances such as those considered above do not 
produce the crucial play of paradox - the constant alternation of creation and 
163 Behler (1990) p. 63. Note that this process is itself almost ironic, since it is "entirely open -ended 
towards the future" - an infinite process of becoming, with no teleological goal (ibid. p. 63). 
164 Indeed Muecke argues that Romantic irony was rarely fully exemplified because it was difficult, 
if not impossible to produce an artwork that included all the attributes or facets of a concept so 
complex. He considers that that it is only in the novels of Thomas Mann that the concept of Romantic 
irony is fully exemplified (Muecke (1969) p. 185/186). 
165 Thus Bonds describes Haydn's work in terms of the origin of musical irony. Indeed, he actually 
acknowledges a chronological distinction between the humour of Haydn and Jean Paul and Romantic 
irony (Bonds (1991) p. 67/68). Haydn's humour and "irony" are not fundamentally Romantic in 
nature; nevertheless, they are an important forerunner of Beethoven's Romantic irony, and indeed 
share some common elements. 
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destruction arising from Fichtean reflection - that was central to Schlegel's 
conception; rather, they produce the effects of proto- romantic irony. 
It is the absence of this infinite process that most clearly distinguishes such instances 
from Romantic irony. Although the satirical elements and "proto- romantic" devices 
in certain cases of musical wit and humour do overlap with Romantic irony to an 
extent, such instances do not produce the infinite reflective paradoxes of Schlegel's 
conception. Rather, the "negative" direction of these instances is more closely 
related to the "stable" and "finite" irony considered by Booth. In "stable" irony 
"once a reconstruction of meaning has been made, the reader is not then invited to 
undermine it with further demolitions and reconstructions ".166 Moreover, because of 
the finite quality of this stable irony "the reconstructed meanings are in some sense 
local, limited. Though some of them are about very broad subjects like religion or 
the nature of God, the field of discourse even in these is narrowly circumscribed ".167 
Crucially, Booth explicitly differentiates such ironies from "infinite" and "unstable" 
types - the type that includes both Romantic irony and the general, existential irony 
that will be considered below. In these cases 
the only sure affirmation is that negation that begins all ironic play: "this affirmation 
must be rejected," leaving the possibility, and in infinite ironies the clear implication, 
that since the universe (or at least the universe of discourse) is inherently absurd, all 
statements are subject to ironic undermining. No statement can really "mean what it 
says". 168 
The wit, humour and even Proto- romantic irony in Haydn, Mozart (and in earlier 
works by Beethoven himself) is limited in scope, "finite" in effect and susceptible to 
stable reconstruction. This occurs particularly in instances of wit - its combinations 
and double- meanings are finite and local in effect, informing specific moments of 
166 Booth (1974) p. 6 
167 Ibid. Booth adds, moreover, that "stable irony ... does not mock our efforts by making general 
claims about the ironic universe, or the universe of human discourse. It does not say "There is no 
truth" or "All human statements can be undermined by the true ironic vision," or ... "we do not know 
anything" (ibid.). 
168 Ibid. p. 240/241 Booth makes the distinction between finite and infinite, stable and unstable 
ironies even clearer elsewhere: "stable irony ... does not mock our efforts by making general claims 
about the ironic universe, or the universe of human discourse. It does not say "There is no truth" or 
"All human statements can be undermined by the true ironic vision," or ... "we do not know 
anything" (ibid. p. 6). 
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movements: musical puns are apprehended in a moment; witty combinations of 
topics remain specific to the context in which they occur. However, even in the 
examples of humour the "annihilation" that occurs is constrained in moments and 
momentary disruptions: they are finite and reconstructable, "jokes" whose meaning 
is perceived in retrospect, and whose annihilating effect is often integrated into the 
subsequent form of the music. The process of such instances is "negative" and finite 
in effect, gesturing towards aesthetic illusion, rather than producing the infinite, 
paradoxical motion of creation and destruction that characterises romantic irony. As 
such, even the "proto- romantic" effects or elements of these instances reflect the 
distinction that Schlegel himself makes between "rhetorical" irony that is 
circumscribed in moments of a work (i.e. "finite ") and works that are "pervaded" by 
irony.169 
Significantly, this distinction can also be seen in the music of Beethoven. 
Longyear's distinction between works that "contain not romantic irony, but a 
playfulness that stems from the Haydn of the finales of the string quartets Opus 33, 
No. 2, and Opus 76, no. 5 and Symphony 102 "170 highlights a developmental 
progression within Beethoven's music: there are important examples of proto- 
Romantic irony in his work. Perhaps the most obvious example occurs with the 
juxtaposition of the (Burkian) sublime and the ridiculous in the finale of the Ninth 
Symphony, where the comedic "Turkish" music undercuts the high seriousness of 
the preceding choral section. This violent dislocation undermines the aesthetic 
"illusion" of the preceding music, demonstrating the intervention of a self -conscious 
authorial "voice ". The coda of the finale of the Op. 95 quartet produces a similar 
comic undercutting of preceding "serious" music: 
169 Schlegel (1991) Lyceum fragment 42 p. 5/6. See the quotation in the second chapter of this work. 
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In both cases the establishment, and subsequent dislocation of an aesthetic illusion 
produces a concurrent shifting of discursive level that could be compared to Heine's 
"sting in the tail "171 or Jean Paul's "hot baths of sentiment ... followed by cold 
douches of irony ".172 Neither of these formulations, however, can be considered as 
Romantic irony, although both are often cited as an indication of its nature. Rather, 
171 See Dill (1989) p. 173 
172 Muecke (1969) p. 181 
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like the examples above, they are finite in effect and stable in reconstruction - they 
are "proto- romantic" in nature. 
Nevertheless, these examples highlight a gradual transition or development of the 
irony that may be observed in Beethoven's works. He was always prone to irony, 
wit and humour: consider the progression of his Haydnesque metrical play and 
abrupt interruptions and juxtapositions, through the parodies of Haydn in his Op. 18 
quartets to the proto- romantic irony of the "Serious" quartet and the 9th Symphony. 
Crucially, however, the irony of Beethoven's late works differs significantly both 
from the wit, humour and "irony" of the "Classical" style and from these earlier 
"Proto- romantic" instances. These works - in particular the Op. 132 quartet - 
produce a continual, infinite process of paradox, a constant alternation of creation 
and destruction that negates or annihilates every positive assertion. The disruptions 
in these works are unmitigated; they cannot be integrated into a "whole" conception 
or "meaning" of a work because they negate such a unified conception in an infinite 
process of ironic undermining. This, in turn lends the parabasis of these works a 
different quality to the momentary, "proto- romantic" authorial intrusions that the 
finite, limited effect of Haydn's humorous annihilation or wit tend to produce. The 
continual process of Romantic irony produces a constant intrusion of the author's 
ironic presence extending throughout the entire work - the continual parabasis that, 
in part, defines it. This difference is not simply a matter of degree. Rather it reflects 
the essential difference between the "finite" humour and wit of earlier examples and 
the movement towards the "infinite" that occurs in Schlegel's Romantic irony. It is 
only in these later works that irony pervades the music; it is only here that the 
continual, infinite, paradoxical processes of Romantic irony proper are to be found. 
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Beethoven's Romantic Irony: 
the String Quartet Op. 132 
The A minor quartet Op. 132 is perhaps Beethoven's strangest creation, rivalled only 
by the quartet that followed it, the B flat quartet Op. 130. The severe disparity of its 
constituent elements has been considered in terms of fragmentation', musical 
critique,2 social commentary3 and even of personal psychological journey.4 In this 
chapter I will argue that, in addition to these interpretations, the extreme nature of 
this work can be considered as a correlative of Romantic irony. Its five movements 
are linked, not only thematically or topically but also by an irony that permeates 
them all, a continual alternation of assertion and negation, of artistic creation and 
destruction. The fragmentation of this work is caused by the frequent disruptive 
occurrences of parabasis -an "authorial" voice whose intrusive presence violates the 
artistic conventions of the music. The incongruity that this produces results in 
multiple levels of paradox and of ironic reversal, and in a continual process of 
objectification within and between the movements. 
First Movement 
This movement might be considered as a microcosm of the entire quartet: the 
incongruity and irony that pervade this movement form the common denominator of 
the rest of the work. The movement presents a dazzling complex of incongruity on 
both the "surface" and the "deep" levels of the music. The "surface" of the music is 
riven with interruptions and juxtapositions, a constant authorial parabasis that 
produces a continual play of levels. The "deep" structure carries the movement into 
the realm of paradox and ironic reversal. It produces a continual dialectic of creation 
and destruction through its thematic process, and a disjunction between thematic and 
harmonic processes that distorts the form of the entire movement. 
' Adorno (1998) p. 125, p. 134 
2 Ibid. p. 134, p. 190 
3 Chua (1995) p. 108 -110 
4 Kerman (1967) p. 265 
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The two "levels" of this movement will be examined separately for the purposes of 
this analysis, whilst recognising this distinction as inherently unsound: such levels 
are inextricably linked, generating each other. Nevertheless, as with all music it is 
the "surface" of this movement with which the listener first engages, "deep" 
structures becoming apparent only retrospectively, frequently upon repeated study.5 
"Surface" structures 
Throughout this movement there is a play of contrast that is perhaps the most 
extreme of all the quartets. The juxtapositions and interruptions of this movement 
produce a continual undermining and diversion of the thematic structure, resulting in 
an almost bewildering complex of topics, conventions and clichés. This fragmented 
"surface" forms a continual alternation of creation and destruction, involving not 
only the conventions of this movement, but of the Classical style in general. It 
presents a complicated play of levels, moving so far and so frequently that no one 
level is the "correct" one: all are problematic. This confusion of levels results in 
continual objectification, parabasis and paradox. 
The contrast between the quiet, contrapuntal opening and the energetic cadenza in 
the first violin between bars 8 and 9 sets the tone for the rest of the movement. 
Although these bars represent an extreme change of topic this contrast is, 
nevertheless, `mediated' and prepared by the crescendo and harmonic movement of 
the preceding bar.6 This is significant because, particularly within the context of 
sonata forms, contrasts, even those of an extreme nature are to be expected 
5 It is worth noting that this point answers the potential criticism that may be levelled at any ironic 
interpretation of music - that the incongruities and reversals that are identified are not always 
perceived clearly in performance i.e. that the music doesn't sound ironic. This may be partially due to 
the fact that performances can modify the effect of incongruities through temporal or dynamic 
"smoothing ": sudden contrasts or juxtapositions, for example, may be mediated and lessened by a 
performer's interpretation of the score. However, it is the case that the types of incongruities and 
reversals that will be identified in Op. 132 require detailed examination of the score. Such close 
scrutiny reveals the fundamental paradoxes that underlie the irony of this work and accounts for the 
fragmented "surface" structure. 
6 The diminished harmony in bars 8 to 10 may be understood functionally as an extension of 
dominant harmony, resolving to the tonic (A minor) in bar 10. 
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stylistically. As will be considered more fully in the next chapter, incongruity 
(which is considered an indicator of irony) is defined not simply by contrast, but 
rather by the context in which the contrast occurs. Since contrast and conflict are 
stylistically expected elements of sonata form, most contrasts in such movements can 
be accommodated by the style. As a result not every contrast will be incongruous or 
ironic. 
The descending Neapolitan arpeggios that begin in bars 18 and 28, however, are 
unmediated intrusions that halt the momentum generated in the preceding bars. In 
both cases these intrusions deflect the harmonic course of the music away from the 
subdominant (D minor). The first intrusion forces the music back to the tonic, 
combined with a juxtaposition of topics similar to that seen in the first ten bars: slow, 
largely homophonic motion is contrasted with the solo figuration of the violin.? The 
second Neapolitan intrusion pushes the harmonic course towards F minor (bars 30 - 
33), a key that is remote from the main key of the movement. Although this is 
quickly "corrected" to F major in bar 35, the F minor passage underscores the 
disruptive effect of these Neapolitan intrusions. Nevertheless, since these dramatic 
intrusions are in keeping with the contrasts of the preceding bars, as well as of sonata 
from generally, at this point in the movement they could perhaps be reconciled to the 
surrounding bars: they are not really an incongruity. 
Subsequently, however, there are unmediated juxtapositions that must be regarded as 
incongruous, intruding into the course of the music, interrupting and diverting it. 
The first of these occurs between bars 37 and 40. The accelerating effect of the 
move from triplets to semiquavers in bars 36 and 37 belies the underlying cadential 
motions. The sudden change of texture and topic in bar 38 -a cadential descending 
sequence - is unexpected in this context: it simply sounds like an intrusion. 
Moreover, the simple sequence and conventional cadential motion (particularly in the 
bass) sound too simple in this context. There is, in other words, an element of cliché, 
or banality to this brief section, which imparts a somewhat comedic air. As will be 
7 Note that here this figuration actually occurs as E dominant seventh, clarifying the function of the 
earlier occurrence. 
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seen, momentary banalities such as these punctuate the music, producing fleeting 
juxtapositions of "comic" and "serious" that, in context, are significant: they are 
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This banal sequence is abruptly cut off in bar 40, with the expected perfect cadence 
in F major being diverted and replaced with an imperfect cadence in D minor. This 
cadence halts the progress of the music entirely: the theme that follows is entirely 
new which, again in the context of the preceding interruptions and diversions, tends 
to give it an intrusive quality. This effect is compounded when the close 
contrapuntal development of this theme is itself suddenly diverted. This diversion is 
related to those seen above: once again, the subdominant is derailed by an agitated 
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figuration in all the parts (bars 44 to 47) that is clearly related rhythmically to the 
earlier Neapolitan arpeggios. The effect of this is that the new contrapuntal theme is 
entirely lost: it is subverted by a diversion. 
This process continues in the remainder of this problematic exposition. In bars 44 to 
47, for example, the strong bass line, ascending violin line, crescendo and cadential 
6/4 harmony strongly suggest a climactic perfect cadence in F major. However, 
although this cadence does occur harmonically correctly it is effectively "undercut" 
by the sudden reduction from forte to piano, and from a full texture of all the parts in 
chordal motion to one single bass note. Above all however, the introduction of the 
lyrical, dance -like second subject initially sounds, in the context of the preceding 
thematic juxtapositions, like another change in thematic direction. Moreover, 
although this second subject is established for a relatively long time (8 bars), it also 
is diverted. Again, the expected perfect cadence in bar 56 doesn't resolve - it is 
"undercut" by a solo C in the cello and by the introduction of new figuration in the 
first violin, which builds until the point where it overruns the theme (bars 60 - 62). 
Nevertheless, the F major tonality of this second subject area is the longest section of 
stable tonality in the exposition - in some ways it presents a more stable tonal centre 
than the fragmented A minor of the first subject.8 
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the subdominant: D minor is avoided in the first subject in order to produce greater contrast with the 
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first is itself significant. It produces a certain reversal of function that, in the context of the other 



















p d,tee i 
non ligam 




s, aM_M M r i i lÇC 
dolce ' i v<: 
dolce 
Minlr. MAN Ds 
crest. non igato 
146 
The intrusions and diversions move in ever -tighter juxtapositions towards the 
conclusion of the exposition: the loud diminished arpeggios of bars 67 and 69 are 
juxtaposed with quiet resolutions. The strong harmonic motion of bar 73, which 
follows the introspection of the preceding three bars, is already somewhat 
incongruous: it sounds too simple and clear - another banality. This is compounded, 
however, when the expected cadence is undercut both by the rest at the beginning of 
bar 74 and by the resolution of the cadence onto an F dominant 7th. This final 
gesture produces a resolution that itself requires resolution - it is paradoxically both 
closural and non -closural simultaneously. 
There are several main elements of incongruity within this exposition. The first, and 
most basic of these is the continual, almost bewildering opposition of topics: in the 
first 11 bars a contrapuntal, "learned style" topic is juxtaposed with a violin cadenza 
(which Kerman calls a "scream ").9 This cadenza is itself cut off prematurely, being 
replaced by a march theme, which is itself interrupted by the B flat fanfare.lo The 
repetition of these juxtapositions, from bar 21, is even tighter, now including banal 
cadential sequences. The end of the first subject area (if such a fragmented structure 
can justifiably be called that) contains another opposition of contrapuntal and march 
topics, before being superseded by the lyrical, arioso -type second subject, a 
juxtaposition that Kerman considers a "drastic contrast ".11 Even the cadential figure 
that closes the exposition must be considered a banal diversion from the expected 
cadence in bar 72. 
9 Kerman (1967) p. 244 
10 It is worth noting that the antecedent phrase of the march theme itself is missing the strong 
downbeat characteristic of a march. The consequent phrase, in contrast, does possess strong down 
beats (for example, beats 1 and 3 of bar 15). It could be argued that the march theme is, therefore, 
flawed - it is both "march" and "non- march" at the same time. 
11 Kerman (1967) p. 245. Note that this second subject, like the first, contains an inherent 
incongruity. There is a basic opposition of duple and triple metres between the upper and lower parts. 
Basil Lam considers that the subjects "fragile identity is purely melodic, disturbed rather than 
supported by the strange restless accompaniment in broken triplets." Lam (1975) Beethoven String 
Quartets, vol. 1 & 2 p. 87 
147 
The crucial element in this strange exposition, however, is not simply the contrast of 
topics, but rather the manner in which they succeed one another. These are not 
simply contrasts - rather they are incongruous juxtapositions, interruptions that 
change discursive levels, resulting not merely in the contrast, but rather in the 
opposition of topics. Every time that there is an assertion of a theme or topic it is 
almost immediately negated by diversion, a process repeated so frequently that it 
produces interruptions of interruptions and diversions that divert diversions. 
Moreover, the movement is punctuated by moments (such as bars 72/74) that Chua 
describes as "pure irrationality ", "a "gape in the garment," a crack in the structure, a 
collapse of logic, creating a crisis to be employed as bliss. "12 The combined effect is 
a bewildering array of themes and gestures that fragments the "surface" of the 
discourse. 
This continual process may be understood in terms of irony. The intrusion of themes 
upon one another results in a process of parabasis: each interruption displays the 
presence of a seemingly destructive authorial manipulation, a wilful, self -conscious 
intrusion upon the conventions and aesthetic illusion of the individual themes and 
topics, and indeed of the music itself.13 The moments of "irrationality" especially 
relate to this parabasis. The cracks and ruptures created by these moments destroy 
aesthetic illusion, objectifying and casting an ironic light on the conventions of music 
- conventions such as logic, continuity, structure and comprehensibility. The 
elements of parody - in the form of clichéd cadences and sequences - and the 
juxtapositions of "serious" and "comic" that often result add further layers to this 
objectification of musical convention. 
Crucially, each of these intrusions may be understood as producing a shift in 
discursive leve1.14 The sudden, unmediated juxtapositions produce an objectification 
of the preceding music - we suddenly change to a "higher" level, "above" the 
12 Chua (1995) p. 88 
13 As considered above, whilst contrast and opposition is an expected part of sonata style, the manner 
in which the oppositions of topics occurs as well as the sheer number of interruptions is incongruous. 
In this circumstance the music moves beyond the accepted norms of sonata style, displaying the 
intrusive presence of an authorial "voice ". 
14 See Hatten (1994) p. 174 ff. 
148 
conventions of the previous material. However, the continual diversions and 
interruptions in this movement create a continual switching of discursive level, to the 
extent that, within a short time, we no longer know which is the "true" level of the 
music and which is the intrusion - we no longer know which elements are objectified 
and which are not, which are "victims" and which are not.15 In this process, every 
assertion is negated; every element or aesthetic illusion created is subsequently 
destroyed. The constant parabasis produces a continual paradox of simultaneous 
creation and destruction, of simultaneous aesthetic reality and artifice - the constant 
Fichtean reflective motion of Romantic irony. 
* 
The fragmentation of the surface of this movement continues throughout the 
development section. Due to this fragmentation the formal functions of this 
movement are somewhat obscured: the continuous changes of theme in the 
exposition ensure that the return of the opening four -note figure does not provide a 
certain structural landmark - it could simply be another thematic juxtaposition. The 
function of the violin cadenza in bar 119 is similarly uncertain. This function of 
these formal and structural landmarks is only clarified in retrospect. The manner in 
which the first theme develops in an apparently untroubled manner from bar 79 
onwards, for example, highlights the structural function of the preceding four -note 
motif, confirming the beginning of the development. The only repeat of the violin 
cadenza acts similarly, signalling the beginning of the recapitulation 
From a certain viewpoint the development section is quite conventional: the key 
scheme, for example, is rather conservative, the first theme being developed first in 
G minor and C minor (bars 79 to 91) and finally E minor (bars 107 to 118). 
Similarly, the thematic development is limited: the march theme retains its identity 
fully, although it occurs in clear counterpoint with the four -note motif for the first 
time in bars 111 to 114. This motif is itself transformed at bar 103, where it occurs 
15 In this regard this movement bears comparison with the works of Tieck and Brentano - there is the 
same intrusive presence, the same complex of the destruction of discursive levels, the same 
fundamental uncertainty of the "true" level. 
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no longer in quiet counterpoint, but rather attains a new forte dynamic level and 
chordal movement. 
Indeed, were it not for the landmine of bar 92 this development would be entirely 
unremarkable (a fact that will be considered below in relation to the "deep" structure 
of the movement). The cadential 6/4 harmony and strong chordal movement of bar 
91 indicate clear cadential motion towards C minor. This cadence is, however, 
completely undercut by nearly three beats rest, following which an entirely new 
theme is introduced in C major. This combination of unexpected key, new theme 
and incongruous rest produces a frankly comical effect. Indeed Kerman describes 
this moment as "pure absurdity ... a contradiction of everything experienced thus 
far ", and as a "nihilistic gesture ... able to trivialize the whole first surge of the 
development and nullify its move from F to G to C minor ".16 Chua picks up 
Kerman's emphasis on absurdity: for him it is a fissure in the music -a moment of 
"aporia" - that brings the formal problems, the "madness" of the movement's 
gestures to the foreground.17 
Although this moment echoes throughout the "deep" structure of the movement, it is 
profoundly important to the "surface" structure. It represents perhaps the clearest 
instance of parabasis, one of the most extreme interruptions that introduces not only 
a contrasting theme but also a silence that is unprecedented in the movement. This 
moment doesn't simply nullify the preceding music; it casts the whole movement in 
an ironic light. If the contrasts of the exposition could be related on some level, to 
the "normal" contrasts of sonata form, this interruption cannot: it simply destroys the 
aesthetic illusion of the movement, completely distorting and objectifying the formal 
function and structure of the development. 
16 Kerman (1967) p. 243 and p. 247 
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development therefore continues, indeed intensifies the undermining of 
cadences, unexpected and incongruous juxtapositions and the introduction of new 
themes seen throughout the exposition. Indeed bar 92 is only the most obvious of the 
incongruities of the development - other interruptions and juxtapositions pervade the 
section. For example, just as the new theme from bar 92 is getting underway, 
another over -simple, hence incongruous sequence, constructed from dotted dance - 
type figuration, diverts it. Similarly, the repetition of the cadence -gesture from bar 
91 in bar 102 is again diverted, this time by the transformation of the four -note motif. 
Such undermining of cadences is not in itself particularly problematic: the 
conventional, quasi -rhetorical purpose of such devices, normally towards the end of a 
formal section or movement, is actually to prolong and strengthen cadential motion. 
However, in the context of this movement the frequency and number of these 
instances is problematic and incongruous - there are simply too many cadential 
diversions. The continual play of discursive "levels" that results contributes to the 
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alternation and undermining of themes, contributes, in other words, to the irony of 
this movement. 
Like the development, the recapitulation appears conventional in approach, 
proceeding in more or less the correct manner with the same succession of themes 
and all of the interruptions, juxtapositions and diversions of the exposition repeated 
here.18 This apparent conventionality means that on this level the recapitulation 
seems to mediate the difficulties of the movement. Whilst the interruptions and 
juxtapositions of the fragmented exposition could be treated as unexpected and 
surprising authorial manipulation - i.e. as parabasis - the incongruities of these 
devices are greatly reduced within the recapitulation, which has a powerful effect 
upon their "meaning ". Because of the repetition, the return of the interruptions and 
diversions of the exposition is expected - they have become a convention of the 
music, and have therefore largely lost their ability to surprise. 
However, on another, deeper, level this recapitulation compounds the problems of 
the movement. Whilst this recapitulation is a "correct" repeat of the thematic 
structure of the exposition, on the harmonic level it is not - the tonic is nowhere to be 
seen. The first theme here appears in E minor; following the Neapolitan interruption 
in bars 128/129 it subsequently reappears in D minor - the subdominant so often 
avoided in the exposition. Finally, despite hints towards the tonic in bars 151 to 154, 
the recapitulation is dominated by the key of C major: the second subject appears in 
this key (bars 159 onwards), and, as in the exposition, forms the longest period of 
stable tonality, lasting until bar 189. The section therefore parallels the A minor -F 
major motion of the exposition with E minor -C major (the D minor section (bars 
134 - 142) effectively acting as the supertonic of C). 
18 As noted above, although the return of the violin cadenza in bar 119 sounds like another 
interruption or diversion - following the long inverted pedal on B and the cadential motion of bar 118, 
E minor is expected in bar 119 - the formal function becomes clear with the return of the first subject. 
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It may therefore be seen that the return of the violin cadenza in bar 119 actually 
indicated the beginning of a false recapitulation. The reversal of this function is a 
relatively conventional aspect of the Classical style. It objectifies conventional 
procedures, highlighting the illusory nature of apparently clear formal markers by 
misleading the expectations that these conventions arouse in the listener. As will be 
seen, however, this is no ordinary false recapitulation of the type seen in Haydn's 
"Surprise" Symphony. Rather, it introduces a deep paradox into the formal structure 
of this movement, a reversal of formal function that is ironic in purport. 
The "real" recapitulation begins unostentatiously at bar 195. The cadences in bars 
188 - 194 are actually more problematic than the earlier occurrence at the end of the 
exposition: they extend the metrical play and harmonic ambiguity. (The beat is 
"lost" between bars 189/190 and is only re- established in bar 195.) However, they 
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In harmonic terms this recapitulation is the "correct" one: both the first theme and 
the canonic theme (bar 214) occur in the tonic, whilst the second subject appears in 
the tonic major. Finally, the coda is firmly rooted back in to the minor mode. 
However, this second recapitulation is markedly different from both the exposition 
and the first recapitulation: although it is correct harmonically, it does not reprise the 
thematic structure accurately. It could be argued that this is because this second 
recapitulation seems to resolve, to some extent, the problems of the movement. Not 
155 
only are the harmonic contrasts between themes resolved, the interruptions and 
juxtapositions are greatly reduced - the Neapolitan interruptions, for example, have 
disappeared, whilst the canonic theme and second subject follow the first subject 
without the sense of interruption and juxtaposition that occurred in either the 
exposition or the first recapitulation. Even the conflict between the first theme and 
the four -note motif has been apparently mediated: the first subject area constitutes a 
more coherent unit where the two antithetical themes occur together in counterpoint, 
the four -note motif in retrograde acting as a cantus firmus to the main theme (bars 
193 to 206). Chua likens this apparent thematic reconciliation to a dialectical 
synthesis, "elements that were opposed now illuminate each other - they are one and 
the same ".19 Such a process would be similar to a conventional sonata form where, 
in the "traditional" definition, elements that are initially opposed are reconciled 
within the recapitulation, at least in harmonic terms. 
However, the mediation and synthesis of this second recapitulation is only illusory. 
This may be seen, on the harmonic level, in the transformation of the second subject. 
The translation of the theme to the tonic major (bars 222 to 230) implies the 
possibility of a Picardy coda, a possibility eschewed, however, by the return to A 
minor (bars 231/232). Significantly, Lam describes this moment as "an effect of 
tragic irony ",20 a statement that Kerman's comments clarify: "What is heartbreaking 
here is the certainty that this vision cannot last, and that we are to be made to hear the 
last bar lapse back to the minor mode ".21 What both commentators highlight is the 
improbability, indeed impropriety of this major version. The irony here arises from 
the comfort of our superior viewpoint as observers: we "know" that such a Picardy 
finish is impossible. 
This, though, is secondary to a profound irony in the thematic structure of this 
recapitulation. According to Chua, the thematic synthesis sought throughout this 
movement is never attained: 
19 Chua (1995) p. 86/87 
20 Lam (1975) p. 88 
21 Kerman (1967) p. 249 
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The closer the synthesis between these contrasts the greater the antagonism, since the 
ambivalent gestures are forced to coalesce; the temporal violence may be eliminated, but 
that merely generates an emotional violence in which the gathering of an ancient 
polyphony (Adagio) with the march (Allegro) compresses past and present, sacred and 
secular, into a disunified unity.22 
I would suggest that this process therefore results in a deeply paradoxical situation: 
The more the music strains to synthesise and resolve its conflicts, the more this goal 
eludes it, producing instead only a tighter juxtaposition and a greater antagonism. 
This results in a sort of "spiral" motion, a continual movement of simultaneous 
attraction and repulsion, assertion and negation, in other words a continual ironic 
motion. 
The ironies of this recapitulation differ from the processes seen in the exposition and 
development: the interruptions and parabasis effects of the exposition and 
development are mediated, at least on a surface level, by the two recapitulations.23 
However, the play of discursive levels and intrusive parabasis is fully reinstated by 
the coda. This is achieved, again, largely through cadential deflection and avoidance 
of closure. Following the elaboration of the first theme (centred strongly on the 
tonic) the diverted cadence in bar 241 appears to prolong the closure implied by both 
the dominant pedal in bars 237/238 and the repeated cadence -like motion in bars 239 
and 240. The expected cadence in bar 243 is, however, avoided again, this time by 
diminished harmony. This movement is repeated again in bars 244/5, the melodic 
line sinking ever lower in its search for resolution. 
The sudden register shift in bar 246 seems designed to counterbalance this descent, 
strengthening the implication of, and need for cadential closure. However, this is 
undermined once more by an interrupted cadence and by a sudden reduction of 
texture to only two voices. This leads to a final attempt at closure: bars 250 to 253 
outline a full 8 - 2 descent, strongly suggesting a final resolution to 1, whilst the 
22 Chua (1995) p. 87 
23 However, as will be seen below the irony in the recapitulations arises from different sources, 
including particularly the relationship between the two recapitulations. 
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diminuendo to a pianissimo dynamic level suggests a different approach to ending 
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This attempt at closure, like those preceding it, is again deflected - the dominant 7th 
harmony continues over into bar 254. However, in contrast to the earlier instances 
where the basic topic and melodic movement are extended rather than interrupted, 
the sudden, unexpected change of topic at bar 254 is entirely incongruous. 
Beethoven introduces a dramatic, almost operatic codetta here: the trills, low 
dynamic level and tense harmony clearly imply a dramatic effect; the sudden rise in 
dynamic level and powerful unison chords from bar 258 confirm this topic. Finally, 
the music achieves the long -delayed closure with the strong repeated cadences of 
bars 262 to 264. 
There are several levels of incongruity surrounding this coda. Firstly, there is a 
dislocation of the harmonic and thematic levels. Although the final codetta section 
is, on a purely harmonic level, a perfectly satisfactory, conventional closure the 
juxtaposition of topics at bar 254 means that the thematic level of the music is 
incongruous, producing a disconnection between thematic and harmonic levels. This 
incongruity, however, is compounded by the more important fact that the operatic 
codetta has about it a distinctly parodic air. There is an element of exaggeration 
surrounding the elements of this final topic - the trills sound too obviously 
"dramatic" in intent; similarly the assertiveness of the chords from bar 258 simply 
sounds overblown (the obvious conventionality of the descending octaves in the bass 
in particular produces this effect). This exaggerated feeling, however, is mostly due 
to the trans- contextualisation of this topic. An operatic, dramatic ending is out of 
context, both in terms of the genre (such obviously operatic music is out of place in a 
160 
quartet) and in terms of the movement itself. This is particularly noticeable given the 
fact that this codetta arises as a very abrupt change of topic. Such juxtapositions of 
topic tend to produce objectification - the conventions of the incongruous element 
will simply sound unconvincing. Moreover, the effect of this juxtaposition is 
heightened by the fact that it follows the fifth attempt at satisfactory harmonic and 
melodic resolution in the coda. Whilst some delay of closure might be expected in a 
coda in order to produce a more convincing ending, the extent of this process in this 
coda must be considered an exaggeration of conventional techniques: the fact that 
every attempt at closure is deflected simply produces too much delay. 
The combination of this too -great cadential delay with the juxtaposition of topics and 
parodic nature of the codetta produces a particularly great incongruity, a particularly 
noticeable parabasis. In this closing parody of a dramatic, "rescue opera" close there 
is more bathos than pathos, more melodrama than drama. Although this might be 
taken as ridiculing or commenting ironically upon the dramatic, operatic basis of 
sonata form generally, within this movement it fulfils a more specific purpose. It 
produces a final objectification of the music's conventions, a final destruction of 
illusion. The fact that the final harmonic resolution, so long delayed, comes in an 
entirely inappropriate manner adds greatly to the incongruity - it is closure of a sort, 
but it is deeply unsatisfactory. This final twist is a last undermining of the preceding 
structure, a moment of parabasis that continues the alternation of creation and 
destruction that has dominated the movement. 
"Deep" structure 
The disjunctions, parabasis and irony seen on the surface levels of the music are also 
reflected in the deep structures. Indeed, these more fundamental levels actually 
produce profound paradoxes that underpin and even generate the irony of the music's 
surface. These deep levels produce a complex of irony and paradox, generated from 
disparate elements - from unity and disunity, from synthesis, chaos and absurdity. 
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The first of these "deep" paradoxes arises from the disjunction between the harmonic 
and thematic structures of the movement that has already been briefly mentioned. 
Throughout the movement these fundamental elements do not coincide, thereby 
creating an almost tectonic tension that affects both the surface and the overall form 
in significant ways. This disjunction is first seen in bar 10 at the end of the solo 
violin cadenza. This cadenza outlines an extended dominant seventh on E, 
underlining the A minor of the opening bars. The resolution of this dominant chord, 
however, comes one beat too early: although the descending 6 -5 in the violin 
suggests that the resolution should occur on the first beat of bar 11, it actually occurs 
on the final beat of bar 10. This produces a striking, though momentary, disjunction 
between harmonic and thematic structures.24 
The problems of this cadence are reflected throughout the movement. As seen there 
is a prevalence of cadence avoidance throughout this movement: whilst the harmonic 
structure always pushes towards closure, the interruptions and intrusions of new 
themes continually avoid it. Even in the places where conventional cadences do 
occur, there is frequently a disjunction in that, whilst the resolution occurs 
technically correctly, there is an incongruous juxtaposition of themes or topics at the 
moment of resolution.25 
These disjunctions, however, function as secondary, "surface" indicators of a more 
fundamental occurrence: the striking dislocation between harmonic and thematic 
structures that occurs within the two recapitulations. As seen, although the first 
recapitulation is an accurate repeat of the thematic structure of the exposition it 
occurs in the wrong keys. However, although it must therefore be considered a false 
recapitulation it is no mere Haydnesque joke: as a false recapitulation it goes on for 
too long - it is almost exactly the same length as the exposition (minus the eight 
24 It is interesting to note, however, that in the first recapitulation this momentary disjunction is 
actually corrected. In bar 120 a dominant seventh on B occurs, essentially the same harmony outlined 
by the violin cadenza (the diminished harmony of the cadenza functioning as a dominant minor 9th 
chord without the root). 
25 See again the transition between first and second subjects in bars 47 and 48 and the sudden 
diversion in bars 72 and 73. Even the extreme rupture at bar 92 in the development actually resolves 
correctly in harmonic terms, albeit with a change of mode. 
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introductory bars), and it is actually longer than the real recapitulation that follows 
1t.26 
It could perhaps be argued that, due to the fragmentation of the tonality in the 
exposition, the "falseness" of the first recapitulation is not readily apparent to the 
listener. Nevertheless, the presence of the second recapitulation clarifies the function 
of this first recapitulation, and exposes the paradoxes of this formal device. As seen, 
the second recapitulation must, in terms of the harmonic structure, be considered the 
"real" recapitulation, since each thematic area occurs in the correct key. Despite the 
"correct" return of the harmonic structure, however, this second recapitulation does 
not reprise the thematic structure correctly; indeed it further antagonises the 
opposition between themes. As a result, in some ways the real recapitulation doesn't 
sound as convincing or extensive as the false one. 
What occurs then, is an expansion of the disjunction between the harmonic and 
thematic structures of the movement - the harmonic and thematic structures of the 
movement do not coincide at a fundamental level. This expansion results in two 
different recapitulations, two different reiterative strategies, with the first return as 
the "correct" recapitulation of the thematic structure and the second the "correct" 
resolution of the harmonic structure. This disjunction and duality therefore results in 
a fundamental paradox of simultaneous contradictory functions: the first 
recapitulation is at once a "false" return and a real one, the second recapitulation 
simultaneously correct and untrue.27 This paradox produces a profound irony at the 
heart of this movement, a continual reversal of function. 
26 Indeed this "false" recapitulation also more accurately recapitulates the thematic level of the 
exposition i.e. the order /succession of themes, the part- writing etc. 
27 It is worth noting that an anomaly in the harmonic course of the first recapitulation - the extensive 
second -subject area in C major - extends this irony. In the exposition the second subject appeared in 
the submediant (F major) in place of the more expected, conventional relative major (C major). The 
submediant second subject in the exposition could therefore be considered unusual. (Although too 
much could be made of this, it is telling that it is often F that replaces A in the cadence diversions that 
are so prominent a part of this movement.) In this "false" recapitulation the second subject occurs in 
the relative major. Thus, from a certain point of view, the "false recapitulation" is more "correct" than 
the exposition: the second subject here appears in the conventional key of a `normal' exposition. This 
could be considered to produce a further element of paradox in this false recapitulation - it is both 
"wrong" and "correct" at the same time. If so, then this paradox is, in itself, enough to establish an 
unusually ironic purport for this false recapitulation. 
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Although the first recapitulation is, as stated, fundamentally different from the 
conventional false recapitulation of the Classical style, there is nevertheless an 
important relationship between the recapitulations of this movement and the 
conventional model. This relationship can be considered ironic: the extent of the 
"false" recapitulation is an ironic exaggeration of the conventional, Haydnesque use 
of such a device. This recapitulation references, almost by default, such 
conventional devices. More importantly, it objectifies the expectations aroused by 
this convention, as well as the artifice of the convention itself. Indeed, even if the 
first recapitulation is considered simply as an extension of the Haydnesque technique 
it is still incongruous. The expansion extends to the point where the false 
recapitulation actually provides an alternative to the real one. This adds a secondary 
level of objectification to the paradox produced by the two recapitulations. 
The paradoxical reversal of function involved in the recapitulation is also seen in the 
development. As Kerman states, in this section "a curiously unimpressive and fitful 
passage ensues, more a deflection from the problems of the exposition than an 
engagement with them ... there is no strong progress and no clear outcome ".28 The 
development is paradoxical in that it really goes nowhere - it is a development that 
doesn't develop. Thus the ironic reversal of function seen in the exposition - the 
paradox of simultaneous opposite meanings - actually pervades not only the 
exposition, but also the entire formal structure of this movement. 
This reversal in the development, though, is related to the profound effect that the 
presence of two recapitulations has upon the overall form of the movement. The 
process of recapitulation in this movement dwarfs the exposition and development - 
the 113 bars of recapitulation almost exactly balance the 118 bars of the combined 
exposition and development. By the time that the coda is added (itself almost as long 
as the development), the unconventional recapitulatory structure of this movement 
has become its dominant structural feature. 
28 Kerman (1967) p. 247 
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This situation, though, arises largely because of the truncated dimensions of the 
development: it is only forty -three bars long (bars 75 to 118). On first hearing the 
brevity of this development section could suggest a particularly terse sonata form, 
perhaps similar to the compact first movement of Op. 95. However, in hindsight the 
development section is simply too short, given the overall dimensions of the 
movement. In fact the odd proportions of this section are due to the recapitulatory 
structure. The first recapitulation actually interrupts the development - it simply 
arrives too early, severely shortening the development. This reading is confirmed by 
the fact that as noted above, the cadenza in bar 119 arrives entirely unexpectedly, 
both thematically and harmonically, interrupting whilst the development is in the 
process of the first combination of the main theme and the four -note motif (bars 111 
- 118). The first recapitulation, in other words, functions as an intrusion. 
The significance of this interruption of the development extends to the most 
fundamental structural level. In diverting the formal course away from the 
development into repetition the first recapitulation shifts the "surface" processes of 
interruption and juxtapositions into the deep structures of the movement. This results 
in a parabasis on the level of formal sections, not simply surface disjunctions - it is 
an intrusion into, and destruction of, the conventions of sonata form. 
Thus the two recapitulations, arising out of the disjunction of harmonic and thematic 
levels, affect the overall form of the movement significantly, distorting its structure, 
and producing paradoxes and formal reversals. This process, in itself, however, 
produces a paradoxical dual function. On the "surface" level of the music the 
reiteration that occurs through these recapitulations actually serves to mediate the 
incongruity caused by the juxtapositions, interruptions and parabasis - these devices 
have lost their power to disrupt. However, although these two recapitulations 
mediate the surface incongruities, they replace them with even more problematic 
"deeper" incongruities - the structural disjunctions and ironic reversals of function 
described. These two recapitulations are therefore, paradoxically, both curative and 
ruinous, the solution to one set of incongruities and the source of others. 
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The final "deep" paradox within the structure of this movement concerns the manner 
in which the thematic structure of the movement relates to the formal structure. 
Firstly, it is striking that themes that, on the surface level of the discourse, interrupt 
and oppose one another, are actually derived from the march -like first subject. As 
may be seen, the lyrical curve of the second subject follows, in retrograde, the line of 
the first theme. The canonic theme from bar 40 is less directly related: it may be 
related either to the end of the first phrase or to the line of the second. In either case 
the appoggiatura figure at the end is the clearest "surface" link. Even the contrasting 
theme introduced after bar 92 is related, as an inversion of the second phrase, as well 
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Other associations may be made between this theme and gestures within the 
movement. The figuration of the violin cadenza, for example, occurs in inversion, in 
the F minor version of the theme in bar 30: 
29 It is also worth observing that the falling appoggiatura at the end of both the canonic theme and the 
intrusive thematic fragment at bar 92 provides a link to both the main theme and the four -note motif. 
Indeed, this figure also links the main theme and the motif: appoggiaturas occur at the end of both the 
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Similarly, the march element of the theme provides a more indirect link to some of 
the gestures - the Neapolitan interruptions and the figures in bars 44 -47, for example, 
clearly relate rhythmically to the theme. 
There is a sense in which the relationships between the themes of this movement 
produce a paradox. The fact that most of the themes and gestures may be related to 
the march theme means that the interruptions, juxtapositions and dislocations that 
occur really amount to one theme interrupting or violating different versions of itself. 
This therefore produces a paradox of simultaneous similarity and difference; the 
themes are at once opposed yet are one in substance. Such a paradox will, by its 
nature, produce an ironic interpretation. 
This thematic inter -relatedness, and the paradox it creates, however, are superseded 
by the labyrinth of connections that may be forged from the four -note motif from the 
opening bars. Kerman's observation that the harmonic course of the movement is 
related to the opening four -note motif is perhaps the most fundamental: the overall 
tonal plan of the movement outlines the basic pattern of this motif, the tonal blocks 
of A minor, F major and E minor following the line of the motif:30 
30 Note that the initial G sharp of the motif would have to be considered to be implied, perhaps within 
the extended dominant function of the first eleven bars. Moreover, the C major second subject in the 
first recapitulation really needs to be ignored if the tonal plan is to be considered a true expansion of 
the motif. (The long A minor recapitulation would naturally be a necessity for tonal closure, thus 
taking precedence over motivic replication.) Nevertheless, the "curve" of the harmonic course does 
bear a close resemblance to the motif, even though, from another viewpoint, it can be considered to 
really only outline the tonic -dominant relationship that is the conventional fulcrum of tonal music. 
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4 -note Motif 
ktto 
Harmonic structure 
Exposition Development 1st Recapitulation 
b 1 - 75 b76 - 102 b103 - 194 
a (d d) 
i I i 
2nd Recap Coda 
Chua's extensive analysis of this movement expands Kerman's observation 
considerably. He demonstrates that this motif dominates not only the harmonic 
structure but also much of the thematic structure of the movement, being present 
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These examples are only a few of the many that may be found throughout this 
movement. It is no exaggeration to state that the all- pervading nature of the four - 
note motif means that it underpins the whole thematic and harmonic structure of the 
movement.32 The fact that this motif is stated so baldly at the beginning of the 
movement seems designed to foreground the complex of thematic associations. 
31 See, for example, Chua (1995) p58 -66 
32 The case for the predominance of this motif can be overemphasised. In constructing it from two of 
the most basic musical gestures - the semitone appoggiatura, either ascending or descending, and a 
fifth- relationship - Beethoven ensures that this motif will resonate, on an almost subconscious level, 
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The manner in which this motif dominates the movement, however, leads to 
profound paradox and irony. On one level the movement is dominated to a greater 
extent than any other single movement by Beethoven by rationality - the expansion 
of two motifs to fill the entire structure. However, there is conflict between this deep 
thematic interconnectedness and the fragmented surface structures, a disjunction that 
Chua describes as a "slippage between gesture and structure ".33 He adds, "The 
expressive gestures in the work make little sense. Created by contrast and 
juxtaposition, this chaotic expressivity is primarily responsible for communicating 
the absurdity of the movement ".34 Thus there is a fundamental opposition between 
the rational unity created by the all- pervading motif and the absurdity and 
irrationality of the surface, gestural structure. 
There is therefore, within this movement a paradoxical state -a constant alternation 
between unity and disunity. Chua, however, considers that this fundamental 
opposition actually results from the thematic processes in this movement: 
The absurdities of the expressive extremes, the abnormality of the form, the tensions, the 
contrasts, the juxtapositions, everything that creates chaos is actually complicit in, if not 
a function of, a rationality that has overstepped itself. The motif is manipulated into a 
contradiction, imposing an order that disorders itself and creates an internal fissure .. . 
the idea of motivic cohesion, intensified by variation and counterpoint, turns inside out, 
revealing how its very opposite - incoherence - secretly inheres within ít.35 
I would suggest, that this notion of a rationality that contains irrationality within 
itself relates this movement to a fundamental irony - the paradox of Fichtean 
reflection. The idea of a motif that so dominates a work that it destroys it may be 
considered a correlative of the reflective process of the subjective ego. In Fichte's 
throughout the movement. Virtually every time an appoggiatura occurs, the motif may be invoked; 
every structural descent will tend to echo its "sighing" motion. Similarly the ubiquitous tonic - 
dominant motion it outlines underpins not only this movement but, on the broadest scale, also the 
entire "Classical" style. Because of this overly generic construction it is possible for the analyst to 
relate almost every bar of this movement to the motif, at some level. However, this begs the question 
of whether every descending semitone or tonic -dominant relationship is related to the motif, or 
whether they are simply the building blocks of tonal music: if a motif is present everywhere, is it truly 
a motif? Beethoven, in other words, exploits the inherent properties of music to produce the most 
widespread association possible. 
33 Chua (1995) p. 87 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. p. 103 
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system everything is the result of subjectivity, being generated by the self -positing 
ego. The subjective ego, however, defines and delimits itself by its reflective 
process, thereby producing a continual alternation of self -creation and self -limitation 
or self -destruction. In creating a movement that at its deepest level simultaneously 
creates and destroys itself, Beethoven produces a correlative of the Fichtean process, 
a reflective movement of pure subjectivity. Moreover, this fundamental alternation 
of creation and destruction, producing infinite, mirror -like reflections is the very 
paradoxical motion that forms the basis of Schlegel's irony. At its heart, therefore, 
this movement displays the nature of Romantic irony. 
The irony of the thematic process of this movement, though, extends yet further. The 
extensive thematic relationships may be considered an exaggeration of the inter- 
relationships that were the pinnacle of the "Classical" style. In "normal" occurrences 
this produces a web of interconnected themes, where one or two themes generate the 
structure, giving it coherence and unity. In this movement, however, this process is 
extended so that virtually all the material is related to two basic themes, a process 
that, as seen, leads not to coherence, but to chaos. The exaggeration of this stylistic 
convention to the point of breakdown in this movement is therefore an absurd 
violation of the very conventions that generated this technique. Moreover, this 
exaggeration relates the "deep" structure of the movement to the fragmented surface: 
each has its elements of exaggeration and "absurdity ", which therefore permeate the 
whole. 
More importantly, however, this exaggeration is also a self -referential act. The 
epitome of the thematic process of the Classical style was Beethoven's own music - 
it was this very technique that Hoffmann and others so praised in the works of the 
"heroic" middle period. The exaggeration of this technique to the point of 
breakdown could therefore be considered an ironic objectification of Beethoven's 
own practices. In this movement Beethoven effectively objectifies and destroys even 
his own vaunted thematic technique, pushing it to the point of absurdity. 
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This self -reflexive exaggeration of thematic inter -relationships is important with 
regard to the ironic interpretation offered here. Self -reflexivity is one of the key 
elements of Schlegel's irony, an indication of self -consciousness and artistic 
parabasis. Crucially, it is of central importance to this quartet - not least in the 
superscript of the middle movement, but also, as will be seen, in the irony of the 
second movement. Its occurrence in this movement compounds the ironies and 
paradoxes seen throughout, the ironic reversal of the formal functions, the 
disjunction between thematic and harmonic levels, the continual destruction of 
illusion and objectification of musical conventions, and the permanent parabasis seen 
on the "surface" levels. At the deepest levels of the music the continual movement 
between self -assertion and self -negation produces an infinite irony - a Fichtean 
reflection. Indeed, the entire structure of this movement - every different level - 
correlates with the elements that constitute Schlegelian Romantic irony. It is a multi- 
faceted complex of discursive levels and paradox, more thoroughly ironic and self - 
conscious than any work by Tieck, Brentano or even Schlegel himself. 
The ironic processes seen in this first movement continue throughout the remaining 
four movements; indeed these movements form, from a certain viewpoint, an 
expansion of the problems of this movement. The irony that pervades this opening 
movement becomes a continual process throughout, a connective thread weaving 
through the movements. It is seen not so much in the musical substance - in 
thematic and sub -thematic relationships, for example - but rather in the process and 
effect of each movement and in their interaction. 
This may be seen in the second movement, which is, at once, both closely linked to 
and fundamentally opposed to the first movement. It continues the processes of the 
preceding movement, sharing many of its incongruous elements: it has a problematic 
harmonic structure; it is self -reflexive; there are banalities, clichés and parodic 
exaggerations; there are issues of cadence avoidance. Moreover, the striking 
instances of intrusive, destructive parabasis in this movement produce the same kind 
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of fragmented musical "surface ", the only difference being the relative sizes of the 
"fragments ". 
However, as Kerman highlights, the contrast between these two movements is 
extreme - it is "complete and almost malicious ".36 The play of metre that is almost 
continuous throughout, for example, relates this movement more to the "Classical" 
traditions Beethoven inherited, rather than to the more overtly "Romantic" language 
of the first movement.37 (As will be seen, though, this "Classicism" is only a thin 
veneer, whose artifice is totally destroyed by ironic objectification.) Indeed, in place 
of the extreme expressivity and fragmentation of the first movement, this one is 
nonchalant, playful and frankly comical. This opposition will draw obvious parallels 
with the relationship between the 3rd and 4`" movements: in both cases an ultra - 
serious movement is immediately followed by a comic dance movement that seems 
to mock the apparent gravity that precedes it. However, despite this apparent 
opposition these movements are inextricably linked by the common presence of an 
all- pervasive irony, a continual authorial manipulation and objectification. 
Second Movement 
The three fundamental incongruities that dominate this movement relate to the most 
basic of musical elements: metrical play and disjunction, and problematic harmonic 
and thematic structures. The most obvious harmonic issue in this minuet is its 
harmonic course: it comprises "blocks" of tonality that are strikingly juxtaposed, 
placed in unmediated contrast with each other. Although the first 22 bars of this 
section are a thoroughly conventional movement from tonic to dominant, the stark 
contrast of E major and C major that follows the repeat is novel, the sudden tonal 
juxtaposition, and the remoteness of the new key producing a particularly striking 
contrast. 
36 Kerman (1967) p. 251 
37 Indeed both Kerman and Lam relate this movement to Mozart. Lam describes it as a "ghost of a 
Mozartian menuetto" (Lam (1975) p. 89), whilst Kerman clarifies the relationship, considering that 
"its grace, workmanship, and something about its humour - so purely professional and strange and 
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Similarly, the return to the tonic from bar 67 (via a simple change of mode from A 
minor) produces another blatant tonal contrast with the stable C major of the central 
section of the minuet. The unexpected repeat of this C major section at the end of 
the second A major section, however is perhaps the strangest, producing a 
juxtaposition that is, if anything, even wilder than the first. The transition is here 
extended by two bars, using A minor as a mediating point. This produces six bars of 
unwieldy tonal motion that foregrounds the striking tonal movement, maximising the 
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The ungainly ascending gesture that links these two juxtaposed blocks of tonality (A 
major and C major) first occurs in the opening of the movement. Its sequential 
function, which outlines the leading note, tonic and submediant in A, D, B and E 
majors, allows no clear sense of tonality; when the theme finally enters there is some 
tonal ambiguity - one is not entirely certain of the key. Coming at the beginning of a 
movement this process, which might be termed a "becoming" process, a search for 
both the tonic and the theme, is unusual. The prominent use of this figure at the 
juxtapositions of tonal areas in this movement might therefore be taken as an 
expansion of the problematic opening of the movement, an unfolding from four bars 
to an entire section. 
This opening gesture, however, also introduces the metrical issues that bedevil this 
minuet. It is used to harmonise the minuet theme, and the leading tone - tonic 
motion places harmonic stress upon the second beat of the bar, by constantly 
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"resolving" onto that beat.38 This stress weakens the first beat, creating an almost 
syncopated effect: the first note of the theme could be considered to occur on beat 3. 
There is therefore a hint of a metrical ambiguity or duality within the first theme, an 
uncertainty regarding where the main beat falls. 
Like the tonal issues this metrical irregularity extends throughout the minuet. Indeed 
the dominance of these issues over the rest of the movement can be considered an 
expansion of the basic characteristics of this theme. Both the metrical and tonal 
dualities that create problems in the movement are seen clearly in the first twenty - 
two bars, within the theme itself, combining to produce subtle incongruities. This is 
seen most clearly in the cadence in bar 22. The repeat of the last five notes of the 
theme from bar 18 stresses the second -beat resolutions. The repetition of this over 
these bars -a hemiola -like device - forces open the metrical duality of the theme, 
undermining the metre, so that the cadence in bar 22 resolves on the second beat of 
the bar, which sounds, however, as though it occurs on the first beat of the bar.39 
Such rhythmic disturbances occur throughout the remainder of the minuet. The C 
major section essentially fulfils a development process, containing, for example, 
imitative, stretto -like entries of the theme (bars 27 to 32) and striking combinations 
of the first bar, its inversion and the second bar simultaneously (bars 45 to 50). 
Nevertheless, cross -rhythms, rhythmic play and momentary hemiola effects, caused 
primarily by the inherent rhythmic uncertainty of the theme itself (particularly 
through the repetition of the quaver motion) continue throughout the section. Most 
obvious is the deflection of the perfect cadence in F major in bar 41 (suggested by 
the cadential bass motion in the preceding bars) by a hemiola figure derived from the 
38 I do refer to the material of bars 5 and 6 as a theme, rather than what it actually is: no more than a 
thematic fragment. The significance of the manner in which this small fragment dominates the 
"Scherzo ", and the incongruity caused by its inability to resolve will be considered below. 
39 These hemiola bars also disrupt the periodicity of the phrases: even without the four bar "intro ", 
the consequent phrase is two bars too long. The melodic movement to G# instead of the more - 
expected B in bar 17 begins this process by repeating, rather than answering, bar 13. This forces an 
extension of the phrase by the hemiola gestures, thereby producing the disruption of both metre and 
phrasing. 
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Similar rhythmic "blurring" occurs at the return to the tonic in bars 68 to 71. The 
repetition of the descending quaver motion of the theme (bar 54 onwards) obscures 
the beat, effectively moving it from the first to the third beat. In bar 69 the hemiola 
figure is used to foreshorten the metre, which conflicts with the "felt" metre of the 
preceding fifteen bars. This produces a "limping" effect that undermines the rhythm 
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Both the metrical play and tonal juxtapositions of the minuet suggest an ironic 
interpretation, on several levels. Firstly, the tonal contrasts in particular produce the 
effect of authorial parabasis: they are inexplicable interruptions that produce 
unconventional tonal conjoinings by simply forcing opposed tonal areas abruptly 
together. The extreme manner in which these unmediated contrasts break with 
conventional tonal practices, and the manner in which these unwieldy connections 
are incongruous with the polished "Classical" style of the minuet, produces the 
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invasive quality of parabasis.40 The metrical play in this movement also suggests 
such ironic intervention - the rhythmic manipulations that upset the minuet and, as 
will be seen, the trio, are clearly due to the intervention of an intrusive compositional 
presence.41 
However, both these elements produce a secondary irony. The type of metrical play 
seen in this movement is clearly related to that of the "Haydn minuet ". Together 
with the obvious allusion to the "classical" style this produces a relationship with 
previous conventions. This relationship however is itself ironic. This irony centres 
on the nature of the minuet "theme ", which consists of only a two -bar fragment, 
"developed" through repetition in different tonal situations. This fragment, though, 
is actually only an antecedent phrase, which produces closural problems: lacking a 
consequent phrase, closure is possible only by repetition of the feminine cadence 
figure of the second bar. This closural problem of ending on a weak beat is 
compounded by the manner in which the harmony continually ascends by a fourth. 
This produces a continual need for strong resolution, a motion that is constantly 
denied.42 In itself, this theme is therefore somewhat incongruous - it is really only 
half a theme, an open -ended fragment that, unable to complete itself, can only repeat 
its final few notes. 
This basic characteristic leads, however, to a greater incongruity. The manner in 
which this one thematic fragment dominates the minuet, which dwells on it to an 
almost obsessive degree, is also deeply incongruous: the first 119 bars of the 
movement (plus repeats) comprise virtually nothing but this theme.43 The extreme 
nature of this repetition produces an exaggeration of the "normal" repetition required 
40 It could be perhaps argued that the strange tonal contrasts in the movement are really only a 
particularly striking third- relationship, a development of previous conventions lending interest to a 
minuet that is otherwise seemingly conventional. The manner in which this occurs however - the 
obviously intrusive quality of the juxtapositions - precludes such explaining away of the incongruity. 
41 Indeed, Chua considers that the rhythmic manipulations of this movement (and the fourth) produce 
an ironic social critique: the undermining of the various dances mocking the nobility, the peasantry 
and the military in turn. (Chua (1995) p. 126 and 129) 
42 As seen above, where perfect cadences do occur, they tend to fall on weak beats, for example in 
bars 22 and 99. In other instances where strong resolution seems likely, for example bar 41, it is 
avoided by diversion. 
43 Although contrast is achieved by means of the juxtaposed tonal areas these devices, as seen above, 
are themselves problematic. 
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by the thematic processes of tonal music: there is simply too much repetition. Thus, 
where the minuet theme with its rhythmic manipulations produces an explicit 
reference to earlier "Classical" aesthetics (and indeed to Classical humour) the 
exaggeration of the conventions of this earlier style produces a parodic effect: it 
objectifies the normal conventions of the music, casting them in an ironic light.44 
The minuet therefore comprises an accumulation of ironic incongruities: its parodic 
nature is compounded by parabases created by tonal juxtapositions and metrical 
incongruities. This interpretation, however, is also supported by the context in which 
this accumulation of incongruities occurs. The irony that pervades the first 
movement sets the backdrop to this movement: irony already forms a convention of 
the quartet, and this convention suggests at least the possibility of further irony in 
subsequent movements. As a result, the incongruities in this movement relate to the 
irony of the first movement: within this ironic context, these incongruities are cast 
into greater prominence and given a parodic, ironic interpretation. 
The trio section confirms this ironic interpretation: the overt parabasis and irony of 
this section surpass that of the minuet. Nevertheless they are derived from the same 
sources: like the minuet the trio broadly comprises a ternary structure, with similar 
problematic contrasts between subsections. Similarly, tonal and metrical 
incongruities predominate, here producing striking displacement of the beat. 
However, to this the trio adds further layers of incongruity, in the form of a 
paradoxical foregrounding of "meaningless" music, and a striking, disruptive final 
moment of parabasis. 
The opening of the trio section introduces three key incongruities. It begins with an 
evocation of a "rustic" musette, the pedal points in the two violins imitating the 
drone of a bagpipe. Whilst it is not unusual for folk -like elements to appear within 
quartet movements, here the absolute harmonic and melodic stasis that is produced 
44 Witness the manner in which Kerman, Lam and Chua all relate this to earlier "Classical" 
aesthetics: Kerman and Lam relate it specifically to Mozart (see again, the quotations in footnote 44 
above); Chua considers that the minuet "was already an anachronism in 1825" (Chua (1995) p. 109), 
which, he adds, is enough to give this movement the air of a parody. 
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comes as something of a shock, the strangeness of its effect being heightened by the 
high register and absence of the lower parts. The melody comprises the most stable 
degrees of the scale - the submediant to the mediant -a range that includes only one 
semitone, C# to D.45 This limited range and lack of semitonal movement minimises 
melodic impetus, an effect compounded by the pedal point, which introduces an 
absolute harmonic stasis - tonic harmony for twenty -two bars. Such a melodic and 
harmonic stasis is incongruous, striking against the conventional norms of the 
"Classical" style - tonal motion and melodic contrast. Even if this opposition is 
mediated by the fact that it originates in a musette topic, it is still an unusual, 
incongruous occurrence. 
This incongruity, however, is compounded by the lack of tonal contrast between the 
minuet and trio. The whole premise of the trio section is to achieve contrast, 
particularly tonal contrast, with the preceding minuet. The fact that this trio occurs 
in the tonic means the most striking tonal contrasts of the movement, which should, 
according to convention, have occurred between sections, now occur in the "wrong" 
place - within them. This produces a subtle reversal of formal function, which, 
together with the tonal and melodic stasis, combines to produce a particularly 
striking incongruity. 
The rhythmic uncertainty of the trio adds to this incongruity. In its original form the 
C #, E and A of bars 199 to 121 occurred on the first beat.46 This original rhythm 
still persists here in the manner in which the arpeggios in bars 121 and 130 to 132 
enter on the third beat. This third beat emphasis, however is opposed to the phrasing 
of the melody, which strongly supports the barring in the score: the F# and D in bars 
123 sound like accented neighbour notes in a turn figure; the movement to the tonic 
and minim duration of the Es and C #s produce strong downbeats on the first beats of 
bars 124, 128, 130 etc. 
45 Actually the supertonic B does also appear in the parallel line of the second violin. Its importance 
is diminished by this secondary role, as well as by the fact that it occurs as a lower neighbour -note on 
a weak beat of the bar. In any case, it is the avoidance of the leading note that is most marked - its 
absence removes melodic/harmonic impetus to a large degree. 
46 See the quotations below of the original dance movements from which the themes of this 
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The larger central section of the trio compounds this incongruity. In bar 141 the 
stasis of the preceding bars is broken, the dominant seventh on C# finally supplying 
the harmonic impetus required to break away from the tonic. In itself, however, this 
sudden change produces an incongruity: this central section is so different from the 
"static" theme that it produces not simply contrast but rather juxtaposition - an 
interruption by markedly different material similar to those of the first movement. 
More importantly, the intrusion of this much- needed movement comes too early - 
the entire section following is shifted one beat early, with beat three functioning as 
beat one.47 This shifting of the metre is achieved through strong harmonic motion: 
the bass changes harmony on the third beat and is held over the barline, whilst the 
simple sequential motion and the placing of the root note on the first and third quaver 
47 This shifting causes some rhythmic ambiguity in bars 141/142 - the dominant seventh in bar 141 
does first sound like the third beat. Nevertheless, by the time bar 143 arrives the change has been 
made and the new metre established. 
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of each group underline the harmonic changes, forcing the sense of pulse onto the 
wrong beat. This shifting of the metre leads to rhythmic clashes of the type seen in 
the minuet. In bars 145/146, for example, the beat is shifted back onto the "correct" 
place by the four -beat dominant seventh on B and the subsequent strong cadential 
bass line in bars 147/148. The sudden change to C# major in bar 149/150, however, 
occurs once more on the third beat, producing a conflict of metre identical to the one 





Ex. 4.12, Op. 132, 2nd Movement 
f:j1 J J. 1 





ï::mim.r =1. r.s 1 
sempre state. 
48 Note that almost identical clashes occur in bars 169 to 174 and bars 190 to 194. 
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Vc. 
The shifting of the beat, combined with the intrusive change in bar 141, is itself a 
clear indicator of authorial parabasis, destabilising the metre and displaying the 
composer's ability to manipulate, even destroy the most basic elements of his 
material. This element of parabasis, though, is heightened by the fact that all the 
material of this trio section derives from quotations of Beethoven's own work, the 
Largo of the Piano Trio Op. 1 no. 2:49 
Example 4.13 
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Chua adds that both the opening section and the contrasting figuration from bar 157 
are also self- quotations:50 
49 This derivation is identified by Lam (Lam (1975) p. 90). 
50 Chua (1995) p. 133 
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Example 4.14 
12 German Dances, No. 8, WoO 13 
Allemande, WoO 81 
Crucially these self -quotations add the element of self -reflexivity to the incongruities 
of this section. By referring to his own previous musical "statements" Beethoven 
directly introduces his own "presence" into the music, a procedure that already gives 
these dance figurations an objectified air.51 This objectification is increased, though, 
by the fact that there is an "incorrect" use of self -quotation here. In the original the 
figurations begin on the main beats, coinciding with the harmonic changes. 
Although the barring of the original is reflected in the quotations, from bar 141 
onwards the quotation is shifted one beat too early. The metrical incongruities and 
the type of disruptive parabasis that occurs between the first "Allemande" and the 
"trio" quotations may therefore be seen to derive from the incorrect use of quotation 
of this passage. 
The exaggeratedly simple use of these quotations compounds their objectification. 
The sequential motion of the "trio" quotation, for example, is underscored by the 
most basic of bass lines; the imitation between parts is too obvious; the thematic 
figure itself too simple. Moreover, the section simply spins out the same circle of 
fifths progressions relentlessly, without really going anywhere. This exaggeration 
51 In such cases the quotation effectively occurs as what Bakhtin terms a "represented, objectivized 
word ... the direct speech of characters" ( Bakhtin (1929) p. 154). Moreover, such occurrences were 
considered to be self -reflexive gestures in the second chapter of this thesis. Whichever terminology is 
used the important point is that these quotations already possess the element of objectification: they 
occur not as "direct authorial speech ", but as represented objects. 
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already produces a somewhat parodic air - it is a too -obvious, exaggeratedly simple 
example of a textbook sequential figuration.52 
However, this exaggerated simplicity is problematic on other grounds. As in the 
scherzo, this entire section from bar 141 to 205 is built from little more than 
fragments: a simple 5 -2 descent on the dominant followed by a turn around the root 
note (bars 141 - 143), and arpeggios and scales (bars 157 - 161). In themselves 
these simple figures are utterly banal: their inherent simplicity, combined with the 
over -conventional sequential motion, and the constant, unbroken quaver motion that 
results from the continual repetition of these closely related figures serves to 
foreground this banality.53 
Although the over -simplicity of this section seems designed to maximise the contrast 
with this intrusion in bar 206,54 the foregrounding of this banal material also 
produces another ironic reversal. This centres on the crucial point that the "themes" 
of this trio are not actually thematic at all, but rather functional figurations. Within 
the "Classical" style such figurations normally function as transitions between 
themes, to modulate or to underline tonal sections, for example; as such they are 
virtually meaningless in and of themselves. The fact that a large part of this trio 
consists entirely of such "meaningless" functional figuration, of such exaggerated 
simplicity, continuing for so long, and going nowhere harmonically is therefore 
significant - by focussing on these figurations the music imparts a certain "meaning" 
or importance to them.55 The result of this is a paradoxical situation whereby the 
inherently meaningless becomes meaningful. This paradox is intrinsically ironic, a 
reversal of convention whereby the functional nature - the "meaning" - of the 
52 As Chua notes, although these figurations are quotations, nevertheless "both the trio and the 
Allemande ... are obviously using a stock progression" (Chua (1995) p. 263 n.40) 
53 Since all of these figures are six notes long and joined together seamlessly the contrast between 
them is minimised, at least rhythmically. 
54 Chua, for example, relates the effect created by the continual repetition of the banal figures to 
boredom or monotony, which, he argues, produces a contrast with the Sublime interruption that 
follows (Chua (1995) p. 110 and 137). 
55 It could be argued that, since this allemande figuration is actually a self -quotation, this music is not 
really "meaningless ". Despite its origins, however, the manner in which it is used in this section - as 
exaggeratedly simple, textbook sequences, continually spinning out for over sixty bars - means that 
the banality of the music is foregrounded. In other words, its purely functional nature becomes the 
"meaning" or focus of the passage. 
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figurations has now become the "theme" of the trio. Combined with the use of self - 
quotation (indeed, self -quotation that is used incorrectly) the parodic exaggeration of 
this meaningless music produces a self -parody, a self -reflexive, self -mocking 
parabasis: in effect, Beethoven ironises himself. This adds a significant self - 
ironising level to the different levels of irony already indicated - the intrusive 
juxtapositions and parody of classical norms.56 
The interruption that occurs in bar 206 is the clearest instance of parabasis in the 
whole movement, and one of the strongest in the entire quartet. There is a sudden, 
inexplicable change from A major to C# minor, and a striking disruption of the light- 
hearted dance of the trio by a markedly dramatic new theme. This ultra- serious, 
quasi- operatic theme is the first truly thematic music of the trio (and arguably of the 
whole movement), a theme that would not be out of place in a sonata movement.57 
In addition to the contrasts of key and topic there is therefore also a conflict of 
strongly thematic material with the "meaningless" figuration that precedes it. 
As so often in this movement metrical issues are important in this interruption. On 
one hand this decisive new theme firmly establishes the 3/4 metre for the first time: it 
occurs after another "correction" of the metre (bars 201 - 205), entirely halting the 
cross -rhythm effect that has dominated the central section of the trio. However, the 
L'istesso tempo section that follows produces a significant opposition of duple and 
triple metres, incongruous within this context: the introduction of the duple metre is a 
complete violation of the fundamental "dance" basis of the trio.58 
56 In addition, as considered above, the metrical play and clashes in this passage can be understood as 
a parodic reference to the type of rhythmic play seen in Haydn's minuets. This, again, adds another 
level to the irony of this section. 
57 Indeed, this opera seria topic is itself almost exaggeratedly serious. Its appearance in this context 
is, as will be considered, incongruous in itself, but this incongruity does render the intruding theme 
somewhat inauthentic: it simply sounds overblown and overly dramatic. 
58 Duple metre bars do, of course, occur in dance movements in the form of hemiolas, producing 
stylistically expected fluctuations in metre that do not interrupt the basic pulse and that resolve 
without problem. Indeed, Chua argues that this L'istesso tempo section is actually a written -out 
hemiola that "corrects" the metrical problems of the trio. As a result, he considers that the return to 
the Allemande that follows appears on the correct beat of the bar (despite the barlines) (Chua (1995) 
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p. 124/125). I think though, that the subito piano and change to A major on the third beat of bar 221 
conflicts with Chua's interpretation - the return of Allemande starts here, interrupting the C# minor 
section, not on the following beat where the theme enters. (Moreover, the cross -rhythms within the 
Allemande considered above mean that, regardless of what beat this theme begins on, its metre is 
uncertain.) The duple time L'istesso tempo is therefore a complete change of metre after all, 
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These sixteen bars therefore violate the conventions of the trio section entirely, 
producing a sudden, disruptive juxtaposition of topics, metre and key that shifts 
discursive levels in a very obvious manner. This obvious authorial intrusion is 
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clearly related to the first movement: it echoes both the semitone movement of the 
motif and the disruption in the development of that movement, producing the same 
shift in levels and the same objectification. 
The manner in which this dramatic theme is subsequently juxtaposed with the return 
of the bucolic musette demonstrates this objectification most clearly: the return to 
triple metre, to A major and to melodic /harmonic stasis after the dramatic events of 
the preceding bars sounds particularly naïve, and inherently artificial. The end of 
this codetta -like section, though, also produces a final metrical twist. The 
syncopations and ascending arpeggios in bars 236 to 238 repeatedly stress the third 
beat of the bar. This sounds like a simple reiteration of a stable tonic, but it actually 
momentarily shifts the sense of pulse from the first beat to the third. 
The effect of this is that when the da capo occurs there is an even more uncertain 
metrical basis to the repeat of the opening bars than at the first occurrence: one is 
uncertain which of the first three notes of the ascending unison passage is accented. 
Moreover, even the final cadence of the movement is problematic: whereas on its 
first occurrence the missing beat in bar 119 is accounted for by the upbeat to the trio 
section, here it is missing altogether. The combination of this with the weak 
resolution on the second beat of the bar means that the final "closure" of the 
movement is metrically undermined. 
The repeat of the minuet section thus highlights the inherent metrical issues of the 
movement, with this final metrical uncertainty concluding the incongruities that have 
dominated the movement. These, together with the unmediated tonal juxtapositions 
and thematic irregularities, run throughout both the minuet and the trio, augmented 
by the incongruities of "static" themes, extended passages of "meaningless" music, 
interruptions and self -reflexive parody.59 These elements already produce, in some 
cases, a paradoxical reversal of function, and indeed already strongly indicate a basic 
59 To this one might add the type of satirical irony that Chua finds in the dance movements of this 
quartet. The ironic social critique, achieved through the incongruities of these dance movements, 
forms an extra level to the already multi -layered irony of this work, in the same way that the works of 
Tieck, Brentano, Goethe and Schlegel himself have a satirical level to their Romantic irony. 
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objectification and irony. The moments of parabasis and the destruction of illusion 
caused by the intrusion at the end of the trio are therefore, as in the first movement, 
only the most obvious of a continual chain of authorial manipulations. These 
interruptions, incongruous changes of topic and paradoxical reversals dominate the 
movement, producing a constant alternation of creation and destruction, assertion 
and negation. 
Third Movement 
The relationship of contrariety that links the first two movements also occurs 
between the third and fourth movements. Together with the attacca between the 
fourth movement and finale, this seems to naturally separate these movements from 
the first, dividing the quartet into two large groupings: 
I III V 
However, the irony of the first two movements is also present throughout the 
remaining movements. Together with the parallelism between the opposed first and 
second, and third and fourth movements, this produces a strong relationship between 
the two groups. 
For example, the quiet contrapuntal opening of the third movement seems designed 
to evoke that of the first movement, underlining the manner in which this movement 
returns to earlier issues. The incongruous juxtaposition of elements and topics from 
the first movement is here magnified into the opposition of juxtaposed formal 
sections. Indeed this third movement more than any other is organised in terms of 
fundamental oppositions, both within the respective sections and especially between 
them. The first Adagio section, for example, may be considered in terms of three 
oppositions - modality vs. diatonicism, polyphony vs. homophony and vocal music 
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vs. instrumental - each of which is projected and developed across the subsequent 
course of the entire movement. 
The opening bars form the nucleus of the tonal structure of the entire Adagio section: 
the alternation between the chords of F and C reflects the tension between these two 
tonal centres that occurs throughout the Adagio. This duality of tonal centre is due to 
the "Lydian" mode of Beethoven's inscription In effect this entire section operates 
in a tension between two poles: the dominant seventh of the tonic (F) cannot be 
formed due to the lydian fourth, preventing strong diatonic resolution. At the same 
time, because of diatonic convention every appearance of B natural undermines the 
stability of the tonic key, pushing the tonality in the direction of the dominant (C). 
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The tonal ambiguity of this section, however, reflects a larger opposition that exists 
across the movement between the modal tonality of this Adagio and the diatonic 
context within which it occurs. The B natural of the lydian mode implies C as a 
tonal centre because of the conventions of diatonic music: in the earlier historical 
context of modal tonality this tension would not be felt. B natural thus functions as a 
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focal point in an opposition of the modal conventions of the Adagio section and 
overall diatonic context. Significantly it is precisely this opposition of modality and 
diatonicism that, as will be seen, informs the contrast between the Adagio and 
Andante sections of the movement. 
The opening Adagio section also establishes two other oppositions that inform the 
overall contrasts between the sections of the movement. The first is between 
homophony and polyphony: the polyphonic entries at the beginning of each of the 
five phrases of the section are answered by the homophonic second part of each 
phrase, thereby creating this opposition within each phrase. This opposition is 
closely linked to the second, the opposition of specifically "vocal" and 
"instrumental" musical contexts. Kerman writes 
The mystic aura is furthered by the unnaturally slow tempo and the scoring or, rather, by 
what seems to be an unnaturally slow tempo on account of that scoring. The image is 
orchestral: forty strings could sustain the hymn at this speed with comfort, but four can 
bear it only with a sense of strain, tenuousness and a certain gaucherie. This Beethoven 
certainly wanted, as the contrast with the superbly idiomatic instrumental sound of the B 
section implies clearly enough.60 
This "sense of strain" is undoubtedly an unusual and significant part of the aesthetic 
of this Adagio. However, it is created not through the scoring of an "orchestral 
image" for quartet, but rather by the re- scoring of a "vocal image" - a specific 
reference to Renaissance vocal polyphony (rather than simply a cantabile style). 
This "reference" is seen in the compass of the melodic lines of each phrase, which 
are confined within an octave, in the alternation of polyphony and homophony, and 
finally in the quality - the actual `shape' - of the musical line, which evokes 
specifically vocal music. The "vocal image" of this Adagio, though, is a specific 
reference to the style of a hymn - the "Heiliger Dankgesang" ( "Holy Song of 
Thanksgiving ") of Beethoven's inscription. The use of an ancient modal tonality, 
however, produces a historical reference to a specifically religious musical past, by 
invoking a specifically "sacred" music from musical history. 
60 Kerman (1967) p. 256, emphasis added 
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The peculiarity of this Adagio is therefore created by the appearance of a stylisation 
of archaic vocal polyphony within the context of an instrumental quartet. This 
opposition of a "vocal" medium within an "instrumental" context, however, also 
introduces a subtle irony. In a normal context the "instrumental" element is entirely 
unimportant - it forms a basic convention of every string quartet. The appearance of 
the vocal stylisation within this Adagio section, though, creates an incongruous 
opposition of two contexts present simultaneously. The fact that, as Kerman notes, 
the instruments have difficulty maintaining the vocal idiom highlights this 
incongruity, foregrounding the conflict of vocal and instrumental conventions. In 
effect, this objectifies the inherent artifice of the "instrumental" element. 
One final important point remains. Throughout this entire section there is an 
uncharacteristic lack of dissonance - even prepared dissonances such as suspensions 
are avoided. This lack of dissonance is actually somewhat foreign to the style of 
polyphony that Beethoven is stylising: in the absence of strong tonal movement 
dissonances provided the music with melodic/harmonic impetus. It may be that this 
absence of dissonance is intended to imply an older style of polyphony here, by 
producing a certain austerity. However, combined with the lack of resolution onto 
either of the tonal centres, the sotto voce dynamic level and the very slow tempo, the 
lack of dissonance produces a certain stasis, a suspension of harmonic and rhythmic 
movement. This creates the effect of this Adagio as a static, timeless object, rather 
than a dynamic, unfolding linear movement. The dialogue that ensues between this 
stasis and the reintroduction of dissonance that subsequently occurs will be 
significant to the "meaning" of the music. 
* 
Aside from the context of the Heiliger Dankgesang, the opening bars of the first 
Andante section present a straightforward dance topic, whose major key and slow 
tempo produce a certain "dignified" connotation. In contrast to the dances in the 
preceding movement, there is a stable triple time with strong downbeats on the first 
quavers of each bar and conventional accompaniment figures in viola and cello. This 
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stable rhythm is underlined by the regular alternation of the robust movement of the 
wide, staccato leaps (with forte dynamics and sforzando accents) in bars 31, 33 and 
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However, it is the relationship between the Neue Kraft fühlend section and the 
preceding Heiliger Dankgesang that forms the fundamental generative force of this 
movement. As indicated, the same oppositions that arose in the initial Adagio 
section occur as oppositions between the two formal sections. Moreover, the 
objectification that began in the Adagio also occurs between the Adagio and Andante 
sections, resulting in the ironic objectification of the Andante. 
The major key of the Andante proves to be of particular significance to this 
objectification process, when understood as a specific signifier of diatonicism in 
general. Within the context of the other movements of this work (indeed of the 
overwhelming majority of tonal music) this element is so prevalent as to be almost 
insignificant. However this particular movement opposes the diatonicism of the 
Andante section with the modality of the preceding hymn, in the "most extreme 
possible contrast ".61 This larger "structural" opposition functions as an enlargement 
of the fundamental opposition that occurred within the structure of the hymn, a 
projection of the structure of the Adagio onto the larger structure of the entire 
movement. 
This same process occurs in the opposition of vocal and instrumental idioms. This 
Andante possesses strong elements of conventional quartet writing - wide leaps, 
trills, and contrasts of dynamic and articulation for example: as Kerman states this 
section is a "superbly idiomatic instrumental sound ".62 Again, within the context of 
the preceding hymn, this assumes greater than normal significance, producing an 
opposition with the "vocal" element of the hymn. Indeed, since the conventions of 
the hymn become established as those of the movement simply because they occur at 
the beginning, the sudden juxtaposition of the contrasting Andante section effectively 
contravenes these conventions. Although this is, to an extent, part of the normal 
process of contrast in music, in this case the nature of the contrast - a sudden 
juxtaposition - results in an incongruity. 
61 Lam (1975) p. 91 
62 Kerman (1967) p. 256 
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This occurs because of a striking ironic reversal of `norms' within these two sections. 
As considered, the modal tonality and vocal idiom of the hymn section are entirely 
unconventional within the diatonic context in which they occur. Nevertheless, within 
this specific movement these unconventional elements have become the convention - 
the "norm ". In contrast, the normally conventional diatonicism and "instrumental" 
texture of the Andante becomes unconventional, resulting in the foregrounding of the 
"normal" context. In other words, the conventions of tonal instrumental music, 
which would be almost banal in another context, here become objects of the 
discourse. This produces a reversal: the conventional becomes unconventional, the 
novel becomes normal, resulting in the ironic objectification of the conventionality 
of the Andante section. 
This process is of the same type that A.W. Schlegel identifies in Shakespeare - a 
juxtaposition of genres that produces an ironic objectification by opposing two 
incongruous viewpoints or sets of conventions. In this case the incongruity of the 
Heiliger Dankgesang and the Neue Kraft sections objectifies the latter section, 
foregrounding its conventions and revealing its aesthetic artifice. 
However, incongruities within the Neue Kraft section add to this objectification. The 
first sixteen bars, for example, are exaggeratedly simple: the harmonic progressions 
throughout the section are particularly simple; Kerman describes them as "lucid, 
even simple- minded ... freely indulging the two common chords denied to the 
Lydian mode, the subdominant and the dominant 7`h ".63 Similarly the melodic lines 
are simple and lyrical (indeed, verging on the banal in places) with the phrases well 
defined by thoroughly conventional cadences. As Kerman states "Beethoven has 
rarely written such beautiful lyric phrases ".64 
When compared with the preceding movement of this quartet (or indeed to the other 
late quartets) the conventionality of this dance is exaggerated - it is too simple. This 
over -conventionality, however, is particularly prominent because of the juxtaposition 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. p. 256/257 
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with the preceding Adagio. Although the opening Adagio section is itself in an 
archaic musical language the novelty of this hymn within a quartet movement is 
particularly striking and unconventional. The contrast of the unconventional hymn 
with the too -simple structure of the Andante foregrounds the conventionality of the 
latter section: next to the hymn the Neue Kraft sounds like an archaic stylisation of a 
"Classical" quartet movement, its simplicity maximising the contrast between the 
sections. 
As considered above, stylisation involves, by definition, an element of 
objectification. However, this latent objectification is compounded by an 
incongruous disruption which begins at bar 47 with a deflection of the cadential 
motion of the previous two bars introducing a new melodic figure.65 In bar 51 there 
is another sudden change of melodic figure, which seems to interrupt or divert this 
new material. The abrupt change to demisemiquaver motion, combined with the 
repeated -note syncopations produces an increase in the rhythmic movement, 
augmented by the crescendo in bar 53 and the strong harmonic movement from 
subdominant to dominant. However, the melodic line in bars 53 and 54 remains 
stationary, repeating a 2 -beat chromatic figure around B flat. This repetition, over a 
dominant seventh pedal that lasts three bars, produces a momentary lack of forward 
momentum that is unprecedented in the section -a rhythmic and melodic stasis that 
is itself incongruous. Moreover, the repetition of this figure produces a hemiola 
effect that momentarily disrupts the triple metre of the dance. The combination of 
this rhythmic disruption with the harmonic and melodic stasis, the too -great 
repetition of the chromatic figure and the rhythmic and dynamic increases in these 
bars momentarily interrupts the progression of the music. 
65 The expected A major occurs not as a new tonic, but rather as a dominant seventh; in effect, the 
cadence is avoided. Although in itself this is explicable as a normal prolongation, the bars that follow 
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The effect of this disruption is compounded by the cadence that follows. The 
movement back to the subdominant at the beginning of bar 55 diverts the cadential 
tonic that is expected after the extended dominant harmony.66 Similarly, 
conventional cadence figure in bars 55 and 56 is itself avoided in bar 57 by a repeat 
of bar 47, which holds the dominant harmony over the barline. This dual cadential 
avoidance (twice in three bars) thereby actually continues the disruption of the 
music. 
The immediate repetition of the entire passage from bar 47 to 56 prolongs the effect 
of these bars yet further: all of the cadential avoidance, melodic diversions and 
rhythmic problems are repeated. Moreover, there is another problematic cadence at 
the end of this repeat (bars 66/67) that is not so much avoided as pre -empted - the 
tonic chord arrives a beat early, on the third beat of the bar. This substantially 
66 The momentary C# diminished harmony on the final semiquaver beat of bar 54 tends, in the 
context to maintain a dominant function. The movement to G in the bass thus smoothes the transition 
from dominant to subdominant harmonies. 
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weakens the closure (an effect compounded by the transformation of D major from 
tonic to dominant seventh on the first beat of the following bar).67 
The effect of the disruptive passage in the middle of the Andante section is 
significant. The combination of cadence avoidance, rhythmic disruption and 
melodic/harmonic stasis is incongruous within the preceding context of the Andante. 
In effect, it destroys the aesthetic illusion of the music, exposing the artifice of its 
conventions. This disruption of the `norms' of the section effectively transforms it 
from a simple stylisation into a parody, albeit a mild one. The conventionality of 
these norms becomes an object of the discourse: through exaggeration and disruption 
their aesthetic "reality" is challenged, a "destruction of illusion" that produces the 
effect of parabasis. 
Although this parabasis effect does arise from the elements within this movement 
alone, it is also related to the parabasis, reversals and ironic paradoxes of the earlier 
movements. Indeed, although the incongruities and disruptions within this Andante 
section are considerably less intrusive than those that occur in the surrounding 
movements, nevertheless this context gives these moments greater prominence than 
might otherwise be the case. In effect, the irony of the preceding movements 
heightens the effect of the parabasis in this movement, making its effect more 
pronounced: we hear in these disruptive elements echoes of the same ironic presence 
that pervaded the first two movements. 
The presence of these ironic elements and parabasis has particular significance for 
the "meaning" of the movement. The two contrasting sections represent different 
aesthetic viewpoints, different "systems" in Schlegel's terminology: the modal, vocal 
system of the hymn is opposed by the diatonic, instrumental system of the Andante. 
However, the Andante is objectified both by the initial juxtaposition with the hymn 
and by the parodic effect produced by the incongruities within its own structure. The 
67 It is worth noting that cadence avoidance that goes beyond the bounds of normal prolongation 
procedures is, again, an essential element of the incongruity of this passage. This relates the ironic 
process in this section to those of the preceding movements, which both involved frequent cadential 
diversions. 
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result is that the Adagio section is `preferred' over the stylised, over -conventional 
system of the Andante (which becomes the object of irony) and this ironic 
preferencing has a significant effect upon the reading of this movement. 
On one level the exuberant dance that forms the Andante section appears to reflect 
the "renewed strength" of Beethoven's inscription "Neue Kraft ftihlend ": as Michael 
Steinberg writes "the staccatos, the wide leaps, the exuberant upbeats in scurrying 
thirty- second notes, the jubilant violin trill that rides across the top of the music, the 
breathless excitement in the accompaniment, all contribute to the joyful 
atmosphere ".68 However, the objectification of this dance section may be read 
programmatically as an ironic reversal, an undermining of its "new strength ". From 
this viewpoint the reality of this strength becomes an artifice - an ironised object of 
the discourse. This reversal, together with the parodic elements and the authorial 
parabasis, continues throughout the movement in a continual paradox of art and 
artifice, creation and destruction, i.e. in Romantic irony. 
* 
The remaining formal sections of this movement are essentially developmental, 
producing, in the case of the two returns of the Adagio section, the effect of a 
variation movement. The first variation of the hymn, for example, introduces the 
dissonance that was denied to the first occurrence. Throughout this section the first 
violin functions like a cantus firmus, exactly repeating its part in the homophonic 
bars of the original hymn, whilst the lower parts introduce rhythmically altered 
versions of the original lines.69 These new syncopated lines interact with the cantus 
firmus to produce a series of suspensions in the top two parts. From bar 93, for 
example, the second violin line plays a syncopated version of the viola line of bars 9 
to 11, producing a chain of 4 -3 and 9 -8 suspensions: 
68 Steinberg, Michael (1994) "The Late Quartets" in Winter, Robert and Martin, Robert (eds.) (1994) 
The Beethoven Quartet Companion p. 271 
69 The second violin actually takes the "contrapuntal" beginning of each of the first violin's phrases 
as the basis for its variations, adding syncopations that produce suspensions against the lower parts. 
Other part redistributions occur, for example between second violin and viola in bars 93 to 97, but 
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These suspensions introduce the dissonance that was so prominently absent from the 
original version of the hymn: the comparison between the two versions means that 
the dissonances of these suspensions produce an atypically powerful, almost novel 
effect, which de Marliave describes as "ecstatic exaltation "; Kerman as a "mystic 
aura ".70 
Paradoxically, however, the same elements that produced such effect in the Adagio 
produce within the development of the Andante section even greater disruption and 
objectification than appeared in the original. The beginning of the development 
actually achieves a simplifying effect; as Lam states, "the second version of the 
70 de Marliave, Joseph (1928) Beethoven's Quartets p. 346, and Kerman (1967) p. 256. This 
"comparison ", though, actually occurs within the first variation of the hymn. Since, in this 
development the first violin repeats the "theme" of the Adagio it may be taken as signifying, in some 
respects, the original version of that hymn; the three remaining parts, in contrast, represent the 
development of the original. From this viewpoint there is a type of opposition, or perhaps a dialogue, 
between the two versions within this first variation. This produces an intriguing reading of this 
section. It is the interaction of the original version (in the form of the first violin) with the new 
variations that produces the suspensions, produces, in other words, a beauty that was not present in 
that original, that was indeed denied to it. 
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Andante makes definite figures (for example, scales) out of the fragmented 
decorations of the first statement ".71 However, the introduction of new rhythmic and 
harmonic elements affects the problematic central sub -section of this Andante (the 
section corresponding to bars 47 to 67 in the original version), disrupting and 
undermining the music's progression more fully than in the original. 
The most obvious moment is the rhythmic alterations that begin at bar 145. The 
elaboration in the first violin and the transformation of the constant demisemiquaver 
accompaniment places greater emphasis on the main beats of the bar, producing an 
increase in rhythmic movement. This is matched by greater harmonic tension and 
dissonance, caused primarily by the increased chromaticism of these bars. Bars 
147/148 centre on the three semitones from G# to B and, whereas the slower speed 
of chromatic alternation in the original kept the harmonic progression lucid, here the 
speed of the alteration obscures this, producing an effect very similar to a false 
relation. In fact, virtually every chromatic alternation in the melody produces 
dissonance with the accompaniment, for example the tritone A - D# in bar 146 and 
the false relations between G and G# in both bars 147 and 148, which occur over 
already -dissonant diminished harmony. 
The accumulation of these dissonances, combined with the too -great accumulation of 
harmony, melody and dynamic and the hemiola effect increases the incongruity seen 
in the original Andante. This rhythmic and harmonic accretion creates an almost a- 
rhythmic dissonance that borders on an obsessive, hysterical quality, a distressing 
flash that is incongruous with the joyful movement of the Neue Kraft dance. This 
disruptive effect spills over into the cadence in bars 149 -151, the increased rhythmic 
movement and displaced bass line making it even more unsteady than the first 
occurrence. 
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This disruption of the dance is also significant because, up to this point this 
developmental variation is entirely congruent with the original Andante. However, 
although the listener expects the recurrence both of the juxtaposition of the Adagio 
and Andante sections and of the disruptions that occur in the original Andante,72 the 
accumulation of dissonances etc. in these bars is not expected - they are, within this 
context, entirely unconventional. This intensified disruption therefore re- exposes the 
conventions of the dance in a more severe, confrontational manner, resulting in the 
re- objectification of the Neue Kraft. 
* 
The final Adagio section continues the developmental process of the previous 
sections, with new rhythmic and harmonic elements producing fresh oppositions. 
72 These elements, in other words, have become conventions of the movement. Witness Lam's 
statement regarding the necessity of the return of the Andante: "The movement's formal scheme (A- 
B-A-B-A) needs this return, but whereas the hymn, in its affinity with the old chorale partitas, 
virtually demands variation, the contrasting section is already on its first appearance a variation on an 
unstated theme, and further elaboration would be unsatisfactory" (Lam (1975) p. 92) 
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These combine with those of the original hymn in the climax at the centre of the 
section to produce the most semantically -full moment of the movement. 
This climactic final section is constructed from canonic entries of two themes. The 
first is a further rhythmic development of the theme of the second Adagio section, to 
which a neighbour -note figure on the high C is added. This theme occurs in 
counterpoint with the first five notes of the cantus firmus theme, which itself 
remained unchanged from the original hymn. The double counterpoint of these 
themes produces a contrast between the rhythmic movement of the syncopated theme 
and the slow, almost static motion of the cantus firmus melody, an uneasy balance 
similar to the contrast of diatonicism and modality that occurred in the first version 
of the hymn. 
This opposition reaches its climax in bars 187 -193. Here the syncopated theme is 
reduced to the neighbour -note figure, centring on only a few notes. This functions as 
a repetitive counterpoint to the climactic statement of the cantus firmus, which 
occurs in its entirety in canon between the upper and lower parts. Despite the 
rhythmic movement the repetition of these few notes introduces a melodic stasis. 
Simultaneously the sf emphasis on the cantus firmus means that at the climactic 
moment this "static" theme is dominant. Finally, the homophony of the climactic 
bars, in stark contrast to the polyphony of the preceding course of the section, 
intensifies this static effect, halting the forward momentum of the music: as Radcliffe 
writes, "motion is reduced to a minimum ".73 
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Crucially, the canonic entries of the cantus firmus, a fifth apart (bars 188/189) 
introduce striking dissonances. Lam comments that 
Beethoven intuitively rediscovers the severe diatonic dissonances of thirteenth -century 
Ars Antigua, combined with a non -harmonic counterpoint in which parts cross like tenor 
and contra -tenor in the early fifteenth century, as though the concept of the triad and its 
inversions belonged to a future age ... this passage [bars 170ff.] belongs to a pre - 
Renaissance world into which an emancipated dominant seventh has insinuated itself.74 
These "diatonic" dissonances - ninths, unresolved dominant sevenths and 
unprepared fourths - dominate within the climactic bars 188 to 194. The 
combination of this "diatonic" dissonance with the extremes of register, pitch and 
dynamic produces a harshness "as brutal as anything in the Great Fugue; the sheer 
volume generated terrifies ".75 Lam's comments, though, highlight a crucial issue 
with regard to this dissonant effect - it results from the structural opposition of 
diatonicism and modality of the original hymn. Although within a modal context the 
unprepared fourths and unresolved sevenths that occur are not considered 
dissonances, within a diatonic context they sound harsh and dissonant. Thus the 
74 Lam (1975) p. 93 
75 Kerman (1967) p. 260 
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effect of these bars results, again, from the opposition between the tonal contexts 
within which this movement operates. 
This extreme, dissonant climax also produces a final opposition of the "vocal" and 
"instrumental" idioms of the first Adagio. Throughout this and the previous Adagio 
sections the cantus firmus has remained essentially "vocal" in nature, signifying the 
original version of the hymn. In this climactic section however, the extremes of 
pitch and dynamic transform this theme, for the first time, into an entirely 
instrumental utterance. This produces an incongruity: to some extent, this theme still 
retains its "vocal" significance, yet here it is clearly a non -vocal, "instrumental" 
element. Therefore it is perceived, from a certain viewpoint, as both simultaneously, 
creating an incongruous reversal within these bars.76 
More importantly, however, the transformation of the Adagio produces a striking 
reversal between itself and the Neue Kraft sections. The accumulation of extremes 
in the climax of the final Adagio section - extremes of dynamics, accentuation, 
register, dissonance and the overwhelming stasis - introduces a strikingly novel 
power that is absent from previous versions of the Adagio. The force of this climax, 
however, is also semantic in nature: these bars produce a culmination of all of the 
oppositions of the movement, the end of a process of transformational, 
developmental `becoming' that has spanned the previous sections. These bars focus 
the semantic weight of this process and of all the preceding music on one point of 
overwhelming force. 
The inscriptions throughout this movement invite us to read this process 
76 Indeed it is tempting to consider not only this reversal but also the entire contrast between the final 
and original versions of the Adagio as incongruous. The final climactic bars reverse the original 
elements: the vocal idiom becomes instrumental, consonance becomes striking dissonance and the 
balance between homophony and polyphonic is disturbed. In effect, this final variation moves far 
beyond the original, almost violating its conventions or `norms' - the climactic bars are perceived as 
markedly different from the earlier Adagio(s). Nevertheless, since the two versions are fundamentally 
the same substance there are, from a certain viewpoint, simultaneous incongruent semantic levels - 
both the original hymn and the new, unconventional "non- hymn ". However, the opposition between 
the two versions is produced through a process of variation and transformation, comparable, for 
example, to the variations of the finales of Op. 109 or the Hammerklavier. As such, although this 
final version is markedly contrasting this opposition does not create incongruity or objectification. 
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programmatically - in terms of "hymns ", "strength ", "the Godhead" etc. Moreover, 
the developmental variation process suggests a type of narrative course, not as a 
"plot" or "story" but rather an end -based trajectory, clearly "aiming" towards the 
final transformation of the hymn. Thus, if both the topic and the inscription of the 
original Adagio evoked "sacred" connotations, the overwhelming power of the final 
Adagio may be read as being related to this original connotation: it may be that the 
strength of the convalescent is found in this explicitly religious music. Alternatively 
one could, following Spandrell in Aldous Huxley's Point Counter Point, consider 
that this final version is a musical representation of heaven, or of God - "the famous 
proof of God's existence ".77 From this viewpoint this final version of the hymn is 
perceived as fundamentally different to the other versions, as "other ", or even 
"external" to them. Within the context of the "sacred" connotations, this could even 
be considered to represent an external, sacred force - the "Gottheit" of the 
composer's inscription. 
Such programmatic readings are particularly significant within the context of the 
objectification of the Neue Kraft sections considered above. As has been seen, from 
its first occurrence the Andante is an "artifice "; its stylised, parodic elements and its 
incongruities and diversions reduce it to an object of the discourse. The inherent 
artifice of this Andante, however, may also be understood as an implication that the 
"New Strength" that its inscription suggests it represents is also an artifice: if the 
music itself is, in some sense, aesthetically inauthentic then so too is its "meaning ". 
This objectified "meaning ", however, is contrasted with the climactic force of the 
final Adagio - the culmination of the development of the entire movement - which 
appears to be the "real" strength: as Kerman notes, "beside this strength the Neue 
Kraft pales ".78 This contrast produces the reversal of the movement - the "strength" 
that is lacking in the Andante is found within the climax of the hymn. 
Although such a reversal is, in itself, somewhat ironic it is also important for the 
interpretation of the overall irony of the quartet that is offered here. The incongruous 
77 Huxley, Aldous Point Counter Point Chatto and Windus, London (1947 edition), p. 594 
78 Kerman (1967) p. 260 
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juxtapositions of the sections and the parodying and objectification of the Neue Kraft 
throughout this movement result in a parabasis - the conventions of the Andante are 
objectified by an ironic authorial presence. Nevertheless, this objectification and the 
reversal of "meaning" suggested fundamentally affects only one of the two 
contrasting elements of the movement - the "system" of the Andante. Thus, the 
ironic elements that result from this objectification are satirical or parodic in nature, 
rather than constituting specifically Romantic irony. Romantic irony relates not 
simply to devices of parabasis, but also to artistic consciousness and, above all, the 
continual paradox of finite "systems" within the infinite universe, the constant 
alternation of assertion and negation. Here, although there is parabasis and 
consciousness, there is no Romantic paradox. 
This paradox, however, arises within the context of the following movement. The 
same harmonic movement that linked the two sections of the third movement is 
employed to establish a relationship between the third and fourth movements: the F 
lydian of the hymn is transformed into the strongly diatonic A major of the Alla 
marcia. Moreover, the "floating" quality of the final F lydian tonality of the third 
movement produces an "open" ending, lacking strong tonal closure.79 This in itself 
provokes a relationship between the movements: the fourth movement seems to fill 
the "gap" left by this vacuum. 
This relationship, though, is one of contrariety: Robert Simpson considers that "there 
is nothing more startling in music than the little Alla marcia that follows [the 
Heiliger Dankgesang] with such cruelly bland abruptness ".80 The juxtaposition 
between the final version of the hymn and this Alla marcia presents exactly the same 
79 Indeed, the indeterminate end of this movement prompts Chua to ask whether it actually ends at 
all. He suggests that the lack of tonal resolution at the end (caused again by the opposition between 
diatonicism and modality) implies an infinite continuation (Chua (1995) p. 151). This intriguing 
question resonates with the interpretation suggested in the current analysis. On one hand if this 
passage is an evocation of the divine in music, then this infinite ending surely can be used to represent 
some external, inhuman (i.e. Godlike) force. More importantly, however, it implies that the 
objectifying processes of creation and destruction, assertion and negation that dominate this 
movement are actually themselves infinite. As such, they could, in turn, be considered to correlate 
with the infinite reflective process of Schlegelian Romantic irony. 
80 Simpson, Robert (1971). The Chamber Music for Strings, in Arnold and Fortune (eds.) `The 
Beethoven Companion' p. 270 
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type of incongruous juxtaposition as those that occurred within the preceding 
movement, and those considered by A.W. Schlegel. Regardless of how one reads 
this final Adagio (whether as an ironic reversal of the "strength" of the Andante, or 
even a musical evocation of the divine), the juxtaposition of these two movements 
produces a savage undercutting of the ultra -serious final transformation of the 
Heiliger Dankgesang by a frankly comic March. 
In this juxtaposition is seen the ironic smile with which Huxley's Mark Rampion 
responded to the final variation: 
They listened, almost holding their breaths. Spandrell looked exultantly at his guest. His 
own doubts had vanished. How could one fail to believe in something which was there, 
which manifestly existed? Mark Rampion nodded. `Almost thou persuadest me,' he 
whispered. `But it's too good.' ... The lines of mockery came back into his face, the 
corners of the mouth became once more ironic. `There, he's the demon again,' thought 
Rampion. `He's come to life and he's the demon.'81 
The effect of this incongruous juxtaposition is profound. At the end of the third 
movement the final transformation of the hymn appeared to represent, in some sense, 
an aesthetic "reality ": the Neue Kraft became, in contrast, an ironised object. 
Programmatically, the strength that was lacking in the Andante, because of the 
objectification of its aesthetic artifice, appeared to be found in the final, climactic 
occurrence of the Adagio. However, the juxtaposition of this movement with the 
Alla marcia demonstrates that, in fact, the "reality" of the hymn was also an artifice: 
it forces the destruction of the aesthetic illusion, revealing its inherent artifice. The 
hymn itself, in other words, becomes objectified. 
The juxtaposition of these two movements introduces the element of paradox. The 
final variation of the hymn is transformed from the position of "reality" into an 
artifice, from being the objectifying element to itself becoming objectified; its 
assertion is negated, and consequently its apparent authenticity and "strength" 
becomes objectified. Through this juxtaposition the hymn becomes both objectifier 
and an objectified artifice, both ironist and the victim of irony, and this "double - 
image" is fundamentally paradoxical, the root of Romantic irony. 
81 Huxley (1947) p. 598 
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Fourth Movement 
The Alla Marcia returns to the metrical play of the second movement - it is 
essentially a comic movement, whose "joking" surface masks further ironic 
incongruities and paradoxes. It is, in fact more a collection of juxtaposed fragments 
than a conventional movement, fragments that are all individually problematic, riven 
with internal incongruities.82 The rhythmic structure of the opening Alla marcia is 
undermined by a device introduced in the opening bar: the second beat is articulated 
in such a way that it sounds like the first beat. The dotted rhythm and ascending 
arpeggio across the first two beats (conventional anacrusis gestures) suggest that the 
first beat is an upbeat, whilst the sf articulation and the entry of the three remaining 
parts produce strong emphasis on the second beat, creating the illusion of a down 
beat. 
Ex. 4.22 Op. 132 4th Movement 
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82 It is this fragmentary nature that resists "symmetrical" interpretations of the quartet as a whole. 
This assemblage of fragments does not "balance" the second movement; rather it links the third 
movement and finale in a continual ironic process. 
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This device produces metrical ambiguity: bar one could imply triple time, the dotted 
rhythms echoing those of the first beat, whilst bar two would be considered a 
"feminine" cadence. However, these bars could also be re- barred in duple metre, a 
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The effect of this is a continual shifting of the main beat throughout the section that 
undermines the rhythmic structure. For example, if these bars are in triple time then 
there is effectively a beat missing in bar two, the next "anacrusis" coming in the 
"wrong" place. The upbeat in bar 4, in contrast, appears in the wrong place 
(regardless of whether duple or triple metre is preferred at this point), whilst the 
stability of the duple metre in bars 5 to 8 creates a rhythmic jarring with the repeat of 
the first bar.ß3 
These shifts of rhythmic emphasis produce rhythmic collisions at the cadence points 
in particular. Bar 13 is perhaps the strongest of these. Here the duple metre from 
bars 9 collides with the false anacrusis on the first beat of this bar. Moreover, the 
repetition of the anacrusis gesture on each beat of bar 14 creates further rhythmic 
problems; when bar 15 begins with another anacrusis on the first beat all sense of the 
"correct" placement of the beat is lost. 
Although such rhythmic deception is not uncommon its occurrence within this 
movement is significant.84 The dotted rhythms, duple metre and fast tempo of the 
movement are conventional elements of the march topic suggested by the 
movement's title. However the manipulation of the rhythmic structure, particularly 
the suggestion of triple time in the opening bars, are entirely incongruous with this 
topic. The incongruity of these rhythmic problems undermines and objectifies the 
conventions of the march topic, baring the artifice of its "system ". The result is a 
paradox: an arrhythmic march, a march that cannot be marched to. 
The second part of the movement creates further incongruity and objectification. 
Conventionally, a contrasting section would be expected here; bars 25 and 26 do 
initially suggest this, both through the new melodic figurations and through the 
conventional change of mode. However, the sudden change of texture, topic and 
83 In addition, see Chua's analysis of this movement, which suggests another possible re- barring 
(Chua (1995) p. 126 -129. The important point is that no one re- barring of this movement is 
satisfactory: the rhythmic structure points to both duple and triple metres, thus every note is 
susceptible to at least two possibilities. 
84 Beethoven uses similar devices in the second movement of this quartet, for example, as well as in 
the Scherzo movement of the quartet Op. 18 number 6. Such devices may also be seen within the 
music of Haydn, in particular the finale of his Op 76 number 6 quartet. 
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dynamic in bar 27 is unexpected and incongruous. The recitative topic is entirely 
incongruous with both the preceding march topic and the two preceding bars, whilst 
the tremolando accompaniment is incongruous even with the ideal of a string quartet: 
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To this unexpected juxtaposition of topics several other incongruities are added. The 
most important of these is that the conventional elements of the incongruous 
recitative section are themselves exaggerated to the point of melodramatic parody. 
For example, whilst the temporal manipulations of the expressive ritardandos in bars 
30 and 36 are perhaps slight exaggerations, the combination of the accelerando 
between bars 36 and 39 with the extreme crescendo (pp to f0 pushes this 
exaggeration too far, beyond pathos into bathos. Both Kerman and Lam highlight 
this effect: for Kerman "there is no getting away from the sheer blatancy of this 
recitative. It is no dignified Gluckish thing - it sounds more like "rescue opera " ";86 
Lam is more emphatic, characterising the section as "savage 
tragedy ".87 
The sudden leap to high F in bar 39 introduces a further incongruous juxtaposition of 
topics - the opposition of the recitative to a violin cadenza. This cadenza interrupts 
the exaggerated recitative in the same manner as the recitative interrupted the march. 
In both cases the incongruity caused by the interruption and juxtaposition of topics 
produces the same type of objectification and destruction of aesthetic illusion that 
occurred within the previous movement.88 Although the juxtaposition of march and 
86 Kerman (1967) p. 262 
87 Lam (1975) p. 96 
88 This interruption of the recitative by the cadenza could also be characterised as an opposition of the 
essentially "vocal" elements of the recitative with an "instrumental" idiom. Up to this point the 
melodic line of the recitative had been confined to a vocal register. However, the sudden leap, coming 
after the exaggerated accumulation of the preceding bars is incongruous: it moves beyond the vocal 
idiom of the section, introducing a distinctly "instrumental" medium, both through its register and 
through the explicitly virtuosic writing. From this viewpoint this interruption produces a parallel of 
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recitative initially objectifies the march section, the subsequent interruption of this 
topic by the cadenza also produces this effect: there is a "chain" of objectification, 
each topic first objectifying, then being objectified. 
In addition to the incongruities that thus arise "between" the topics in this movement, 
however, the incongruities in both of the sections - the exaggerated, parodic effects, 
metrical incongruities that undermine the dance topic, and oppositions of vocal and 
instrumental idioms - foreground and undermine the conventions of the individual 
sections from within. This effectively produces two objectifying processes within 
this movement, exposing the artifice of both of its sections. 
Thus, whereas the fourth movement initially objectified the third movement through 
its incongruous juxtaposition, it is itself an objectified artifice, riven with 
incongruities. The effect of this is vital: the objectification of this movement creates 
a Romantic paradox. Each element of the two movements - the hymn, the Neue 
Kraft, the march and the recitative - undergoes the same process. Each one causes, 
by juxtaposition, the objectification of one of the other structures, before 
subsequently becoming the object of such a process; each section is thus both an 
aesthetic "reality" and, at the same time an "artifice ". The incongruities and 
reversals within the movements add to this objectification, undermining each from 
within. This produces, throughout, a continual process of assertion and negation, 
creation and destruction, a paradoxical situation created by the intrusion of an ironic 
authorial presence. 




Although the attacca between the fourth and fifth movements alone establishes a 
clear relationship between them, the descending semitone F -E also echoes that of 
the last bar of the fourth movement, whilst the A minor harmony resolves its final 
dominant chord. These purely musical connections, however, highlight a connection 
with the ironic procedures of the previous movement(s). This finale is not an answer 
to, or resolution of the problems of these movements, however; rather it is a 
continuation of the irony of these movements, intrinsically and significantly linked 
with the preceding ironic context and displaying some of the same devices. For 
example, the rhythmic manipulation seen in the second and fourth movements is 
suggested by the elements of cross -rhythm within the opening bars. The accented 
second beats of the viola and second violin in the first two bars conflict with the first - 
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Since it occurs at the beginning of the movement the effect of this rhythmic 
interaction is more pronounced, unsettling the main theme of the movement 
somewhat: when this theme commences in the third bar the rhythms of inner and 
outer parts are not quite synchronised. There is therefore (as so often in the middle 
movements) a certain duality within this theme, an apparent simplicity complicated 
by its accompaniment. Nevertheless, despite this momentary rhythmic uncertainty, 
the unassuming, conventional rondo -type theme of this sonata -rondo movement, 
once established, appears to be the least problematic of all the movements. Indeed, 
the manner in which the exposition of this movement proceeds seems to confirm this. 
The first subject area (to bar 48) is entirely conventional, remaining firmly in the 
tonic, with symmetrical, antecedent -consequent periodicity. This is underlined by 
the repetition first of the eight -bar theme, then the contrasting theme and finally the 
clear, quasi- dramatic cadential repetitions of bars 34 to 42. 
The modulation to G major at bar 50 that begins the second subject, however, 
introduces the first incongruous element in the movement. The manner in which this 
modulation is achieved is too conventional: the cadence sounds like a trite, textbook 
modulation. This too -simple cadence is combined with the sequence that is itself too 
simple and conventional, finishing on an imperfect cadence after rhythmic 
diminution and hemiola. The combined effect of these simple movements is almost 
comical when compared to the complex rhythmic interactions and "serious" topic of 
the preceding rondo theme; this contrast, together with the exaggerated simplicity 
tends to give these bars a somewhat parodic effect. Whilst within another context 
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these parodic elements would not be particularly problematic, the context of the 
previous movements tends to magnify such incongruities, imbuing them with added 
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The second part of this first episode returns to the "serioso" topic of the main theme 
in bar 59, but expands the elements of rhythmic manipulation. The syncopations 
from bar 63, for example, relate to the cross -rhythm of the first theme. The repeated 
emphasis on the third beat in these bars undermines the rhythm, effectively shifting 
these bars a beat early, resulting in momentary rhythmic uncertainty in bars 68 and 
69. The process is repeated between bars 71 and 78, before the hemiola -like 
transition back to the tonic in bars 82 to 89 adds a final rhythmic distortion. 
The incongruity created by the second episode, however, is of far greater 
significance. The final cadence of the first return of the theme is interrupted in bar 
123 by a sudden, unexpected change from A minor to F major, underscored by the 
accents and block -chord texture. The section that follows this intrusion is 
constructed from a complex of cross -rhythms. Although the phrasing in the first 
violin produces, in places, a quasi -6/8 metre, the sf accents, matched by the cello 
highlight the 2nd beat of the bar. The second violin, in contrast, accents the second 
and fifth quavers, whilst the viola stresses the fourth quaver. The combined effect of 
these conflicting accents is that none of the parts appears to be rhythmically related 
to any of the others. This results in the apparent disintegration of the ensemble into a 
chaotic rhythmic fragmentation. Moreover, although the section is in C major the 
dissonances that occur (for example, the tritones produced by the appoggiatura 
figures in the violins in bars 125/6) tend to add greater harshness to the chaotic effect 
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There are moments of greater tonal/rhythmic stability in this episode, such as the 
pedal C that, from bar 132, grounds the tonality and realigns the instruments 
rhythmically. Nevertheless, the chaotic effect of the previous passage continues 
through the remainder of this developmental episode. Bar 144, for example, returns 
to the violence and fragmentation of the beginning of the episode following the more 
lucid harmonic motion of the descending bass in the previous bars.89 The same 
complex of competing rhythmic accents is produced, with the part- writing of the 
earlier occurrence inverted (the sf chords on the second beat, for example, now occur 
in the first violin, the 6/8 rhythm in the cello). 
89 Although the first violin essentially outlines a descending C major scale (with appoggiaturas) in 
these bars, the fact that, in bar 136, the tonality is diverted from the expected C major, together with 
the chromatic descent in the second violin and viola and the lack of a true bass means that this tonal 
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Although the repetition of the rhythm of bar 144 every four bars produces a clearer 
rhythmic structure, this is countered by an increased occurrence of dissonance, 
predominantly tritones, between the middle and lower parts. Many of these fulfil 
appoggiatura functions, but the manner in which they succeed each other obscures 
this. In bar 145, for example the G dominant 7th on beat 2 is immediately followed 
by tritones C # -G and E -A #. Similarly, the function of the commonplace dominant 
and diminished 7ths in bars 144, 148, 152 and 156 is obscured by the inversions 
chosen, which highlights their dissonances. The cumulative effect of this increased 
dissonance and tonal disturbance with the rhythmic fragmentation, the extremes of 
dynamic and register and the angular sf accents again produces the effect of a violent 
chaos. The entire episode from bars 123 to 159 may therefore be understood as a 
fragmented, tonally uncertain disruption, whose destructive energy defies attempts to 
assert tonal or rhythmic order. 
Although the interruptions in this episode are incongruous, nevertheless the 
fragmentation and chaos of this section is actually implicit in the main theme of the 
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movement itself. The fragmentation of the rhythmic relationships within this section 
might be taken as an expansion of the conflict between the apparent simplicity of the 
theme itself and the cross -rhythms of the accompaniment, to the point where the 
complex of different accents destroys the ensemble. This relationship between the 
main theme and this episode could be understood as a reflective gesture: as the 
movement expands it actually destroys itself, the reflective drive destroying the 
assertion of the main theme, producing a process of self -creation and self - 
destruction. 
The expansion of the metrical problems of the theme into the rhythmic chaos of the 
episode, however, also disturbs the return of that very theme.90 The recapitulation is 
problematic from its beginning. Bars 160 to 167 dissipate the rhythmic energy of the 
previous bars, steering towards a return of the theme in D minor via a quasi - 
rhetorical pause on diminished harmony (subsequently reinterpreted as A dominant 
7`h). The subsequent return of the theme, however, is fragmented in nature: the first 
two bars are simply passed between the violins, producing the effect of thematic 
fragmentation rather than recapitulation. 
It is here that the disruptive, violent effect of the preceding episode is seen most 
clearly. The destruction in that section produces a "developmental" effect in these 
bars, which obscures the return of the theme in the tonic at bar 176.91 There is no 
easy thematic return in this recapitulation, no strong resolution onto the tonic to 
announce its presence - it doesn't sound like a recapitulation. Rather, it begins with 
a struggle to reassert the theme following the preceding episode: it is only around bar 
180 that the functional ambiguity of these bars is resolved, the theme emerges re- 
established and the recapitulation begins. 
90 From this viewpoint there is a certain parallel between the problems of the recapitulation in this 
movement and those of the first movement. In the first movement the formal paradox of "false" and 
"correct" recapitulations arose from separation of thematic and harmonic levels that first arose in the 
exposition. Here the incongruities within the recapitulation derive from an expansion of those within 
the main theme itself. The parallel continues in that both movements also have problematic turns to 
the tonic major, and codas that produce parabasis and objectification. 
91 This is compounded by the redistribution of the part- writing and the new textural additions in the 


















































The problems of the beginning of the recapitulation are, however, also reflected in its 
somewhat truncated proportions. Bar 176 corresponds not to the first statement of 
the theme, but rather to the second in bar 11, albeit altered. A corresponding section 
(bars 19 to 26) is also missing from the recapitulation of the consequent phrase, 
presumably in order to maintain a balance between the phrases. Finally, the re- 
transition to the contrasting major section is also shortened. This recapitulation is 
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thus not a literal repeat, but rather an incomplete, problematic reassertion of the first 
theme. 
It is the coda, however, that produces the most obvious irony of the movement, an 
irony that is related to that of the first movement. It provides the moments of 
greatest incongruity, metrical manipulations, incongruous juxtapositions and 
interruptions, meaningless repetition and moments of disruptive parabasis that 
parallel those of the first movement. It begins in bar 243, with a fugato built from 
the final figure of the recapitulation. Into this the main theme gradually insinuates 
itself; the first two bars of the theme appearing in counterpoint with themselves. 
Violin 1 
Violin H 
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The accelerando that begins in bar 271, however, is "distressing as well as 
unexpected ",92 producing an accumulation of rhythmic /dynamic momentum, with 
some destabilising of the rhythm and momentary blurring between 6/8 and 3/4 
92 Lam (1975) p. 98 
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metres. Combined with the twelve -fold occurrence of the semitone F -E in the first 
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Significantly, the effect of these bars is to establish an opposition between the 
"learned style" of the fugato and the "madness" of the exaggerated accumulation of 
93 Ibid. p. 98 
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the accelerando. This opposition occurs not so much as a juxtaposition of topics, but 
rather as a transition, with the distressing, hysterical bars developing from the fugato. 
The incongruity produces a paradoxical reversal: the "learned" and the "insane" are 
brought into relationship. 
The incongruity of this passage, however, is surpassed by that of the sudden change 
to the tonic major at the apex of the Presto version of the theme that follows the 
accelerando (bar 294 onwards). This apparent attempt at an extended Picardy close 
parallels the second recapitulation of the first movement, but here, the change 
produces a greater incongruity by interrupting and diverting this Presto version. 
Moreover, although a Picardy close is a fairly conventional procedure within a minor 
work, it is entirely unwarranted, both within the context of this movement as well as 
within that of the entire quartet: it is too conventional, too obvious to bring closure to 
the fragmented, ironic work that precedes it. 
The incongruity of this moment thus tends to objectify the coda from its beginning: 
the strange, unexpected change in tone is a parabasis effect, undercutting the 
" serioso" context of the movement. More importantly, however, the coda is 
seriously undermined and objectified by incongruities within its structure. The most 
obvious occurs in bar 320 where, in place of the expected A major there is a rest on 
the first beat that momentarily interrupts the flow of the music. Though small, this 
rest has a profound effect, effectively moving the main beat of the next 16 bars from 
the first beat to the second: following the resumption of the cadence on the second 
beat of bar 320 the whole section is, as it were, shifted over one beat.94 The effect of 
this is revealed in bar 336, where the "felt" metre of bars 320 to 335 collides with the 
"normal" metre of bar 336, thereby highlighting the rhythmic problems caused by the 
earlier rest: 
94 The pizzicato chords on beat 2 of bars 322 and 324, together with the entries on that beat in bars 
324 and 326 maintain the illusion of the strong beat. This passage is analogous to the central section 
of the trio in the second movement. There are also analogous moments in the first movement: the 
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The incongruity of this passage is augmented by the exaggerated simplicity of the 
cadential motion from bar 328. This section is built from simple block harmony and 
conventional scale figures, with repetitions that, because of the simplicity of the 
material tend to sound extraneous. Indeed, the over -simplicity of this passage tends 
to produce a parodic quality: in the context of the movement these too -simple coda 
figurations sound somewhat naïve and inauthentic. 
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The incongruity of this entire section, however, is also highlighted by the interesting 
chromatic inflection in bars 339 to 343. The D minor harmony of bar 339 and the F 
naturals in the first violin in the two bars following hearken back to the minor key of 
the movement, as though the change to the tonic major has been momentarily 
forgotten. This effect is made all the more obvious by the "correction" to F# that 
occurs in 342/343, and by the distortion of the periodicity that results from the 
insertion of these two corrective bars. In context these details become important, a 
reminder of the incongruity of the major key of the coda. 
These incongruities, particularly the rest in bar 320, are clear instances of authorial 
parabasis, an intrusion into the work from "outside" that destroys the illusion of the 
coda - its conventionality. This moment of parabasis, in itself, could perhaps prompt 
an ironic interpretation, but the obviousness of the moment serves to highlight the 
inherent problems and authorial manipulation of a coda that is, from its beginning, 
unconvincing and incongruous. 
In addition to the complex of incongruities within this coda, however, there is also an 
unnecessary accumulation of conventional closural procedures. The accelerando and 
subsequent Presto tempo that begin the coda are conventional procedures, with 
precedents in Beethoven's own earlier works as well as in Haydn.95 However, to 
this convention is subsequently added another conventional coda procedure - the 
change to the tonic major. The fact that these conventions happen consecutively, 24 
bars apart, rather than simultaneously, produces the effect of an incongruous 
accretion of coda procedures: the Picardy close seems surplus to requirements. This 
problematic use of both coda conventions, in other words, entirely undermines the 
coda, underlining the fundamentally inauthentic nature of the transition to A major. 
This accumulation is taken to a final stage in bar 351, where the dominant is 
interrupted by a repeat of the material from bar 303. From there the major section of 
95 See, for example the change of tempo at the end of the finales of Haydn's Op. 33 no. 5 quartet and 
Beethoven's Op. 18 no. 6. 
231 
the coda is repeated in its entirety, largely unchanged from the first occurrence 
(except for some fuller textures, with new doublings and some re- distribution of 
parts). Significantly, this repeat even includes the incongruous rest from bar 320, 
producing the same shift in pulse, which results in the same rhythmic clashes and 
"correction" of F natural to F #.96 
Although this doubling of the coda produces the same "surface" incongruities, it also 
introduces an important structural incongruity. The movement falls broadly into a 
sonata -rondo form: 
A B A B A 
Exposition Development Recapitulation Coda 
The repetition in the coda, however, distorts the overall dimensions of this form: 
even if the Presto section (rather than the fugato) is taken as the beginning of the 
coda it is still 124 bars long - nearly a third of the movement. This could be 
considered to be a "balance" for the whole quartet, an extended major coda needed to 
counteract the fragmented, troubled movements that precede it. However, the fact 
that this "extended" coda is simply a two -fold repetition of the same material 
precludes such conventional explanations. This repetition actually produces formal 
oddity: it is not a long coda, but a shorter one played twice. It is almost entirely 
redundant, an unnecessary, incongruous replication where the "jokes" - the 
misplaced beats, clichés etc. - are literally told twice. As such not only does this 
repeated section become virtually meaningless, verging on banal, but more 
importantly the comic effect of the "jokes" is lost. Instead, these devices themselves 
become objectified: the incongruity of this repetition draws attention to the "device" 
of these jokes - in effect it exposes their illusion. In so doing it raises their effect, as 
it were, to the second power. They become not simply humorous incongruities, but 
96 It is worth noting that the incongruity of the F natural - F# motion is actually highlighted by the 
changed texture: the increased dissonances with the accompaniment in bars 389 -391 foregrounds the 
play of major and minor tonalities. 
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rather, they themselves are objectified, subjected to the ironic comment of an 
intrusive artistic presence. This results in a reflective function: the ironising of these 
negations produces a paradoxical double -negative effect. 
The incongruities of this repetition thus add a final layer to the accumulation of 
incongruities - the accumulation of irony - seen throughout the coda. Within this 
context even the emphatic final cadence, which in another context would have been 
unremarkable, seems problematic: the ironising of conventional coda procedure that 
has preceded it undermines its assertion of closure. It is too emphatic: it simply 
sounds too neat, too conventional, particularly for the quartet that has preceded it. 
Thus, although it is an ending it seems to play with this certainty, to produce a final 
ironic twist; this coda closes the movement with an ironic half -smile, a seemingly 
innocuous ending that is entirely undermined and entirely inappropriate for its 
context. 
* 
This quartet, as several commentators have noted, is a work that, despite its 
fragmentation and obvious oppositional nature, seems to project a particular air of 
wholeness or coherence - a peculiar balance of unity and disunity (to borrow 
Kerman's terms).97 This balance may be sought, and to an extent found, in purely 
musical occurrences: one thinks of the reminiscence of the opening bars in the 
Heiliger Dankgesang, or of the cadenza in the fourth movement that recalls those of 
the first movement. On a deeper level, there are suggestions of symmetry between 
the five -part structure of the whole and that of the third movement, and explicit 
thematic connections, for example between the themes of the first movement and the 
last movement: 





Perhaps, above all, such connections may be seen in the manner in which the four - 
note motif can be traced through much of the thematic structure, not only of the first 
movement, but also subsequent movements.98 
Such instances have led some commentators, like Kerman, to relate it to one 
underlying concept - to pain, or some psychological progression.99 This analysis 
likewise relates all the movements of this work to an underlying concept - Romantic 
irony. These movements are joined together, not only by the type of connections 
mentioned above, but also by common ironic processes. Incongruous rhythmic 
manipulations, for example, run throughout the 2nd, 4th and 5th movements, whilst 
problematic, incongruous codas link the first and last movements. Similarly, 
elements of self -reflexivity, whether explicitly as quotation (not to mention 
inscriptions), or obliquely, as a foregrounding of the thematic procedures of 
Beethoven's own "middle- period" works link 1St, 2na and 3ra movements. Finally, 
emphases on "meaningless" or banal music occur in several movements, together 
with frequent elements of parody and cliché. 
More importantly, throughout this work there is a continual fragmentation of the 
surface of the music through constant juxtapositions and incongruities. These 
juxtapositions alone demonstrate an ironic, manipulating authorial consciousness; 
they are compounded, though, by the recurrence of sudden, explicit intrusions of a 
destructive authorial voice. Together these produce a repeated destruction of 
illusion, an undermining and objectification of every aesthetic "reality" that is 
98 See, for example, Chua's demonstration that the motifs of the first movement may be seen 
transformed through those of the rest of the quartet. (Chua (1995) p. 152 -160) 
99 Kerman (1967) p. 242/243 
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presented by incongruous juxtaposition with other "realities ". This recurring 
violation of conventions constitutes a constant parabasis, the continual manipulation 
of a conscious ironic presence similar to that of works like Tieck's Der Gestiefelte 
Kater or Brentano's Godwi. 
The continual destruction of illusion that results from this parabasis produces within 
each movement a paradoxical position of constant antithesis and contradiction, a 
continual paradox of assertion and negation. The continual progression from 
objectifier to objectified, from "reality" to artifice throughout the work, together with 
the formal paradoxes and reversals that occur on the deepest levels of the music, 
imply an infinite paradox. They produce an infinite alternation of creation and 
destruction, a Fichtean reflective movement between finite and infinite like an 
unending reflection between two mirrors. In other words, the paradoxes that lie at 
the heart of this work locate it within the locus of Schlegel's Romantic irony: it may 
be understood in terms of all of the elements considered above - paradox, 
consciousness and parabasis. It is a striking and powerful instance of musical irony, 
the objectifying and ironising of all "systems" from the infinite, free viewpoint of an 
ironic composer. 
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Paradox, Fugue and Song 
Irony sensu eminentiori [in the eminent sense] is directed not against this or that 
particular existing but against the entire given actuality at a certain time and under 
certain conditions ... It is not this or that phenomenon but the totality of existence that it 
contemplates sub specie ironiae. 1 
Kierkegaard 
The Cavatina from Beethoven's Op. 130 quartet and the Grosse Fuge, its original 
finale, present ironic structures that are somewhat different from those seen in Op. 
132. The incongruous juxtapositions, parabasis and reversals produced, throughout 
the work, a continual paradoxical movement from objectifier to objectified, from 
assertion to negation, from creation to destruction. Crucially, the juxtaposed 
elements of each section were themselves internally incongruous. The two 
movements from Op. 130, however, produce "balanced" structures, comprising 
extreme juxtapositions of internally congruent elements, without the type of internal 
incongruities and parabasis seen above. Throughout this chapter these balanced 
structures will be considered to correlate with paradox as paradoxical forms. As 
such, these paradoxical structures will be correlated with a type of irony - known 
variously as "general ", "Socratic" or "existential" irony - in which the totality of 
existence is perceived as fundamentally paradoxical. These movements will 
therefore be understood as eloquent statements of general irony. 
The harmonic ambiguity that begins the Cavatina has significant consequences for 
the whole movement. The bass motion across this opening bar outlines a cadential 
"fifths" motion: after the first E flat chord, the dominant seventh on C briefly implies 
F major (the dominant of the actual dominant of the movement (B flat)). However, F 
minor occurs instead, before the move to B flat and the resolution to the tonic in the 
second bar. The occurrence of such a common progression in the first bar of the 
movement creates an unusual tonal ambiguity, obscuring the function of the first 
chord: the E flat chord doesn't "sound" like the tonic, rather it tends to function 
1 Kierkegaard (1841) p. 254 
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momentarily as the subdominant of B flat. This ambiguity is intensified by the entry 
of the melody on the third beat, which produces an anacrusis effect across the whole 
bar. The combined effect is striking. The harmonic progression of the first bar 
functions as a process of modulation; such a modulatory process implies a 
progression from a musical "somewhere" towards a goal. In this case though, the 
"somewhere" is missing, producing both an "open" harmonic and, by extension, 
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The ambiguity of these bars may be understood as a "functional ambiguity ", the type 
that William Thomson considers as an essential aesthetic force, where a composer is 
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deliberately ambiguous for an aesthetic end.2 In this case, as will be seen, the 
ambiguity is crucial to the development and the "meaning" of the movement: 
paradoxically, the return of this opening at bar 49 joins together the two incongruous 
structures that comprise this movement. 
The main body of the movement - the Cavatina section - is particularly simple. 
Essentially, it is a song -like texture, as befits a "cavatina ": the melody is confined to 
the first violin, whilst the remaining parts fulfil mainly a harmonic role, in a 
predominantly homophonic texture. The melody itself is largely conjunct and 
confined to a vocal register that corresponds roughly to a mezzo soprano range, 
avoiding extremes of either pitch or dynamic. The harmonic structure is 
predominantly major which, together with the slow tempo, restrained dynamics and 
the conjunct motion of both melody and accompaniment produces a pastoral 
connotation. 
Formally the movement initially appears just as simple. The repetition of the 
antecedent phrase of the theme leads, via simple modulatory motion, to a contrasting 
section from around bar 20. The cadential -type material of the bars 23 to 30 is then 
itself repeated, extending the section to bar 39 and producing an overall symmetry to 
the movement's periodicity. However, it is important to note the thematic links that 
underlie the entire Cavatina. Much of the movement may be derived directly from 
the opening 10 bars: for example, the contrasting section is derived from a repeat of 
the consequent phrase of the theme (compare bars 20/21 with 5/6). More 
importantly the material from the opening bar reappears in key places: in bar 10 it 
links the two statements of the main theme together;3 the quaver motion in bars 17 to 
21 is derived from that of the opening bar, and its use in the fifths progression in bars 
17 to 19 perhaps underlines the initial function. This material therefore plays a 
2 Thomson, William (1983) "Functional Ambiguity in Musical Structures" Music Perception vol. 1 
p. 3. Such ambiguities will be discussed more fully in the final chapter. 
3 Although the two lower parts do not play the same material as the opening bar the repetition in the 
upper two parts ensures the effect of repetition. Crucially, however, the absence of the harmonic 
motion in these bars heightens the effect of the return of this material in bar 49. The significance of 
this will be considered below. 
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crucial role throughout the main part of the movement: it helps to produce an overall 
effect of a tight thematic and gestural integration, which Dahlhaus describes as "a 
dense mesh of motivic associations, with a degree of complication that merits the 
term labyrinthine ".4 
In this context the arrival of the beklemmt section in bar 40 produces a striking 
incongruity, perhaps one of the greatest in any of Beethoven's quartets. The 
oppressed, agitated music of the beklemmt recitative seems calculatedly opposed to 
the pastoral lyricism of the Cavatina aria, forming significant oppositions on each of 
the basic musical parameters. The C flat major /A flat minor tonality, for example, is 
remote from the B flat tonality of the first section, also producing an opposition of 
major and minor (despite the mediating effect of the C flat major beginning). 
Likewise, the triplet -pattern of the accompaniment of the beklemmt is incongruous 
with the surrounding duplet figuration, and although the accompaniments of both 
sections are homophonic, the block chords of the beklemmt evoke recitative, rather 
than the voice -led, arioso -like accompaniment of the Cavatina. Finally, the 
extremely disjunct, fragmentary nature of the melodic line, which achieves an almost 
syncopated effect, is opposed to the lyricism of the Cavatina. Moreover, the fact that 
this melody violates the `norms' of melodic writing produces a particularly 
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Crucially, the opposition of these sections /topics is heightened by the fact that there 
is no transition between them a transition section would have lessened the contrast. 
Rather the sudden change of texture, metre and key of the beklemmt occurs entirely 
unexpectedly as an interruption an abrupt, incongruous juxtaposition of 
incongruous elements, foreign to the surrounding Cavatina sections. 
The unusual formal structure and proportions of this movement strengthen the 
designation of the beklemmt section as an interruption. According to the Grove 
Dictionary a cavatina is "a short aria, without da capo, which may occur as an 
independent piece or as an interpolation in a recitative ";5 Koch's Musikalisches 
Lexicon adds that cavatinas should have no second section.6 Musical forms, 
however, seldom conform to dictionary definitions: whilst some, like Haydn's 
cavatina `Licht and Leben' from Die Jahreszeiten (1799 -1800), do conform to this 
definition exactly,7 others, like the cavatina `Se vuol ballare' from Act One of Le 
5 Westrup, Jack (2001) "Cavatina ", The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians ed. Stanley 
Sadie, vol. 5 
6 Koch, Heinrich (1865) Musikalisches Lexicon p. 147 
7 Other `conventional' examples include Weber's `Glocklein im Thale' from Euryanthe (1823) and 
`Porgi amor' and L'ho perduta' from Mozart's Le Nozze di Figaro (1786). 
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Nozze di Figaro do not. This cavatina is considerably more extended, in a ternary 
form that possesses both a contrasting second section (faster tempo, duple metre 
instead of triple) and a return to the opening material.$ 
Beethoven's Cavatina initially appears more similar to Mozart's than to the `normal' 
definition, possessing both a contrasting section and an apparent da capo. 
Significantly, however, whereas in Figaro's cavatina the contrasts between sections 
are clearly signalled by conventional gestures and the preceding harmonic course, 
and are delimited by cadences and fermata, this is not the case with Beethoven's 
movement. Within the context of the Cavatina music the beklemmt section is an 
unprepared, unexpected contrast -an interruption rather than simply a contrasting 
formal section, intruding on the course of the preceding material. As such, the 
formal structure of this movement is unconventional, even incongruous within the 
stylistic context suggested by its title: the dramatic interruption of the Cavatina by 
the beklemmt is unprecedented in both earlier and contemporary uses of the 
'cavatina' designation. This stylistic incongruity is furthered by the manner in which 
this insertion forces the occurrence of the final `da capo' section: it is necessary to 
"answer" the beklemmt, but this da capo is itself incongruous with the stylistic 
conventions of the form. 
It is possible to explain this unconventional form in more conventional terms: Hatten 
considers it a hybrid of formal schemes and techniques, a blend of "aria, part form 
and sonata ",9 whilst Kerman, stressing its "vocality ", styles it as a "long, loose 
ternary song occasionally disturbed by declamatory pressures ".10 However, as Chua 
states, attempts to "neutralise and unify" the Cavatina "simply miss the point ":11 the 
8 Likewise, Weber's `Und ob die Wolke sie verhüle' from Der Freischütz (1821), though smaller in 
scale, also has a ternary construction, though without word- repetition in the final section. 
9 Hatten (1994) p. 210 
10 Kerman (1967) p. 196 
11 Chua (1995) p. 194 Indeed, Chua characterises the beklemmt as an "insertion ", an intertextual 
reference to the slow movement of the Piano Sonata Op. 110 (ibid). Similarly, Dahlhaus describes 
these two contrasting elements as "different styles that co -exist in the movement" (Dahlhaus (1991) p. 
235). 
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Cavatina contains an enforced contrast, a contradiction arising from the insertion and 
interruption of the beklemmt music. 
The ending of the beklemmt section compounds its problems. The E flat major that 
functions as the dominant of A flat minor in bars 46 to 48 is transformed into the 
tonic via the return of the opening modulatory gesture, followed by a repeat of the 
Cavatina.12 The effect of this upon the movement is profound. The recurrence of 
the modulatory bar establishes an important connection with the first occurrence. 
However, the context of the second occurrence affects the first occurrence 
retrospectively, provoking a reassessment of it. The recurrence of this phrase solves 
the problem of the opening bar by "resolving" its initial harmonic ambiguity - it is 
almost as if the beklemmt section is "missing" from the opening. 
Crucially, the return of these bars therefore establishes a transition between two 
topics that were initially incongruous: the return of the modulatory process actually 
elides the beklemmt and the Cavatina. Although the beklemmt interruption forces a 
contradiction, the two incongruous sections are nevertheless linked. This is achieved 
primarily through the harmonic process described, but the effect is strengthened by 
the thematic resemblance between the fractured melodic line of the beklemmt section 
and the opening theme of the Cavatina:13 
12 See ex. 5.2 above. Note, however, that this return of the opening gesture is not absolutely exact. 
There is a displacement of the bass, which now outlines an E flat triad. However, the E flat -E 
natural -F motion still occurs (in the viola), with the same momentary C dominant 7th harmony 
leading to F minor (over a B flat) and B flat. Thus, although the "fifths" motion is weaker, the basic 
harmony is still present, and the (almost) exact repeat of the second violin line makes the return 
obvious. 
13 Indeed, both Hatten and Kerman suggest that the similarity between the themes indicates a 
variation process. Kerman considers the beklemmt theme "a sort of variation of the principal tune" 
(Kerman (1967) p. 198) whilst Hatten characterises the entire movement as a "developing variation" 
form (Hatten (1994) p. 208). 
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beklemmt section, bars 41 - 45 
This process therefore establishes a type of "circular" or "cyclical" formal and 
harmonic procedure - the beginning of the movement is linked, by implication, to the 
end of the beklemmt in a continual, infinite process, a significant cyclical motion of 
crisis and resolution. Although on one hand the incongruity of the beklemmt section 
appears to resolve through the recapitulation of the opening music, this process 
actually produces a paradox within the structure and formal function of the 
movement. The beklemmt section, although incongruously juxtaposed with the 
Cavatina is nevertheless understood as part of the same structure, joined by a circular 
harmonic process, and by thematic similarities. In effect, this movement comprises 
two elements that are simultaneously incongruous but related, juxtaposed but 
semantically connected, in a continuous paradox. 
This paradoxical, circular process perhaps explains the formal oddity of the 
movement. In effect, the return of the opening music functions as an evocation or 
reminiscence, rather than as a full recapitulation. This accounts for both the 
truncated dimensions of this apparent da capo return, as well as the lack of a 
recapitulation of the "second" theme (from bars 23 onward). The point of the return 
is to effect the connection between the two incongruous sections - to suggest a 
continual `circular' process - rather than simply to repeat the opening material for 
the sake of formal propriety. Indeed, the manner in which the movement ends could 
support such a viewpoint. Despite the overlapping cadential material in bars 63 to 66 
there is no strong perfect cadence; rather, the movement simply stops on a repeated E 
flat chord. The effect of this is that ending is as syntactically "open" as the 
beginning, the lack of closure implying the possibility of continuation. 
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The juxtaposition of the Cavatina and beklemmt sections could be understood as an 
ironic contrast resulting in a destruction of the aesthetic illusion - the artifice - of the 
Cavatina by the unconventional beklemmt section. However, whereas, in Romantic 
irony (as seen in the Op. 132 quartet) there are incongruous elements within the 
structure of the elements, this movement comprises two completely internally 
congruent elements. As will be seen, in this case neither element is objectified: 
rather, the structure may be considered simply as a balanced juxtaposition of two 
incongruous elements. 
As will be considered more fully below, if balanced juxtapositions of incongruous 
elements such as those of the Cavatina (and, as will be seen, the Grosse Fuge) may 
be considered to be paradoxical, then they may also be correlated with the paradoxes 
seen in the form of irony known variously as "general ", "Socratic" or "existential" 
irony. As will be demonstrated, the important relationship between the fundamental 
basis of this form of irony and paradox also produces a connection between this 
general, existential irony and Schlegel's conception of Romantic irony. This 
connection is important for the reading of the movements of Op. 130 given here: the 
relationship between Beethoven and Schlegel's philosophy seen above strengthens 
such an ironic interpretation of these works. 
Therefore, in order to establish the basis for these readings I will first consider the 
relationship between paradox and general, existential irony. In addition, the manner 
in which musical structures such as those of the Cavatina and the Grosse Fuge may 
be considered paradoxical, and the manner in which the process of objectification 
functions in such structures will also be considered. Finally, analysis of the Grosse 




The first difficulty in dealing with general, existential irony is to recognise that it 
originates primarily from a philosophical viewpoint regarding the fundamental nature 
of existence. That is, that whereas Romantic irony and satire are primarily discursive 
forms, inherently associated with artistic technique, general irony is first and 
foremost a perception of existence as ironic. Muecke outlines its fundamental basis: 
General Irony lies in those contradictions, apparently fundamental and irresolvable, that 
confront men when they speculate upon such topics as the origin and purpose of the 
universe, the certainty of death, the eventual extinction of all life, the impenetrability of 
the future, the conflicts between reason, emotion, and instinct, freewill and determinism, 
the objective and the subjective, society and the individual, the absolute and the relative, 
the humane and the scientific. Most of these, it may be said, are reducible to one great 
incongruity, the appearance of self -valued and subjectively free but temporally finite 
egos in a universe that seems to be utterly alien, utterly purposeless, completely 
deterministic, and incomprehensibly vast. l4 
Although understanding existence as paradoxical and ironic was a conception of 
profound importance in the Nineteenth, and especially the Twentieth centuries, its 
origins are far older. Muecke, for example, considers this type of irony in classical 
antiquity, particularly in Xenophon, but he also states that "it is probable that the 
perception of `General Irony' situations is as old as philosophic thought, as old as the 
discovery that natural forces are not to be controlled by magic or propitiated by 
sacrifices ".15 
As will be elaborated below, the baseline of general irony is a twofold paradox. 
Firstly, existence itself is perceived to be paradoxical, containing contradictory 
elements - the oppositions that Muecke highlights - that nevertheless co -exist in 
incongruous juxtaposition. Secondly, our relation to that universe is paradoxical: we, 
as finite beings seek to impose a finite order - meaning, value and purpose - on a 
universe that is infinite. In doing so we create the paradoxical structure of the 
perceived universe; existence, in other words, is paradoxical because of our attempts 
14 Muecke (1970) p. 67/68 
15 Ibid. p. 69 
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to find meaning. It is therefore the human condition that the more we seek such 
"meaning ", the greater the paradox and irony. 
According to Sheinberg, such general irony (which she refers to as "existential 
irony ") may be understood in terms of two types - "negative" and "positive ". As 
will be seen, these `types' are essentially opposing viewpoints concerning the ironic 
paradoxes of existence, describing the same phenomena in opposing terms. In the 
case of "negative" existential irony these paradoxes are viewed as a negation of all 
knowledge, all "positivity ". The essence of this type lies in the ironic consciousness 
that Kierkegaard attributes to Socrates. In The Concept of Irony he argues that the 
perception of existence as ironic, indeed the phenomenon of irony itself began with 
Socrates: 
If irony is a qualification of subjectivity, then it must manifest itself the first time 
subjectivity makes its appearance in world history ... This points to the historical 
turning point where subjectivity made its appearance for the first time, and with this we 
have come to Socrates.l6 
Kierkegaard's consideration of Socratic irony centres on Socrates' consciousness of 
his own ironic, paradoxical position. In Plato's Apology, for example, Socrates 
describes his understanding of the "human wisdom "17 attributed to him by the 
Delphic oracle: 
The truth of the matter, gentlemen, is pretty certainly this: that real wisdom is the 
property of God, and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or 
no value ... he would say to us `The wisest of you is he who has realised, like Socrates, 
that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless '18 
Socrates `wisdom' is his consciousness of his own condition of ignorance. According 
to Socrates, the highest achievement of human wisdom is made by he who realises 
that he can never truly know anything, except, perhaps, for the knowledge that he can 
know nothing. Thus from Socrates' viewpoint all of humanity is the victim of a 
16 Kierkegaard (1841) p. 264 
17 Plato Apology, trans. Tredennick (1954) p. 49 
18 Ibid. p. 52 
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paradoxical irony: the knowledge that we think we have turns out to be nothingness. 
Crucially, although Socrates is himself in the same position his ignorance is vitally 
different: he is continually conscious of this ignorance, and, as Kierkegaard 
repeatedly stresses it is precisely this consciousness that produced Socrates' irony: 
When Socrates declared that he was ignorant, he nevertheless did know something, for 
he knew about his ignorance; on the other hand, however, this knowledge was not a 
knowledge of something, that is, did not have any positive content, and to that extent his 
ignorance was ironic ... If his knowledge had been a knowledge of something, his 
ignorance would merely have been a conversational technique. His irony, however, was 
complete in itself. Inasmuch, then, as his ignorance was simultaneously earnest and yet 
again not earnest, it is on this prong that Socrates must be held. To know that one is 
ignorant is the beginning of coming to know, but if one does not know more, it is 
merely a beginning. This knowledge was what kept Socrates ironically afloat.19 
Socrates' ignorance in itself was not ironic, however; rather, his consciousness of his 
own ignorance produced objectification, leading him to view both the world 
(Kierkegaard uses the term "actuality ") and his own position in a fundamentally 
ironic light. This process, as will be seen, is therefore effectively a self - 
objectification or self -satirising, which allows him to view his own position 
ironically. Though aware of his own ignorance, he can do nothing about it - it is part 
of his very humanity: no matter what knowledge he gained, he could never truly 
know anything. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, "the whole of existence has become 
alien to the ironic subject [Socrates] and the ironic subject in turn alien to existence, 
that as actuality has lost its validity for the ironic subject, he himself has to a certain 
degree become unactual ".20 Socrates' consciousness frees him, to a certain extent 
from the predicament by producing an ultimate, infinite irony. 
Kierkegaard, following Hegel, defines the process of this Socratic irony as "infinite 
absolute negativity ". The basis of this definition rests upon Hegelian dialectics, 
whereby every assertion contains within itself the seed of its own negation. This 
definition implies an infinite process of negation, a continual movement from 
19 Kierkegaard (1841) p. 269 
20 Ibid. p. 259 
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assertion to negation, and therefore an infinite chain of irony. As a result of this 
process everything is negated except irony itself - it alone remains absolute. 
In contrast, in "positive" existential irony the fundamental paradoxes of existence are 
not considered in terms of infinite negation, but rather as a positive process: "the 
irony of reality is ... wholly accepted as a phenomenon, as a fact, which does not 
need or seek a solution ".21 The conception of existential paradoxes as "negation" 
thus arises solely from the imposition of finite human logic upon these fundamental 
contradictions: if actuality is inherently contradictory then the existence of this 
paradox does not necessarily imply human ignorance of some fundamental "truth ". 
From this viewpoint the infinite negation of Socratic irony is replaced with a positive 
perception of paradox. 
Bakhtin's theory of "carnival" (together with the related concepts of 
"unfinalizability" and the grotesque) might be given as an example of such 
"positive" existential irony. The juxtaposition of opposites and the overturning of 
social norms that is inherent in carnival and in the grotesque is a freeing process, 
infinitely creative and unfinalizable (i.e. open- ended, always potential, never 
conclusive). Carnival, and carnival laughter "challenge all social norms that have 
ever been or ever will be; they incorporate a spirit of joyful negation of everything 
completed or to be completed ".22 Indeed, Morson and Emerson's comments reveal 
the "positive" existential basis of carnival: "In carnival, Bakhtin thought he had 
discovered a social ritual of pure antinomianism, and in carnival laughter he detected 
an eternally "unofficial," "second truth about the world" - a truth that rejects the 
existence of all Truth. Laughter becomes a "universal philosophical form " ".23 
21 Sheinberg (2000) p. 44 
22 Morson and Emerson (1990) p. 94 
23 Ibid. p. 92/93. There is an important relationship between Bakhtin's theory of carnival and the 
grotesque and Schlegel's philosophy. Bakhtin considers that 
Unlike the medieval and Renaissance grotesque, which was directly related to folk 
culture and thus belonged to all the people, the Romantic genre acquired a private 
"chamber" character. It became, as it were, an individual carnival, marked by a vivid 
sense of isolation. The carnival spirit was transposed into a subjective, idealistic 
248 
Sheinberg argues that the difference between negative and positive existential irony 
arises initially from issues of morality and ethics. She considers, for example, that 
for Kierkegaard irony was "morally negative and even socially dangerous ",24 and 
that the description of it as "negativity" therefore results from the imposition of this 
belief upon the phenomenon.25 However, although the moralistic aspect of Hegel's 
understanding of irony (from which Kierkegaard derived his definition) lingers, to an 
extent in Kierkegaard's discussion,26 the negativity that he continually ascribes to 
irony is the infinite, absolute process of negation of every positive assertion rather 
than a morally negative process.27 The difference is significant: existential irony 
does not possess an inherent morality or ethic by which it can be differentiated into 
"negative" and "positive" types. Rather, the distinction occurs simply as two 
philosophy. It ceased to be the concrete (one might say bodily) experience of the one, 
inexhaustible being, as it was in the Middle ages and the Renaissance (Bakhtin, Mikhail 
(1941) Rabelais and his World p. 37) 
He refers specifically to Schlegel as a "theorist" (ibid.) of this new genre, relating explicitly to his 
concept of irony. It may therefore be seen that there is a strong element of the "positive ", generative 
force of carnival and existential irony at the core of Schlegel's thought (ibid. p. 41). 
24 Sheinberg (2000) p. 42 
25 The situation is, however, more complex than Sheinberg allows. Kierkegaard actually considered 
Socrates' irony a necessary stage in world -historical development, functioning as a beginning point - 
the infinite possibility of positivity. Thus Socratic irony was not for him simply morally negative, but 
rather both negative and positive simultaneously: 
Socrates has no positive system; but it must be added that by its pressure the infinite 
negativity has made all positivity possible, has been an infinite incitement and stimulation 
for positivity. Just as in daily life Socrates could begin anywhere, so his significance in 
the world -historical development is to be the infinite beginning that contains within itself a 
multiplicity of beginnings. Thus as a beginning he was positive, but as mere beginning he 
is negative ... the unity thereof is precisely irony. (Kierkegaard (1841) p. 216/217) 
26 This moralistic element may be seen throughout Hegel's discussions of irony: "The proximate 
form of this negativity which has been called irony is, then, on the one hand, the illusory nature of all 
that is matter of fact, or moral, or of substantive content, the nothingness of all that is objective and of 
essential and independent worth. So long as the Ego adheres to such a standpoint as this, everything 
appears to be null and void, the personal subjectivity alone excepted, which thereby becomes hollow 
and empty, and nothing but conceit itself" Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of Fine Art, trans F.P.B 
Osmaston (1920) p. 90/91 
27 "Irony is the infinitely light playing with nothing that is not terrified by it but even rises to the 
surface on occasion ... it is earnestness about nothing - insofar as it is not earnestness about 
something. It continually conceives of nothing in contrast to something, and in order to free itself of 
earnestness about anything, it grasps the nothing. But it does not become earnestness about nothing, 
either, except insofar as it is not earnestness about anything." Kierkegaard (1841) p. 270 
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different views regarding essentially the same perception of paradox: one regards it 
as infinite negation, the other as infinite assertion. 
Crucially, Schlegel's conception of Romantic irony is related to both "types" of 
existential irony. Although "positive" existential irony is often considered as a 
primarily twentieth- century concern, it actually forms an integral element of 
Schlegel's irony. Romantic irony, as Hatten states, possesses "a critical perspective, 
from a higher plane on the workings of life or art";28 it is, as considered in the 
second chapter, an aesthetic response to the fundamental paradoxes of both existence 
and of art. This fundamental existential basis is reflected in the crucial relationship 
between paradox and irony, in which, as seen, paradox is treated as a positive, 
generative element.29 Moreover, the background of post -Kantian philosophy seen 
throughout Schlegel's fragments relates to paradox in this manner: there is a 
continual balance of assertion and negation derived from the Fichtean model. 
However, the emphasis on consciousness within Schlegel's writing on irony also 
creates a strong correlation with the type of ironic consciousness identified in 
Socrates.30 In Socratic irony the consciousness of the existential paradox leads to 
the viewpoint that life itself is ironic, and that mankind is the victim of this irony. 
Schlegel's Critical (Lyceum) fragment number 42 (quoted in chapter 2 above) 
demonstrates that this Socratic ironic consciousness lies at the centre of his 
philosophy of irony, as embodied in Romantic poetry. Schlegel clearly relates the 
28 Hatten (1994) p. 174. In addition, Hatten considers that Schlegel's irony "moves beyond the 
figurative trope, or even sustained dramatic irony, to the level of the author's (composer's) 
detachment and self -critical consciousness, not only from writing (composing) but from life as well. 
Thus, irony is inflated to a kind of cultural trope at the level of philosophical contemplation." (ibid.) 
This designation is reminiscent of Quintilian's consideration of Socrates, quoted above. 
29 Consider again Schlegel's description of irony the consciousness of as an "infinitely teeming 
[vollen] chaos" (Ideas no. 69, quoted in chapter 2 above): the use of "vollen" is fundamentally 
positive and generative. 
30 The influence of Socrates' irony upon Schlegel's philosophy of irony may be traced to Schlegel's 
renowned background in Classical scholarship. Plato's Socratic Dialogues are the most obvious 
source; however, Aristotle also refers to Socrates' irony within the Nichomachean Ethics (2.7.1108a 
19 -23, 4.7.1127a 20 -26 and 4.7.7.1127b 22 -26). In addition, Quintilian's comments in his Oratorical 
Education are of particular interest (Institutiones oratoriae 9.2.46). Within his discussion of irony as 
both trope and figure, he treats Socrates' entire life effectively as a third type of irony, neither trope 
nor figure. It is this third form of irony - Socratic irony - that forms an essential element of Romantic 
irony. 
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irony of "Romantic poetry" to Socratic irony: it is a reflection of life, a continual 
ironic consciousness like that of Socrates' irony, with the poetic creation resulting 
from the artist's consciousness of the paradox of existence. Moreover, Schlegel's 
description of irony in this fragment as "the mood that surveys everything and rises 
above all limitations, even its own art, virtue or genius "31 finds echoes throughout 
Kierkegaard's later discussion of Socrates. Indeed, Kierkegaard highlights the 
relationship between Socratic and Schlegelian irony: 
If irony is a qualification of subjectivity, we shall promptly see the necessity of two 
manifestations of this concept, and actuality has indeed attached names to them. The 
first one, of course, is the one in which subjectivity asserts its rights in world history for 
the first time. Here we have Socrates ... For a new mode of irony to be able to appear 
now, it must result from the assertion of subjectivity in a still higher form. It must be 
subjectivity raised to the second power, a subjectivity's subjectivity, which corresponds 
to reflection's reflection ... here again we meet irony. But since this position is an 
intensified subjective consciousness, it quite naturally is clearly and definitely conscious 
of irony and declares irony as its position. This was indeed the case with Friedrich 
Schlegel, who sought to bring it to bear in relation to actuality.32 
Kierkegaard clearly considers that Schlegel's irony is based in the same fundamental 
consciousness of the irony of existence as Socratic irony.33 Indeed, his comments 
highlight several important points concerning the relationship between Romantic and 
Socratic irony. The first of these is the clear development that he traces from 
Socratic irony to Schlegel's conception: both arise as a response to the same 
fundamental perception of existence as paradoxical. This is related to the second 
important point: the "general" or "existential" basis of both Romantic and Socratic 
irony requires a process of self -objectification. 
31 Schlegel Lyceum fragment 42, p. 6. 
32 Kierkegaard (1841) p. 242. Note that Kierkegaard's comments also highlight the post -Kantian 
subtext within the basis of Schlegel's irony. Indeed in defining irony as "the first and most abstract 
qualification of subjectivity" (ibid. p. 264) Kierkegaard reveals an inherently transcendental 
philosophical basis. 
33 See also the quotation from Wellek in the second chapter of this work: Schlegel's irony is the 
"recognition of the fact that the world in its essence is paradoxical ". Welleck (1955) p. 14. Behler, 
moreover, clearly indicates the Socratic basis not only of Schlegel's irony, but also of his concept of 
literature: 
"In varying formulations, Schlegel attempted to rescue the Socratic -Platonic irony of a 
configurative, indeterminable, self -transcending process of thinking and writing and to 
integrate it with the modern style of self -reflection and self -consciousness as the 
decisive mark of literary modernity ". (Behler (1990) p. 82) 
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This common process may actually be seen in two unpublished fragments from 
Schlegel's Literary Notebooks. Fragment 778 begins "Irony = Self -parody ? ",34 
whilst in the next fragment, number 779, he states that "Socrates had transcendental 
satire ".35 These fragments are closely related to Critical Fragment 108, in which 
Schlegel describes Socratic irony as "continuous self -parody ", in addition 
considering that: 
Socratic irony is the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation ... It 
is the freest of all licenses, for by its means one transcends oneself; and yet it is also the 
most lawful, for it is absolutely necessary.36 
In all three of these fragments the element of self -objectification is implied - indeed 
in the first it is actually stated: self -parody requires self -objectification. Similarly 
Schlegel's designation of Socrates' irony as satire also implies an objectifying 
process. This establishes a relationship between Romantic irony and "general ", 
Socratic irony: both types involve a process of self -objectification (a function that 
will be considered more fully below). 
Nevertheless, although there is a clear relationship between Romantic irony and 
these forms of "existential" irony, the difference between them is also important. As 
Kierkegaard's comments indicate, in Romantic irony there is an additional level of 
irony - the Romantic artist is conscious, not only of his position as the victim of 
ironic existence, but also conscious of his consciousness. In other words, the 
Romantic artist is the victim of a double irony, a double objectification of his 
position. Romantic irony is the self -objectification of an already ironic 
consciousness, an irony on irony - an artistic response through which the Romantic 
artist seeks to transcend the fundamental irony of existence. 
34 Schlegel (1957) p. 91 
35 Ibid. 
36 Schlegel (1991) Critical (Lyceum) fragment 108, p. 13 
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This difference is particularly important in relation to the quartet movements 
analysed here. The relationship between the types of irony is reflected in the 
manner in which paradox features so prominently in Schlegel's writing. Beethoven's 
proximity to Schlegel and the Romantics, and the connections between them, means 
that his work may be considered in terms of both of these related types of irony. 
Indeed, both types may be seen in these late works: whilst the Op. 132 quartet 
produces Romantic irony proper, the fundamental structures of the Cavatina and the 
Grosse Fuge from Op. 130 are simply paradoxical. These later movements lack the 
extra level of objectification - the continual parabasis - that occurs in Romantic 
irony. Rather, their structures simply present incongruous juxtapositions of 
individual elements, each of which is internally congruent. These movements will be 
considered in terms of paradox: the paradoxical structures of these movements will 
be correlated to the philosophical viewpoint of general, existential irony seen above. 
In other words, they will be considered as an expression of the fundamental, ironic 
paradox of existence. 
In order to develop this viewpoint, however, two important areas need to be 
examined, before the final analysis of the Grosse Fuge. The first of these is the 
manner in which paradox may be seen to occur in musical discourse; the second is 
the manner in which the process of objectification can be seen to function in both 
philosophical and discursive forms of general, existential irony. 
Incongruity, Contrariety and Paradox 
Considering ironic, existential paradox as a subject of musical discourse appears 
problematic. Whereas verbal discourses may express general irony in non -ironic 
forms, such as the simple statement of the philosophical viewpoint that "life is 
paradoxical" (which produces only a single semantic level), musical discourse cannot 
make such statements. Rather, it must actually present a paradox, which can then be 
correlated with the paradox of existence; music, in other words, must employ an 
ironic technique - must actually be ironic - to express the viewpoint of general irony. 
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Prerequisite to such correlations, however, is the understanding that the fundamental 
ironic paradox of existence may be conceived of as a structure of manifest 
oppositions or contrarieties. This idea has important consequences: understanding 
general irony as a structure allows a correlation to discursive structures that produce 
paradox. In particular, as Sheinberg demonstrates, examples of irony in musical 
discourse arise because of such structural correlations - where musical structures 
incorporate incongruous elements this paradoxical structure may be directly 
correlated to the structure of irony.37 It is therefore important to consider the manner 
in which such a paradoxical structure might arise. 
As briefly suggested above, the balanced juxtaposition of incongruous elements 
within Beethoven's Cavatina (and, as will be seen, the Grosse Fuge) may be 
considered in terms of paradox. The basis of this viewpoint may be seen within 
Kerman's analysis of the first movement of Op. 130, which relates the extreme 
juxtapositions within this movement to paradox: 
The piece celebrates dissociation, forced by the play - or rather the war - of contrast .. . 
Beethoven's central concern for contrast ... here thrusts toward the breaking point; 
once the fragmented imagination had assumed control in the opening movement, 
paradox and indirection were destined to stay with the piece to the end.38 
Kinderman is more assertive, arguing that the first movement of this quartet carries 
binary oppositions "into the realm of paradox ... in Op. 130 they seem to be pursued 
for their own sake to create a condition of paradox ".39 Moreover, the composite 
theme in the coda, constructed from the two opposing themes is Beethoven's 
"supreme exercise in paradox ".40 Hatten considers, on a more general level, that 
such juxtapositions of contradictory or previously unrelated types signal shifts in 
discursive level, and that this shifting of level creates Romantic irony.41 Finally, 
37 Sheinberg (2000) p. 16/17 
38 Kerman (1967) p. 320 
39 Kinderman (1995) Beethoven p. 299 
40 Ibid. p. 300 
41 Hatten (1994) p. 170, 174. Note, however, as considered above this process is more accurately 
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Sheinberg also highlights the correlation between such juxtapositions and paradox. 
In particular, she considers that "musical juxtapositions of apparently irreconcilable 
incongruities would convey [existential] irony. More often than not they would 
appear simultaneously or with very short-span alternations between two or more 
musical topics ".42 She adds that such instances of existential irony require "an 
almost perfect balance "43 between the incongruous elements in order to succeed. 
The implication that may be drawn from all of these writers is that the balanced 
juxtaposition of incongruous elements may be considered to produce a musical 
correlative of paradox. Crucially, such cases would also form correlatives or 
analogues of existential irony. This form of irony is itself defined, particularly 
within Schlegel's writing, in terms of paradox - existence is considered essentially as 
an infinite paradox of contradictory "actualities ". Thus paradoxical structures may 
therefore be considered as expressing the same fundamental irony, as correlatives 
expressions of an existential paradox. 
This definition of paradox, however, is problematic: the combination of contrasting, 
even contradictory semantic elements occurs prominently within innumerable 
musical discourses, particularly sonata forms. This poses the question of whether 
simply presenting a structure which comprises contradictory elements within a larger 
meta - structure is enough to produce a paradox. If so then, as a result, such structures 
may be considered correlatives of existential irony; sonata form, indeed virtually all 
music could therefore, from a certain point of view, be considered ironic. 
Consequently, paradox, and, by extension, cases of existential irony would become 
virtually meaningless as a subject of musical discourse. 
understood as the Muecke's "proto" Romantic irony; it is not fully -developed Romantic irony in 
Schlegel's sense of the term (see Muecke (1969) p. 164/5). 
42 Sheinberg (2000) p. 62 She adds, moreover, that music that displays "juxtapositions of more then 
one stylistic or topical context, none of which may be regarded as `governing "' may be regarded as 
conveying irony (ibid. p. 64). 
43 ibid. 
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This interpretation, though, arises because of an emphasis on the relationship of 
contrariety between the elements of an ironic structure. In other words, sonata form 
is a correlative of paradox only if one considers that in both the elements are 
contrasting or even contradictory, and yet co -exist within a greater meta -structure. 
Irony, however, arises from incongruity, rather than simply from contrast; this 
difference between incongruity and contrast allows the separation of music's normal 
contrasts from cases of musical paradox. 
Hatten's analysis of musical metaphor and irony through musical troping is 
significant in this regard. He agues that troping - the bringing together of different 
correlations to produce, by synthesis, a third meaning - requires the contradiction of 
"stylistic expectation ", which must occur within the same "functional location ".44 
For example, the use of a closural articulation as an opening produces a contradiction 
within the functional location of the beginning, which must be accounted for on a 
higher level of the discourse. Crucially, "without a functional location or process to 
enclose the two terms or to set up a certain stylistic expectation, one could not claim 
the existence of contradiction. Instead the "difference" would simply register as 
contrast ".45 
Although Hatten's definition of irony is, as indicated above, somewhat 
problematic,46 his comments on contradiction indicate that incongruity involves 
more than simple contrast. If Hatten's criteria of functional location and stylistic 
44 Hatten (1994) p. 169 
45 ibid. 
46 For example, Hatten's insistence upon contradiction within one "functional location" means that 
his definition cannot account for instances of irony such as the juxtapositions of tragic and comic 
scenes that A.W. Schlegel identified in Shakespeare. Such juxtapositions do not occur within the 
same functional location, and therefore would not, according to Hatten's definition be considered 
ironic. Moreover, the fact that Hatten deals with both irony and metaphor in essentially the same way 
- as tropes arising from juxtapositions of contradictory elements - means that, in practice, the 
distinction between them is not always clear. He considers that this difference resides in that, whilst 
in metaphor the elements of the trope do not negate, irony always involves negation and reversal (This 
clearly minors Booth's discussion of the same problem: Booth considers that states that the process of 
metaphor, in contrast to irony is "not usually one of repudiation or reversal but of exploration or 
extension ... The essential process ... is addition or multiplication, not subtraction" (Booth (1974) p. 
23).) He does not, however, demonstrate how negation is to be differentiated from contradiction, and 
this weakens his consideration of irony. 
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expectation may be subsumed under the term context, then incongruity, in 
comparison to contrast and contrariety, may be seen to be based not solely in logic 
(or even perceptual logic), but rather in context. Although all incongruity involves 
contrast, incongruity is not defined by the content of an opposition, but by the 
context in which this opposition occurs. Incongruity is not simply contrast - it is 
contrast which violates or contradicts contextual or stylistic norms. For example, 
within sonata form one expects that contrast, and even, in some cases, the most 
extreme of contradictions will occur, and on some level be reconciled into a greater 
whole. Therefore, such contrasts are not considered incongruous: they are 
stylistically and contextually expected. As such, there is no paradox, and 
consequently a correlation to irony is untenable. 
Paradox can only occur in structures that present incongruous elements. However, it 
is vital to recognise that these incongruous elements must be completely internally 
congruent, in order that they constitute discrete contexts. If any of the elements were 
to contain incongruities, then these incongruities would tend to produce, within the 
individual elements, the effect of parody or satire, and would introduce a parabasis 
effect. In this case the resulting structure - internally incongruent elements in 
juxtaposition - would correlate to the multi -levelled structure of Romantic irony, 
rather than to the simple paradox of general existential irony. 
The Cavatina presents a balanced juxtaposition of incongruous elements, each of 
which is internally congruent i.e. incongruously juxtaposed contexts. The 
interruption of one stylistic context and sudden juxtaposition with another 
contravenes the stylistic norms - the context - of the elements. This violation of the 
stylistic context, according to the definition given, produces incongruity, rather than 
simple contrast. This results in co- existent incongruous elements; in other words, 
this incongruity produces the type of paradox defined above. Crucially, the 
correlation between such paradoxical structures and existential irony means that, in 
this movement this type of irony is treated not simply as a subject of the discourse, 
but rather as the substance of the discourse, the message of its meta -structure. 
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Indeed Beethoven uses the incongruous structure of this movement to force the 
perception of paradox upon the listener. This occurs largely through the use of 
extremes: the Cavatina is the most lyrical movement of the entire quartet; indeed 
within the context of the earlier movements it sounds strikingly emotive. The 
beklemmt section which opposes it is, however, even more intense. Indeed, with this 
contrasting section Beethoven takes the process of juxtaposition one step further - 
the beklemmt section is not only juxtaposed with the preceding Cavatina material, 
rather, it interrupts it. The incongruity of this juxtaposition - the violation of the 
Cavatina - foregrounds the contrast between the sections: the interruption forces the 
contradictory elements into confrontation, and forces the perception of this conflict 
upon the listener. The `solution' of this confrontation, however, is paradoxical. The 
circular process of the movement creates a relationship between the elements, 
producing an impossible relationship of both contrariety and complementation. 
Beethoven's Cavatina thus, in A.W. Schlegel's terms "shows both sides of the 
medal "47 - it expresses an ironic existential paradox of incongruous, antithetical 
viewpoints. 
As will be seen, the Grosse Fuge goes still further. In this movement Beethoven 
accumulates the type of extreme juxtapositions seen in the Cavatina, amplifying the 
foregrounding of incongruity and paradox to breaking point. The very nature of the 
music in this movement, and the force of the juxtapositions between elements are so 
extreme that they cannot be reconciled. This overwhelming presentation of paradox 
may be taken as an expression of general existential irony - this movement forcefully 
objectifies all of the incongruous, juxtaposed elements within its paradoxical 
structure. 
* 
47 Schlegel, A. W. (1808) p. 369 
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Paradox, Satire and Objectification 
Before analysing the paradoxical structure of the Grosse Fuge, however, it is 
important to briefly consider the manner in which the process of objectification 
functions in cases of existential irony. Muecke, Booth48 and Sheinberg all 
differentiate general irony from satire; Sheinberg, for example considers that 
There are two kinds of irony: satirical and non -satirical. Satirical irony is attached to a 
given set of norms and values, and its final aim is to prefer only one of the incongruous 
elements of the message, i.e. to become a non -ironical message. Non -satirical irony, on 
the other hand, is more complicated. Often called `romantic irony' it actually 
encompasses three different types of irony.49 
Although the philosophical emphases of these three "non- satirical" types - Romantic 
irony and both "positive" and "negative" existential irony - are contradictory, 
nevertheless, all three originate from the same fundamental perception of existence 
as paradoxical. Crucially, Sheinberg considers existential irony does not produce the 
"preferencing" that occurs in "satirical" irony; rather, this type of non -satirical irony 
is a constant "balanced" state of paradox.5° 
However, throughout previous chapters the process of objectification was considered 
the basic criterion for irony. Such objectification will, by definition, produce 
"preferencing ": the "objectifying" viewpoint will always be preferred over the 
48 Booth uses the terms "stable" vs. "unstable" to differentiate forms such as satire and parody from 
existential or general types of irony. Nevertheless, the differentiation is clearly reflects the same 
underlying thought. 
49 Sheinberg (2000) p. 61 
50 This may be seen in her assertion that whilst "negative" irony requires an objectifying, ironising 
viewpoint, "positive" existential irony does not: 
"[Negative irony] assumes the existence of an ironist (i.e. of an `intention') who 
alienates himself from his surrounding reality, assuming a superior position from which 
he contemplates the absurdities of life ... [Positive] Existential irony, on the other 
hand, does not necessarily demand the alienation of the contemplating subject from 
reality, but accepts his own consciousness as being an integral part of this reality and 
accepts the fact that reality does not necessarily play by the rules of logic ". Ibid. p. 
44/45 
The lack of an alienated, ironising viewpoint in existential irony thus appears to preclude either 
preferencing or objectification. 
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"objectified" viewpoint. Therefore, if cases of existential irony (whether as 
discursive structure or philosophical world -view) are to be understood in terms of 
objectification, they must also be considered to produce preferencing. 
This may be approached through considering the relationship between the different 
types of irony, which may be seen in the following diagrams. If all forms of irony 
may be understood in terms of objectification it becomes possible to relate them all 
to one single structure of opposed incongruous elements: 
vs. 
The simplest case is found in satire where, in relation to the above diagram, the 
process of objectification occurs at the level of the actual opposition between the 
incongruous elements. In such cases one element of the incongruous structure - one 
"viewpoint" - is preferred over the other element. This preferencing confirms one of 
the "meanings" of the discourse, whilst negating the other: the preferred meaning 
becomes the "non- ironical message "51 of the discourse, whilst the rejected meaning 
is objectified, becoming the victim of the satire. 
The process of objectification in existential irony is less obvious. In the case of the 
philosophical aspect of this irony it arises primarily as an objectification of all "non - 
ironic" viewpoints or realities by the viewpoint that "existence is infinitely 
contradictory and ironic ". This process is fundamentally the same in all `types' of 
existential irony - "positive ", "negative" or "Romantic ": although there are 
differences in the philosophical basis of "positive" and "negative" existential irony 
this difference relates only to the manner in which existential paradoxes are 
perceived. "Negative" existential irony (the type attributed to Socrates) assumes a 
51 Ibid. 
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"truth" of which humanity is irrevocably ignorant. In contrast, in "positive" 
existential irony `reality' is considered to be inherently contradictory and 
paradoxical, rather than logical and systematic - there is no "truth ". Both types, 
however, share the fundamental perception of existence as paradoxical: from the 
"negative" viewpoint this paradox is understood as infinite negation, reducing 
everything to nothing, from the "positive" viewpoint it represents infinite assertion. 
In both cases, however, it is not simply the perception of existential paradoxes that 
entails objectification and irony: rather, objectification arises from the perception of 
this perception as irony. It arises, in other words, from a consciousness of the 
relationship between the self and this paradoxical existence -a consciousness of the 
irony of my own situation. The irony of "negative" existential irony arises from the 
consciousness of the ironic, paradoxical position of the self - the consciousness of 
one's own "ignorance "; in "positive" existential irony it arises not simply from the 
perception and acceptance of existential paradoxes, but rather from the consciousness 
of the ironic position of the self within this paradox. In both cases this process is 
effectively one of self -objectification: the fact that I am aware of the irony in my 
situation, indeed that I allow myself to accept it, to participate in it, and even to be, as 
Muecke writes, the victim of an impossible situation,52 places me in exactly the same 
position as Socrates: my consciousness self -objectifies. Despite differences in 
philosophical viewpoint the perception of oneself as the victim of irony is the same - 
the process of self -objectification forms the essential basis of the irony. From this 
very specific viewpoint then everything, including the self, is the victim of an 
existential irony: "general" irony encompasses both positive and negative existential 
irony, as the self -objectification of a finite viewpoint within a paradoxical `reality'. 
In cases of existential irony in discourse this objectification process manifests itself 
somewhat differently. Where there is a simple presentation of paradox -a balanced 
juxtaposition of incongruous contexts - objectification does not occur between the 
elements of the structure, as in the case of satire. Rather, there are actually two 
52 Muecke (1969) p. 120 
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levels of incongruity operative, the objectification process occurring on the second 
level of the discourse. The function of this second, objectifying level may be seen in 
the following exquisite example - the first two lines of New Corn, by the Chinese 
poet T'ao Ch'ien: 
Swiftly the years, beyond recall. 
Solemn the stillness of this spring morning.53 
This is an extreme example of a discourse constructed from two complete but 
opposed semantic structures. As Empson observes, it comprises two opposed "time - 
scales ",54 which are essentially contrasting semantic levels, neither of which is 
preferred; both are equally valid, their simultaneous existence producing a 
paradoxical structure of opposition. 
The opposition between the two contradictory elements of this example - the 
"movement" of time in the first sentence versus its "stasis" in the second - form a 
first level of incongruity. However, the perfect balance between these elements 
precludes either objectification or preferencing in this discursive level. These occur, 
rather, within a second level of incongruity, which arises between both of the 
individual elements and the greater meta -structure of which they are part. Each 
element of the structure individually implies a state of "non- paradox" - each 
represents a single viewpoint from "within" which time is either moving or static. 
However, the incongruous juxtaposition of these discrete, opposing elements 
produces a meta -structure that is paradoxical. This generates an opposition between 
the respective "non- paradoxical" viewpoints of the individual elements and the 
paradox produced by their simultaneous co- existence. Thus although there is no 
objectification between the elements, the incongruity of their juxtaposition results in 
the objectification of the "non- paradoxical" actuality of both of the individual 
53 Waley, Arthur (1962) 170 Chinese Poems p. 60 
54 In his analysis Empson considers the words `swift' and `still' to be ambiguous because "though 
each is meant to be referred to one particular time -scale...between them they put two time -scales into 
the reader's mind in a single act of apprehension" (Empson, William (1956) Seven Types of Ambiguity 
p. 24). As will be considered in the final chapter of this thesis, however, this poem is actually an 
example of a paradoxical structure, rather than ambiguity. 
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elements by the paradoxical meta -structure: in other words, the apparent "realities" 
of both of the individual elements are actually seen to be "artificial ". 
Crucially, this objectification of both elements of the paradoxical structure may be 
understood as a preferencing of paradox over non -paradox. The paradoxical 
structure of the poem correlates to the "superior" viewpoint that "life is paradoxical ". 
This viewpoint objectifies the individual elements of the paradoxical structure, which 
represent the view that "life is not paradoxical ", by opposing them within a greater 
paradoxical structure. This paradoxical presentation, in other words, suggests the 
viewpoint of an ironic consciousness that created the juxtaposition; in effect it 
implies the presence of an ironic author. Such cases thus do not simply present a 
paradox, rather their very existence posits an objectifying, ironic viewpoint. 
Discursive paradoxes such as these may therefore be understood as representing the 
viewpoint of existential irony. The simple presentation of a paradoxical structure 
produces the preferencing of one ironic message over other non -ironic messages: the 
"meta- message" of these structures is paradoxical - such structures `mean' 
"Paradox ". 
This process is represented in the following diagram. The two levels of incongruity 
occur between the elements of the structure (A vs. B), and between the meta - 
structure and these individual elements (i.e. A and B (paradox) vs. A or B (non- 
paradox)). Objectification occurs, as it were, in a "downwards" direction between 
the upper and lower levels, rather than between the opposed elements of the lower 
level. The "actuality" represented by the equally- balanced elements of the 
opposition is objectified by the paradox of their simultaneous co- existence within the 
meta structure. 
A B A and B (paradox) 
vs. 
A vs. B A or B (non -paradox) 
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All cases of general, existential irony will engender the preferencing seen in this 
process: each forces exactly the same confrontation of paradox and non -paradox as 
that seen in the poem. Regardless of whether existential paradoxes are considered as 
negation or assertion, existential irony is fundamentally a preferencing of the 
viewpoint of existence as paradox over the individual, "non- paradoxical" elements of 
which it is comprised. This understanding may be seen within Muecke's comments 
on general irony. He states that this ironic viewpoint 
may be quite wrong. It is, however, accepted as reality by a great many modern writers, 
and that is a sufficient basis for irony: the ironist needs only to be convinced that his 
view of reality is valid and another contradictory view is not. In this case the contrary 
view is the conviction that `God's in his heaven - All's right with the world!' or at least 
an ineradicable feeling that the world really ought to make sense, that it ought to be 
organised according to the principles of reason and justice, that death is not really the 
end, that we do have freewill, that the rights of society and the individual are 
reconcilable, that man is not a biological dead -end, that life is not a chemical accident. 
One has also to add that General Irony is an irony of a rather special kind, in that the 
ironic observer is also among the victims of irony along with the rest of mankind.55 
Finally, it is important to note that Romantic irony shares the same basic objectifying 
structure as that seen in satire. As with existential irony, however, there is an 
additional level of incongruity: here, the objectification of viewpoints is "upwards" 
between the individual elements and the meta -structure; it is an objectification of the 
external, god -like viewpoint by our own, limited viewpoint. Through the first level 
of irony - the use of techniques of parabasis - the ironist momentarily sets himself, 
his system, above this external, infinite viewpoint. This creates a second level of 
irony, which produces a third and then a fourth: there is, in other words, an infinite 
chain from the position of the object of irony - the objectified - to that of the 
perpetrator of it - the objectifier: 
CM. 
A vs. B 
A vs. B 
A 
55 Muecke (1970) p. 68/69 
vs. B etc. 
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Therefore, although the process of objectification occurs on different levels in each 
of the various "strains" of irony, nevertheless, each may be derived from the same 
structure. Every irony involves an opposition of co- existent incongruous elements, 
which produces objectification and preferencing - the different `species' of irony are 
generated simply according to the level upon which this fundamental objectification 
occurs. Every irony, in other words, has a "victim ", even if, as in Romantic irony or 
general "existential" irony, the victim is also the ironist. 
* 
The Grosse Fuge, Op. 133 
Whilst the Cavatina of Op. 130 may be considered to be an exquisite example of 
general existential irony, it is far outweighed by the movement that originally 
followed it - the Grosse Fuge, one of the pinnacles of Beethoven's output. 
Significantly, the structure of this work correlates with general irony in the same 
manner as the Cavatina: it presents a paradox of juxtaposed, incongruous elements, 
large "fragments" that are simply hammered together in incongruous juxtaposition. 
Crucially, each of these elements is thematically related: this simultaneous 
opposition and relationship results in paradox. In contrast to the quartet Op. 132 
however, each of the subsections of this movement is internally congruent, 
possessing no incongruous elements. Rather, the juxtaposition of sections produces a 
structural incongruity that correlates with existential irony. Indeed, this work will be 
seen to possess several levels, not only of irony, but also of ambiguity. 
The incongruous structure that extends across the entire movement may be seen in 
microcosm in the opening Overtura. Here almost all the incongruities that will 
inform the structure of the movement occur in more extreme juxtaposition than 
occurs subsequently. Consequently, it is here that the paradox of the movement - the 
existential irony - is expressed most clearly. Kerman states the case for considering 
the Overtura as incongruent most succinctly: "One primary fact is being set forth 
here: the paradox that four themes, utterly incongruous in feeling, can be made of the 
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same note set ".56 The fundamental paradox of the movement is that although the 
subsections of the Overtura are incongruous, nevertheless they function as versions 
of the same "main" theme. The Overtura thus contains, in embryo, the irony of the 
Grosse Fuge: many incongruous, opposed elements are paradoxically shown to be 
part of the same structure. 
It is important to consider that the incongruity of the Overtura does not occur simply 
as a result of the contrast between the sections, but rather from the manner in which 
they are juxtaposed. The rhythmic diminution of the opening gesture that occurs in 
bars 11 - 16, for example, sounds like a development of those bars. Similarly, the 
Meno Mosso (bar 17) occurs as a simple contrast: a process that is stylistically 
expected, particularly in slow introductions. However, by the time that the dual 
themes of the first fugue are reached (bar 31) they occur as the fifth contrasting 
section and thematic transformation in only 30 bars. 
Thus whilst contrast is a stylistic element of many introductions, the extent of the 
sudden juxtapositions in these bars is stylistically incongruous. The sections of the 
Overtura do not occur as transformations of the theme - the transformation of themes 
is usually a matter of process - but rather as contrasting, incongruous versions of it. 
The sudden juxtapositions of different versions of the same theme produce the 
paradox that Kerman identifies. 
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However, I would suggest that the paradox of the Overtura, and the correlation with 
irony that results, are evaluated as such only retrospectively, with the context of the 
whole movement behind them. As will be seen, the juxtapositions of bars 650 to 670 
recall the process of the Overtura, and it is only with this recapitulation that the full 
extent of the paradox of the opening bars is revealed. Although the elements of the 
Overtura present contrasting versions of the same theme, and although this does 
create incongruity, the process of the Overtura must be evaluated, not singularly, but 
rather as part of the larger structure of the movement. 
Indeed, on first hearing the Overtura is more likely to produce ambiguity than 
paradox. As will be seen in the final chapter of this work, ambiguity is, to a greater 
or lesser extent, involved in the opening of every work as part of the normal 
unfolding of discourse. Such ambiguity occurs largely because of the expectation of 
continuation that occurs at the beginning of every movement; simply put, there are 
always multiple possibilities for how the work will proceed. Since it occurs at the 
beginning of the movement the Overtura produces ambiguity as to the manner in 
which the work is to continue. 
This ambiguity is seen clearest at the fermata in bar 30. By this point in the structure 
several subsections have been presented, each of which can be heard as a separate 
theme, capable of sustaining development. Significantly, all of the themes are 
clearly related to a single thematic nucleus; each occurs as a version of a 
"fundamental theme ". In addition, these bars follow a circle of fifths from G to B 
flat; occurring at the opening of a movement this process means that there is no 
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stable tonal centre, but rather several potential tonalities. Similarly, the different 
metres of the fragments within the Overtura mean that there are several possible 
alternative metres presented. 
Thus at the fermata in bar 30 there are several potential courses that the work could 
take, several different thematic, harmonic and metrical options. Each of these forms 
a potential "outcome" of the introduction - the work could proceed by developing 
one of the previous themes, or indeed by introducing a new theme. Moreover, since 
each of the thematic fragments is presented more -or -less equally, at this stage none 
of them is a "preferred" option. This creates a structure of alternative potential 
outcomes similar to those identified as ambiguities in the final chapter of this work. 
Although the Overtura does produce a paradoxical structure, its ambiguity is equally 
important to the unfolding of the work. This opening section represents an 
embryonic form of the ironic structure of the whole movement, but its positioning at 
the beginning of the work produces a powerful ambiguity. To ignore this ambiguous 
function is to ignore an important function of the Overtura in relation to the 
movement: the subsequent structure of the whole movement is an unfolding of that 
of the opening. As Richard Kramer observes, "this opening music, menu -like, 
advertises the four main "subjects" of the music to follow . . . these four 
premonitions are ... hints at the music to follow ".57 
The manner in which this "unfolding" occurs, however, is crucial. Like the 
preceding Cavatina movement, the various sections of the Grosse Fuge (each of 
which develops from the Overtura) are incongruously juxtaposed. This results in a 
paradoxical structure of incongruously juxtaposed sections, each of which is derived 
from the same thematic nucleus -a structure that correlates with existential irony. 
* 
57 Kramer, Richard (1992) "Between Cavatina and Overture: Opus 130 and the Voices of Narrative ", 
in Lockwood, Lewis and Webster, James (eds.) Beethoven Forum, vol. 1. p. 172 
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Detailed examination of each section demonstrates the incongruity across the 
structure of the work. The B flat fugue (bar 30) appears to present a simple 
resolution of the ambiguity of the Overtura: its dual themes are established (for the 
moment) as the "preferred" version of the fundamental "theme" by around bar 34. 
The internal structure of this fugue, however, produces two different levels of irony. 
The first of these arises from the relationship between its two themes. Lam considers 
the combination of these themes to be "very unclassical ";58 the result of this 
combination is that the fugue "acquires from the interaction of macro- and micro - 
rhythms a controlled violence without parallel in music before the twentieth 
century".59 
Following Lam's observations it is possible to consider that an incongruous 
opposition occurs between the two themes on the level of rhythm, more specifically 
of meter. The rhythmic emphases of the two themes produce a metric contradiction: 
the dotted rhythm of the theme in the first violin strongly establishes the first and 
third beats of the bar; in contrast, the "motto" theme (Lam's term) in the viola is 
underscored by strong sf articulations, thereby emphasising the 2nd and 4th beats. 
The motto theme does not sound syncopated, rather as it progresses the heavy 
accents tend to subvert the rhythm of the contrasting theme, creating the effect of the 
main beat on beats 2 and 4. 
The contradictory meters of the two themes produce the effect of rhythmic 'clashes' 
of the type that occurs in bar 39, where the entry of the contrasting subject, 
emphasising the 1st and 3rd beats, sounds incongruous with the preceding bars, 
which have effectively accented beats 2 and 4. This effect is even more pronounced 
from bar 111: the "motto" theme appears on the second quaver of the bar, creating 
even stronger rhythmic clashes with the contrasting theme. Similar rhythmic 
transformations occur towards the end of the section: the transformation of the main 
58 Lam (1975) p. 109 
59 Ibid. 
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theme into triplet rhythm in bar 138, for example, produces a clashing cross -rhythm 
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The thematic structure of the B flat fugue therefore already contains incongruity: the 
two themes are experienced as two rhythmically contradictory structures. The 
rhythmic incongruity of the two themes may be considered as an indicator of irony - 
their opposition produces the simultaneous presence of incongruous elements - the 
structure of irony given in the previous chapter. 
Moreover, the incongruity of the two themes of this fugue is related to a second 
incongruity, a second level of irony arising from the opposition of this fugue to 
conventional procedures. As both Kerman and Chua observe, the harmonic structure 
and the process of the B flat fugue follow fugal conventions closely, indeed almost 
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too closely, not only in the exposition, but also throughout its course.60 This 
remarkably tight fugal construction thus relates this fugue to conventional procedure. 
However, whilst the underlying structure of the fugue may be entirely conventional, 
the effect of this structure is overwhelmingly unconventional. Throughout almost 
the entire fugue there is an unconventional emphasis on musical extremes: there is a 
constant forte dynamic, underscored by heavy sf accents producing a too -great 
emphasis; there are extremes of register and dissonance, particularly from bar 110, 
combined with wide leaps of both themes; there is an almost unbroken quaver pulse 
throughout which, together with the dotted rhythms of the contrasting theme a 
constant rhythmic momentum. In addition, the rhythmic incongruity that results 
from the combination of themes becomes increasingly extreme as the section 
proceeds, especially from bar 111 (see above, ex. 5.5). This rhythmic complexity is 
heightened by the dense texture that prevails - there is scarcely a bar that has less 
than three parts sounding. 
This combination of musical extremes and rhythmic incongruity is outside both the 
"norms" of conventional fugal procedures, and even the stylistic norms of the other 
late quartets. As such, the cumulative effect of the musical extremes in this fugue are 
thoroughly unconventional, a viewpoint that perhaps explains Stravinsky's 
description of the Grosse Fuge as "hardly birthmarked by its age ", an "absolutely 
contemporary piece of music that will be contemporary for ever ".61 More 
importantly, the unconventional effect of the accumulation of extremes within this 
fugue is actually disturbing and almost bewildering: Lam describes its effect as 
"controlled violence" and as "terrifying ";62 Kerman describes "harsh staggering 
accents ... rhythmic fury ... frantic diversions ";63 Radcliffe recalls that the section 
has been described as "`uncouth', `rugged' or `outlandish "'.64 The combination of 
60 See Kerman (1967) p. 279 and Chua (1995) p. 242 
61 Stravinsky, Igor and Craft, Robert (1982) Dialogues p. 124 
62 Lam (1975) p. 109/110 
63 Kerman (1967) p. 283 
64 Radcliffe (1965) p. 142 
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incongruous rhythmic elements, overly dense texture, extreme dissonance and 
chromaticism in this dysphoric fugue results in a systematic undermining of the 
stabilising elements of western music - harmony, rhythm and texture: the result is 
nothing short of musical chaos. 
The unconventional, chaotic effect of the fugue produces a subtle incongruity within 
the context of its conventional underlying structure. This incongruity occurs initially 
between the thoroughly conventional fugal structure and the unconventional effect it 
produces - an opposition of musical order and musical chaos. However, it also 
functions between the extrageneric "topical" associations of these elements: the 
underlying order of the conventional harmonic and contrapuntal structure of this 
fugue may be considered to represent the "reason" of the learned style; this is 
opposed by the connotations of musical chaos that the extreme, dysphoric character 
of the music evokes. This opposition and incongruity produces irony: the B flat 
fugue is paradoxically both conventional and unconventional, highly ordered and 
entirely chaotic. 
* 
A third incongruity occurs in relation to the B flat fugue: this incongruity arises as a 
result of the juxtaposition and extreme contrast of this fugue with the Meno mosso 
section that follows it. For example, the driving cross rhythms and metrical 
incongruity of the dual themes of the fugue are opposed to the rhythmic /metrical 
stability created by the simple meter and well -defined periodicity of the Meno 
mosso. Likewise, there is an extreme opposition of dynamics: the fugue was forte 
for such an extended period that the sudden pianissimo of the Meno mosso actually 
comes as something of a shock. Overall, the combination of slow tempo, major key, 
softer dynamic level and more lyrical melodic shaping in the Meno mosso is opposed 
to the loud, angular, dysphoric fugue. Crucially, this produces a significant 
opposition between topics: the more homophonic texture, and the lack of 
counterpoint in the Meno mosso are categorically "non- fugal" in nature, creating an 
opposition with the fugal, "learned style" topic of the preceding section. 
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Although these contrasts and oppositions are quite extreme, it is important to note 
that contrast alone is not enough to produce an incongruity - contrast is, after all, not 
unusual in Beethoven's music. Rather, the incongruity of these sections arises from 
the manner in which the transition between the sections is achieved: the sf G flat 
chord in bar 158 interrupts the progress of the fugue, whilst the fermata introduce, 
indeed force, a stasis that is completely incongruous with the context of its 
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overwhelming rhythmic momentum. This interruption of the fugue thus produces 
the effect, not simply of contrast, but rather of incongruity.65 
It is certainly possible to regard the incongruous juxtaposition of the fugue and Meno 
mosso sections in the same manner as those seen in Op. 132; i.e. as a correlative of 
Romantic irony, or a juxtaposition of "serious" and "comic" genres of the type 
discussed by A. W. Schlegel. However, two factors make the incongruities of this 
movement a correlative of general, existential irony, rather than Romantic irony. 
The first of these is the simplest, and probably the most significant. As was 
discussed in relation to the Overtura, there is a clear thematic relationship between 
the two sections - they are manifestations of the same thematic nucleus. However, 
the incongruous juxtaposition of these sections creates a paradoxical situation where 
different versions of the same theme are forced into an opposition: they are both the 
same and contrasting simultaneously. 
Secondly, like the Cavatina movement that originally preceded the Grosse Fuge, both 
of these incongruously juxtaposed sections are internally congruent. There is, in 
other words, no contravention of the conventions of these sections, no ironic 
manipulation of their conventions to produce parody or satire. Whilst it is relatively 
easy to demonstrate the congruence of the Meno mosso section - its texture, dynamic 
levels, tonality and thematic structure remain entirely consistent throughout - it 
would appear, in contrast, to be harder to demonstrate the congruence of the fugue: 
as has already been considered, it produces two levels of irony within itself. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that, although the fugue is harshly dissonant, 
extreme, chaotic, and even terrifying, it is entirely consistent throughout. In other 
words the work -specific conventions of the section are not contravened or ironically 
manipulated in the manner in which those within Op. 132 (particularly the dance 
movements) were. There is, in short no parabasis, no authorial intrusion within the 
65 Note that the fact that the Meno mosso section follows this fermata, in the same key, with the same 
reduction in dynamic etc establishes a semantic connection: the G flat chord is part of the Meno 
mosso; it is clearly the Meno mosso that interrupts the fugue. 
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structure of this first fugue. Rather, the irony that occurs within this fugue forms one 
its conventions. From its beginning both the incongruity that arises from the 
combination of themes and the incongruity between the fugal structure and its effect 
(the opposition of order and chaos) produce irony. Crucially, though, this irony is 
maintained consistently throughout the section - it therefore forms one of the 
conventions of the structure, part of the aesthetic of the first fugue. The significance 
of this is that, in Schlegel's terms, the irony present in the B flat fugue forms its 
"system ". In contrast to the Romantic irony of the Op. 132 quartet, here the irony 
does not intrude in a process of parabasis, rather it is present throughout as a 
convention; this first fugue expresses irony as a subject, through its structure. 
Thus the juxtaposition that occurs between the B flat fugue and the Meno mosso 
section occurs as an opposition of two incongruous musical structures, each of which 
is internally congruent. The irony therefore exists, as it were, in the spaces between 
the sections: the incongruous juxtaposition - the intrusion of the Meno mosso into 
the fugue - may therefore be understood as an objectification of the artifice of both 
of the incongruous elements. This creates a structural paradox that, as considered 
above, may be correlated with the paradoxes of general irony: it is an expression of 
existential irony. 
* 
The technique of the incongruous juxtaposition of internally congruent structures is 
repeated several more times throughout the structure of the Grosse Fuge. Each 
juxtaposition contributes to the ironic structure of the whole, producing a continual 
chain of ironic incongruities. The introduction of the "Allegro molto e con brio" 
section (bar 233), for example, produces an ironic juxtaposition of "serious" and 
"comic" topics;66 this dance section, like the two preceding sections is internally 
congruent, producing the same type of juxtaposition seen between the B flat fugue 
and the Meno mosso. The incongruity of this juxtaposition is again achieved through 
66 Although this section is not humorous, as such, nevertheless the "light- hearted" nature of this 
section is opposed to the serious character of both the Meno mosso and, in particular, the first fugue. 
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the transition between sections: the suddenness of the fortissimo chord, followed by 
the completely contrasting music of the Allegro molto produces an incongruous 
juxtaposition. As Kerman states, "the blatancy of its [the dance -like section] return to 
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The Allegro molto dance has barely been established, consisting of only 36 bars, 
before the rhythmic momentum is interrupted and halted altogether by the fortissimo 
A flat chord in bar 272. This sudden stasis is unexpected: rhythmically, it is 
incongruous with the prevailing dance topic; harmonically it rather cuts across the 
prevailing B flat tonality.68 This alone produces the effect of an interruption, but the 
extreme opposition that occurs between the soft, lyrical topic of the Allegro molto 
and the second fugue (in A flat) that follows heightens this incongruity. Kerman 
describes this fugue as "as acrid and furious and extensive as the B flat fugue, and as 
incessantly loud ":69 the opposition of this violent fugue to the preceding dance 
produces an incongruous juxtaposition as great as any in the work. 
The A flat fugue, like all of the other sections of the work, is internally congruent; 
this congruence, however, is like that of the first fugue - it actually contains an ironic 
structure. Into this fugue Beethoven introduces thematic processes and modulatory 
progressions that are more reminiscent of the development of a sonata than of fugal 
technique. After the exposition (bars 273 to 308) the harmonic course of the fugue, 
for example, comprises extended modulatory passages based on circle of fifths 
progressions: the first (bars 308 - 328) takes the theme from C to E flat, a process 
repeated in bars 350 - 366; in between there is another modulatory fifths passage 
based upon the trill figure from the end of the first statement of the theme in bar 10 
68 Although the A flat - diminished motion of the previous two chords does, to a certain extent, 
prepare the A flat chord one could not really term this a modulation. In the context, this therefore A 
flat occurs as an interruption of one tonality by another. 
69 Kerman (1967) p. 288/9 
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of the Overtura. This passage completes the circle of fifths begun in bar 308, 
proceeding from A flat back to C for the re -entry of the theme in bar 350. 
Throughout this fugue Beethoven treats the theme developmentally, fragmenting it, 
developing the separate elements and recombining them in new ways. From bar 377 
through to 400, for example, there is an extraordinary ascending passage constructed 
from a fragment of the opening of the theme in canonical entries between cello and 
viola. Over this the first violin plays trills, derived from the end of the theme, whilst 
the second violin adds a figure derived from a diminution of the opening three notes 
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Similarly, the second section of the fugue, in E flat (bars 414 - 452), takes the 
diminution of the theme as its subject, combining it with the second subject of the B 
flat fugue. Again, this section pursues a descending modulation process, until the 
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cadence gestures of bars 450 -453. The final section of the fugue, following these 
cadential gestures, combines the elements already developed with figures based on 
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This development and manipulation of the fugue subject, together with the 
modulatory harmonic processes, strongly suggests the type of sonata procedures seen 
in Beethoven's own development technique, rather than conventional fugal 
technique. This duality could be understood as an opposition of the fugal structure 
with a distinctly non -fugal technique; if so, then the A flat fugue, like the B flat 
fugue, contains an incongruity within its structure, an opposition of fugal and non - 
fugal conventions simultaneously. In both cases, however, the structural 
incongruities, whilst unconventional in stylistic terms, nevertheless form the 
conventions of the respective sections and are maintained consistently throughout. 
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Thus, if there is irony in the structure of this A flat fugue, it occurs as one of its 
conventions, rather than as an intrusive "authorial" manipulation. 
The introduction of non -fugal, developmental techniques in this fugue indicates an 
interesting issue with regard to this whole movement. Kerman considers that 
Beethoven's use of fugue in the late works in general may be attributed to a search 
for alternatives to sonata form.70 However, neither of the large fugal sections in this 
work are able to bear the unconventional processes they are subjected to. As Chua 
states, the fugal texture "is unable to assimilate the dynamic contrast and synthesis of 
sonata form . . . without the implicative power of development, there is only a 
fractured structure of contrasts ".71 Whereas sonata form can accommodate such 
contrasts stylistically, the oppositions and processes of this movement violate the 
`norms' of even the freest fugal technique. As such they are stylistically 
incongruous, and hence all the more striking. It may be, therefore, that Beethoven 
chose fugue for this finale precisely because it cannot sustain the extreme 
juxtapositions and oppositions of the movement: this incongruity foregrounds the 
oppositions within the movement in order to force the perception of paradox and 
irony upon the listener. 
* 
The A flat fugue, and the transformation of the Meno mosso section that follows 
introduce, via the cadential gestures, a closural signification for the first time in the 
entire movement. This closure is, however, problematic - it does not occur in the 
tonic key. This prompts two possible interpretations: these cadences could either be 
a Haydnesque misleading, an ironic manipulation of the expectations of the listener 
in the manner of the "Surprise" Symphony or, alternatively, they could simply 
gesture towards the closure of one section of the work - a pivotal structural moment. 
(This second possibility is supported by the fact that the tonal ambiguity of the 
70 Ibid. p. 273 
71 Chua (1995) p. 242 
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Overtura prevented any stable tonal centre being established at the beginning of the 
work.) 
Regardless of which way these cadences are interpreted, the closural signification 
that results produces an important effect, introducing an expectation of the 
impending end of the work. Moreover, from this point there begins a recurrence of 
previous material, in forms that are clearly transformations of their first occurrences. 
The return of the Meno mosso section, for example, involves a transposition to A 
flat, together with a substantial increase in dynamic level and the introduction of 
accented crotchet motion that produces a more homophonic texture. The effect of 
this transformation is to minimise the contrast between the Meno mosso and the A 
flat fugue. Thus whilst there is still an abrupt shift of topic between bars 492/493, 
the consistency of key and dynamics etc. makes this far less striking than the 
previous juxtapositions. In other words this new version of the Meno mosso has 
actually become to a large extent congruent with the fugue. 
Crucially, this process continues the implication of sonata procedures that have 
occurred earlier: the combination of thematic return and transformation, following 
the "closural" gestures in the A flat fugue produces a recapitulatory effect. 
Moreover, this process extends to subsequent contrasts between sections: like that 
between the fugue and the Meno mosso, subsequent contrasts no longer create 
incongruous juxtapositions. Rather, their incongruity has been negated because they 
have, to a certain extent, become an expected convention of the music. They are no 
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For example, within this context even the sudden tonal ambiguity of the passage 
from bar 511 to 530, which interrupts the continuity of the preceding sections, has 
the effect of a recapitulation: it mirrors the tonal ambiguity of the Overtura. 
Similarly, although the return of the Allegro dance in bar 532 might have been 
considered to represent the same incongruous juxtaposition between serious, quasi - 
rhetorical gestures and the lighter, "comic" style of the dance that occurred on the 
first appearance of this material, nevertheless the return of this dance is experienced 
as recapitulation. The extension of this dance, which was initially interrupted by the 
A flat fugue, produces an extended section in the tonic, underlining the 
recapitulatory, closural effect of the passage and removing the incongruity of the 
initial juxtaposition. 
Even the seeming interruption by the relative stasis of the thematic statement at bar 
609 does not produce incongruity. Rather, since the juxtaposition of contrasting 
sections has become a convention of the movement it functions in a recapitulatory 
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The final sections of the movement (from bar 656), however, restore the full force of 
the incongruities of the preceding structure, bringing them into even greater 
prominence. The passage from the end of the Allegro molto dance section through to 
the final, climactic statement of the theme has deep significance for the entire 
structure of the movement - it functions as a recapitulation of the Overtura section, 
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the climactic moment of several of the movement's most important processes. 
Kerman's comments on these bars are insightful: 
Beethoven is still stressing the paradox. The themes have all been pulled together - 
fantastically different as they can still be heard to be. They have provided material for an 
extraordinary, coherent structure - grotesque as they still sound in bare juxtaposition .. . 
At the end of the A flat fugue, thematic versions from earlier in the composition return to 
make a climactic recapitulation. But the way this is managed does not seem calculated to 
reconcile all the manifestations of the basic theme; it has the effect, once again, of 
stressing their paradoxical co- existence in the same universe.72 
This section, however, does not simply stress the paradox "once again" - rather it is 
the point of the greatest incongruity in the entire work. The two thematic fragments 
in bars 657 to 662 evoke, or more accurately, signify the whole of the sections that 
they were previously part of. These bars effectively establish semantic and thematic 
connections with these sections; one part of the section, when occurring in a different 
context, comes to signify the whole. Consequently the incongruous juxtaposition of 
sections seen throughout the whole movement is invoked in these few bars. 
Crucially, the fact that these fragments occur in an even more truncated form than the 
original Overtura forces the structure of the whole movement into an even more 
extreme juxtaposition than occurred throughout the movement. The result of this is a 
foregrounding of the process of incongruous juxtaposition, of the paradox of the 
entire movement. 
It is also at this point that the incongruity of the original Overtura is most clearly 
seen. With the context of the whole movement as it were "behind" it, the truncated 
recapitulation produces a re- evaluation of the Overtura. This re- evaluation 
underlines the incongruity and irony of the opening of the movement - it is at this 
point that the paradox and irony of the Overtura, which are expanded through the 
entire movement, is most clearly perceived. 
The final version of the theme, the Allegro molto e con brio section from bar 662 has 
a profound effect upon the structure of the movement. This version of the theme is 
72 Kerman (1967) p. 278/9 
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the most powerful in the work, forming a massive climactic statement that extends 
the theme beyond any of the previous versions. Moreover it seems to form, as it 
were, a "definitive" version, a summation of the thematic process of the entire 
movement. Considering this, the unfolding of the Grosse Fuge could be considered a 
reversal of conventional thematic and musical processes, proceeding from the 
fragmentation and development of the theme towards a single, unified statement. 
Ex. 5.13 Op. 133 
(Allegro molto e con brio) 
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Such an interpretation of this moment would suggest that this version of the theme is 
a goal or a terminus. Moreover, this end -point would finish the ongoing process of 
objectification that has occurred throughout the movement, with the final version of 
the theme emerging as, in some sense, an "authentic" version. It would, in other 
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words, constitute the objectification within the movement as a finite process by 
"preferring" this final version of the theme. 
This interpretation, however, is weakened in two ways. Firstly, the recapitulation of 
the Overtura seems to preclude the interpreting the paradoxes of this movement as 
"finite ". This recapitulation proceeds in reverse order: starting from the 
recapitulation of the theme of the B flat fugue the music progresses through the 
Meno mosso theme (which occurs before the double fugue themes in the original 
Overtura) towards a powerful unison theme. This reversal of the original order 
implies a certain circularity of structure, a thematic symmetry across the movement. 
As was seen in the Cavatina, the circular nature of this structure implies an infinite 
movement, a continuous chain of irony. 
Secondly, (and more importantly) this "infinite" motion is continued through the 
succession of rapid juxtapositions that follow this overwhelming, climactic "final" 
theme to the very end of the work. The climax is initially juxtaposed with elements 
from the light- hearted, "comic" dance sections (bar 680/681), an effect repeated by 
the juxtaposition of the pianissimo restatement of the theme in bar 689 with the 
cadential gestures of the dance section (bars 702 to 716). 
Ex. 5.14 Op. 133 
(Allegro molto e con brio) 
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As with the recurrence of the thematic fragments in bars 657 to 662, these "dance" 
elements signify the earlier sections of the work; significantly, their juxtaposition 
therefore produces the same type of serious - comic contrasts that occurs elsewhere 
in the movement.73 These juxtapositions continue the process of objectification that 
has been functioning throughout the entire work. In particular, the juxtaposition of 
the climactic theme with lighter "comic" elements creates an ironic incongruity 
similar to that seen, for example, between the powerful climactic final statement of 
the Heiliger Dankgesang and the comedic Alla Marcia of Op. 132. Here, as in the 
earlier example, this incongruous juxtaposition undermines the "climactic" effect of 
the final theme, revealing its inherent artifice: despite the dynamic and thematic 
power of this moment, the climax actually becomes objectified. Within this context 
even the final cadences sound somewhat inauthentic: they seem almost imposed 
upon the work, conventional devices of closure seem, like those of the coda of Op. 
95, to be incongruous within the context. 
73 As Nicholas Marston states, the recurrence of the dance section in these bars may be understood as 
"connotating a lighter, even humorous vein ". Marston, Nicholas (2000) -The Sense of an Ending ": 
Goal -Directedness in Beethoven's Music" in Stanley, Glenn (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Beethoven p. 97 
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The circularity of the structure, the final rapid juxtapositions (which continue the 
process of the movement through to its end) and the undermined ending imply that 
the paradox and objectification within this movement are not finite, ending with one 
"preferred" element, "meaning" or version of the theme. Rather, whilst the Cavatina 
expressed one simple, incongruous juxtaposition the Grosse Fuge may be understood 
as an expansion of this paradox on a massive scale. It produces (or implies) a 
circular, "infinite" structure of incongruously juxtaposed elements, each of which 
was seen to be internally congruent. This produces irony on two levels. Firstly, each 
of the subsections is objectified by the incongruity of the juxtapositions, an ongoing 
ironic objectification of the artifice of each of these sections. Secondly, the thematic 
relationship between the juxtaposed elements produces a fundamental paradox: the 
elements are incongruous, yet they all derive from the same thematic nucleus i.e. 
simultaneously the same and different, simultaneously art and artifice. 
From this viewpoint this "infinite" paradoxical structure may be understood to 
correlate to the perception of the paradox of existence that is seen within general, 
existential irony and that also forms the basis for Schlegel's philosophy of irony and 
"transcendental poetry ". As such, this movement, together with the Cavatina may be 
understood ultimately as manifestations of the "new mode" of irony that Kierkegaard 
identifies in Schlegel, Tieck and Solger: they are "subjectivity's subjectivity ", 
"reflection's reflection ", a continual, infinite paradox that mirrors the fundamental 
paradoxes of life and art. Together they may be understood, in short, as infinite, 
absolute paradoxes, powerful evocations of the paradox of general, existential irony. 
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Satire: the Replacement Finale 
"Naivety is, or is what appears to be ... Classical to the point of irony".1 
Friedrich Schlegel 
The assertion in the preceding chapters that the Op. 132 and 130/133 quartets can be 
understood in terms of paradox and Romantic irony allows a new interpretation of a 
perennial problem. The replacement of the original finale of the Op. 130 quartet - the 
Grosse Fuge - with a new Allegro finale, the last movement that Beethoven completed, 
is one of the most singular and curious events in the composer's biography. That this 
substitution was made at the behest of the publisher Artaria with, it would appear, 
relatively little resistance from Beethoven makes it even more astonishing: at no other 
time did Beethoven as a mature composer allow external pressures or opinion to direct 
the course of his composition. That he appeared to do so in this situation, with a work 
so staggering in its originality and scope as the Grosse Fuge, makes the event all the 
more significant. 
The uniqueness of this incident has meant that virtually everyone who has written about 
Beethoven has apparently been compelled to make some attempt to account for it. 
Indeed, the replacement of the Grosse Fuge with the alternate Allegro finale seems to 
produce a particular problem for commentators on the quartets. As Kerman points out, 
the viewpoint that one takes towards this singular event has a tendency to be coloured by 
which of the alternatives one considers to be the `best', or the `most fitting'.2 As will be 
seen, it also depends, to a great extent, upon the manner in which Beethoven is viewed, 
both as composer and as a human being. 
The viewpoint proposed here is that the replacement of the Grosse Fuge is a 
fundamentally ironic act: far from being an accession to public taste or an admission of 
1 Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 51 p. 24 
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shortcomings in the original Fugue, the replacement finale is satirical in function. As 
will be seen, this movement is constructed in an exaggeratedly conventional manner, 
and is comprised largely of musical banalities and clichés. This results in an 
objectification of musical conventionality that will be considered to reflect a satirical 
comment upon the limited, conventional viewpoint of those who could not accept the 
original finale. From this viewpoint it is tempting to liken Beethoven's irony to that of 
Socrates: in this movement the wisest man of his age satirically objectifies, through his 
"ignorance ", the prejudices and folly of his contemporaries. 
Moreover, this interpretation of the replacement finale places it within the context of the 
original quartet. As some commentators have noted, after Op. 130 Beethoven appears to 
have moved on to other concerns: Kerman, for example, relates the Op. 131 quartet to 
the notion of "integration ", setting up an antithesis between this work and Op. 130. 
More significantly, for the current work, Daverio considers the C# minor quartet in 
relation to Friedrich Schlegel's conception of the fragment.3 Therefore, considering this 
replacement in terms of satire represents a return to the concerns of the earlier works: 
Beethoven returns to irony, replacing one ironic finale with another. 
Certain elements of this viewpoint may be found in Ivan Mahaim's Beethoven: 
Naissance et Renaissance des Derniers Quatuors. Mahaim suggests that financial 
pressures and the attempted suicide of Beethoven's nephew effectively broke the 
composer: 
Que lui importait maintenant, quelques mois avant de disparaître, de séparer la Grande 
Fugue de son XIIIe quatuor et de lui substiteur un autre finale? - L'avenir lui paraissaint si 
lointain et si incertain qui la verrait reviver à la salle de concert, et reprendre sa place 
authentique. Le présent, pour lui, c'était la «réconciliation» avant le départ définitif de 
«son fils» chéri ... séparation qui signifiait la faillité de ses aspirations affectives les plus 
impérieuses ... on leur composera le finale -postiche, à «ces boeufs», à «ces ânes». 
(What did it matter to him now, a few months before his death, if he separated the Great 
2 Kerman (1967) p. 368 
3 Daverio (2000) p. 159/160 
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Fugue from his quartet and substituted another finale? The future, which would see the 
Fugue live again in the concert hall, and resume its authentic place, seemed to him distant 
and uncertain. The present, for him, was the period of "reconciliation" before the final 
departure of his dear "son" ... the separation which signified the bankruptcy of his most 
imperious emotional aspirations ... He would compose a finale- pastiche for them, those 
"cattle ", those "asses ".)4 
Mahaim does not, however, expand upon the "pastiche" element that he perceives in the 
replacement finale: instead, he describes the character of the movement in comedic 
terms such as "un petit poney" or "le clown ".5 Beyond this, he refers to the movement 
as "all exuberance, carelessness, lightness, a fair -ground humour or a pastoral 
tenderness "6 and considers that it returns to a style reminiscent of either Beethoven's 
own earliest compositions, or of his predecessors.7 
It would seem, however, that Mahaim uses the term "pastiche" to indicate a `mask' or a 
`persona' adopted by Beethoven: 
Lorsqu'il a composé la Grande Fugue, il était dans toute le force de son imagination 
créatrice, édifiant le gigantesque monument de la Trilogie. La Grande Fugue après la 
Cavatine, c'est une victoire, et c'est bien l'impression qu'elle fait lorsqu'on est familiarisé 
avec tous ses contrastes, l'ampleur de son architecture, la permanence du grand thème 
symbolique ... Le Rondo ce n'est pas une victoire, mais ce n'est pas une vraie détente; 
c'est l'oeuvre d'un Beethoven résigné, malheureux ... Le Rondo caché, sous éphémère 
déguisement, les désespérances de son Coeur meurtri, de son courage abattu, de sa 
résignation; il cache les premiers signes de sa dernière maladie: 
Je suis las, la joie m'a quitté pour longtemps. Tous mes espoirs s'effondrent. 
(When he composed the Great Fugue, he was building the gigantic monument of the 
Trilogy in the full force of his creative imagination. The Great Fugue, coming after the 
Cavatina, is a victory, and that is the impression that it makes when one becomes familiar 
with all its contrasts, the width of its architecture, the permanence of the broad symbolic 
theme. The Rondo is not a victory, but it is not a true relaxation; it is the work of a 
resigned, unhappy Beethoven ... The Rondo hides, under an ephemeral disguise, the 
despairs of his bruised Heart, his demoralised courage, his resignation; it hides the first 
signs of his last disease: 
4 Mahaim, Ivan (1964) Beethoven: Naissance et Renaissance des Derniers Quatuors p. 427, trans. 
Kerman (1967) p. 369 
5 Mahaim (1964) p. 430 
6 Ibid. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are the present authors. 
7 Ibid. 
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I am tired, the joy left me for a long time. All my hopes break down.)8 
This conception of the finale comes close to that expressed here. The process of 
dissembling that is inherent in the adoption of a mask or persona is, as Muecke observes, 
an intrinsic element of irony, forming part of the original meaning of the Greek 
eironeia9. In such a process the ironist pretends to be other than he is in order to win an 
advantage over an adversary. Therefore, in considering this movement as such a 
"disguise" Mahaim invokes this quality of deception in his designation of pastiche. 
However, his attribution of "heroism" to the Rondo seems to preclude the ironic element 
implied by the use of the term `pastiche': 
Miracle d'heroïsme de provoquer la joie et la gaieté quand l'âme est noyée de chagrin, 
prête à défaillir. C'était le miracle de Mozart, et c'est celui du Rondo de Beethoven. (To 
force joy and cheerfulness when the soul is drowning sorrow, ready to faint is a miracle of 
heroism. It was the miracle of Mozart, and it is that of the Rondo of Beethoven.)10 
The inherent artifice of a "pastiche" or a mask would undermine genuine heroism: 
Beethoven's response is not a genuine heroism, or a genuine joy, but an artistic device 
adopted for purely satirical purposes. Mahaim's use of the term "pastiche" therefore 
seems to relate simply to the difference between Beethoven's personal circumstances at 
the time of the composition of the Rondo and the actual character of the piece. 
In addition, Mahaim views the replacement Rondo finale as incongruous with the rest of 
the Op. 130 quartet: he considers the replacement of the Fugue a "mutilation "11 of the 
Thirteenth quartet, an act of despair prompted by illness and a largely imaginary 
poverty. As such, the "disguise" adopted by Beethoven in the Rondo is purely for the 
purpose of self -preservation, in order to hide his own pain, grief, and disappointment. 
Crucially however, Mahaim never actually explains how this finale manages to mask 
8 Ibid. p. 432/433 
9 Muecke (1970) p. 14/15 
10 Mahaim (1964) p. 430 
11 Ibid. 
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Beethoven's supposed sadness, nor does he demonstrate such a function within the 
movement itself. 
The viewpoint proposed here differs somewhat from Mahaim's. He demonstrates 
incongruities between both this movement and the rest of the quartet, and between the 
character of the Rondo and Beethoven's frame of mind at the time of its composition. In 
the present work the incongruities that create the satirical purport of this movement will 
be seen to occur within the structure of the movement. 
Moreover, the replacement finale is not viewed as an act of passive acceptance or 
despair. Rather, it will be considered as simultaneously a satirical broadside at those 
who would not, or could not accept the original version of the Op. 130 quartet and an 
eloquent defence of the Grosse Fuge. Although there is, due to its satirical nature, an 
element of the "disguise" common to all forms of satire, this persona is adopted not as a 
defensive mechanism but as a form of ironic attack. Moreover this persona is not a 
simple "mocking" of stylised elements, as is, to an extent, implied by the designation of 
"pastiche ": it is an ironic comment on musical conventionality and banality that 
objectifies not only musical anachronisms but also the conservative tastes of 
Beethoven's critics. 
* 
Historical and Critical context 
Critical attempts to explain the replacement of the Grosse Fuge normally involve an 
account of the external conditions in which the replacement of the finale occurred. The 
first of these is the financial compensation that the replacement would garner: 
Beethoven was to receive a fee from Artaria for the replacement, as well as for the 
separate publication of the Fugue. The financial recompense for the work is certainly a 
plausible motivation for the replacement: the figures involved were not inconsiderable - 
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they would have provided for his living expenses for a month. However, this possibility 
is usually rejected outright: the sanctity of Beethoven's reputation seems to preclude the 
possibility that the alteration of the finale was undertaken purely for financial gain.12 
This explanation, however, is perhaps more plausible than most commentators would 
like to believe. Although Beethoven was renowned for his artistic integrity, the 
romanticised view of him as unconcerned with worldly matters simply doesn't hold: he 
made a living from his art, and specifically from publishing his works. Indeed, as may 
be seen from his correspondence, Beethoven was financially astute; at times his 
negotiations with his publishers border on the Machiavellian. His supposed poverty and 
financial pressures may therefore have lent weight to the suggestion of the replacement. 
This is all the more likely given the exceptional personal circumstances in which 
Beethoven found himself immediately prior to the composition of the Allegro 
movement. Once again, his health was deteriorating, undoubtedly affecting his 
emotional well- being. In addition, he was profoundly affected by the attempted suicide 
of his nephew Karl, as attested to by his correspondence with his close friend Karl 
Holz.13 Perhaps due to the struggle for custody that Beethoven had with Karl's mother, 
this relationship was, at least for the composer, a significant one: Karl embodied 
Beethoven's paternal hopes and aspirations, and he invested a great deal of emotional 
energy in the relationship. It has therefore been suggested that these two factors were 
involved in Beethoven's compliance with the publisher Artaria: he was so emotionally 
drained that he had little energy left to refuse, or was more easily swayed than normal. 
However, as Kerman insists, against all of these circumstantial factors must be placed 
the huge artistic self -consciousness and integrity of Beethoven, as both composer and 
man. He, along with many other commentators, arrives at the conclusion that 
12 See, for example, Cooper (2000) p. 345 and Kerman (1967) p. 369/70. 
13 "All my hopes have vanished ... all my hopes of having near me someone who would resemble me at 
least in my better qualities!" Quoted in Solomon (1978) p. 395/6 
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Beethoven, normally so tenacious, if not downright stubborn when it came to the subject 
of his own work, would only have replaced the Fugue if he came to see that there was 
something intrinsically wrong either with its own structure, or with its place within the 
Op. 130 quartet. In other words, the substitution occurred purely on aesthetic grounds, 
even if other external pressures mediated this decision. 
Kerman states that he is "inclined to take Beethoven's replacement of the Fugue as an 
acknowledgement (however, reluctant, bad -tempered, greedy, etc.) that he saw 
something wrong with the way it sat in the quartet ",14 and that the act of replacement 
"can be taken as a sign of self -doubt and self -exasperation and resentment that other 
people kept telling him what he knew better himself'.15 Daverio supports Kerman's 
viewpoint, suggesting that Beethoven came to consider that the Grosse Fuge makes the 
whole quartet unbalanced, shifting the emotional and discursive `weight' too much 
towards the finale, thereby "dwarfing" the preceding movements. According to him, 
the replacement of the Grosse Fuge therefore "demonstrates a genuine concern for 
proportion - and also for generic propriety ".16 (It is interesting to note that other writers 
have considered this as grounds for retaining the Grosse Fuge, in preference to the 
Allegro, arguing that the whole compositional trajectory of the quartet is end -orientated, 
and that without the Fugue there is no `closure' to the work.)17 
The argument for an aesthetic reason for the replacement of the Grosse Fuge is perhaps 
strengthened by the fact that Beethoven had previously composed alternative 
movements for several other major works - the Ninth Symphony and the Waldstein 
sonata being the most prominent examples. The replacement of the finale of the Op. 130 
quartet was not, therefore without precedent in a major work. However, there is a 
14 Kerman (1967) p. 370 
15 Ibid. 
16 Daverio (2000) p. 164 
17 See, for example, Kropfinger, Klaus (1987) `Das gespaltene Werk - Beethovens Streichquartett Op. 
130/133' in Brandenburg, Sieghard and Loos, Helmut (eds.), Beiträge zu Beethovens Kammermusik, 
Kinderman (1995) p. 303/304 and Kramer (1992) 
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crucial difference in the case of the Grosse Fuge: the replacement was introduced after 
the first performance, when it had already been sold to a publisher and was already 
actually engraved. In the cases of the other works the replacement movements were 
undoubtedly made entirely as a result of an artistic decision by the composer, with no 
external collusion, prior to performance and publication. The fact that this was not the 
case with the replacement of the Grosse Fuge tends to undermine the argument for an 
aesthetic basis for the decision. 
Indeed, I consider that the view that the substitution of the Fugue was aesthetically 
motivated is inherently problematic: it seems likely that Beethoven, had he truly 
considered the Grosse Fuge to be flawed would have undertaken a revision prior to both 
performance and publication, as in the other cases cited. The fact that there is no 
indication of any intention to do so may therefore be taken, however tentatively, as 
evidence that he saw no need for such a revision. 
Even more compelling is Beethoven's response to the reception of the Grosse Fuge at its 
first performance. The audience reportedly demanded a repeat performance of the 
Tedesca and the Cavatina - the Fugue, however, was not well received. It was heavily 
criticised for its difficulties and, in the days following was even described as being like 
"a sort of Chinese puzzle" in its incomprehensibility18. Beethoven, who had remained 
absent from the concert, residing instead at a nearby inn was, of all the movements, most 
concerned with the reception of the Fugue. When Holz informed him of the success of 
only the middle movements he was reportedly furious that the fugue had not been well 
received, and described the audience as "cattle" and "asses ".19 
It is clear from this response that the Grosse Fuge was, for Beethoven, a movement of 
particular importance within a quartet that, according to Kinderman, was known as his 
18 Solomon (1978) p. 443 
19 Mahaim (1964) p. 419 
297 
`Liebquartett'.20 Holz, charged by the publisher Artaria with the difficult task of 
persuading Beethoven to provide a replacement for the Fugue, also attests to this fact. 
According to him, Beethoven was profoundly reluctant to remove the Grosse Fuge from 
the quartet: "[He] held tight to the Fugue, and was persuaded only with difficulty to 
separate it from the quartet ".21 This reluctance, around six months after the first 
performance of the Op. 130 quartet, seems to oppose the viewpoint that Beethoven 
perceived problems with the movement in retrospect, and was therefore persuaded to 
replace it. 
The issue of the importance of the Fugue for Beethoven appears to be closely related to 
the genesis of this movement, an issue that is greatly debated. This debate centres upon 
whether or not the Grosse Fuge was the generating impulse of the quartet, or indeed 
whether it was ever a part of the `original' conception: according to Klaus Kropfinger, 
the Fugue was, from the beginning, integral to the conception of the quartet, its theme 
having been sketched during the composition of Op. 132;22 Bekker agrees, considering 
that "The final fugue ... gathers up all the parts [the preceding movements] in itself and 
makes a unity of the work ".23 Cooper argues, that this was not the case, and 
that the Fugue was a relatively late addition, forming an "intrusion "24 into the work. 
Although Chua clearly considers that the Grosse Fuge forms an integral part of the 
original `Galitzin' version of the Op. 130 quartet,25 Warren Kirkendale considers that 
the Fugue is, like Bach's `Art of Fugue' a compendium of fugal technique and, as such, 
may quite naturally be detached from its original place within the Op. 130 quartet.26 
Significantly, almost all of the writers cited (and there are many more) use their 
20 Kinderman (1995) p. 304 
21 Quoted in Kerman (1967) p. 368 
22 Kropfinger (1987) pp. 304 - 315 
23 Bekker (1925) p. 332 
24 Cooper (1990) p. 214 
25 Chua (1995) p. 269, note 21, quoted below. 
26 Kirkendale, Warren (1963) "The `Great Fugue', Op. 133: Beethoven's `Art of Fugue "', Acta 
Musicologica, vol. XXXV p. 14 -24 
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argument concerning the genesis of the Fugue to support their respective preferences of 
finale. 
This issue seems vital in that, if the Fugue was either the generating impulse of the 
whole quartet, or even just an essential part of the original conception, then its removal 
constitutes nothing less than a `violation', with the replacement as a completely foreign 
insertion. If, on the other hand, the Fugue is itself an aberration, then its removal is an 
acceptable solution to an aesthetic dilemma. However, this issue is of little importance 
to the current discussion. The important point, rather, is that the Fugue did, at one point, 
exist as the finale to the quartet, with the result that the relationship established between 
this movement and those preceding it results, in the `Galitzin' version, in an "end - 
weighting" of an extraordinary degree - the Fugue is both the aim and the summation of 
the entire quartet. 
This relationship - the original trajectory of the work - is problematic, for those who, 
like Kerman, consider the replacement of the Fugue as a reaction to some aesthetic 
shortcoming. The alternative finale simply does not fulfil the function of a finale in the 
manner of the Grosse Fuge: it can neither bear the weight of the entire quartet, nor 
encompass the diversity of the preceding five movements. Rather, it seems, as Cooper 
observes, to belong to a different, `lighter' aesthetic: 
A comparison with Op. 135, which it superficially resembles in many ways, will reveal 
how close Beethoven came in the op. 130 finale to the contracted scope and vision of 
Biedermeier art. If the first and last movements of op. 135 do indeed represent a 
contraction of scope and a reduction of visionary power compared with the preceding 
quartets, they still retain potency of a different kind. The harmless, gelded quality that is 
characteristic of Biedermeier art is hardly found even in Beethoven's occasional 
compositions; but an occasional composition is exactly what the finale of op. 130 proved to 
be.27 
However, although the Op. 135 quartet does, as both Cooper and Chua observe, move 
towards a simpler, more direct aesthetic, nowhere does it come remotely near the clichéd 
27 Cooper (1985) p. 414 
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gestures of the Allegro. This difference is significant. Kerman suggests that the 
incongruity between the replacement finale and the rest of the quartet may be explained 
simply in terms of the passage of time between the composition of Op. 130 and that of 
the replacement finale, a period that had included the composition of Op. 135. The 
replacement finale, however, is not in the same style as Op. 135, despite the `superficial 
resemblance' between them. Thus Beethoven is not simply writing a replacement finale 
from a different aesthetic viewpoint in a "new" style that was arrived at since the 
composition of Op. 130 - if he were, there would not be such a difference between Op. 
135 and the replacement Rondo. It appears then that the composition of the Allegro 
movement represents a definite stylistic choice, different from anything else composed 
at the time. This is problematic for the viewpoint expressed by Kerman and those who 
follow him: if Beethoven did indeed perceive the supposed problems with the Fugue 
from "beyond" its composition then would he, from this more dispassionate position not 
have composed something more fitting than the alternative finale seems to be? In short, 
why replace one problematic finale with another? 
The decision to acquiesce to a replacement finale for the Grosse Fuge, whether as a 
result of financial, personal or aesthetic considerations, is only half of the issue. The 
main debate centres upon the manner in which Beethoven chose to replace the Fugue: 
the radical change in tone in the Allegro provokes issues that have divided critics from 
the beginning. Some writers consider that the new finale is actually less problematic 
than the Fugue, and indeed that, since it is more in keeping with the overall feeling and 
course of the quartet, it is much better suited and a better ending to the quartet than the 
original finale. This argument may be seen as an attempt to reconcile this replacement 
movement with other movements of the B flat quartet. Cooper, for example, adopts this 
view, stating that the replacement finale's "smaller scale and optimistic character . . . 
suit the quartet as a whole. Like Op. 135, it seems at times to recall the eighteenth 
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century, leading back to normality after the extraordinary profundity of the Cavatina".28 
Cooper, however, is in the minority: many more critics, regardless of their opinion of the 
Grosse Fuge, have considered the replacement movement to be problematic. Kerman, 
for example, states that, although he does not consider the original version of Op. 130 to 
be satisfactory, he finds the revised version equally unsatisfactory, especially when the 
whole quartet is compared to the other late quartets.29 Kinderman considers that, 
because of the extremes of contrast and juxtaposition within the rest of the quartet, "the 
Grosse Fuge provides a much more compelling culmination than the substitute rondo 
finale ",30 whilst for Mahaim, as was seen, the Rondo is not an alternative to the Grosse 
Fuge but a foreign entity, a desecration of the original version of the quartet by a 
Beethoven who was broken and defeated. 
Cooper acknowledges the incongruity of this movement with the rest of the Op. 130 
quartet, attempting to explain this difficulty by relating the Allegro to the concept of 
finishing a serious work of art with a lighter finale, as happens frequently in Mozart. He 
considers that the replacement finale therefore indicates "an earlier, pre- romantic 
aesthetic ",31 an aesthetic that was, of course, precisely that of Beethoven's youth. He 
speculates that this movement, together with the Op. 135 quartet, may be taken as 
evidence that Beethoven was on the verge of another stylistic period -a reversion to an 
earlier aesthetic - perhaps occasioned by his troubled personal circumstances. In the 
event, this change never came to fruition because of the composer's death. 
For Kerman the issue rests upon the character of the replacement Allegro. His argument 
is essentially that Beethoven, following the composition of Op. 131 and 135 had moved 
through the difficulties encountered in the Op. 130 quartet. As a result, the problems 
28 Cooper (2000) p. 346 
29 Kerman (1967) p. 370 
30 Kinderman (1995) p. 306/7 
31 Cooper (1985) p. 389 
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addressed in that quartet were now distant and he could view the struggle within the 
earlier work more dispassionately. This new perspective, in addition to allowing him to 
see the inherent problems with the Grosse Fuge, also affected the character of the 
replacement: Beethoven was now above these issues, and the "sunny, gay, classicising, 
Haydnesque conclusion "32 is his response to the problems from beyond them. The effect 
that this produces for the whole quartet, however, is unsatisfactory; it is simply out of 
place within the scope of the work. 
The viewpoint proposed in the current work initially appears to support this latter view: 
the replacement finale is unsatisfactory when considered as either a conclusion to the 
Op. 130 quartet, or as a replacement for the Grosse Fuge. However charming, however 
subtle or powerful this finale appears to be, it remains incongruous both "internally ", in 
relation to the quartet in which it resides, and "externally" with the composers other 
works. Indeed, even those who consider it a more fitting conclusion to the Op. 130 
quartet than the Fugue still feel compelled to explain the radical departure in tone that it 
represents.33 Within the middle movements of the Op. 130 quartet there is a trend 
towards simplicity, particularly within the two dance movements, and even towards a 
more "Classical" aesthetic within the third movement. Nevertheless, all of the preceding 
movements contain significant complexities and innovations. Against this backdrop the 
exaggerated conventionality of the replacement finale appears decidedly incongruous - 
its anachronisms, clichés and conventionality sounding markedly naive compared to the 
striking contrasts, juxtapositions and innovations of the preceding five movements. 
Therefore, I consider that the incongruity that exists between the replacement Allegro 
movement and its context can be explained only as a direct stylistic choice. Although 
some commentators consider the anachronisms of this movement to be, in essence, a 
Haydnesque tribute to the spirit of the Biedermeier, this movement moves far beyond 
this point. It is comprised largely of clichés, references to the past that are so thoroughly 
32 Kerman (1967) p. 371 
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conventional as to border on the banal. The exaggeration and accumulation of these 
gestures objectifies their conventionality, and this objectification effectively leads to the 
satirising of this conventionality: the movement may be understood in terms of irony, as 
a satirical polemic against musical banality. Irony is an integral meaning or function of 
the replacement finale - in fact it may be that it is the whole reason for this movement's 
existence. 
From this viewpoint it is therefore possible to consider that in replacing the Grosse Fuge 
with the Allegro, Beethoven replaces one ironic movement with another. Considering 
the replacement in terms of irony may therefore better allow the reconciliation of this 
movement to the context of the quartet into which it was inserted. As seen in the 
preceding chapter, I consider that irony forms an inherent part of the purport and the 
structure of the Op. 130 quartet as a whole and of the Fugue in particular. An "ironic" 
reading of the replacement Allegro movement would place it within the greater ironic 
context of the rest of this work: this finale would therefore function as only one of 
several ironies. 
The ironies of the two finales to this quartet, however, are of different orders. As was 
considered in the previous chapter, the irony of the Grosse Fuge is essentially 
paradoxical, or `general' irony: the perception of existence as ironic. This paradoxical 
irony of existence is expressed in its overpowering structure through the continuous 
juxtaposition of incongruous elements, a continual chain of paradox. The irony of the 
replacement finale, in contrast, is satirical, directed towards the viewpoint of those who 
considered the Fugue to be unintelligible, or unsuccessful. 
Considering this movement in terms of irony may therefore also account for the 
circumstances in which the substitution of the finale came to be effected. The theory 
proposed here that Beethoven's decision to replace the Grosse Fuge was not 
fundamentally based upon aesthetic grounds. That is, the decision was not, as Kerman 
33 See, for example, Kerman (1967) p. 370 -374 and Cooper (1990) p. 214 ff 
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argues "an acknowledgement ... that [Beethoven] saw something wrong with the way it 
sat in the quartet "34. Rather, this decision may have been taken entirely as a response to 
the external pressures cited above. Although it may have been that the actual decision 
was made because he felt that there was, due to these pressures, no alternative but to 
replace the Fugue, I would suggest that the replacement movement is a satirical response 
to the viewpoint of those who misunderstood or undervalued the Grosse Fuge. 
Although the historical evidence given above is only circumstantial, the response to the 
first performance of the Op. 130 quartet, and the subsequent opinion of his publisher 
clearly produced a situation where Beethoven was misunderstood, rejected and even 
ridiculed. It is not inconceivable, given his propensity for irony, that he responded with 
irony, even sarcasm. (Indeed, to consider the replacement finale as an ironic response is 
consistent with the broader context of both the "inter- personal" irony that informed 
Beethoven's manner, and the irony in his other quartets.) The implication of his 
outburst following the first performance is that the audience were too simple- minded to 
comprehend the Fugue - is it possible that his response was to insult those who insulted 
him by giving them a replacement finale that was so musically simple, even banal that it 
is essentially comprised largely by clichés? Such a response would indicate aesthetic 
shortcomings, not in the Grosse Fuge, but rather in those who failed to appreciate its 
value. 
* 
The Replacement Finale: Allegro 
Analysis of the exposition of this movement demonstrates the significant proportion of 
conventional, even clichéd gestures. The opening gesture of this movement - the 
accompaniment figure in the viola - is an example of the type of "clockwork" figure that 
34 Kerman (1967) p. 370 
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Haydn utilises in the second movement of his "Clock" Symphony. The manner in which 
this gesture is presented - highlighted baldly on its own - foregrounds i.e. draws 
attention to its anachronism. The opening bars may therefore be considered to produce a 
certain anachronistic character, or a sense of a musical past tense. 
In addition, this accompaniment figure produces a striking contrast with the Cavatina 
that would, in the revised version of the quartet, precede it. Cooper considers this 
juxtaposition to be "cynical ": "the staccato notes of the viola break in on the tense 
emotional silence at the end of the Cavatina".35 In effect, the viola "undercuts" the 
emotionalism of the Cavatina and, as has been considered above, the effect of such 
undercutting of a serious movement is almost invariably comic. This comic effect is 
heightened by the fact that the "clockwork" accompaniment has itself been identified 
with Haydnesque wit: "Most of the familiar nicknames for [Haydn's] works respond to 
features that listeners have taken as humorous ... In other cases the wit is on a higher 
plane e.g. the "ticking" accompaniment in the slow movement of the `Clock' 
Symphony ".36 Cooper also observes the comic effect, particularly of the harmonic 
structure, of these opening bars, as well as that of the pseudo cross -relation of the theme 
in bars 69/70.37 Thus these opening bars may be considered to produce the effect not 
only of the comic, but particularly of a comic anachronism. 
The theme that Beethoven introduces over this accompaniment continues to reference 
previous musical styles. Essentially this theme (bars 3 to 10) outlines an ascending 
dominant seventh arpeggio followed by a descent to the leading note, with simple rising 
appoggiatura figures following the repetition of this note. The consequent phrase 
effectively repeats the gesture, minus the appoggiaturas, and the entire phrase is repeated 
almost exactly between bars 11 and 17. This type of triadic allegro theme, with clearly 
35 Cooper (1985) p. 390 
36 Webster, James (2001) "Haydn: Style, Aesthetics, Compositional Method" in The New Grove 
Dictionary of Music and Musicians ed. Stanley Sadie Vol. 11. p. 192 
37 Cooper (1985) p. 390 
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defined periodicity and repetition possesses an undoubted "Classical" character; witness 
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However, over the course of the movement the "Classical" feel of the theme is combined 
with an exaggerated simplicity of melodic motion. The transitional figure between bars 
18 and 24, for example, is almost trite in effect, with its simple alternating figure and 
repetitiveness. Even more obvious is the codetta at the end of the exposition: bars 89 to 
95 are effectively comprised of a repetition of an descending -ascending scale figure in 
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octaves in the outer parts around a pedal point in the inner parts. This figure is utterly 
banal - it is the most simple way imaginable of underlining the dominant harmony at the 
end of the exposition. Indeed Kerman goes so far as to describe this section as 





Ex. 6.2 Op. 130 6th Movement 
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The exaggerated simplicity of function within the formal sections of the exposition may 
also be seen within the second -key area. The imitative entries at bar 33 that effect the 
transition to the dominant are an obvious gesture. The first imitation, in bars 33 and 34 
simply echoes the preceding bars, thereby effectively producing two perfect cadence 
gestures in as many bars. As a result they are somewhat redundant, or even banal: the 
gesture is simple enough without being repeated. The effect is heightened by the 
prominence of the repeat occurring within a solo line. 






Ex. 63 Op. 130 6th Movement 
32 (Allegro) 
Even more exaggeratedly simple is the sequence that occurs between bars 51 and 56 
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Although these bars do not trace an exact sequence harmonically (the F in the bass in bar 
54 actually breaks the sequence), nevertheless a conventional descending- thirds 
progression is clearly signified. The texture is, again, as simple as imaginable, with the 
imitation of the semiquaver figure between the instruments, which serves to underline 
the harmonic sequence, occurring over close -position chords. Finally, the semiquaver 
308 
figure occurs over thoroughly conventional cadential harmony, reaffirming F major. 
The combination of these elements combines to produce an exaggeratedly simple effect, 
effectively stripping the music down to its barest formal functions. The fact that this 
sequence appears as an almost verbatim repeat underlines the banality of the gesture. 
When these banal functional passages are considered within the context of the simple, 
"Classical" thematic sections, then an even more strikingly conventionalised, banal 
effect is produced. Essentially, therefore, the exaggerated simplicity of this exposition 
arises from the cumulative effect of the combination of simple elements. 
Sheinberg specifically identifies the accumulation of conventional gestures as a type of 
exaggeration, because no one instance of a type or style should contain all the elements 
common to that style. Therefore, this exaggerated accumulation of such conventions 
may be regarded as a technique of satire: "the accumulation of all the features that are 
considered as characteristic of any group, race, species or type on one sole individual 
would result in its caricature ".39 Thus if each element within this movement were 
considered individually then it might be possible to reconcile them. However, the sheer 
number of conventional, over -simplified gestures, and in particular the repetition of 
these clichés throughout this section, makes such a reconciliation impossible - the effect 
is satirical. 
This is compounded by the harmonic structure of the movement. Although, as will be 
seen, there are elements of the harmonic architecture that are novel, overall the harmonic 
movement sounds particularly simple. This effect is heightened by the comparison with 
both the preceding movements of the Op. 130 quartet and the other late quartets. As an 
example consider the harmonic structure of the first ten bars of the movement. There is 
an element of harmonic ambiguity within the theme in that it begins off -tonic, on the 
supertonic dominant. However, from this beginning it follows a simple circle of fifths 
39 Sheinberg (2000) p. 120 
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progression - the most conventional of modulatory progressions - to arrive on the tonic 
in bar 10. The cadence in this bar is preceded (bars 8 and 9) by a thoroughly 
conventional bass line - B flat, G, E flat, F, B flat (I, VI, IV, V, I) - that sounds 
particularly simplistic as a result of the overall texture. The repetition of the entire 
process in bars 11 to 18, and the conventional "balancing" movement towards the 
subdominant over a tonic pedal in bar 25 onwards further underscores the tonic of the 
movement. 
Even the moments of harmonic ambiguity that occur in the exposition of this movement 
may be seen to be related to conventional procedure. The cadence that is expected in bar 
67, following the sequential and cadential gestures in bars 51 to 66 that were considered 
above, is undercut by the sudden harmonic diversion and reduction to solo cello. Such a 
harmonic procedure is conventional, effectively delaying the cadence so that, when it 
does occur in bar 89, following the harmonic ambiguity, the dominant is established all 
the more powerfully. 
Indeed, throughout the course of the movement, the conventional harmonic /functional 
landmarks of sonata form are maintained. As Kerman observes, Beethoven begins the 
development section, following the insertion of the unusual A flat major episode (which 
will be considered below), in the entirely conventional key of the dominant . The 
conventionality of this moment is heightened by comparison with the unconventional A 
flat episode, as well as by the manner in which the modulation to F is achieved: 
"Beethoven stops at the first turn, F minor, and with a flip of the mode begins his 
development as conventionally as you please on the dominant, F major ".40 Kerman 
considers this harmonic procedure, as well as the movement towards the subdominant in 
the recapitulation to be a reference to Haydn: "Here the bow to Haydn seems even 
deeper ... because Beethoven seems to be getting so much more pleasure out of these 
40 Kerman (1967) p. 371 
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Haydnesque manipulations ".41 
In addition, I would suggest that the whole harmonic process of the first -key area is 
actually reminiscent of Haydn: the off -tonic opening, the resulting harmonic ambiguity 
and the basic opposition of major and minor are Haydnesque gestures. All of these may 
be seen within the opening of his quartet Op. 33 no. 1. This movement begins, 
apparently unambiguously, in D major. However, the tonality moves towards B minor 
in bar 3, before being deflected by the interrupted cadence in bar 4. This vacillation 
between D major and B minor is continued throughout the next six bars, the silences in 
bars 5 and 9 and the repetition of the interrupted cadence disallowing any settling of the 
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Kerman is not alone in considering that this movement contains references to Haydn. 
41 Ibid. 
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Steinberg, for example, refers to the opening harmonic transition from G minor to B flat 
as "a piquant, rather Haydnesque harmonic slant" 42 Similarly, Cooper relates this 
movement, together with the andante of the Op. 127 quartet to the Biedermeier aesthetic, 
referring to it as "a well -turned and comfortably upholstered Biedermeier chair into 
which the listener can sink "43 and as a "tribute to the domestic, middle -class spirit of the 
Biedermeier age ".44 Although this is not so closely related to Haydn, the clear 
implication of Cooper's comments is that this movement appears to be, in large part, 
conventional and conservative. 
Although Chua does no actual analysis of this replacement finale his comments are 
particularly important for the theory given here. Like Kerman, his starting point is the 
observation that the Allegro was written outside the time period of the Galitzin quartets, 
and the assumption that it, along with Op. 135, subscribes to a completely different 
compositional aesthetic. He considers that, although some have seen the style of the Op. 
131 and 135 quartets and the Allegro as a re- integration of Beethoven's style, after the 
dissociation and disintegration of he earlier works, such a return would, in fact be 
impossible. Rather, he considers that there is "an air of indifference, as if the progress of 
the "Galitzin" quartets had simply reached a point of stasis, and all that is left is the 
history of that progress to play with ".45 Indeed, he considers that comparison of the 
Grosse Fuge and the Allegro highlights this: whereas the Fugue pushes towards 
destruction, "the new finale, in the face of that destruction, hides beneath a sheen of 
history or a style of Classicism as if nothing had happened ".46 The result is that the new 
finale is "disconcerting ", because of its "nonchalant smile ".47 
Chua's comments highlight two of the issues most central to the current argument. The 
42 Steinberg (1994) p. 244 
43 Cooper (1985) p. 390 
44 ibid. 
45 Chua (1995) p. 4 
46 Ibid. 
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first of these is that the conventionality of this movement, whether this is referred to in 
terms of "Classicism ", as "Haydnesque" or even as a tribute to the Biedermeier, is 
fundamentally inauthentic - it is, in his terms, only a "sheen" or a "style" (by which he 
presumably means a stylisation). However, as has been demonstrated, the 
conventionality, or classicism of this movement is exaggerated, particularly in the case 
of functional passages and "architectural" tonal landmarks. This produced a "too- great" 
accumulation of simple, even banal gestures, caused in particular by the immediate 
repetition of each gesture. 
Moreover, the exaggerated conventionality of this movement is incongruous with the 
context in which it occurs. This context encompasses the Op. 130 quartet, in which, as 
has been stated above, the replacement finale is incongruous in terms of style and 
harmonic language, as well as in the overall compositional trajectory of the quartet. 
However, it also includes the vast majority not only of the late quartets, but also of the 
late style in general. Even Op. 135, which belongs to a different compositional aesthetic 
than the other late quartets, is not as exaggeratedly simple as this movement. 
The result of this is that, rather than a stylisation of Classicism, this movement becomes 
a satirical parody of this style. The exaggeration of conventional elements is 
incongruous with both the style and with the context of the rest of the work. Because of 
this exaggerated incongruity, this movement will be seen to be not a "tribute ", either to 
Haydn or, as Cooper suggests, to the Biedermeier aesthetic, but rather a satirical parody 
of musical conventionality and cliché. The aim of this parody is the objectification of 
musical simplicity and comprehensibility in order to satirise the viewpoint of those who 
misunderstood the Grosse Fuge. 
47 Ibid. p. 243 
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The Fugue within the Allegro 
The second important consideration highlighted by Chua concerns the relationship 
between the replacement Allegro finale and the Grosse Fuge: 
It is unfortunate that this issue - "which finale ?" - leads to an utterly futile debate in which 
one movement is inevitably marginalized in exalting the other. Either the Grosse Fuge 
belittles the `scherzo' or the `scherzo' mocks the grossness of the fugue, depending upon 
whether one prefers the sociability of the Classical aesthetic or the prophetic struggle of the 
nineteenth- century genius. Such a dispute devalues the fact that the scherzo is wrought in a 
highly sophisticated and ambiguous form and that the Grosse Fuge is carefully calculated 
as an integral part of the quartet and is not some detachable monstrosity that ended up as 
op. 133.48 
It is important to realise that in the case of the replacement finale of the Op. 130 quartet, 
unlike the other cases of replacement movements cited above, the new movement does 
not simply replace the original. As has been considered, the revisions of the Waldstein 
and the Ninth Symphony etc. were completed before the performance or publication of 
these works; the replacement movements therefore supplant the originals, effectively 
negating their existence as parts of the work. In the case of the Op. 130 quartet, 
however, the fact that the work had been performed and all but published in its original 
version means that the replacement of the Grosse Fuge did not simply supplant this 
movement but rather produced two radically different versions of the same quartet. 
There is therefore almost a duality within the very structure of this quartet. 
The existence of two alternative versions of the same quartet is of utmost importance to 
the reading of the Allegro movement. The fact that the quartet originally appeared with 
a different ending means that the existence of the replacement finale does not negate that 
of the Grosse Fuge: rather this alternative exists in relationship with the original version. 
In other words, the Allegro movement can never exist as a movement in its own right, 
but will always be compared to the Fugue: it will function precisely as a replacement, 
48 Ibid. p. 269 n. 21 
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with the presence of the Grosse Fuge, as it were, in the background. 
Chua concludes that this duality leaves the `meaning' of the quartet "open" - neither 
version of the quartet can truly achieve a final closure due to the existence of an 
alternative purport. In other words, the dual courses of the work produce a structure of 
alternatives similar to those discussed in chapter six. I would suggest, however, that the 
duality of this quartet cannot really be adequately described simply as a passive 
"openness ". The radically different character of the alternative finales has a tendency to 
establish an antithetical relationship between the two versions of the quartet, a 
relationship of contrariety, or even juxtaposition that has occurred from the moment the 
replacement was made. 
Cooper highlights the opposition between the two alternative finales when he states that 
"as a replacement for the Cyclopean masonry of the Grosse Fuge the effect is as 
incongruous as that of a Baroque chapel attached to a Romanesque cathedral" 49 This 
incongruity is important for the reading of the Allegro that is proposed here: the Allegro 
exists not simply as a replacement for the Fugue, but rather as reaction to the whole 
situation surrounding the Fugue. It exists as an ironic, satirical comment upon the 
circumstances surrounding the replacement of the Fugue, the shadow of which looms 
over the Allegro as a constant, unheard presence. 
Crucially this relationship between the Allegro and the Grosse Fuge is actually reflected 
within the structure of the Allegro. Daverio points out that the new finale contains 
"echoes" of the Fugue: as a result he considers that this movement represents "more than 
a concession to popular taste ".50 I would suggest, however, that this finale contains not 
simply "echoes" of the Fugue, but specific references to its thematic, harmonic and 
textural structure. For example, the opening gesture of the Allegro relates closely, if 
antithetically, to the opening of the Fugue. The powerful opening unison G's of the 
49 Cooper (1985) p. 390 
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Fugue, which build upon the high seriousness of the Cavatina, are recalled in the 
Allegro, transformed into an anachronism that, as has been seen, undermines the 
seriousness of the preceding movement. In addition, the harmonic course of the opening 
theme of the Allegro follows the same circle of fifths as the opening Overtura of the 
Fugue. 
Arguably the most significant references to the Fugue, however, occur within the 
development section of the Allegro. The development section begins with a quasi - 
rhetorical version of the theme in bars 97 to 100 before modulating to the unusual key of 
A flat major in bar 109, at which point an entirely new theme, markedly different in 
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As has been indicated, this movement is essentially a hybrid of sonata and rondo forms: 
50 Daverio (2000) p. 164 
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indeed it is the insertion of this A flat major episode that contributes most to this reading 
of the formal structure of this work. In such a scheme this section functions as a first 
episode and it is entirely appropriate, therefore, that there is an introduction of new 
material. However, this "episode" is far more than simply a contrasting formal section - 
it is a direct reference to the great A flat fugue of the original finale. 
As was considered above, this A flat fugue is, together with the first B flat fugue, one of 
the twin pillars of the Grosse Fuge's structure. It is surely no coincidence that 
Beethoven chooses this remote key for the episodic material of his replacement finale. 
Indeed the reference to the Fugue can scarcely be doubted when one considers that, 
within this section there is also a reference, indeed almost a quotation, of the main four - 
note theme of the Fugue (bars 132 -140). Although Steinberg terms this moment simply 
a "casual reference "51 I would suggest that it is actually, as Daverio considers, "a 
motivic relative of the four -note cell that runs through the Grosse Fuge "52. This 
viewpoint is strengthened by the fact that this thematic reference to the Fugue theme 
occurs in a prominent location, in terms of both the texture (i.e. imitated between the 
two violins in a high register), as well as formally - within one of the most important 








In addition to these thematic and structural references the 16 -bar unison passage at the 
end of the development section (bars 208 to 223) strongly recalls the gritty texture and 
chromatic movement of the Fugue. Indeed Kerman relates both this passage and the 
Scherzo of Op. 135 to the Grosse Fuge: "there is the same sense of unknown energy 
flaring without notice, of turbulence suffered and controlled - the same whiff of the 
Great Fugue ".53 This strange unison passage occurs following a section of very 
conventional development material and processes. Following the imitative entries of the 
theme in bars 162 to 168 the ascending figure from the third bar of the theme occurs as a 
sequential motive, accompanied by a semiquaver figure derived from the second bar of 
the theme (bars 170 to 172 - example 5.8). This fragment appears in inversion as a 
counterpoint to itself from bars 182 to 188 and then in diminution from bar 189 
onwards. This manipulation or exploration of the motivic potential of the elements of 
the theme is highly conventional in approach: indeed compared to the developments of 
Beethoven's "Heroic" style it is almost banal. The conventionality is, again, highlighted 
by the harmonic course of this development, which is essentially limited to circle -of- 
fifths motion, albeit rapid in places. The result of this is that it is possible to consider the 
development section of this movement as an essentially conventional passage 
sandwiched between two significant references to the Grosse Fuge. 
It is the combination of references to the Grosse Fuge that is significant. In addition to 
the harmonic references of the opening bars, the insertion of the A flat section means 
that two of the key harmonic elements of the Fugue are retained within the structure of 
the Allegro. These tonal references are further underscored by the thematic reference, or 
quotation within this episodic section. Thus not only are there passing resemblances to 
key structural moments of the Fugue within the Allegro, but there is also an evocation of 
the Fugue itself, represented by its theme. The unison passage at the end of the 
development section does not simply add another reference: rather it places these key 
references in contrast with very conventional developmental material. This 
53 Kerman (1967) p. 372 
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juxtaposition of Fugue references with overtly conventional material results in a direct 
confrontation of the evocation of the Fugue with the musically conventional or banal, 
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The result of this is that the relationship that exists between the two movements, which 
arises as a result of the circumstances that generated the replacement finale, is reflected 
as an opposition within the structure of the new finale. As was stated above, the new 
finale does not simply replace the Grosse Fuge: rather, it exists as an alternative ending 
to an already- completed work. As such, there is always a comparison between the 
alternative versions i.e. the alternative finales of the quartet. This is particularly 
important in light of the interpretation of this movement proposed here. If this finale is 
understood as, in some sense, a satire of musical conventionality then it could be argued 
that it not only objectifies such conventionality but does so specifically in relation or in 
contrast to the Grosse Fuge, as an inter -textual comment. Within this movement the 
only areas of non -conventional discourse are those that refer specifically to the Fugue: 
those that relate simply to the Allegro material are exaggeratedly conventional. Whereas 
the exaggeration of the conventionality of the Allegro material produces an 
objectification of this material (for reasons that will be considered more fully below), the 
unconventionality of the passages that refer to the Fugue prevents their objectification. 
As a result, within the very structure of the finale, its own structure is seen to be 
subordinate and objectified/satirised, in direct comparison to the references to the Fugue. 
The implication of this reading is obvious: the assertion of the unconventionality of the 
Fugue over the musically conventional and banal 
* 
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Paradoxically, the duality that exists within the structure of the Allegro finale with the 
insertion of the references to the Grosse Fuge actually serves to make this replacement 
finale a more interesting and innovative movement than it otherwise might have been: 
for all its conventionality it is not simply a series of clichés, or a hackneyed re- hashing 
of Classical conventions. Rather, it actually possesses great charm and surprising 
sophistication - it is, after all, a movement by Beethoven! In particular the ambiguity of 
its formal structure is striking: this movement is really, as Imeson and Chua also 
consider, a kind of rondo with sonata elements and an extended coda. Within the 
pantheon of Classical genres hybrids such as sonata -rondo are, almost by definition, 
ambiguous in that most of the formal elements fulfil some kind of double- function. 
It is, however, significant that it is the insertion of the references to the Grosse Fuge - 
particularly the A flat episode and the unison passage - that produces the ambiguities 
and formal innovations of this movement. In addition, it is the parallelism between the 
harmonic structures of the opening of the Fugue and the theme of the Allegro which 
produces the striking harmonic subtlety of the replacement finale. It is surely not 
coincidental that the innovative elements of this movement correspond to parallelisms 
with the Fugue: again, the innovative is juxtaposed with the conventional/banal. 
The coda of this movement adds strength to the reading of this movement as a process of 
the objectification and satirisation of musical convention. Within this coda many of the 
clichéd elements of the Allegro material are exaggerated beyond the point of simple 
cliché until there is a rupturing of the "surface" of the discourse. This undermines the 
conventionality from within, producing incongruities within these very clichés and 
anachronisms that results in the objectification, not simply of their conventionality, but 
also of their artifice. 
Perhaps the most significant instance of this occurs from bar 414 onwards. From this 
point there is the appearance of the beginning of a "second development ", a device that 
Beethoven had previously used in the codas or recapitulation of other movements (the 
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first movement of the Ninth Symphony, for example). This process begins with a 
stretto -like repeat of a fragment derived from the opening gesture of the theme, before 
this thematic motif is developed into an opposing ascending- descending, tonic -dominant 
motion from bar 418, and, from bar 422, further transformed into a diminished seventh 
arpeggio. This diminished seventh then functions first as an ascending 2 -bar sequence 
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The motion across these twelve bars is important. There is a combination of a harmonic 
ascent through sequential motion, which actually accelerates in pace across bars 426 to 
430, and an overall crescendo. The effect produced by this combination is of urgency, 
or of a forceful movement ascending, both harmonically and dynamically, at an 
increasing rate. Such a combination would not be particularly unusual for an ascending 
sequential motion. However, in this instance the fact that when the theme finally 
emerges as a complete statement it appears nearly an octave higher than when the 
sequence began indicates the exaggerated repetition involved in this passage - the 
sequence simply goes too far. 
In addition to this exaggerated sequential motion there are several other exaggerated 
extremes within this passage. Firstly there is an extreme register used - the first violin 
uses about the highest tessitura of the entire movement. In addition, there is an extreme 
of compass across the ensemble, with upper and lower parts very far apart, an effect 
compounded by the extreme leaping motion in the cello throughout. The actual texture 
of the part- writing throughout the entire process is also somewhat unusual - it is 
essentially homophonic throughout the whole process, which, because of the speed of 
movement, produces a particularly dense effect. When the climactic statement of the 
theme finally occurs, however, the texture suddenly thins, with the inner parts 
effectively functioning as a pedal. This sudden change highlights the previously full 
texture even more. Finally, there is an extreme dynamic level used: following a long 
crescendo through the whole of the process of these bars, the climactic statement of the 
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theme culminates with a fortissimo dynamic level - one of the loudest moments of the 
movement. 
The exaggeration of the elements of this sequential process is significant for the 
climactic statement of the theme that occurs in bar 430. When the theme does finally 
occur it halts the sequence abruptly, literally forcing itself into place, wrenching the 
diminished seventh motion into a dominant seventh only on the last beat of the bar. The 
result of this is that rather than an assertion of the theme, this moment sounds somewhat 
incongruous - the accumulated energy of the ascending sequence does not climax in the 
manner in which it might otherwise. This effect is compounded by a problematic 
harmonic basis for the climactic moment. In bars 25 to 32 there is corresponding 
appearance of the theme on B flat. Here the tonic pedal means that, although there is a 
V7 harmony (implying E flat) in the theme, there is no real move away from the tonic, 
and, as a result, it is more firmly established at the end of the consequent phrase (bar 
32). Similarly, the moment of the re- establishment of the theme and of the tonic in the 
recapitulation also functions over a tonic pedal (bar 247 onwards). In the coda, 
however, the fact that the harmony under the B flat V7 arpeggio moves means that there 
is no establishment of the tonic. Instead, the E flat in bars 432/433, moving to B flat 7 in 
bar 433 sound like I - V. Although by the end of the consequent phrase the tonic is 
again established, it is not as emphatic as the earlier occurrence - it is the E flat in bar 
435 that tends to sound like the tonic. The effect of this is that, although this climactic 
statement of the theme should, after such a monumental build -up, sound as an emphatic, 
even triumphant statement, it is critically undermined by the uncertainty of its actual 
key. (Note that this effect is achieved really through the fundamental instability inherent 
in the structure of the theme itself.) 
Even more significant, in terms of the harmonic basis of these bars, is that, despite the 
huge momentum generated by the entire process of these bars, the sequence both begins 
and ends in B flat. The manner in which the tonality is wrenched back towards the tonic 
means that, in effect, this sequence, which is almost by definition a modulatory process, 
324 
actually fails to modulate. This is compounded by the fact that this accumulation of 
exaggerated extremes is actually incongruous with the rest of the movement - it moves 
beyond the established norms of the entire preceding movement, dynamically, 
harmonically, and in terms of register. The end result of this combination of too -great 
repetition, exaggerated extremes and unstable tonality is the undermining of the 
climactic statement: in effect it sounds "wrong ". Arriving after such an exaggerated 
accumulation this cannot help but fracture the "surface" of the discourse. 
In other words this moment in the coda produces a striking incongruity. Much of this 
movement is constructed from an accumulation of exaggerated conventions and banal 
clichés. However, at this point the exaggeration goes so far and is so extreme that it 
breaks the very conventions that comprise it. This produces incongruity between this 
moment and both the rest of the movement and stylistic convention. This results in the 
"breaking of illusion ", thereby displaying the artifice of the moment, which forcefully 
objectifies the conventional and banal elements - they become the victims of satire. 
* 
At this point it is perhaps necessary to consider the manner in which the use of 
convention in this movement may be understood to produce the process of 
objectification required for an ironic interpretation. As considered, the accumulation 
and exaggeration of these conventions essentially produces incongruity within the 
structure of the movement itself, within the context of the rest of the quartet and with the 
original context from which such musical conventions are drawn. This incongruity 
produces an objectification of these conventions - the type of aesthetic "distancing" 
discussed earlier in this work - resulting in them being placed in an inferior position. 
Consequently they become the victims of a mocking, satirising irony. 
However, it is vital to consider that the objectification of these conventions produces, by 
extension, an objectification of a viewpoint expressed by, or in, these conventions. In 
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her discussion of the ethical basis of irony Sheinberg argues that there is a tendency to 
correlate the opposition of "normative" vs. "non- normative" with that of "culturally 
favoured" vs. "culturally dis- favoured ".54 Stylistic "norms" are therefore, by extension, 
those which are "culturally favoured ". Significantly, she relates this latter opposition 
specifically to moral or ethical values, with the result that non -verbal forms of discourse 
such as music become capable of satirical comment upon ethical and moral concerns: 
where stylistic norm are satirised, then it is not only the normative style, but also the 
ethical norms represented by that style or topic, that becomes the victim of the irony. In 
effect the objectification of a stylistic norm, whether by exaggeration or another device, 
transforms that norm and any ethical or cultural value that is correlated to it, into "non - 
normative", and hence into "culturally dis- favoured ". 
This is effectively what occurs within this movement: throughout this work there is, as 
has been seen, an objectification of conventional "Haydnesque" gestures, banal 
modulatory processes and harmonic progressions, largely through the accumulation and 
exaggeration of these "norms ". In particular, within the coda these conventional norms 
are exaggerated to the point where the whole surface of the discourse - the artifice of 
these conventions - is fractured. The important point is that the conventions that 
comprise most of this movement are clearly anachronistic - they belong to an earlier 
musical age. Thus they may be understood to correlate not simply with the musical style 
of Classicism, but also with an ethical or moral norm that may be termed 
"conservatism ", that is, with classicism not as a previous style, but as a cultural 
prescription for the present. 
I would suggest that the objectification of conventional norms within this movement 
transforms their purport into "non- normative" and "culturally dis- favoured" - they 
become the victims of satire. As a result the conservatism that is correlated with these 
norms itself becomes objectified as "culturally dis- favoured ": there is a reversal of 
ethical norms. Crucially, the conservatism identified within this movement - the 
54 Sheinberg (2000) p. 25 
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exaggerated conventionality and banality - may be attributed, not simply to a general 
cultural viewpoint, but rather specifically to those who, like the "Biedermeier" audience 
at the first performance or the publisher Artaria, found the Fugue too extreme for their 
conservative tastes. The specific references to the Grosse Fuge lend weight to this 
reading of the replacement movement as a satirical polemic against the infamous 
"Cattle" and "Asses" that attracted Beethoven's fury. 
It is telling that the satirical technique employed by Beethoven in this movement shares 
many common elements with the almost archetypal satire seen in Jonathan Swift's A 
Modest Proposal, written in 1729. Although no relationship between the two pieces is 
suggested by the comparison, it is illuminating to consider similarities in approach. The 
first of these arises from the use of convention and exaggeration. Swift, like Beethoven, 
uses thoroughly conventional language and phraseology, as well as the conventions of 
publishing - such as the use of italics and capital letters - in order to produce a "veneer" 
of erudition and reasonableness. However, once the topic of the discourse is announced 
the accumulation and exaggeration of these conventions, resulting from the extended 
length and the fullness of the argument results in an extreme incongruity between the 
conventional tone and the subject matter. 
In other words, since large sections of Swift's Proposal are in thoroughly believable 
prose and demonstrate impeccable logic its effect is almost authentic, almost convincing. 
Indeed, if cannibalism were actually socially acceptable, then this piece could be a taken 
as a piece of straightforward economics. However, the complete incongruity between 
the logical, conventional structure of the work and the context in which it occurs creates 
the satirical purport that this work engenders. Since cannibalism is socially 
unacceptable, the Modest Proposal is rendered satirical: the conventional "sociality" of 
the writer, together with intelligence and erudition of his proposal is opposed to, and is 
entirely incongruous with, the social unacceptability of the actual content of the 
proposal. 
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Significantly, Swift's use of convention is "aimed" in the same manner as Beethoven's. 
Swift's work addresses not simply the situation of the starvation and deprivation in 
Ireland, but also those represented by the conventionalised language used throughout the 
piece. In effect, he is directing his satire at those who sit idly by, discussing the problem 
and advancing solutions in spite of the suffering of the Irish, and the pressing need of 
action. In this way the conventions used within the process of the also become the target 
of the satire. Similarly, the musical conventions used within Beethoven's Allegro 
movement become the target of his satire: Beethoven uses exaggerated conventionality 
to represent musical conservatism and banality, objectifying these conventions within 
the discourse to satirical effect. 
Crucially in Swift's polemical satire the reader only becomes aware of the satirical 
purport gradually: after an initially convincing, conventional opening the piece is viewed 
increasingly as ironic as the incongruities and exaggerated conventionalities mount. 
This is almost exactly the same course as that pursued by Beethoven in the replacement 
finale: much of the discourse appears to be authentic, and indeed there are elements that 
belong to the composer's later works. Nevertheless, such occasions actually function as 
an element of the satire: they constitute the "surface" of the discourse, a "foil" without 
which the satire cannot occur. For example, the appearance of the Fugue references in 
the "correct" key within the recapitulation (bars 361 -387) helps to produce the structural 
integrity of the whole, as well as confirming the sonata -rondo interpretation. As the 
movement progresses the accumulation of exaggerated conventionality and banality, 
together with both the internal incongruities and the incongruity with its musical and 
biographical context, means that the satirical purport of the movement becomes 
increasingly apparent. 
Significantly, in both works, the "surface" of the discourse is disturbed towards the end. 
As has been seen, the coda of the Allegro exaggerates the conventions of the movement 
to the point of incongruity, resulting in a "rupturing" of the discourse that results in the 
effect of "wrongness ", thereby objectifying the conventions - the artifice - of the 
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movement. In a similar manner, at the end of the Modest Proposal the artifice of the 
proposal is juxtaposed with a statement of the condition of the poor in Swift's Ireland, 
thereby moving beyond the prevailing conventional devices of the satire, in favour of a 
simple statement of the problem: 
I desire those politicians who dislike my overture, and may perhaps be so bold as to attempt 
an answer, that they will first ask the parents of these mortals, whether they would not at 
this day think it a great happiness to have been sold for food, at a year old in the manner I 
prescribe, and thereby have avoided such a perpetual scene of misfortunes as they have 
since gone through by the oppression of landlords, the impossibility of paying rent without 
money or trade, the want of common sustenance, with neither house nor clothes to cover 
them from the inclemencies of the weather, and the most inevitable prospect of entailing 
the like or greater miseries upon their breed for ever. 
Beethoven's satirical attack within the replacement finale of the Op. 130 quartet is 
arguably more subtle than Swift's: there is less absurdity and none of the grotesquery 
present in Swift's polemic. Nevertheless, if the object of Beethoven's satire at first 
appears to be less clear this is only because it happens to comprise the very musical 
material of which the movement is constructed - the banal, clichéd gestures of an 
anachronistic musical conservatism. The interpretation of this movement as irony 
upholds Kinderman's assertion that "Beethoven's composition of the substitute rondo 
finale cannot be equated with a renunciation of the quartet in its original `Galitzin' 
version, with the Grosse Fuge as finale ".55 From this viewpoint the finale may be seen 
to be, not a replacement or substitute, but an eloquent defence of the Fugue. Rather than 
a capitulation to popular taste or an acknowledgment of failure, it is a satirical parody no 
less powerful than Swift's, a bitter ironic comment upon the musical conservatism and 
aesthetic shortcomings of the Fugue's detractors. 
This understanding therefore suggests a new motivation for the replacement of the 
Fugue. Moreover it demonstrates that the irony within these quartets is not only 
Romantic, it also encompasses the "rhetorical species of irony which, sparingly used, 
55 Kinderman (1995) p. 303 
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has an excellent effect, especially in polemics "56 that Schlegel identified as the 
complement to his "philosophical" irony. Beethoven was, in other words, not only a 
Romantic ironist; he was also a satirist of the highest order. 
56 Schlegel (1991) Critical (Lyceum) fragment 42 p. 5 
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Ambiguity vs. Irony 
It appears to be nearly impossible to discuss the nature and effect of irony without 
mentioning ambiguity. As will be seen, the problems of the relationship between 
these two phenomena are complex, and discussion about them is often avoided. The 
result is that they are often elided; indeed they are sometimes considered one and the 
same thing. This chapter will consider the relationship between these two 
phenomena, arguing that, although there is a relationship between ambiguity and 
irony, nevertheless the distinction between them is vital. Therefore, throughout this 
chapter I will attempt to demonstrate the manner in which they may be distinguished, 
using examples from Beethoven's quartets Op. 59 number 3 and Op. 130. This 
differentiation is particularly important when considering musical discourse, not 
least because ambiguity plays a vital role within the processes of tonality. More 
specifically, the instances of ambiguity within Beethoven's quartets, particularly the 
late quartets, are significant; considering these occurrences as irony obscures this 
significance and risks missing the point of these works. 
One of the most significant studies of ambiguity is Empson's Seven Types of 
Ambiguity. He defines ambiguity thus: "The fundamental situation, whether it 
deserves to be called ambiguous or not, is that a word or a grammatical structure is 
effective in several ways at once ".1 He goes on to expand this definition, 
considering that 
A word may have several distinct meanings; several meanings connected with one 
another; several meanings which need one another to complete their meaning; or several 
meanings which unite together so that the word means one relation or one process. This 
is a scale which might be followed continuously. `Ambiguity' itself can mean an 
indecision as to what you mean, an intention to mean several things, a probability that 
one or other or both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has 
several meanings.2 
From this starting point Empson proceeds to divide the spectrum of ambiguous 
utterances more or less according to the extent to which these simultaneous 
1 Empson (1956) p. 2 
2 Ibid. p. 5/6 
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meanings are contradictory. In many of his examples, particularly of the earlier 
types of ambiguity, the result is that there are simply two ways in which the text may 
be read. Thus, according to him, in the following example the Lady is either 
humble, in contrast to "the proud ", or is actually proud herself. 
How loved, how honoured once, avails thee not, 
To whom related, or by whom begot; 
A heap of dust is all remains of thee; 
`Tis all thou art, and all the proud shall be. 
(Pope, Unfortunate Lady) 
The last line of George Herbert's The Sacrifice is similar: 
But now I die; Now, all is finished. 
My woe, man's weal; and now I bow my head: 
Only let others say, when I am dead, 
Never was grief like mine. 
In this case there are two ambiguities. The first of these is with regard to the word 
"mine ": the grief belongs either to Christ himself, or to the "others ". In addition, the 
word "others" possesses ambiguity of this sort - it may be that the "others" are those 
who crucify, or some future "others ", regardless of which way the first ambiguity is 
read. 
A basic structure of ambiguity may be derived from Empson's definition: in cases of 
ambiguous words or structures such as those above, there are two or more possible 
meanings, i.e. semantic structures, present simultaneously, producing alternative 
readings for the same text. In some cases, these semantic levels form opposing terms 
that are culturally defined as contradictory: for example the opposition, regarding the 
character of the Lady in Pope's poem, of humble and proud. These examples must 
therefore, according to Empson's definition, be considered ambiguous, since they are 
"effective in several ways at once ". 
The problem with Empson's definition of ambiguity, and the structure of ambiguity 
that may be inferred from it, is that it may also be taken as a definition of irony: 
irony, as was seen previous chapters is also a structure of simultaneous "meanings ", 
which are often oppositional in nature. Like ambiguity (or at least like Empson's 
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definition of ambiguity), ironic structures may possess "several distinct meanings ", 
that may, or may not be "connected ". And in irony it is certainly the case that 
several meanings "unite together so that the word means one relation or one 
process ". 
This problem - the differentiation of ambiguity from irony - is often reflected in the 
work of those that discuss irony. Although there is frequently some 
acknowledgment of a differentiation between the phenomena, in practice the 
boundaries between them are not considered, and the two terms are often used 
synonymously. For example, Muecke denigrates the manner in which later concepts 
of irony appear to be indistinguishable from ambiguity: 
Recently ... there has been a tendency to equate subtlety in irony with a lesser degree or 
even an absence of contrast, so that any ambiguity may be regarded as ironical. And 
since practically all literature says more than it seems to be saying, if only because it 
contains the universal in the particular, practically all literature can be called ironical.3 
Earlier in his discussion, however, he identified an ironic structure as an ambiguity: 
Thirlwall cites the Antigone of Sophocles as ironical in that it impartially presents two 
equal and opposite points of view. The germ for this concept of irony is already in 
Friedrich Schlegel's `Irony is a form of paradox' but Thirlwall even if he had read this 
in Schlegel is much more explicit. The later history of the concept of irony elevates this 
kind of irony to a central position: in any paradox there are two contrasting truths; an 
ambiguity is ironical if the two co- existent meanings are opposed.4 
The matter is complicated still further when Muecke later considers that ambiguity, 
together with exaggeration, innuendo and "other stylistic warning signals ",5 may be 
read as an indicator of irony; indeed in his earlier work he explicitly considers 
ambiguity to be a technique of "impersonal irony ".6 The implication of this is that, 
if ambiguity is an element, indicator or technique of irony, then irony and ambiguity 
are, in essence, one and the same thing. 
3 Muecke (1970) p. 32 
4 Ibid. p. 22, emphasis added 
5 Ibid. p. 55 
6 Muecke (1969) p. 70/71 
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Similar problems may also be seen in Booth's work. He, like Muecke, refers to 
ambiguity and irony separately, as distinct phenomena, and yet he likewise appears 
at times to consider ambiguity as either an effect or form of irony. For example, in 
discussing the manner in which multiple interpretations of a work are possible, 
Booth describes this type of ambiguity - the duality of meaning of a text - as "the 
irony that disorients by resisting univocal interpretation, the irony that evades 
committed speech ".7 He considers this as "only a branch of a great and ancient art; 
even those modern works which are highly celebrated for their rich ambiguity reveal, 
on close inspection, large tracts of stable irony ".8 His discussion of Samuel 
Beckett's The Unnamable is similar: Booth describes the contradictory, internally 
incongruent views expressed in Beckett's work first as ambiguities, then 
subsequently as irony. 
Philosophers and scientists and literary critics differ greatly about the value of clear 
literal statement, and about the availability of an unequivocal hold on any aspect of the 
truth. I think that none of the major philosophers has gone as far in repudiating them as 
Beckett asks us to go in The Unnamable ... his position, if it can be called that, seems 
to me (and apparently to him) self -defeating, illogical, and untenable. But to say this is 
not to say that because we cannot reconstruct his ultimate ambiguities, or because they 
contradict the assumptions of my book, Beckett should not write them ... There can be 
no guidebook to tell us how much irony a work should contain; the artist himself will 
show us how much of it a work can contain and still succeed with us.9 
More recently, Sheinberg, who views irony in terms of its semantic structure, 
considers that both irony and ambiguity display this same structure: 
A musical structure that encompasses coexisting incongruities can be regarded, by 
definition, as correlative to the cultural unit of ambiguity: for example, Maria's lullaby 
from the first act of Wozzeck, which combines incongruous musical elements of lullaby 
and military march. It is therefore not only an expression of musical irony, but also a 
musical correlative of ambiguity as a cultural unit... Ambiguity has several semantic 
embodiments in semantic structures, most notably irony. In many senses the cultural 
unit `irony' is a correlative of the cultural unit `ambiguity'; their structures are therefore 
correlative, too, and not just analogous to each other. This is a statement of major 
importance to this study, because it means that there can be musical structures that will 
correlate (rather than be analogous) with irony, parody, satire and the grotesque - all of 
these being particular cases of the cultural unit of ambiguity. 10 
7 Ibid. p. 48 
8 Ibid. 
9 Booth (1974) p. 276 
10 Sheinberg (2000). p. 16/17, emphasis original 
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Indeed, she goes beyond this, considering that ambiguity is a type of meta -structure, 
of which irony and its sub -species are specific manifestations or modes. 
Irony, parody, satire and the grotesque all use two or more layers of meaning, and 
therefore they can be regarded as manifestations of semantic ambiguity. Irony in its 
broadest sense, both as a tool for satirical purport and as an expression of the 
unresolvable, could be regarded as a structural prototype for all other modes of 
ambiguity.11 
The problem of considering ambiguity and irony to be the same thing, to conceive of 
them as correlatives, or even simply to use one as a synonym for the other is that, in 
doing so leads to the logical conclusion that every instance of ambiguity must be 
considered to be ironic. The implications of such a view in relation to musical 
discourse are significant. According to this viewpoint, the diminished seventh chord 
that begins Beethoven's quartet Op. 59 no. 3 (example 1) must be considered to be 
an ironic gesture: since this chord could resolve in several different ways it must be 
considered to present several different meanings simultaneously, depending on the 
manner in which it's tonal function is interpreted. The following diagram 




E major /minor (as V minor 9th) 
G major /minor (as VII) 
B flat major /minor (as enharmonic G flat) 
C sharp major /minor (as enharmonic B sharp 
diminished) 
Taking this further, it will be seen that, within the cultural context in which this work 
appears, every diminished chord must be considered ironic, since every one is 
"effective in several ways at once ". Moreover, this is true of every musical 
occurrence whose tonal function is uncertain, or could resolve in more than one way. 
Thus even a dominant seventh at a cadence is included, because of the possibility 
l l Ibid. p. 27 emphasis added 
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that the cadence may turn out to be, amongst other "meanings ", either perfect or 
interrupted. 
From this viewpoint the examples that Empson gives must also be considered ironic, 
and in terms of language in general there is an even more profound significance. As 
will be considered more fully below, virtually every word can have, according to 
context, more than one meaning; every word therefore possesses an inherent type of 
ambiguity. According to the arguments given above, however, this latent ambiguity 
- known as lexical ambiguity - would have to be interpreted as constituting irony, 
and thus all language becomes an ironic utterance.12 
Clearly, understanding ambiguity and irony as the same phenomenon is an untenable 
position, leading eventually to almost absurd, though logical conclusions. More 
importantly, from this viewpoint the value of both ambiguity and irony is 
enormously diminished, for if every utterance can be considered, at some level, 
ironic, then irony becomes of very little value. Differentiating between irony and 
ambiguity may therefore prove to be important for both phenomena. 
One possible solution to this problem was presented by Thomson's conception of 
"functional ambiguity ". According to Thomson ambiguity is not always ironic in 
purport, rather it is an essential aesthetic force - a composer may be deliberately 
ambiguous for aesthetic end: 
Samples of musical ambiguity suggest that composers on occasion utilise dual, or 
multiple, or even vague meaning as integral parts of their image making. There are 
passages within some works when such attributes as directness, stability, assurance, 
clarity, unity or predictability would be inappropriate. At these locations the composer 
achieves structural success with an event that projects just the opposite qualities: 
obliquity, instability, evasiveness, diversity, equivocation, or even sheer disorder, if that 
be the most appropriate condition for the moment.13 
12 It might be argued that considering every word ambiguous is little better than considering every 
word ironic. The problems of lexical ambiguity, however, are at least problems familiar to linguists 
and semioticians: better the devil you know! 
13 Thomson (1983) p. 10 
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Such intentional ambiguity is termed "functional ambiguity ": "When a music event, 
whether small or large, projects equivocation, implying no clear syntactic meaning 
or two or more potential meanings, I call this an instance of functional ambiguity".14 
Thomson's work has been heavily criticised in a recent article by Kofi Agawu. He 
argues that ambiguity cannot really happen in music: "once the enabling constructs 
of music theory are brought into play, equivocation disappears ".15 He considers that 
the application of context via musical theory removes the ambiguity in an 
irreversible "ambiguity- clarity order ". Moreover, apparent ambiguities may be 
disambiguated by specifying "context, listener baggage and segmental level "16 and 
by differentiating between the diverse meanings according to a hierarchy based in 
either structural or stylistic factors. 
decidable hierarchy of probabilities. 
Effectively ambiguities are changed into a 
In addition, Agawu discusses two different types of ambiguity. "Weak" ambiguities 
are the type of implicative, expectation -based ambiguity that will be considered 
below. "Stronger" ambiguities are produced both prospectively (i.e. as implications) 
and retrospectively, and thus are the final state of the music, a true state of final 
equivocation. Agawu, however, discounts the former type altogether and argues that 
for the reasons outlined "strong" ambiguities do not occur in "concrete musical 
situations" either. 
Whilst some of Agawu's argument is persuasive there are several problematic areas. 
The first is his definition of ambiguity: "a musical situation is ambiguous if it gives 
rise to two or more meanings ".17 This definition is effectively the same as 
Empson's, and therefore demonstrates the same kind of problem. Secondly, the fact 
that Agawu limits himself only to tonal ambiguity is problematic. There can be 
cases of formal ambiguity, for example, where the function of a section is ambiguous 
14 Ibid. p. 3 
15 Agawu, Kofi (1994) "Ambiguity in Tonal Music: a Preliminary Study" in Theory, Analysis and 
Meaning in Music ed. Anthony Pople p.88 
16 Ibid. p. 94 
17 Ibid. p. 89 
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in the "strong" sense: the easiest example is the first movement of Beethoven's 
Piano Sonata Op. 31 no. 2, where the prominent ascending arpeggio can be 
understood as both theme and, in retrospect, as a transition. Moreover, there are 
often also ambiguities regarding the semiotic significance of musical events: 
different readings of the same musical events can, according to Agawu's own 
definition, be regarded as ambiguous. 
Finally, whilst it is true that most tonal ambiguities can be disambiguated, and that 
virtually all resolve the irreversible manner described, nevertheless Agawu's 
reduction of possibilities to probabilities does not actually remove the ambiguity: 
there is always the possibility that the most theoretically probable outcome may be 
circumvented. Moreover, ambiguity does not have to exist as the final state of the 
music to have existed within the process of the music. Just because the equivocal 
exists only for a certain period of time does not negate the objective fact of its 
appearance within the work. This is important in that, as Thomson states, a 
composer may use such moments of ambiguity for an aesthetic end. 
Beethoven indeed uses the equivocal in just this manner. As will be seen, in the 
third movement of Op. 130 he actually uses "weak" ambiguities to profound effect. 
Each individual ambiguity within the movement resolves according to the process 
outlined by Agawu. The recurrence of instances of ambiguity throughout the 
movement, however, establishes ambiguity as an important element of the music's 
structure and meaning, opposing the apparent "clarity" or "certainty" of Classicism. 
Despite Agawu's criticism, Thomson's theory of functional ambiguity as an 
aesthetic end is convincing. However, his analyses, which focus on demonstrating 
congruence or incongruence between semantic levels, are less so. He considers only 
congeneric signification based upon both "simple sound articulation" (loudness, 
duration, pitch and timbre) and "gross form" (i.e. larger scale properties such as 
melody, texture, and harmony): 
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If within the total event at least two properties are noncongruent then structural ambiguity 
is a latent potential. If pairs of nonconguent properties coincide, either simultaneously or 
serially, ambiguity becomes a result of high probability for the perceptive listener.18 
In effect he proposes a semantic structure of ambiguity identical to those considered 
earlier: parallel, contradictory semantic levels. Thus since Thomson's structure of 
"functional" ambiguity is the same as that of irony, it is impossible, in practice, to 
determine the distinction between them. As Sheinberg demonstrates, since irony and 
ambiguity appear to have the same semantic structure, ambiguity will always 
correlate with irony. 
However, I consider that this problem arises, in part, through viewing irony purely as 
a structure. If, as in previous chapters, irony may be understood as a process of 
objectification, then it becomes possible to present ambiguities that are not ironic, 
i.e. "functional" ambiguities. For if irony is no longer based solely upon the 
incongruous structure but upon the objectification of that structure, then where there 
is no objectification, as is the case with ambiguity, then there is no irony. 
Considering the difference between ambiguity and irony in terms of objectification, 
however, simply re- frames rather than solves the problem: the problem comes to 
centre on why one structure produces objectification, whilst another, seemingly 
identical structure does not. Therefore, over the course of this chapter, the 
differentiation of ambiguity from irony will be approached in two complementary 
ways. Firstly, although irony and ambiguity appear to possess the same structure - 
simultaneous, incongruous semantic levels - I will consider that objectification only 
occurs in ironic structures because ironic structures only occur on the "manifest" 
level of the discourse. Ambiguous structures, in contrast, always function on the 
"immanent" level, where, as will be seen, objectification cannot occur. Secondly, 
the result of considering the difference between irony and ambiguity in terms of 
immanence and manifestation will be that ambiguity will actually be shown to 
possess a different semantic structure from irony. Therefore, since ambiguity 
18 Thomson (1983) p. 15 
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possesses a different structure and occurs on a different level of the discourse, the 
effect of ambiguity will be seen to be different from irony. 
This approach to ambiguity is essentially semiotic and structuralist in nature. The 
reason for this approach is twofold. Firstly, ambiguity and irony both deal with the 
"meaning" or "meanings" of a given discourse; as such this suggests that a semiotic 
or semantic approach may be appropriate. Secondly, as may be seen from the above 
discussion there is a kind of latent structuralism involved in the conception of these 
phenomena (particularly in the cases of Booth and Sheinberg); my approach simply 
makes this explicit. In particular, I have chosen to use key terms from the work of 
the structuralist semiotician A. J. Greimas, specifically the concepts of "immanence" 
and "manifestation ". Again, the fact that several different theorists have chosen to 
apply his work to music suggests a certain pertinence or transferability of some 
aspects of his work to music.19 
Immanence vs. Manifestation 
As stated, it is possible to make a fruitful distinction between ambiguity and irony on 
the basis of the opposition of the conceptions of "immanence" and "manifestation ". 
Greimas' understanding of immanence, which derives, via Hjelmslev, from 
Saussure, designates a semiotic system prior to its manifestation in discourse. He 
considers that "manifestation logically presupposes the manifested, that is to say the 
immanent semiotic form ";20 in other words, immanence is logically anterior to 
manifestation. (In Eco's terms, a cultural unit must logically exist as an identifiable 
entity, prior to its occurrence in a discourse.) Immanence then may be understood as 
the latent semantic structure of a word, prior to its occurrence in a given discourse. 
19 See, for example, Grabócz, Márta (1996) Morphologie des OEuvres pour Piano des Liszt, Tarasti, 
Eero (1978) Myth and Music and A Theory of Musical Semiotics (1994), and Monelle, Raymond 
(1991) `Structural Semantics and Instrumental Music' in Music Analysis, 10/1 -2. 
20 Greimas, A.J and Courtes, J. (1979) Semiotique, Dictionnaire raisonné de la Théorie du Langage 
p. 151 
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The function of this immanent semiotic level may best be seen in terms of Greimas' 
understanding of the "lexeme ".21 The term "lexeme" relates to individual words, 
indicating a semantic structure comprising all of the possible meanings that they may 
possess when they occur in discourse. It is essentially a configuration of the 
potential semantic contents of an individual word, all the meanings associated with it 
prior to its occurrence within a specific discourse. Thus the lexeme, as such, never 
occurs as a discursive unit, manifest in the discourse, since it is never possible that 
all the potential meanings of a word will actually occur simultaneously. Rather, it is 
a sort of `virtual' unit, a lexicon of potential meanings of an individual word. 
When this word occurs in discourse, however, some of these meanings are 
confirmed, whilst others are rejected within the specific context in which the word 
occurs, producing the meaning of the given utterance. The confirmation of one 
meaning occurs through the process of "redundancy ", another key semiotic term, 
which refers simply to the iteration or repetition of semantic units. A simple 
example of the function both of redundancy and of the lexeme may be seen in 
Greimas' analysis of the sentence "the dog barks" [ "le chien aboie"].22 He considers 
that the words "dog" and "barks" both contain the semantic element "animal" as one 
of the elements of their respective lexemes.23 The combination of these words 
within the sentence therefore produces repetition or iteration of this unit - this 
repetition makes the element redundant. In a characteristically Greimasian reversal 
of meaning, however, such redundancy makes such units more significant, rather 
than less significant (as might be supposed from the normal meaning of the term).24 
Thus "animal" is an essential part of the meaning of the sentence. 
21 See, for example, the definition of "lexeme" in Greimas, A.J and Courtes, J. (1979), as well as his 
use of the term throughout his Sémantique Structurale (1966), for example p. 56ff and 81 
22 This analysis may be found in Greimas (1966), p. 56ff and 81 
23 Actually Greimas observes that the semantic unit "human" is also iterated in both words (since 
"dog" can be a derogatory term for a human). There is thus an interesting ambiguity to this sentence - 
it could refer either to an animal or a human - which only a greater context will clarify. Nevertheless, 
Greimas actually ignores this ambiguity entirely, a procedure I am following simply for the purpose of 
the example. 
24 It is, however, worth observing that too much redundancy will produce the effect of utter banality. 
This is, in a different way, a type of "meaninglessness ", created by too -great repetition of a unit. The 
concept of redundancy thus seems particularly appropriate to music, where there is a constant balance 
between the necessary repetition of a gesture or theme to clarify its "meaning" or function and the 
over -repetition that leads to banality. 
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A similar process may be seen in music. Raymond Monelle, for example, applies 
Greimas' concepts to the analysis of the opening bars of the B flat minor fugue from 
the first book of Bach's Das Wohltemperirte Clavier25 
r 
In these first two bars there is the redundancy of musico- semantic units such as 
"minor ", "descending ", "duple time" through their reiteration between the notes of 
the theme. Again, it is the repetition of these semantic units that makes their 
presence clear to the listener: their redundancy increases the signification.26 
Returning to the distinction of immanence and manifestation, it is possible to see that 
in the first example given there are two structures operative. The first is the semantic 
structure of the words of the sentence anterior to discourse (the lexemes), consisting 
of all the meanings associated with each of the words, all the potential meanings that 
each of them may take when manifested in a discourse. This potential, latent 
structure is what is indicated by the term "immanence ". In contrast to this, the 
semantic structure of each of the words when they occur in the short sentence or 
discourse above will be composed of iterated or redundant meanings. Instead of 
many alternative potential meanings, each word will produce essentially one actual 
meaning (in this case the semantic element "animal "); this type of semantic structure 
is termed "manifested ". 
25 Monelle (1991) 
26 The significance of units such as "minor" and "duple time" is most important at the beginning of a 
piece, where there is an inherent initial uncertainty regarding metre and tonality. The significance of 
these semantic units naturally diminishes as the piece progresses - these "meanings" occur so 
frequently that they become over -redundant. Nevertheless, new occurrences such as hemiola bars or 
major -key transformations, for example, would foreground these original significations again though. 
Thus the redundancy of these significations establishes them as some of the most fundamental, "deep" 
elements of the structure. 
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There are two important considerations with regard to Greimas' definition of 
immanence that must be borne in mind throughout this discussion. The first of these 
is, as Greimas is at pains to point out, that discursive manifestation and the semiotic 
process are not one and the same thing; rather, they are two different processes. 
According to him, "manifestation, conceived as making the form present in the 
substance, presupposes semiosis (or the semiotic act) as an a priori condition. It 
brings together both the expression and content forms even in advance, as it were, of 
their material realisation (purport) ".27 
Therefore, according to Greimas, the immanent structure of a word is conceived of 
as an already -completed semiosis, i.e. a Saussurean union of signifier and signified, 
existing prior to discursive manifestation. In other words, the syntactic formant of 
the word and its potential semantic meanings have already been bound together by 
cultural convention (i.e. "cat" means, among other things, "small mammal "). 
Manifestation is therefore understood as one realisation of this complete a priori 
semiosis within the context of a specific discourse. As a simple example, the perfect 
cadence at the end of the first movement of quartet Op. 59 no 1 may be considered to 
be a specific manifestation of the cultural unit "perfect cadence ".28 This cultural 
unit is already a complete semiosis, which exists as a meta -type for all perfect 
cadences - i.e. as an immanent structure. 
Although it seems somewhat obvious, Greimas second point is particularly 
important, and must be considered carefully: immanence and manifestation are not 
mutually exclusive but are part of the same process. This interdependence may be 
seen both within specific discourses, and the more general context of signifying 
systems as a whole. Firstly, within any specific discourse the immanent structure 
arises as a result of the manifest structure. For example, in order for the immanent 
structure of the potential meanings of a dominant seventh at a cadence point to occur 
requires that the chord itself actually appears, manifested in the discourse. However, 
27 Monelle (1991) p. 183 
28 Which itself will form further correlations, with units such as "closure" for example. 
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it is equally the case that the manifest element that creates such immanent structures 
(the chord itself) is itself a specific realisation of a previous immanent structure. 
Such interdependence within this specific instance is a microcosm of the large -scale 
interdependence that exists in every signifying system. This introduces what appears 
to be an impasse. Simply put, immanence and manifestation are interdependent in 
that, in order for any immanent structure to occur in any semiotic system at all, 
requires that a previous manifestation must have occurred - semiosis cannot take 
place without discursive manifestation. However, it is equally the case that 
manifestation i.e. discursive communication requires an immanent structure - 
manifestation cannot occur if there is no common "semantic universe ". It would 
appear then that since immanence and manifestation are, in reality, two sides of the 
same coin, it will not be possible to use their opposition as a method of 
distinguishing between ambiguity and irony: if immanent and manifest levels are 
interdependent, how can they be used to effectively differentiate ambiguity from 
irony? 
However, the issue of "Which came first, the immanent or the manifest ?" - a 
rewriting of the "chicken vs. egg" impasse - is important only in considering either 
the "first instance" of a cultural unit (i.e. the first time that a Saussurean union of 
signifier and signified is used to communicate, by cultural agreement) or the "first 
instance" of my learning the signification of the unit.29 In both of these cases the 
distinction between immanence and manifestation ceases to exist, since they both 
require manifestation to produce immanence, and immanence to produce 
manifestation. 
Beyond these instances, though, the question is entirely irrelevant. Once a unit has 
been used to signify, it passes on an individual scale into my private lexicon and, on 
a cultural scale, into the shared lexicon that forms a necessary part of all systems of 
signification. Once a unit has become established in this way, it can be seen to 
29 Eco deals with this issue - the problem of the first occurrence of cultural units - at length in his 
Theory of Semiotics. 
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possess both immanent and manifest levels. Consideration of this lexical function 
thus addresses the interdependence of immanence and manifestation. Implied in the 
concept of an immanent structure of discourse is an understanding that every 
semiotic process involves, in part, the functioning of a lexicon of previously 
manifested structures. Every listener possesses, through experience, a lexicon of 
previous occurrences: thus, for example, the manner in which a diminished seventh 
may resolve is known because this has been learned from previous manifestations. 
Such knowledge is retained in the lexicon so that comparison of a given point of an 
individual work to the lexicon of previous occurrences, both within the same work 
and from other works, allows the listener to construct potential implications for the 
manner in which the work will continue (potential resolutions for the diminished 
seventh, for example). Significantly, some of these potential outcomes will be 
realised in the course of the discourse, whilst others will be eliminated. 
Lexical function therefore exploits the apparent paradox of the relationship between 
manifest and immanent level, using what is or has been manifest in order to create 
what might be. A lexicon forms an immanent structure anterior to discursive 
manifestation, indeed it is lexical function that actually allows the existence of the 
immanent level: without lexical function - a remembrance of previous 
manifestations - discourse, indeed communication, is entirely impossible. Thus the 
very possibility of discourse may be taken as the empirical proof of the existence of 
both lexical function, and of the existence of an immanent level of discourse. 
However, the fact that lexical function, like all immanent structures, only occurs 
because of prior manifestation means that it too occurs within the same paradox 
described above. Nevertheless, the existence of lexical function may be taken as 
proof of the existence of the immanent level of discourse; indeed, in some ways it is 
the immanent level. The fact that to understand the ambiguity inherent in a 
diminished seventh I must have experienced different resolutions of previous 
diminished sevenths does not negate the objective existence of the ambiguity that I 
experience now - i.e. the immanent structure of simultaneous different potential 
meanings generated by the chord. The result of this is that it is possible to overcome 
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the difficulties implied simply by accepting the functional distinction between 
immanence and manifestation provided by lexical function. 
Thus, returning to the earlier example, the dominant seventh in a cadence 
progression is clearly manifest, but it also has an immanent structure of possible 
outcomes: it will resolve to the tonic, to another chord (as either an interrupted 
cadence or an augmented sixth), or, finally, there is the remoter possibility that it 
may not resolve at all. Each of these possible outcomes is implied by the chord, 
thereby forming an immanent structure of possibilities. However, only when one or 
other of these possibilities actually occurs in the discourse can any of them be said to 
be manifest. There are clearly two different processes operative here, even if their 
origin is the same. Thus, although immanence and manifestation are interdependent 
processes, nevertheless, they are different, and it is this difference that I intend to 
exploit to distinguish between ambiguity and irony. This difference is significant: 
immanent structures cannot be ironic. 
This "practical" distinction between immanence and manifestation is shared by 
Eugene Narmour, whose "Implication- Resolution Model" of musical discourse 
draws upon lexical function. Narmour's description of stylistic implications clearly 
demonstrates that style may be understood in terms of lexical function as a lexicon of 
intra- and inter -opus "norms ", a "virtual" level of culturally remembered 
occurrences. The location of an individual work within its stylistic genre thus 
creates specific implications as the work unfolds, and these implications actually 
comprise an immanent discursive leve1:30 
The recognition of implication in any parametric pattern would depend upon the relative 
resemblance (degree of functional and conformant synonymity) of the pattern to its 
predecessors both within and without the piece. Style - intra- and extra opus norms - 
thus becomes both the source of specific implications and the framework by which they 
are evaluated. Strength of implication would be directly related to the number of times 
such and such a realisation had followed such an implication. From without, a listener 
would recognise an implicative pattern and judge its strength by remembering various 
30 The most obvious examples are the expectations raised by forms such as sonata form, and the 
frequent manipulation of these stylistic expectations by composers. 
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statistical recurrences of syntactic relationships in the style. From within, the realisation 
of an implication already anticipated by the listener on the basis of prior knowledge and 
learning would contribute to the systematic aspect of the style. Further repetitions of 
these implied realisations would serve to reaffirm the systematic (synchronic) aspect, 
whereas a novel realisation or a novel denial would weaken the system and emphasise 
the diachronic aspect of style . . . A new style would be established once a novel 
realisation or a novel denial recurred. Thus within a piece a realisation would always 
involve synchronic and diachronic feedback in the style. 31 
Narmour's work also highlights an important distinction that will used to 
differentiate between immanent and manifest levels: the opposition of "actual" vs. 
"potential ". His "implications" are the potential meanings of a given musical 
occurrence; since the "realisation" of these implications occurs through the 
reiteration of these, such realisations are manifest, or actualised meanings. In terms 
of lexical function, implications are "virtual" iterations of the potential meanings 
produced by the lexicon in advance of the manifested outcome of the music: thus I 
hear a dominant 7th chord and, depending on the context, construct the possible 
outcomes. Crucially, however, the potential meanings raised by a given point in the 
discourse exist only as potential until one of them is confirmed i.e. until one of them 
actually occurs, manifested in the discourse. Until that point they form a structure of 
potential meanings "between" (as it were) the actual discourse and my individual 
lexicon. 
The distinction between actual vs. potential may therefore be used to clarify and 
effectively separate immanent and manifest levels. Whenever an implication i.e. a 
potential meaning arises between a manifest structure and a lexicon, then this 
structure of potential meanings can be said to form the immanent level of the 
discourse. In contrast, the manifest level of the discourse comprises the actual 
iterations of these potential meanings, and thus has a more concrete, objective 
existence within the structure of the discourse. In other words, immanent structures 
are comprised of potential meanings whilst manifest structures are actualised 
meanings. 
31Narmour, Eugene (1977) Beyond Schenkerism: the Need for Alternatives in Music Analysis p. 127 
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Although it might appear that the distinction between potential and actual is, in 
reality, a grey area, nevertheless, drawing a dividing line in this manner is possible: 
The knowledge of semiotic structures can be considered either as a description, that is to 
say as a simple explicitation of immanent forms, or as a construction, if the world is 
only structurable, that is to say capable of being "in- formed" by the human mind. In 
order to exclude any metaphysical quarrel from semiotic theory, we deem it appropriate 
to limit ourselves to setting up operational concepts, by calling semantic universe (the 
"there is meaning ") any semiotic system prior to its description and semiotic object its 
explicitation with the help of a constructed metalanguage (and of constructed 
representation languages).32 
Thus, Greimas draws the dividing line at precisely this same point. The "semantic 
universe" (his term for the immanent level) is a structure of potential meanings (in 
fact, all the potential meanings of every word, in its broadest form), composed of the 
individual potential meanings of each lexeme. The "semiotic object" is the form of 
the immanent semantic universe manifested in terms of the individual 
"representational language ". Thus, using a simplistic example, the semantic unit 
<sigh> is an immanent semantic structure of both the English word "sigh" and, in the 
Western musical tradition of a descending semitone in a minor key.33 The important 
point however, is that the potential structure is specifically identified as being 
immanent, while the realisation, the "making actual ", in discourse in a 
representational language (whether in language, music, art etc.) is the manifestation 
of this immanent form. In short, immanence correlates with potential, manifestation 
with actual: what is, is manifest; what might be is immanent. 
* 
Before applying this distinction within an analysis of the ambiguities of the opening 
of Beethoven's quartet Op. 59 number 3 two important observations regarding the 
function of such potential meanings must be made. The first of these is that a 
structure of different potential meanings or resolutions will almost invariably be 
32 Greimas (1979) p. 151 
33 Monelle traces the original root of this topic to "weeping ", rather than "sighing" (Monelle, 
Raymond (2000) The Sense of Music: Semiotic Essays p. 66 -73). He demonstrates that the latter 
meaning arose once the original signification was forgotten. I refer to this later meaning, however, 
purely because it is the more commonly understood, not least because of Riemann's designation of the 
gesture as a "Mannheim sigh ". 
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unequal in terms of probability - some of the potential resolutions will be more 
"expected" than others. This inequality occurs as a result of statistical norms: the 
more frequently the same outcome occurs for any given discursive occurrence, the 
more probable its occurrence on subsequent occasions. For example, it is more usual 
for the cadential dominant seventh to resolve as a perfect cadence than as an 
interrupted cadence. Therefore, at the point of the dominant seventh chord a perfect 
cadence, rather than an interrupted cadence is more statistically probable. The result 
of this unequal probability is that the structure of potential meanings will be 
"asymmetrical" in terms of expected outcome. 
The unequal probability of the potential resolutions of an ambiguous structure is 
closely related to the concept of "markedness ", a semiotic concept first applied to the 
analysis of musical discourse by Hatten. He defines the concept simply as "the 
valuation given to difference ", adding that 
Wherever one finds differentiation, there are inevitably oppositions. The terms of such 
oppositions are weighted with respect to some feature that is distinctive for the 
opposition. Thus, the two terms of an opposition will have an unequal value or 
asymmetry, of marked versus unmarked, that has consequences for the meaning of each 
term.34 
Hatten uses the example of the opposition of major and minor to demonstrate the 
function of markedness. He considers that the minor mode is the more marked term 
in the opposition because it is consistently used to represent the tragic, whereas the 
major mode may represent not only the opposite - the comic - but also other topical 
genres not directly related to the tragic (for example, the pastoral, the heroic etc.). 
The minor mode therefore has a narrower range of expression, and thus possesses 
greater significance. Similarly, the potential outcomes of a dominant seventh chord 
are statistically weighted in favour of a resolution as a perfect cadence; the 
alternative resolution - to an interrupted cadence - is the more marked. Therefore, 
although the first outcome is more expected, the second is more significant. Thus 
the particular effect of an interrupted cadence arises because it is less statistically 
expected and more marked. As a result the axes of such oppositions are 
34 Hatten (1994) p. 34 
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asymmetrical, being weighted in favour of the marked terms: as David Lidov states 
in his introduction to Hatten's work, the marked term of an opposition "tends to be 
more richly evaluated (positively or negatively) and more special ".35 
The structure of ambiguity will therefore be considered to be similarly unequally 
weighted, or asymmetrical not only with regard to statistical probability, but also in 
terms of markedness value. However, it is vital to realise that, despite this unequal 
distribution the actual constitution of the structure remains unaffected: despite the 
asymmetry it still comprises an immanent structure of two or more potential 
outcomes.36 
Secondly, from the above discussion it is increasingly clear that the immanent level 
cannot be regarded simply as a latent level of the discourse. On the contrary, it plays 
as active a part as the manifest structure, bearing as much significance upon the 
meaning of an utterance.37 Narmour highlights the importance of its activity: "The 
signifying implication and the signified realisation are two inseparable, 
complementary aspects of our temporal experience ... music theory must take both 
aspects into account simultaneously. "38 
35 Ibid. p. x 
36 It is worth noting, however, that many cases of ambiguity do not present only two potential 
meanings, i.e. not simply one binary opposition on the immanent level. Rather, it is frequently the 
case that several potential meanings might occur: for example, dominant seventh chords produce three 
possibilities - resolution as perfect or imperfect cadences or reinterpretation as an augmented sixth 
chord. In cases such as this, however, both markedness and statistical probability still function 
because the structure of three potential outcomes forms three binary oppositions: perfect vs. 
interrupted cadence, perfect cadence vs. reinterpretation and interrupted cadence vs. reinterpretation. 
In this case an augmented sixth resolution is the least expected and most marked term in both 
oppositions in which it appears, and is therefore the most significant outcome. 
37 Narmour's description of this process is eloquent: 
"In an implication -realisation model, style forms - schemes based on statistical recurrences - would be 
conceived as forming anterior pools of implicative resources on which the idiostructure (and the style 
structure) would draw. In the actual piece, of course, only some implications would be present. And 
only some, not all, would be realised. Thus the structure of a work would be composed of the 
realisations of implications presented against the background of specific implications and specific 
non -realisations which the idiostructure and the style patterns simultaneously invoke ... As in 
microphysics, where the temporal "acts" of particles are studied by the "tracings" they leave, so 
behind each piece of music would lie a "shadowgraph" of unrealised implications whose implied 
(unrealised) structure would contribute to the richness and depth of the actual realisations of the 
idiostructure and the style structure." Narmour (1977) p. 212, emphasis original 
38 Ibid. p.211, emphasis original 
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To paraphrase Narmour, what a work is not is as important as what it actually is. 
This is a purely logical consideration: since the presence of one term of an 
opposition always implies the presence of the other term, part of the meaning of 
every manifested element occurs because of what the meaning of that word excludes. 
Therefore, since words, as lexemes, have more than one potential meaning, then 
these potential meanings also help define, negatively, what the contextual meaning 
of the word is as it occurs in discourse. Narmour states that these rejected meanings 
form an immanent level that is an active part of determining the meaning of the 
manifested discourse.39 The implications raised, and subsequently rejected during 
the process of discourse form part of this structure, which remains as part of the 
discourse adding a type of "negative" meaning to the "positive" manifested meaning. 
I consider that ambiguity presents a particular effect of this active immanent level 
upon the discourse, producing an semantic structure of potential 
redundancies /meanings. This immanent structure arises as a result of lexical 
function: comparison of a given point in the current discourse with the reader's 
lexicon produces a structure of two or more potential meanings /outcomes 
(Narmour's "implications ") for one element of discourse. These potential meanings, 
however, remain as potential until they are either confirmed or rejected. As soon as 
one potential meaning is chosen over the other - confirmed through the context in 
which it occurs - the alternative meaning is no longer a possibility for the manifest 
structure of the utterance and the ambiguity is resolved. The chosen meaning will be 
confirmed by reiteration and simultaneously the alternate meanings will be negated 
and eliminated. The rejected "meanings" remain dormant within the context of the 
current discourse, contributing meaning in the "negative" manner described above. 
Crucially, in cases of ambiguity the immanent level is an active part of the discourse: 
it directly affects the meaning of the discourse, producing the particular effect of 
several potential meanings simultaneously. Thus, through ambiguity the immanent 
level is not, like Narmour's "shadowgraph ", relegated to a position "behind" the 
39 He uses the term "shadowgraph ". 
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meaning, contributing only "negatively ". Rather, it is an active, vital part of the 
discourse. Moreover, since every word, and indeed every musical occurrence 
possesses "lexical" ambiguity to a greater or lesser degree, ambiguity in discourse 
may be taken as a macro indication of the microstructures of ambiguity that 
continuously occur upon every word. Discursive ambiguity is, in other words, an 
attenuation of lexical ambiguity, a particular effect of the active immanent level 
upon the manifest structure of the discourse, used for aesthetic end. 
The opening of Op. 59 number 3 
The following analysis is intended to demonstrate the distinction between ambiguity 
and irony (via that between immanence and manifestation) in practice upon one of 
the most striking instances of tonal ambiguity in Beethoven's entire oeuvre - the 
opening bars of quartet Op. 59 number 3. The entire introduction to this movement 
is essentially a prolongation of tonal ambiguity: consequently ambiguity is an 
aesthetic element of particular importance to the whole movement. Moreover, the 
unequal statistical weighting of the potential outcomes of an ambiguous structure is 
particularly relevant to this work. Throughout, Beethoven consistently chooses the 
resolution of each harmonically- ambiguous chord that is the statistically least 
expected, most marked, and thus most significant of the possible outcomes in order 
to create the effect of this passage. 
As was considered above, the diminished chord that begins the movement is an 
ambiguous gesture:40 the fact that this chord could resolve several ways produces 
several potential meanings for the chord, several "virtual" redundancies "between" 
the actual manifest chord and the listener's lexicon. (Diagram 1 above.) According 
to the distinction outlined above, the fact that these meanings remain only potential 
at this point in the discourse means that they must be considered as part of the 
40 This statement reflects the historical context in which this quartet appears: with the breakdown of 
the "functional" nature of tonality that occurred throughout the 19t Century diminished chords 
became less ambiguous, their function becoming more colouristic. 
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The manner in which this diminished chord "resolves" is particularly interesting. In 
light of the following F7 chord, the diminished chord becomes re- interpreted as a 
dominant minor ninth without the root (F), the F# being reinterpreted 
enharmonically as G flat. It is important to note that, whilst in the lexicon of the 
"ideal listener" such a resolution would have been one of the possible redundancies, 
I would suggest that it would have occurred as one of the least likely - diminished 
sevenths do not "normally" resolve this way. 
The dominant seventh in the second bar possesses the same type of structure as that 
of the preceding chord: since it can resolve several ways it produces a structure of 
opposed potential meanings. Thus, like the diminished chord, the dominant seventh 
can be said to possess an ambiguous structure, since this structure occurs on the 
immanent level of the discourse41. As with the first chord, Beethoven reinterprets, 
rather than resolves the F7 chord, transforming it enharmonically into a "German" 
augmented sixth (the E flat becoming a D #), which resolves in a conventional 
manner to a second inversion A minor. This reinterpretation of the dominant seventh 
is the least expected of the potential outcomes of the F7 chord: 
41 It should be noted, once more, that not all of the potential resolutions of the dominant chord 
possess equal statistical probability. The resolution as a perfect cadence is far more stylistically usual, 
whist the other potential resolutions are more marked. Therefore the manner in which this chord 








The fact that the A minor chord is in second inversion tends to imply that the chord 
is cadential i.e. as Ic in either a perfect or imperfect cadence. Whilst the chord itself 
is not usually regarded as inherently ambiguous, as a diminished or even a dominant 
seventh might be, it is still possible, as indicated, to construct at least two potential 
resolutions for the A minor chord. However, the enharmonic reinterpretation of the 
previous two chords raises a third possibility, the potential that this chord might not 
resolve in the "normal ", or "expected" manner at all, but rather that it too might be 
reinterpreted. Therefore, due to the fact that this A minor chord has at least three 
potential resolutions, shown below, it may be regarded as possessing, within the 




perfect cadence (as Ic) 
imperfect cadence (as Ic) 
harmonic reinterpretation 
The D7 chord in bar 6 does in fact cause the A minor chord to be reinterpreted as the 
supertonic in an implied II -V - I, rather than as the tonic - another unconventional 
resolution. Furthermore, on the first two beats of bar 6, this D7 possesses ambiguity 
of the same type as that of the earlier dominant seventh in bar 3. However, the 
descent to C in the bass on the third beat of the bar rules out the possibility of an 
imperfect cadence and therefore appears to unambiguously imply a resolution to G 
major. 
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Once again the dominant does not resolve as expected, avoiding the cadence by 
moving to the chord of B minor, and the phrase ends (if it can be called an end) on 
another diminished chord. This diminished chord will of course possess the same 
type of structure of potential meanings as that of the opening chord (though probably 
with fewer possibilities) - the same ambiguity. 
This brief analysis has attempted to demonstrate three key issues regarding both the 
relationship between irony and ambiguity and the particular function of this 
relationship within this quartet. The first of these is the manner in which the 
opposition of potential vs. actual may be used to differentiate the immanent level 
from the manifest. Each of the ambiguities that occurred in the passage arose from 
the simultaneous existence of several possible outcomes, i.e. several potential 
meanings, for one chord. However, these structures of simultaneous, different 
potential meanings were never actualised in the discourse. Rather, each ambiguity 
"resolved" from a structure of several potential meanings to one actual outcome, 
albeit the outcome that was the least expected according to stylistic conventions. 
The oppositional structure that formed the ambiguity must therefore be considered to 
have existed only as potential, since this structure never appeared as an actualised 
structure within the discourse. Consequently, it must be understood to be part of the 
immanent level of the discourse. The opposition of actual vs. potential may 
therefore be used to differentiate the manifest level from the immanent. 
The distinction between actual and potential, correlating with manifest and 
immanent levels is vital: as a result, the immanent structure of potential meanings of 
each of the chords must be regarded as ambiguous, rather than ironic. As was seen 
in previous chapters, every case of irony necessarily involves a process of 
objectification. For objectification to occur, however, requires that both of the 
opposed elements that comprise the ironic structure occur in the manifest structure of 
the discourse. Therefore, as will be considered below, the simultaneous oppositional 
structures of the individual chords in the above example cannot be regarded as 
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ironic, even though they individually comprise several simultaneous contradictory 
meanings. These structures exist on the immanent level of the discourse, preventing 
the process of objectification from occurring; consequently, each must be understood 
as ambiguous, rather than ironic. 
This is the second point regarding the relationship between immanent and manifest 
levels: if the distinction between them is not maintained, or is ignored, then irony 
and ambiguity appear to possess the same structure -a single structure comprising 
simultaneous, contradictory/different elements. Consequently, each chord in the 
example would need to be understood as being inherently ironic; not only the 
inherent tonal ambiguity of the diminished chords, but also even the "lexical" 
ambiguity of the other chords would have to be regarded as irony. Beyond this, 
virtually every utterance, musical, linguistic or otherwise would have to be 
considered ironic, since a structure of opposed meanings could conceivably be 
constructed for almost every element of these utterances. 
However, introducing the distinction between immanent and manifest levels, as was 
demonstrated in the analysis, allows a clear distinction to be drawn between irony 
and ambiguity. Because the structure of opposed potential meanings for each of the 
chords occurs on the immanent level, the chords themselves can be regarded, in 
terms of their tonal function, as possessing an ambiguous, rather than an ironic 
structure. 
This is closely related to the third point regarding the example, which concerns the 
manner in which Beethoven uses ambiguity within this passage. Although harmonic 
ambiguity is, to a certain degree, expected in slow introductions here it is strikingly 
foregrounded. Since ambiguity continually recurs as a property of each of the chords 
it can be said to occur as an actual semantic element of these bars: ambiguity 
effectively functions as a type of musical topic, an entity in its own right. (As will 
be seen, this use of ambiguity as a semantic unit or topic is particularly prominent in 
the third movement of Op. 130.) 
357 
The ambiguity that recurs through each of the chords in this passage, however, is in 
reality simply the "lexical ambiguity" inherent in diminished and dominant seventh 
chords, the latent ambiguity that creates several potential meanings for virtually any 
given word or note. Whilst this appears to negate, or at least undermine, the 
importance of the ambiguity that occurs in this passage, it is precisely this lexical 
ambiguity that Beethoven uses to produce the effect of this passage. In other words, 
he specifically exploits the ambiguity inherent within the system of tonal harmony in 
order to produce the aesthetic effect of this particular passage. 
Throughout the bars that were analysed, Beethoven, by a series of harmonic 
"reinterpretations ", avoids resolving any of the chords in the "usual" or expected 
manner. Rather, in each case he consistently chooses the potential "resolution" of 
the ambiguous chords that is the most unconventional, most marked and least 
expected stylistically. The result is twofold. Firstly, it produces a continual 
avoidance of resolution and tonicisation - within the first eight bars of the movement 
the keys of B flat major /minor, then A minor and finally G major are variously 
implied, though none is established. This is combined with (indeed contributes to) 
the constant undermining of the listener's expectations regarding the resolution of 
the ambiguities created by the individual chords. The iteration of unconventional, 
unexpected resolutions is significant: over the course of these bars the listener 
actually comes to expect that the least statistically probable harmonic procedure will 
be the one that actually occurs - the stylistically unexpected has become the most 
probable outcome. 
Paradoxically, in such a case the conventional resolution will eventually become 
more significant than the unconventional resolutions: the reversal of statistical 
probability within the specific work will produce a corresponding change in the 
markedness values, with the "conventional" term becoming the most unexpected and 
the most marked - in short, more significant. This reversal is crucial for the 
subsequent course of the entire movement: Beethoven uses the ambiguity of this 
passage, together with the unconventional resolution of these ambiguities and the 
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continual undermining of the listener's expectations to produce a subtle irony when 
the tonic is finally established. 
The reversal that occurs in the introduction produces an incongruity between the 
harmonic processes within the context of this movement and the "norms" of tonal 
harmony, an incongruity which gives rise to irony. Through this reversal the 
unexpected becomes the "norm" of this movement, whereas the conventional "norm" 
- the "usual" process of tonal harmony - is objectified. This objectification occurs 
primarily though exaggeration: the manner in which the tonic of the movement is 
finally established, at bar 43, is almost exaggeratedly simple - the cadential 
progression is so straightforward as to verge on the banal. Moreover, the point 
where is occurs - 14 bars into the Allegro - is really too late, undermining the 
establishment of the tonality. 
However, this objectification also occurs because of the opposition between the 
exaggerated conventionality of this moment and the unconventional introduction that 
precedes it. Because of the reversal of markedness values and statistical probability, 
this exaggeratedly conventional cadence is actually both unexpected and marked. 
Thus the fact that when the "conventional" does actually occur it appears both 
unexpectedly and exaggeratedly means that the overt conventionality of the moment 
becomes objectified. In other words it is ironically undermined; the conventional 
becomes objectified, it's very conventionality becoming the object of a subtle satire. 
Thus, although the analysis focused on the ambiguous structures of the individual 
chords, the ambiguity of the introduction actually results in an ironic effect - indeed, 
irony is important both within this introduction and the whole movement. The 
crucial point for the current discussion, however, is that this irony is distinct from the 
ambiguity analysed above. The ambiguity in the passage occurs within the structure 
of the individual chords; the ironic effect occurs as a result of a separate process that 
recurs across the entire passage. Thus, whilst the opening diminished seventh itself 
is not ironic, but ambiguous, the manner in which the ambiguity of the chord is 
resolved produces irony: all of the ambiguous chords resolve unconventionally, 
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undermining expectation and convention, and finally the establishment of the tonic. 
It is vital to understand though, that this irony occurs only because of the recurrence 
of such unconventional resolutions - individually these are not ironic. Therefore, 
although ambiguity and irony both occur in the passage, they occur as distinct 
processes. The fact that the introduction involves both makes it even more important 
to differentiate between them, in order to better understand the functioning of this 
movement. 
* 
The Structure of Alternatives 
* * 
Further significant examples of ambiguity from the later quartets will be considered 
below. First, however, several important additions must be made to the proposed 
distinction between irony and ambiguity. These arise from the fact that there are 
some ambiguities - unresolved ambiguities - where the distinction between actual 
and potential meanings, and immanent and manifest levels, appears less successful in 
distinguishing ambiguity from irony. For example, the ambiguity of the final two 
lines of Herbert's The Sacrifice, quoted earlier, clearly comprises two iterated 
meanings: "I" and "mine" iterate <Christ's griefs; "others" and "mine" iterate 




< Other's griefs 
"Others" 
Both these meanings appear to be iterated in the structure of the discourse; either can 
be constructed from within the discourse itself, without recourse to a "virtual" 
iteration from a lexicon. The poem therefore appears to contain two incongruent 
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meanings on the manifested level simultaneously; according to the earlier definition, 
these lines would have to be considered ironic, rather than ambiguous. 
However, the basic definition still holds: the above structure - two meanings 
converging on one element - is still a structure of possibilities, rather than of 
manifest actualities, still ambiguous rather than ironic. In this example the meaning 
of the word "mine" is evaluated in retrospect and is found to produce two possible 
meanings, either of which could form a complete, iterated structure were it not for 
the existence of the possibility of another, contrary meaning. In other words, the two 
meanings for the text exist as two alternatives. 
Crucially, these two alternative meanings converge on only one manifest element. 
Thus to read either of the meanings requires the negation of the other: to read the text 
as "Christ's Grief' requires the reinterpretation of each of the constituent parts of the 
sentence, with the result that the alternative meaning - "Other's Grief' - is rejected. 
Therefore each element of the text is susceptible to two alternative, mutually 
exclusive interpretations. 
The possibility of alternative readings produces a requirement for further redundancy 
to create a single meaning, i.e. in order for the meaning of the lines to be certain. 
Neither of the meanings can be regarded as a sole, actualised meaning for the 
discourse; however, neither is redundant enough to exclude the possibility of the 
other. These two potential meanings may therefore be considered to form a structure 
of alternatives. 
The decisive issue will be whether further redundancy will "resolve" the structure or 
not. If the structure of alternatives exists upon the immanent level of the discourse 
then adding to one of the alternative readings will "resolve" the structure from 
several meanings to one single meaning, essentially by confirming one of the 
possible meanings and negating the others. If, however, it exists on the manifest 
level, then no resolution to a single meaning would be possible. A structure of 
manifest incongruent elements - i.e. an ironic structure - can never be negated by 
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further redundancy; further reiteration of one element would never remove the 
objective existence of the other element. Rather, both elements always remain 
present in the discourse as a manifest structure of simultaneous incongruity. 
As an example of this, consider again the opening lines of the poem New Corn: 
Swiftly the years, beyond recall. 
Solemn the stillness of this spring morning. 42 
This poem was previously identified as ironic, an extreme example of a discourse 
constructed from two complete but opposed semantic structures. The important 
point here, however, is that no matter how much redundancy were added to either of 
the two elements of the poem there would never be sufficient to negate the opposed 
element: the objective, manifest existence of both incongruent elements will prevent 
this "resolution" - irony will always occur. 
In contrast, further redundancy does resolve the final lines of The Sacrifice. The 
substitution of the lines "Only let others say of me, when I am dead, never was grief 
like mine" for the originals produces a simple iteration of the first person ( "me" - "I" 
- "mine "). This negates the possibility of the alternative meaning: this alternative 
reading simply ceases to exist and the structure of simultaneous opposed meanings 
"resolves" to one single meaning.43 (It must be added that the alternative meaning 
could equally be iterated in a similar manner.) 
Whilst this crass violation of these lines is regrettable, it demonstrates the crucial 
point that a structure of alternative meanings for one manifest element will always 
remain a structure of potentials; it will always, and can only, function on the 
immanent level of the discourse. Despite the fact that both meanings are, to a certain 
degree, iterated in the discourse, the possibility that the structure could resolve means 
that these alternatives remain only immanent possibilities, rather than manifest 
actualities - the poem is ambiguous, rather than ironic. 
42 Waley (1962) p. 60 
43 Actually, the alternative reading could still be constructed, but doing so would render the lines 
grammatically incomprehensible. 
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The following example, often given in discussions of human perception, further 
demonstrates the ambiguity of such structures of alternative potential meanings. 
This drawing (W.E. Hill's My Wife and Mother in Law), containing two contrasting 
images -an old lady and a young woman - might at first be considered strikingly 
ironic: age and youth - cultural opposites - are combined in one entity, objectifying 
the transience of both. It appears as though this dual structure comprises two 
manifest "meanings" - the outline of both ladies must clearly exist, or else we would 
be unable to see either. As such it appears as though these different meanings cannot 
be considered to be potential. Moreover, to see only one image I must ignore the 
objective presence of the other in the drawing: as Booth argues, once the duality of 
meaning in such cases is apprehended it is impossible to see either reading as wholly 
convincing on its own.44 Therefore, it seems that only by ignoring the irony could 
this structure be "resolved" in the manner possible in ambiguity. 
This drawing, however, is actually an unresolved ambiguity. The two different 
"meanings" exist in the same manifest elements: every line of the drawing is 
susceptible to two different, mutually exclusive, interpretations. Interpreting the 
44 Booth (1974) p. 128 
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drawing as either of the images involves the momentary negation of the existence of 
the other; to see the image of the young woman requires a complete reinterpretation 
of the meaning of the constituent parts of the drawing, removing the possibility of the 
existence of the alternative image. The two images do not therefore exist 
simultaneously, rather they are alternative readings of the same discourse. In effect, 
by viewing either of the images I momentarily transform the duality of meaning of 
the drawing into a single meaning, thereby "resolving" the ambiguity. 
Thus this drawing evinces exactly the same type of structure as that seen in Herbert's 
poem - a structure of alternatives that may be resolved by further redundancy. In 
such cases of unresolved ambiguity the reader's lexicon supplies potential 
redundancies for the given manifest occurrence. The alternative readings of an 
unresolved ambiguity are "projected" as potential meanings into a virtual "future" of 
the discourse (even if that future is never actually manifested) as an immanent 
structure "between" the discourse and the reader's lexicon. 
The potential for resolution, however, indicates a lack of semantic closure. Since a 
structure of alternative meanings is an immanent structure then it cannot possess 
syntactic closure: as soon as closure occurs the resulting structure will exist as an 
actualised part of the manifest level of the discourse.45 Rather, in cases of 
ambiguity there is only the potential for closure. Both of these examples may 
therefore be considered to be semantically "open ", lacking semantic closure on the 
manifest level of the discourse. Indeed, all cases of ambiguity produce such "open" 
45 According to Meyer closure is always a result of "syntactic relationships ": closure can only occur 
within syntactic systems, where, by definition, "the elements of the parameter can be segmented into 
discrete, non -uniform relationships so that the similarities and differences between them are definable, 
constant, and proportional" (Meyer, Leonard (1989) Style and Music: Theory, History and Ideology p. 
14). Thus, within the system of tonal music he identifies melody, rhythm and harmony as syntactic 
parameters, since all of these make hierarchic structures possible and "establish mobile processes and 
closural articulations" (ibid. p. 15). He considers that it is only such syntactic systems that the criteria 
for closure can be established - since a system of uniform elements, or a graded continuum is lacking 
in definition and delineation, difference and relationship cannot be generated. Therefore such systems 
are devoid of both impetus (i.e. the "movement" created by difference and hierarchy) and closure 
(since all elements are equal, none is truly an "ending "). Significantly, he also considers that closure 
is essentially defined by the perception of the listener. Syntactic systems produce differentiation and 
closure; but syntax itself is produced by cultural convention rooted in human perception and 
cognition. Therefore, closure may be said to be a result of human perception. 
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structures - immanent structures of potential redundancy, partially manifest yet 
lacking semantic closure. 
In contrast, the fact that irony is formed from two distinct, manifest discursive 
elements, rather than the structure of alternatives seen in ambiguity, means that the 
incongruity that arises from these elements also occurs on the manifest level. This 
manifestation prevents the resolution of the structure: the syntactic closure of these 
individual elements prevents their negation by further redundancy - as was seen, the 
incongruity will still function despite this further redundancy.46 If such ironic 
structures did not possess closure then there would be the potential for the type of 
"resolution" seen in ambiguous structures. Therefore, the fact that such resolution 
cannot occur is attributable to the presence, to some degree, of semantic closure. 
Therefore, irony will be understood as a structure composed of two or more 
incongruous, "closed" elements simultaneously, existing upon the manifest level of 
the discourse. In contrast the lack of closure in ambiguity means that its structure of 
two or more simultaneous potential elements, existing as a structure of alternatives 
upon the immanent level of the discourse, can be considered to be a semantically 
"open ". 
The crucial point about the "open" structure of ambiguity is that in such structures no 
process of objectification can occur. Throughout previous chapters objectification 
was considered to be the process that defines irony, arising as an effect of its 
structure, whereby one viewpoint or element of such an ironic structure is preferred 
over another. In all cases the non -preferred term becomes the objectified "victim" of 
the irony. However, within ambiguous structures such as those considered above the 
contradictory elements exist only as potential redundancies, each of the alternative 
46 Although it is possible to view an ironic discourse as non -ironic, this involves ignoring a part of 
the total structure (or the effect of that particular part) rather than re- interpreting the substance of the 
discourse. For example, to consider a subtle irony such as the second movement of Tchaikovsky's 
Sixth Symphony simply as a non -ironic waltz requires ignoring the fact that it occurs in 5/4 time: this 
metre is opposed to the obvious waltz gestures, producing both "waltz" and "non- waltz" 
simultaneously. Ignoring the existence of one term of this opposition, however, does not negate the 
opposition, simply because both terms of the opposition actually exist as distinct elements of the 
discourse. Far from removing the irony in the discourse, this process simply does not recognise it. 
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meanings arising as a "projection" on the immanent, rather than manifest level of the 
discourse. The whole structure therefore possesses only the potential for semantic 
closure. 
The very nature of this ambiguous structure means that any preferencing of one of 
the alternative elements over another would "resolve" the structure by effectively 
adding redundancy to the preferred meaning. As above, this extra redundancy would 
iterate the preferred meaning whilst simultaneously negating the rejected term - in 
effect one of the alternative meanings would be chosen over the others. 
Consequently, the whole structure would resolve from several potential, immanent 
meanings to only one actualised meaning. Accordingly, the process of 
objectification simply cannot function in immanent structures such as those 
considered: even though they consist of contradictory elements they must be 
considered to be ambiguous, rather than ironic. 
* 
The Structure of Ambiguity 
As was stated above ambiguity differs from irony not only in regard to the process of 
objectification, but also in terms of structure. This may be seen through refining the 
diagram derived from Herbert's Sacrifice. While both meanings of the last lines may 
apparently be seen in the manifest structure, the lack of semantic closure actually 
projects them as an immanent structure of alternative potential meanings identical to 
the ambiguities in the introduction to Op 59, number 3. 
Diagram 6 «I <first person> 






The "direction ", as it were, of this diagram is important. The left side represents a 
semantically "open" structure of two "meanings" meeting at one point in the 
manifest structure. This type of occurrence produces a structure of alternatives - the 
projection "forward" of potential iterations by the reader's lexical function. This 
structure of potential meanings (represented by the right hand side of the diagram) is 
the structure of ambiguity - an immanent structure of two or more alternative 
potential meanings connected to a single element of the manifest discourse. 
Significantly, the left hand side of the diagram is evaluated retrospectively, or 
"backwards ", whilst the right hand side, i.e. the ambiguity, is evaluated "forwards" 
as a projection of "what might be ". The left hand side of the diagram gives rise to 
the right, but it is only with this right hand structure that ambiguity occurs. 
Crucially, this ambiguous structure differs from that of irony, which was considered 
to be two simultaneous but different manifest structures. Whilst irony may be 






However, in every ambiguity there is a third potential resolution. In the example 
from Herbert's poem further redundancy of either potential meaning (either "Christ's 
grief' or "other's grief') will resolve the ambiguity, negating the rejected term. If 
both alternatives are actually iterated, however, then the structure of simultaneous 
contradictory meanings will be transformed from the immanent level onto the 
manifest level of the discourse. Such an occurrence would allow the process of 
objectification (since objectification can occur on the manifest level) and as a result 
the ambiguity would "resolve" ironically, not as "either -or" but rather as "both ". 
There are therefore three potential meanings - "Christ's grief', "other's grief' or 
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"both" - of which the first two are unambiguous, and the last ironic. In light of this, 
the ambiguous structure of this poem may be regarded more like this: 
Diagram 7 "I" <first person> i 
<Christ's Grief> i i 
"mine" - - - <both> i.e. <irony> 
<Other's grief> 
"Others" <plural> 
This alternative outcomes of the structure (the right hand side of the diagram) may 
be expressed more simply still, as <A vs. B vs. A + B >, which itself may be reduced 
to a fundamental opposition: 
irony vs. non -irony 
A +B A or B 
Thus within every ambiguity there exists the potential for irony: the ambiguity 
contains the potential to resolve either "normally ", as either of the opposed terms, or 
"ironically ", by iterating both. In other words, all cases of ambiguity, including 
unresolved ambiguities such as Herbert's poem, could express irony if both 
alternative readings were iterated, forming simultaneous, different elements. 
The manner in which the Grosse Fuge unfolds from the ambiguity of the Overtura 
can be understood as just such an occurrence. As was seen in the fourth chapter of 
this work, the multiple fragments of the Overtura, coming at the beginning of the 
movement, produced a powerful ambiguity, i.e. several potential outcomes for the 
manner in which the movement might continue. Throughout the subsequent course 
of the movement, however, each of the outcomes actually occurred, in incongruous 
juxtaposition with each other. This may be understood as a resolution to the "third 
possibility" inherent in every ambiguity. In other words the ambiguity of the 
Overtura resolved ironically throughout the course of the Grosse Fuge not as any one 
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of the individual themes but, paradoxically, as all of them: the ambiguity of the 
Overtura "resolved" into an ironic structure. 
Nevertheless, it is important to realise that although irony is one of the possible 
outcomes of every ambiguity this does not make the ambiguity itself ironic. Rather, 
the fact that the structure could "resolve" non -ironically means that irony remains 
only one of the potential meanings. In short, every ambiguity contains the potential 
for both irony and for non -irony equally. This explains the reason that ambiguity 
and irony are so often confused. Those who are aware of the existence of irony - 
"tuned" to irony, if you will - will feel the potential for irony in an ambiguous 
utterance. Indeed we may feel this potential so strongly that we confuse the potential 
for irony with the actual manifestation of irony: in short, we come to regard the 
immanent structure as manifest. This tendency to confuse ambiguity for irony is 
most acute in the case of an ambiguity that, as in Herbert's poem, does not actually 
resolve either way, leaving an "open" structure of potentials with no further iteration. 
The temptation to regard such an unresolved ambiguity as ironic is strong: at the 
point of the ambiguity there appears to exist a structure of simultaneous different 
meanings - the structure of irony. 
However, ambiguity (including unresolved ambiguity) always produces an immanent 
structure of alternative potential iterations, the lack of closure in such "open" 
structures producing the need of continuation (or ending). This results in the 
projections of "virtual" meanings into the "future" of the discourse, of which one is 
the potential for "ironic" resolution. The possibility of the resolution of this 
structure, i.e. for a non -ironic outcome, though, is absolutely vital. Even though one 
of the potential outcomes of the ambiguity is ironic the fact that, as was seen, 
ambiguity can resolve non -ironically prevents the process of objectification, and thus 
prevents the unresolved structure from being ironic in itself. In other words, in a 
case of ambiguity even though I may be aware of the potential for irony in the 
utterance, and even if I choose to understand it as irony, there is always the 
possibility for a non -ironic resolution. As such, the ambiguous utterance itself 
cannot be considered to be ironic. 
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Moreover, not only is ambiguity not a correlative of irony, but irony (in all its forms, 
including satire, parody and Romantic irony) is not, as Sheinberg describes it, a 
"mode of ambiguity ", but rather a distinct, separate phenomenon. Ambiguity is a 
particular effect of the immanent structure of discourse upon the meaning (purport) 
of an utterance. This effect is distinct from irony, which is an effect of the 
interaction of different structures on the manifest level of the discourse. To consider 
ambiguity and irony to be, in essence, one and the same thing is to weaken both: 
they are different - two individual, powerful modes of expression. 
The distinction between irony and ambiguity is particularly important in relation to 
Beethoven's quartets: the late quartets in particular are almost synonymous with the 
ambiguous and the equivocal. However, as has been demonstrated, there are also 
significant instances of irony within these quartets. Therefore, if the distinction 
between irony and ambiguity is not maintained, or if the two phenomena are elided, 
then the difference in the effect and the purport of these instances will be negated: 
the subtlety and eloquence of the works will be less well perceived. 
Ambiguity of the type seen within the opening of the quartet Op. 59 number 3 is 
found frequently within the later quartets. One of the most obvious examples is the 
finale of the Op. 135 quartet, whose Grave introduction - based upon the famous 
"Muss es Sein ?" theme - uses the same type of lexical ambiguity seen above. 
Although F minor does appear as tonal centre in the second and eighth bars it is 
never really established as the tonic in the introduction. The fact that F appears as an 
implied dominant 7th in bar 4 shifts the tonal centre away from the tonic; that the 
consequent B flat itself occurs as a dominant 7th continues this process. In addition, 
the frequent use of diminished harmony (bars 6,7 and 9 - 11) and the change of 
mode in bars 4 and 5 create further tonal ambiguity. Finally, Beethoven uses the 
inherent ambiguity of the dominant minor 9th chord through the last three bars of the 
introduction (bars 10 - 12). This chord could resolve several ways (diagram 8), 









Ex. 7.2 Op. 135 4th Movement 
Grave, ma non troppo tratto 
F major /minor (as perfect cadence) 
D major /minor (as interrupted cadence) 
B major /minor (as augmented 6th) 
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In fact it does not actually resolve; the Allegro starts on the dominant, and F major, 
the tonic, is not really established until bar 24. Indeed throughout the first section of 
the allegro the tonic is somewhat undermined by both avoidance of strong cadences 
and by the continual use of the F as a dominant 7111. Even the final cadence of the 
section (bars 40/41) is undermined by the weaker first -inversion dominant and 
immediate deflection from F to E in preparation for the A major of bar 45. In other 
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words, the tonal ambiguity that characterises the introduction may be seen to inform 
the tonal structure of the rest of the movement. 
Ambiguity is in fact an important element of much of the entire quartet. The second 
movement, for example, is a masterpiece of the rhythmic ambiguity seen so 
frequently in Beethoven's scherzos. In addition, the opening movement is strikingly 
similar in effect to both Op. 59 number 3 and, as will be seen, to the third movement 
of Op. 130. Moments of ambiguity mark many of the structural landmarks of the 
movement, obscuring their function and consequently, the overall form. For 
example, as with the Op. 59 quartet the tonal ambiguity of the opening four bars is 
juxtaposed with a harmonically and melodically simple first theme, leading to a 
certain comic undermining of the tonic. This comic effect is heightened by the 
mocking of the pathos of the low, semitone "sigh" gestures in bars 1 and 3 
juxtaposed by the high, syncopated gestures in the second and fourth bars: 
The use of ambiguity here (and indeed throughout the whole work) is clearly related 
to those seen in Op. 59 number 3. Such ambiguities, though, are perhaps used most 
eloquently in the third movement of the Op. 130 quartet, being employed to subtly 
undermine the forms and principles of Classicism. This procedure is significant 
given the context of the rest of the quartet: the undermining of the Classical style in 
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p 
The interpretation of the "poco scherzoso" marking at the beginning of the 
movement is significant for any subsequent reading. There are two possibilities. 
Following Kerman and Steinberg it may be understood as a suggestion that the 
opening `sigh' must not be taken too seriously, as mildly deceptive wit rather than 
pathos.47 (That the indication appears over these very bars strengthens this 
viewpoint.) Alternatively, it may be applied more generally to the whole movement: 
the whole must be taken a little jokingly, not simply the particular gesture of the 
opening bars. 
This second viewpoint allows that not only is the apparent emotionalism of the 
opening gesture to be taken with a pinch of salt, but also that the overtly `Classical', 
Rococo -like movement that it presages is not entirely what it seems either. 
Compared to the other movements of the Op. 130 quartet this movement is 
undoubtedly light- hearted. Nevertheless, under its refinement and grace there is a 
serious point; Beethoven's `jokes' are often barbed, the comic and jocular masking 
the profound. 
It is perhaps due to this disarming surface, as well as to the scope of the other 
movements of the Op. 130 quartet, that this movement is often all but overlooked.48 
47 See Kerman (1967) p. 317 and Steinberg (1994) p. 233 
48 See, for example, Steinberg, Lam, Cooper, Kinderman and Daverio, all of whom spend precious 
little time on this movement. 
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Even Kerman spends very little time in analysis, merely pointing out one or two 
"subtleties of structure "49 and the (striking) manner in which the opening gesture 
links the movement to those around it. Instead, he prefers simply to state his 
admiration: 
It offers such a spontaneous flow of musical notions, so perfectly disposed and so 
brilliantly scored, such an enchantment of intelligence and warmth and airy poise, that 
analytical formulations seem somehow helplessly beside the point ... this beautifully 
ordered cascade of melody, dance, and sheer sonority really does not want to be 
separated.50 
On this last point both Imeson and Chua obviously disagree with Kerman. Imeson 
analysis of the formal structure of this movement in terms of the interaction of levels 
of `voice' is reminiscent of Carolyn Abbate. Chua's analysis is perhaps closest to 
that given below. He demonstrates not only striking subtleties, but also a 
fundamental disparity between the `surface' of the movement and the processes that 
underlie it. He considers that throughout this movement there is a lack of closure, 
produced through a constant undermining of cadence, even though, paradoxically, 
much of the thematic material comprises cadential clichés. There is therefore a 
disjunction between the thematic and tonal structure, whereby the tonal structure 
constantly pushes toward closure even as the thematic structure continuously evades 
it. Chua considers that this contradiction results in formal ambiguity, with the 
evasion of closure obscuring or even precluding formal landmarks. He concludes 
that this ambiguity in turn produces the effect of a critique: the lack of closure and 
the disparity between the harmonic and thematic structures challenges the very basis 
of the Classicism invoked by the movement51. 
49 Kerman (1967) p. 317 
50 Ibid. p. 316 
51 "It is never clear where the initial theme begins, or where exactly the exposition and recapitulation 
end, or for that matter where they start, or where the development and coda begin, or at what point the 
tonal conflict is set up or resolved. It is not that these things do not happen; it is just that the 
fundamental elements of Classical construction do not synchronise to articulate the critical moments 
in the form at any point ... In this Andante, Beethoven is playing not merely with the Classical 
conventions he evokes but with the Classical system itself." Chua (1995) p. 186 -188 
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However, as Lam observes, "sonata form is a style, not a form ".52 As will be seen, 
throughout this movement Beethoven evokes the style of a Classical sonata form, 
without necessarily subscribing to the form. The fundamental opposition of the 
movement occurs not so much between a traditional first and second theme as 
between an ambiguous structure and an evocation or reminiscence of the apparent 
certainty or clarity of Classicism. Indeed, much of this movement is clearly related 
to an earlier aesthetic. The harmonic structure of the first bars of the first theme, for 
example is strikingly simple; the repetition of the material and the periodicity of the 
phrases are also quite conventional. Finally, the part writing in particular subscribes 
to the ethos of the Classical quartet: the melodic material is distributed equally 
through the parts, often with significant imitation, resulting in the independence of 
parts - the "conversation" - enshrined in Classical procedure. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasis the difference between the "Classical" 
elements of this movement and those of the replacement finale of the quartet. Unlike 
the replacement finale there is no real element of stylisation in this movement: 
although there is clearly an evocation of a classical aesthetic, the music contains 
none of the exaggerated clichés and banal passagework exhibited by the alternative 
finale. The lack of exaggeration and cliché means that the conventions of this third 
movement are not objectified in the manner of those in the finale. Instead, this 
movement produces an evocation of a lighter aesthetic, a "divertimento" character. 
It is therefore at this point that I disagree with Chua: this movement does not present 
a critique of Classicism in the way that, for example, the replacement finale of the 
quartet does. I would suggest that the difference lies in the "aim" of the movements. 
In the alternative finale Beethoven utilises exaggerated, banal clichés in order to 
satirise musical conventionality and conservatism. In contrast, in this movement the 
divertimento -like, "Classical" thematic material is set in opposition with an 
ambiguous introduction. Therefore, whereas in the alternative finale the "Classical" 
element is satirised, in this movement it is placed in dialectical confrontation with the 
ambiguous and equivocal, an opposition that pervades the movement. 
52 Lam (1975) p. 105 
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This opposition is established within the opening bars of the movement. The 
harmony of the first two bars essentially centres around two diminished chords, the 
first of which resolves to B flat minor, the second being transformed into A flat 
dominant seventh before resolving to the tonic (D flat major) at the beginning of the 
third bar. These diminished chords possess exactly the same type of inherent tonal 
ambiguity as that analysed in the opening of the 3rd Op. 59 quartet. In addition there 
is a momentary lexical ambiguity in the first solo B flat note that will prove to be 






Ex. 7.4 Op. 130 3rd Movement 
Andante con moto, ma non troppo 
poco scherzando 
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As in other cases - for example the opening of both Op. 130 and Op. 59 number 3 - 
the tonal ambiguity of the introduction delays the establishment of the tonic. 
Although B flat minor is implied at the beginning of the second bar, the instability of 
the diminished chords on either side of it prevents its tonicisation. In addition, the 
ambiguity these bars means that the arrival of the actual tonic in the 3rd bar is 
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undermined and is therefore not entirely stable. As Chua states, the tonic emerges 
"colouristically rather than cadentially ".53 
This is significant in that it problematises the beginning of the movement. As 
Kerman demonstrates, the opening bars function as a type of transition from, or link 
to, the B flat tonal centres of both of the preceding movements, as well hinting 
towards the Cavatina.54 However, in addition to this transitional function, these two 
bars also represent a truncated introduction. This introduction is problematic 
essentially because it is too short: in comparison with other similar introductions this 
one sounds somewhat curtailed. This is largely due to the arrival of the main theme 
in the third bar. Although the textural and thematic changes in this bar clearly 
signify the beginning of the theme, this is undermined by the uncertain tonality that 
results from the ambiguity of the opening bars. The effect of this is that the arrival of 
the first theme tends to sound "imposed" upon the preceding bars - it does not 
proceed from these bars but rather is inserted over the top. This insertion occurs too 
early for the harmonic structure, and as a result tends to sound as an interruption, 
curtailing the introduction too early. 
It is perhaps at this point that the relevance of the "poco scherzoso" direction is seen. 
These first three bars may be taken as a juxtaposition of serious and comic of the 
type considered elsewhere in this work. The manner in which the main theme 
effectively interrupts the pathos of the opening gesture causes a somewhat comic 
effect, an `undercutting' of the type seen so often in Beethoven.55 It is significant 
that, in this interpretation that the `joking' element therefore applies not to the first 
two bars, but rather to the comic effect introduced by the `Classical' thematic 
material: throughout this movement the procedures and conventions of this 
`Classical' theme are continually derailed by moments that are directly related to the 
opening. 
53 Chua (1995) p. 184 
54 Kerman (1967) p. 314/315 
55 Not least in the finale of the 9th Symphony. 
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Significantly, however, the manner in which the introduction is interrupted also 
establishes and highlights the most fundamental oppositions of the movement: the 
opposition of ambiguity with stable diatonicism, equivocation with Classicism. This 
opposition occurs in the juxtaposition of topics in the second and third bars. The 
descending semitone gestures and the implied B flat minor tonality produce a 
"tragic" topic in the opening two bars; the tonal ambiguity of these bars is also part 
of their topic. These are opposed both to the stable diatonicism of the major tonality, 
and to the ascending melodic line, light staccato accompaniment and overall "dance" 
elements /topic of the first theme. The direct opposition between these two sections 
forms the fundamental dialectic that underlies much of the structure of the 
movement. 
The most significant manifestations of these oppositions may be found where 
momentary ambiguities disrupt the tonal and thematic processes of the movement. 
The first of these occurs in bar 13. At bar 11 a new theme enters on the dominant, 
moving away from A flat and passing briefly to B flat minor at the beginning of bar 
13. The sudden A flat 7th chord, however, interrupts abruptly, momentarily halting 
the music. Although there is an inherent ambiguity in this chord (as considered 
above, it could resolve in several ways), the tonal interruption it causes is slight; the 
tonality quickly settles back into A flat. However, although the tonality remains 
relatively stable, this interruption prompts the abandonment of the theme that had 
only been established two bars previously. Instead of the resumption of this subject, 
new thematic material is introduced in the cello at the end of bar 13. This new theme 
is unrelated (except tonally) to either the first theme or to that from bar 11; 
effectively it forms another second subject. The momentary interruption in bar 13 
therefore begins an important process that recurs throughout the movement - the 
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The next two interruptions intensify this disruption. The first interruption, though 
slight, prompted a change of thematic material; the second, in bar 17 is more 
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pronounced, the sudden syncopated fp chord forcing the tonality from A flat onto a C 
major chord. Since the C major chord occurs so suddenly, effectively as a foreign 
entity, its function is ambiguous: it could be a new tonal centre or a pivot chord to 
another key entirely. In addition to this ambiguity, the interruption halts the music's 
progress again, forcing the abandonment of the previous thematic material. 
The third interruption, at the end of bar 19, is the most pronounced, completely 
halting the music and, again, prompting striking tonal and thematic changes. The C 
major chord of bar 17 becomes a dominant seventh at the end of the bar, and in bars 
18 and 19 the tonality centres on F major. The quickening harmonic pace in bar 19 
heads, via chromatic melodic motion towards a perfect cadence. However, at the 
crucial moment the interruption of the solitary D flat in the first violin deflects this 
cadential process, halting the progress of the music entirely. When it resumes it is 
with a recurrence of the first theme, now in C major (a remote key from the tonic). 
It is important to note the manner in which the initial opposition of the movement is 
involved in this interruption. The descending semitone motion in the first violin in 
bars 19 and 20 obviously recalls that of the opening bars. More importantly the 
occurrence of the lexical ambiguity inherent within this single note reiterates the 
ambiguity of the opening: there are numerous ways in which this note could be 
resolved. Significantly, this produces a semantic link to the opening gesture - the 
ambiguities of both moments are understood to be related, effectively forming an 
ambiguous "topic ". More importantly, this relationship means that the entire 
semantic and topical structure of the introductory section is recalled at this moment, 
its oppositions condensed into only a couple of beats between bars 19 and 20. 
Moreover, this relationship is actually established between all three interruptions, 
since each introduces a momentary ambiguity and prompts a change of thematic 
material. Thus even the momentary ambiguities of the first two interruptions, by 
virtue of this semantic relationship, are derived from and related to the initial 
ambiguity - the ambiguous "topic" - of the opening gesture. 
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It may therefore be seen that the opposition established in the opening bars radically 
affects the progress of the movement, particularly the tonal and thematic course. 
Specifically, the ambiguity that first occurs in the opening bars disrupts the 
established conventions of the music. It undermines the harmonic and thematic 
course of the music through the momentary ambiguities of the interruptions, which 
continually disrupt the progress of the form by forcing sudden tonal and thematic 
changes. 
Although the effect of these momentary ambiguities in the exposition is important, 
the development section produces an even more prominent ambiguity, specifically 
with regard to where is actually begins. Some commentators have suggested that this 
occurs with the unusual return of the first subject in C major in canon at bar 20, with 
the material in bars 26 to 31 forming a new developmental theme.56 Others reckon 
the beginning of the development from bar 32, citing the harmonic course and 
cadential, codetta -like material from bar 27 onwards in support of this viewpoint.57 
Both viewpoints, however, identify bar 37 as the beginning of the recapitulation: 
there is a recurrence of the opening gesture, with the cello's prominent semitone F 
flat -E flat substituted for the first violin's initial B flat - A, and the main theme 
enters in the tonic two bars later. From there the recapitulation proceeds as expected 
with a more or less literal repeat of the first subject, a retransition and the second 
thematic area in the tonic. 
What is remarkable about this recapitulation, however, is that it occurs much too 
early in the movement. This introduces a problem for either of the viewpoints 
regarding the placement of the development. If the development is considered to 
occur at bar 20 then the interruption by the D flat in bar 19 forms a sudden diversion 
of the thematic and tonal structure, forcing the development into the second subject 
area. The interruption in bar 19 thus problematises the second subject area under this 
reading. However, if the development section is reckoned from bar 32 then the 
56 See, for example, Cooper (1985) p. 377 
57 See, for example, Chua (1995) p. 181 and Kerman (1967) p. 317 
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recapitulation at bar 36 means that the development itself consists of a mere 4 bars, 
much too brief for even the tersest sonata form - it is the development that is 
problematised.58 
Nevertheless, although I agree with this latter viewpoint, the crucial point is that the 
recapitulation in bar 36 actually occurs as an interruption, identical in effect to those 
considered in the exposition. Bars 32 to 35 represent only the beginning of a 
conventional development section: thematically these bars are derived from the 
codetta material, which is itself derived from the first theme. A new ascending scale 
figure is also added, along with a bass figuration that is perhaps related to that of the 
first theme. In addition from the end of bar 33 there is a conventional developmental 
modulatory process based upon circle of fifths motion. 
It is not unusual for Beethoven to bring the music of introductions into later sections 
of the movement. However, the recurrence of the opening material at bar 36 
abruptly halts the progression of this development, introducing slower homophonic 
motion instead of the rhythmic momentum and counterpoint of the previous bars. 
Moreover, because of the strong cadential gestures at the end of bar 35, A flat is 
expected at the beginning of bar 36. The diminished harmony that actually occurs 
therefore produces a harmonic diversion, and this unexpected harmony, together with 





Ex. 7.6 Op. 130 3rd Movement 
(Andante con moto, ma non troppo) 
32 
i . C= `°.+OC_----..- 
NOV 1,_1_ 
==c=-1101111_ 
58 It is worth noting that, although both Chua and Kerman subscribe to this latter interpretation, 
neither explains the interruption and drastic foreshortening of the development that results from the 
too -early occurrence of the recapitulation. 
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The significant point, for the current analysis, is that ambiguity plays an important 
role in the process of the interruption. Bar 36 obviously recalls the opening bars - 
the repeat of the melodic motion alone is enough to establish this. However, these 
bars also share the ambiguity with the other interruptions seen above, a reiteration of 
the ambiguous "topic ". Whereas these earlier interruptions diverted the harmonic 
and thematic course, this interruption completely derails the development section. 
More importantly, it forces the recapitulation to occur too early, severely truncating 
the form of the entire movement. Therefore, again, the normal procedures of a 
classical sonata form are diverted and problematised by an ambiguous interruption; 
once again there is the juxtaposition of the opposition seen within the opening 3 bars. 
It is important to consider that the same pattern of interruption and juxtaposition is 
continued throughout the recapitulation of this movement. However, although the 
effect of this is similar to the first occurrences, the reiteration of these gestures 
mediates their disruptive consequences. In effect, they have become part of the 
movement's conventions, and therefore are, to a certain degree, expected to reoccur. 
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As is often the case, however, the coda intensifies the problematic elements of the 
movement: between bars 67 and 77 Beethoven significantly augments the 
ambiguities seen above, to the point where, as Lam highlights, "all sense of the main 
tonic is, for the moment, lost ".59 At bar 67 there is what appears to be the beginning 
of a re- transition. Because of its correspondence to bar 9, this produces the 
expectation of movement from the subdominant back to the tonic. Instead, bar 69 
consists of a descending spiral of diminished 7ths, with the prolongation of this 
diminished harmony in bar 70. The tonal ambiguity produced by these diminished 
chords, which Kerman considers to be Beethoven's most expressive, is extended in 
the three bars following, which form another recurrence of the opening gesture.60 
This recurrence is significantly altered however: the B flat in the first violin now 
occurs over diminished harmony, and resolves onto A dominant 7th. This gesture is 
repeated in bars 72 and 73, with resolutions onto A flat 7 and F7 respectively. 
Finally, bars 74 and 75 produce a significant alteration of the opening of the main 
theme: these function as a sequential modulatory progression from B flat to G flat, 
with added minor 9ths and chromatic motion that somewhat obscure the tonality. 
Throughout bars 67 to 77 there is, therefore, a continual process of ambiguity. The 
diminished harmony present throughout bars 69 and 70, as well as within bars 71 to 
73 is inherently ambiguous, as considered above. Significantly however, the 
dominant 7th chords onto which all the diminished chords in bars 77 to 73 resolve are 
themselves ambiguous, since each could resolve in several different ways. There is 
therefore an attenuation of the ambiguity of these gestures: one ambiguous chord 
"resolving" onto another. The tonal uncertainty created by these bars is continued 
through the modulation process of bars 74 to 76. Although such progressions are 
very common, the presence of dominant seventh chords, as well as the uncertainty of 
the eventual tonal destination of the sequence, does produce a certain ambiguity, 
particularly within the context of the preceding bars. 
59 Lam (1975) p. 105 
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The effect of this passage is significant. These bars may be considered as an 
iteration of the ambiguity that has been so important in the progress of the 
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movement. As was stated, the opposition of this ambiguity with the "Classicism" of 
the thematic material became, through repetition, a convention of the movement, 
thereby reducing the effect of the juxtapositions within the recapitulation. However, 
the novelty of the passage from bar 67 foregrounds both this ambiguity and, as a 
result the fundamental opposition of the movement, once more. 
This may be seen once more in the closing 10 bars of the movement. At bar 77 the 
music, following this extended passage of ambiguity, settles back into a stable tonal 
centre, with a perfect cadence in the tonic at bar 79. However, even this return is 
undermined by the sudden shift to B flat major in bar 80. This abrupt movement 
perhaps underlines the important tonal relationship present in the opening gesture. 
The B flat of the opening bar, which becomes B flat minor in the second, is the same 
key as the preceding movement. Moreover, if the opening bars are understood as a 
movement from an initial B flat, through B flat minor to D flat in the third bar, then 
these bars may be taken as a microcosm of the tonal plan of the first three 
movements. The interruption at this key point in the coda - at the very point where 
the tonality is to be re- established - by B flat is therefore quite significant, reiterating 
at the close of the movement a striking tonal relationship from the opening. 
Regardless of this, the effect of this sudden B flat chord is to once more produce a 
check on the music's progress. Once more there is a moment of tonal uncertainty 
and the music is forced needs to "find" itself. Indeed it is only at bar 85 that there is 
a return to D flat and to thematic material, and only in the very last cadence does the 
tonality of this movement assert itself unequivocally. The fundamental opposition 
that has dominated the movement so far therefore punctuates even the coda of this 
movement. Right to the end of this movement the light, "Classical" divertimento 
character is continuously interrupted by the "dysphoric ", "tragic" gestures of the 
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In a sense this reading prompts its own interpretation: it is possible to argue that the 
opposition that pervades this movement results in the objectification of the 
conventions of this movement. In such an interpretation the constant juxtaposition of 
the divertimento thematic material with the dysphoric, ambiguous elements/topic 
produces an undermining of the "Classical" elements, thereby indicating their 
inherent artifice. 
This interpretation would be similar to Chua's: he considers this movement, and 
indeed the 2nd and 4th movements of this quartet, as a `critique' of Classicism and 
Biedermeier domesticity.61 He argues that this critique is achieved through an 
exaggeration and dislocation of the Classical language from which the movement is 
constructed.62 However, the exaggeration of the elements and procedures of the 
Classical style would, as considered in the previous chapter, almost invariably result 
61 Chua (1995) p. 165 
62 "The wit of this movement is a cutting wit, for this is not simply a piece of nostalgia but a critique 
which exaggerates these processes until they dismantle the precision of the surface." Ibid. p. 183 
"Beethoven is tampering ... with the very construction of the Classical language - the syntax of 
tonality, the punctuation of cadences, the articulation of themes." Ibid. p. 188 
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in satirical effect. As was stated earlier though, I suggest that the "Classical" 
elements of the main thematic material of this movement do not possess the 
exaggeration, cliché and banality that were seen within that of the replacement finale 
for the quartet. Although there is a certain undermining of Classical conventions 
within this movement, in comparison to the later movement, this one sounds 
positively authentic. The lack of exaggeration means that there is no real element of 
satire in this movement, no critique of the actual language or conventions of the 
"Classical" style. 
Rather, within this movement the "Classical" elements occur as a symbol. This 
symbol is used to signify not simply the style of Beethoven's predecessors Mozart 
and Haydn, but also to represent the ideals of the Enlightenment itself. The 
evocation of the Classical style in this movement - particularly of the tonal and 
thematic process - represents the balance and order of the Enlightenment, the belief 
in clarity, in science and, above all in logic. The opposition of this symbol with its 
antithesis creates the dynamic of the movement. Everywhere in this movement the 
classical style is confronted with, and interrupted by ambiguity, equivocality and 
dysphoria. This fundamental opposition problematises the main structural points of 
the movement: the introduction, the second subject, the development, the 
recapitulation and the coda are all significantly undermined by moments of 
ambiguity. 
There is a sense in which, try as it might, Enlightenment logic and order is constantly 
derailed and aborted by the presence of its opposite. Every time it tries to assert 
itself its success is limited: it is only a matter of time before another interruption 
occurs. This process explains the high percentage of cadential gestures that Chua 
identifies within the movement. Virtually every interruption results in a tonal 
deflection away from the "correct" key; the preponderance of cadential material may 
therefore be understood as an attempt, following such diversions, to re -assert the 
tonality of the movement and to re- establish its tonal course. In other words, it is an 
attempt to re -assert the "Classicism" of the thematic material. 
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This movement does not, therefore, represent a straightforward critique of Classicism 
per se. Rather, it produces a confrontation of the Classical style and, by implication, 
Enlightenment ideals with the equivocal and ambiguous. The use of an unmistakably 
Classical language, and in particular a divertimento style, does produce the "joking" 
effect implied by the poco scherzoso indication. This light -heartedness, however, is 
a mask that veils a more serious point: throughout the movement there is a 
fundamental opposition of certainty, order and logic with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The crucial point, however, is that the use of ambiguity in this opposition is not 
inherently ironic. The play of implication and resolution produces a tonal ambiguity 
that frustrates every attempt at "Classical" order. However, although this creates a 
striking opposition, the actual ambiguities themselves do not produce objectification: 
the processes involved in these moments of equivocation are therefore, as seen, 
fundamentally different from those of irony. Rather in this movement the distinct 
aesthetic effect of "functional" ambiguity is elevated to a central position; in this 




Beethoven's quartets are great works of art. Part of the power of these works, as with all 
great artworks, lies in their ability to sustain multiple interpretations without loss, to 
accommodate new readings or new significances that may be attached to them by 
successive interpreters or analysts. Their strength, in other words, lies in their multi - 
valence, in their "openness ". 
It is perhaps because of the contemporary concern with such equivocation and plurality 
that irony is increasingly a topic of musicological research, and indeed is becoming an 
increasingly accepted element of Beethoven scholarship. This thesis has brought an 
interpretation of these works that places them within the context of irony, particularly 
Friedrich Schlegel's philosophy of Romantic irony. The understanding of Romantic 
irony and the analytical interpretation advanced throughout this work differs from those 
of other writers in that Beethoven's irony is viewed not only as a rhetorical device or an 
authorial presence, but rather as a fundamental aesthetic position. The irony it reveals in 
these works is not circumscribed in moments, or in the "breaking of illusion" alone but 
rather is a constant state, a fundamental paradox. These different approaches, however, 
are complementary - Beethoven's irony is Romantic and existential, but it is also 
rhetorical and satirical, as the interpretation of the replacement finale of Op. 130 
suggested. 
The interpretation of these works offered here, though, suggests that they revel in the 
fecundity of the equivocal, of ambiguity, paradox, irony and chaos. The objectification 
of each of the individual musical systems within these movements implicates the artifice 
of all musical systems. There is no privileging of any system or viewpoint, unless it be 
the privileging of heterogeneity over unity, of paradox and contradiction over certainty. 
This is encapsulated succinctly in one of Schlegel's fragments: 
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It's equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to 
decide to combine the two.' 
The paradox that this fragment infers strikes at the root of our conceptions of meaning: 
even though the creation of "systems" or "actualities" is meaningless, nevertheless, 
humanity requires and seeks such actualities in order to function. We are thus held, 
motionless, between the need for meaning and the impossibility of meaning; we exist, in 
other words, in a state of ironic paradox. 
Considering Beethoven's work within the historical context of Schlegel's thought - as a 
paradoxical combination of system and non -system, of the meaningful and the 
meaningless - thus relates it to an aesthetic conception that came to have profound 
importance, not simply within the context of Romanticism, but also in Twentieth - 
century art and aesthetics. Moreover, it can lead to conclusions that are, perhaps 
paradoxically, of relevance to contemporary concerns. Within the context of 
postmodernism, the thought encapsulated by the fragment quoted above sounds 
distinctly contemporary: there is a similar regression of meaning, a similar oscillation 
between significance and emptiness. Moreover, there is in both postmodernism and 
Schlegel's Romanticism a similar baseline self -irony, a similar objectification of the 
inherent artifice of all human constructions. 
This similarity suggests possibilities for ways in which this discourse might progress. 
For example, it might be possible to relate the conception of Beethoven's works given 
here to concepts such Bakhtin's `heteroglossia', conceiving of them as a plurality of 
utterances or `voices', none of which is privileged. Or it might be possible to examine 
the relationship between the process of objectification identified within these works and 
the deconstruction both of musical "meaning" and of the boundaries between musical 
genres. Of particular interest might be the relationship between the fragmentary nature 
of the late works and the Romantic conception of the fragment, a conception that, as was 
briefly mentioned, relates once more to irony. This in turn might establish a dialogue 
' Schlegel (1991) Atheneaum fragment no. 53 p. 24 
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with more modern conceptions of the fragment, such as those suggested by Adorno. All 
such approaches - which are beyond the scope of this thesis - would reinforce once 
more the veracity of Stravinsky's famous statement that the late works (or at least the 
Grosse Fuge) are "contemporary music that will remain forever contemporary ".2 
The approach used here - the suggested relationship between Beethoven and Schlegel - 
reflects, however, the current hermeneutic approach of historical musicology. In other 
words it attempts to relate Beethoven's work to a philosophical conception that was 
contemporaneous, and to establish an analytical interpretation within a historical context 
that is directly pertinent to the works considered. 
I use the word `interpretation' advisedly, for in a post- modern, post -formalist context it 
is increasingly the case that all analyses may be considered interpretations, and the 
process of analysis as a reading of the text.3 In this context it is perhaps surprising to use 
a structural approach. However, so far as such concepts are concerned, I think the 
ongoing rethinking and deconstruction of musicological method and analysis runs the 
risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Rather than rejecting such approaches 
outright a synthesis ought to be possible, whereby structural approaches can be used as 
tools or bases for analysis without necessarily subscribing to the a priori assumptions of 
structuralism. 
In other words, provided that one acknowledges that such concepts as "surface" or 
"deep" structures (and to an extent the notion of structure itself) are analytical 
conceptions or metaphors, then it is possible to use them to formulate a reading of the 
discourse. For metaphor is by nature an additive process - an accretion - that 
illuminates by comparison. It does not embody a "real" relationship between the two 
constituent elements, but rather a perceived relationship or an analytical judgement. On 
2 Stravinsky and Craft (1982) p. 124 
3 I use the word "text" here even more advisedly, without specifying whether it refers to the written score, 
the performance of the music or otherwise. 
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this basis structural approaches may be used to provide a comparative model, focussing 
on specific elements or qualities within the music. Such approaches, which may seem 
contingent, can still facilitate analytical insight, provided one acknowledges the 
limitations of the given metaphor. 
A structural approach is particularly useful when it comes to differentiation, and it is on 
such a basis that the suggested differentiation between irony and ambiguity functions. 
The contemporary focus on the equivocal and multivalent resulting from deconstructive 
approaches makes it particularly important to consider the nature of, and relationships 
between, equivocal modes of communication. For if, as a result of this shift, "even the 
most apparently unambiguous texts prove to contain the makings of doubt and 
uncertainty ",4 then the elision of the ambiguous and the ironic means that even such 
apparently unequivocal texts might be considered ironic. The attempt at a differentiation 
arises from a conviction that elision of these phenomena weakens their veracity, making 
their effect commonplace,5 and that multiplicity of interpretation should not be confused 
with irony. 
Differentiating irony and ambiguity is, I believe, particularly important in relation to 
Beethoven's quartets for, as seen, these works may be understood in terms of both 
phenomena. This differentiation allows more detailed discussion and greater critical 
appreciation of their different aesthetic purposes and effects within these works. 
However, it also allows a clearer understanding of the relationships between these 
phenomena and other aesthetic concerns within the larger corpus of the composer's 
work. This is necessary because, as Nicholas Cook succinctly states, in addressing his 
4 Whittall, Arnold (1999) `Autonomy/Heteronomy' in Rethinking Music ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark 
Everist 
5 This assumption, of course, begs deconstructing - why shouldn't they be commonplace? Why should 
they be privileged? The only answer that I can offer is that if irony and ambiguity become commonplace 
-a ground -state of all art, all communication, all meaning - then we lose something valuable, even if that 
value is only culturally established. We risk denying ourselves access to a mode of thought that has, as 
Muecke points out (Muecke (1970) p. 2 -3), been seen within much of our greatest art, literature and, I 
would add, music. 
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work we must "keep before us ... the image of a Beethoven who was both earnest and 
ironical ".6 Beethoven's quartets are an amalgam of both equivocation - satire, 
Romantic irony, paradox and ambiguity - and forthrightness, a fusion of both 
Romanticism and Classicism. As a result, Beethoven's relationship to Schlegel's 
Romanticism is perhaps most clearly seen within these works, for Schlegel's Romantic 
artform 
embraces everything that is purely poetic, from the greatest systems of art, containing 
within themselves still further systems, to the sigh, the kiss that the poetising child breathes 
forth in artless song ... It alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole 
circumambient world, an image of the age. And it can also - more than any other form - 
hover at the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, free of all real and ideal self - 
interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a 
higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors 
6 Cook (1993) p. 105 
Schlegel (1991) Athenaeum fragment 116 p. 31/32 
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